Opinion
No. CV02-0170193S
August 6, 2003
The defendant Holiday Village at Punta Cana, S. A., DBA Club Med, moves to dismiss this action based on: (1) lack of personal jurisdiction and (2) forum non conveniens. The following facts give rise to this motion. On or about July 16, 2000, the plaintiff was a guest of the defendant at its hotel in Punta Cana in the Dominican Republic when she slipped/tripped on a step, incurring injuries to her legs, knees and back. Plaintiff initiated this suit by serving the writ, summons and complaint on the defendant's agent by certified mail pursuant to General Statutes § 33-929.
The defendant now moves to dismiss this action, alleging that the court does not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant because the defendant does not have sufficient contacts with the State of Connecticut. The defendant also argues that pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens, it is improper for a Connecticut court to assert jurisdiction when the accident occurred in the Dominican Republic and many of the material witnesses reside in the Dominican Republic.
In support of its argument that the defendant does not have sufficient contacts with the State of Connecticut to allow it to exercise jurisdiction over it, Holiday Village alleges that it does not transact or solicit business or have any employees in Connecticut. It also notes that only it, not Club Med, was named as a defendant. The plaintiff contests those factual claims, relying on the affidavit of Gail Depietro the Operations Manager for Milford Travel Agency. While it is unclear whether the plaintiff made reservations for her stay at Holiday Village through the Milford Travel Agency, Ms. Depietro avers that she "received each season, for the past twelve years, from Club Med its brochure which includes advertisements from Punta Cana Village in the Dominican Republic for which [she] institute[s] travel arrangements from the United States to Punta Cana Village in the Dominican Republic." The plaintiff has also appended as exhibits to its memorandum copies of advertisements posted on the Club Med website soliciting business at the Punta Cana resort. The plaintiff argues that the totality of these contacts bring Punta Cana within the ambit of General Statutes § 33-929 (f) which provides:
(f) Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this state, by a resident of this state . . . whether or not such foreign corporation is transacting or has transacted business in this state and whether or not it is engaged exclusively in interstate or foreign commerce, on any cause of action arising, as follows: . . . (2) out of any business solicited in this state by mail or otherwise if the corporation has repeatedly so solicited business, whether the orders or offers relating thereto were accepted within or without the state.
For purposes of resolving the instant dispute, the controlling phrase in § 33-929 (f) is "Every corporation shall be subject to suit in this state . . ." The clear intent of the phrase is to permit a plaintiff to obtain personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation if the plaintiff's cause of action arises out of one of the four enumerated types of conduct performed by the corporation in Connecticut. See, Lombard Bros. Inc. v. General Asset Management Co., 190 Conn. 245, 257 (1983) ("The statute . . . confers jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of any business solicited in this state . . . if the corporation has repeatedly so solicited business"). In this case, the plaintiff claims in her memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss that, "The defendant `Club Med' is a foreign corporation and solicits business in state travel agency promotions and brochure circulation in Connecticut."
A review of the appendices to plaintiff's memorandum is highly persuasive that Club Med indeed solicits business in Connecticut. The flaw in plaintiff's argument, however, is that Club Med is not a defendant in this action. Only Holiday Village at Punta Cana, S. A., dba CLUB MED is named as a defendant. Accordingly, plaintiff's reference to Lombard Bros, Inc. v. General Asset Management Co., and to DeLuca v. Holiday Inns, Inc., No. CV 91 0339342 (1993), is inapposite. In Lombard Bros., supra, the dispute concerned whether the named defendant Second District solicited business in Connecticut. Likewise, in DeLuca v. Holiday Inn, supra, the issue was likewise whether one of the named defendants Ocean Properties Bahamas, Ltd. had solicited business in Connecticut. In both cases an actual named defendant, properly served and named a party to the action, was subject to scrutiny under the long-arm statute to determine whether its activities in Connecticut constituted solicitation within the meaning of § 33-929. In this action, by contrast, the plaintiff is attempting to impute to the named defendant solicitation activities conducted by a third party not named as a defendant to the lawsuit. That type of boot strapping is not sufficient to overcome defendant's claim of lack of personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss is granted, and the court's previous order denying the motion is dismiss is vacated.
SO ORDERED
HOLZBERG, J.