Opinion
21-883
01-31-2023
Jossean Crispin, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nick Rodriguez, Warden; Craig Purdy, Elizabeth Tugie, Carlene Davis, Keith Lizon, Gregorio Robles, Brian Jackson, Scott Semple, Shannon Dow, Defendants-Appellees, Andrea Reischerl, A.P.R.N.; William J. Longo, L.P.C., PhD. Leonard J. Santarsiero, Dave Maiga, Derrick Molden, Angel Quiros, John Doe, Monica Rinaldi, Cheryl Cepelak, Jane Doe, Victoria A. Kilham, Defendants.
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Jossean Crispin, pro se, Middletown, CT. FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Jacob McChesney, Assistant Attorney General, for Clare Kindall, Solicitor General, William Tong, Attorney General of Connecticut, Hartford, CT.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 31st day of January, two thousand twenty-three.
Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Vanessa L. Bryant, Judge).
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Jossean Crispin, pro se, Middletown, CT.
FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Jacob McChesney, Assistant Attorney General, for Clare Kindall, Solicitor General, William Tong, Attorney General of Connecticut, Hartford, CT.
PRESENT: DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge, PIERRE N. LEVAL, JOSE A. CABRANES, Circuit Judges.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the order of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
Appellant Jossean Crispin, proceeding pro se, challenges an order denying his motions to modify or enforce a settlement agreement and to reopen his case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). We assume the parties' familiarity with the remaining underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal, which we recite only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
The settlement agreement stemmed from a 2019 civil rights lawsuit against Connecticut Department of Corrections ("DOC") officials, in which Crispin repeatedly moved for the appointment of counsel, arguing that his mental health diagnoses, including schizophrenia, compelled the court to appoint counsel. On July 14, 2020-several months into litigation and after the parties had started negotiating a settlement-the District Court granted Crispin's motion for counsel in part and directed the clerk to appoint counsel for the limited purpose of representing Crispin at a future settlement conference. That same day the court received confirmation from the defendants' attorney that the case had settled, and-just 24 minutes after granting Crispin's motion for counsel-entered an order dismissing the case without prejudice to reopening by August 4, 2020. The next day, the parties filed a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulation of dismissal with prejudice dated July 14, 2020-which Crispin signed pro se-after which the court converted its prior without-prejudice dismissal into a with-prejudice dismissal. The court did not retain jurisdiction over the settlement agreement, which was not filed with the court at the time. At no time was counsel appointed pursuant to the District Court's prior order.
Approximately eight months later, Crispin moved both to reopen the case and to modify or enforce the settlement agreement. In addition to arguing more generally that he was dissatisfied with the terms of the settlement agreement (a copy of which he attached), Crispin alleged that defense counsel concealed that the court had appointed an attorney to represent him in settlement negotiations, and that he had therefore been "misl[e]d" into settling on less-favorable terms than he would have obtained if represented by an attorney.
The District Court denied Crispin's motions. It first determined that it lacked jurisdiction to enforce the out-of-court settlement agreement under Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994). Construing the reopening motion as seeking relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3)-which permits relief from a judgment on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct-the court then determined not to set aside the order dismissing the case because, among other things, the Notices of Electronic Filing pertaining to appointment of counsel and confirming the parties' settlement, respectively, were sent only 24 minutes apart. According to the District Court, this was too brief a period for defense counsel to have learned of appointment of counsel, negotiate and presumably expedite an entire settlement agreement, sign the agreement while concealing counsel's appointment from Crispin, then report the settlement to the court. Thus, the record did not support Crispin's claim that defense counsel both knew of and concealed the order appointing an attorney during negotiations. The District Court also held that Crispin had not shown entitlement to relief under the catch-all Rule 60(b)(6) and had moved too late to reopen the case by not taking action for eight months. Crispin appealed.
We turn first to the District Court's determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the settlement, a decision we review de novo. Rogers v. Petroleo Brasileiro, S.A., 673 F.3d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 2012). A district court does not "automatically retain jurisdiction to hear a motion to enforce a settlement agreement simply by virtue of having disposed of the original case." Hendrickson v. United States, 791 F.3d 354, 358 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Rather, motions to enforce settlement agreements require a separate "basis for jurisdiction," which exists where a district court's order of dismissal either "(1) expressly retain[s] jurisdiction over the settlement agreement, or (2) incorporate[s] the terms of the settlement agreement in the order." Id. (citing Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 378, 381).
The District Court's order dismissing the case neither expressly retained jurisdiction over the out-of-court settlement agreement nor incorporated the terms of the agreement. Therefore, the District Court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. In order to enforce his settlement agreement, Crispin would need to bring an action in state court.
With regard to reopening, the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 741 F.3d 353, 357 (2d Cir. 2013). Under Rule 60(b)(3), a district court may grant relief from a judgment for "fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party." To warrant relief, the motion must be supported by "clear and convincing evidence" of misrepresentations or misconduct. Fleming v. New York University, 865 F.2d 478, 484-85 (2d Cir. 1989).
Asserting fraud and misrepresentation, Crispin argued that opposing counsel knew and failed to disclose that the District Court granted Crispin's motion to appoint counsel. As stated above, the District Court concluded that the 24-minute interval between the order directing the clerk to appoint counsel and the order dismissing the case as settled was too brief for the alleged fraud to have been carried out. Crispin did not necessarily claim that the entire settlement process happened in that window, and the record does not reveal whether the settlement agreement (as opposed to just a settlement in principle) was prepared and finalized before defense counsel notified the court that the parties had settled on terms. Regardless, the District Court's reasoning did not rest on a "clearly erroneous factual finding," In re Terrorist Attacks, 741 F.3d at 357, and Crispin has not otherwise met his clear-and-convincing-evidence burden of showing that defense counsel actively misled him. Assuming without deciding that a failure to alert Crispin about the appointment of counsel could amount to misconduct or misrepresentation, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Crispin fell short of meeting his burden under Rule 60(b)(3). Fleming, 865 F.2d at 484-85.
The District Court also denied Crispin's motion to reopen the case under Rule 60(b)(6), which provides that a judgment may be vacated for "any other reason that justifies relief." Rule 60(b)(6) is "properly invoked where there are extraordinary circumstances or where the judgment may work an extreme and undue hardship." Matarese v. LeFevre, 801 F.2d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 1986) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Some circuits have held that in certain circumstances the breach of a settlement agreement may suffice as an "extraordinary circumstance" justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See 12 Moore's Federal Practice - Civil § 60.48 (2022) (collecting cases). Assuming arguendo that a breach could in some instances amount to an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief, Crispin has offered no evidence of breach and does not assert that the DOC failed to pay him the settlement sum. Nor has Crispin offered adequate evidence that he is entitled to relief on the ground that he was incapable of comprehending the settlement agreement. To the contrary, his handwritten addendum below his signature shows that he understood the scope of the agreement and how it would affect his interests.
Finally, having requested supplemental briefing on whether the District Court should have inquired into Crispin's competency under Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c), we find no reversible error in its failure to do so. We have held that a district court abuses its discretion by failing to conduct a Rule 17(c) inquiry where the court has received (1) evidence that a party has been adjudicated incompetent or (2) verifiable evidence from a mental health professional showing that a party has been or is currently being treated for a mental illness which could render the party legally incompetent. Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care Ctr., 323 F.3d 196, 201-03 (2d Cir. 2003). The court was not confronted with evidence that Crispin had been adjudicated incompetent. To the contrary, while the court did receive medical records detailing his serious mental health issues, none of these records indicated doubts about Crispin's competency nor recommended appointment of a guardian ad litem. Cf. Powell v. v. Symons, 680 F.3d 301, 309-10 (3d Cir. 2012) (applying Ferrelli and reasoning that the district court's failure to conduct a Rule 17(c) inquiry was an abuse of discretion where the litigant's psychiatrist informed the court that the litigant was not "competent . . . to represent himself in court"). Crispin's filings in relation to this matter further establish that he understood the nature of the proceedings and his rights and interests in them.
We have considered all of Crispin's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the District Court.