Opinion
CASE NO. 1D13-4714
06-11-2014
MICHAEL A. CREWS, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Appellant, v. SAMUEL STROTHER, Appellee.
Jennifer Parker, General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee; Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Lance Eric Neff and C. Ian Garland, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Samuel Strother, pro se, Appellee.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.
Charles A. Francis, Judge.
Jennifer Parker, General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee; Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Lance Eric Neff and C. Ian Garland, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Appellant. Samuel Strother, pro se, Appellee. THOMAS, J.
The Department of Corrections ("DOC") appeals the lower court's order granting Appellee's mandamus petition regarding a statutory interpretation of section 57.085(5), Florida Statutes (2012). DOC asserts that the lower court erroneously interpreted the statute. Alternatively, DOC argues that Appellee was barred by the doctrine of res judicata from re-litigating this issue. We affirm.
Factual Background
Appellee initially filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Lafayette County Circuit Court. That mandamus petition asserted that section 57.085(5), Florida Statutes, allows DOC to withdraw money from an inmate's trust account to pay a lien only when the balance of the trust account exceeds $10 and, because Appellee only had $10 in his account, DOC was without statutory authority when, on January 19, 2011, it removed $9.50 and imposed a 500 processing fee. The Lafayette County Circuit Court denied Appellee's mandamus petition, finding that Appellee misread section 57.085(5) and DOC was correct in its interpretation of the statute. Appellee sought review of this order by filing a petition for certiorari in this court in case number 1D11-2345. This court issued an order informing Appellee that the lower court's denial of his mandamus petition was properly reviewable by appeal and providing Appellee the opportunity to file an initial brief, but noting that failure to file a brief could result in dismissal. Appellee failed to file an initial brief in case 1D11-2345 and, on August 12, 2011, this court dismissed the converted appeal without reaching the merits of the statutory interpretation issue.
Approximately six months later, Appellee filed another petition for writ of mandamus in Lafayette County, which was transferred to Leon County. This second mandamus petition, the basis for this appeal, again asserted that DOC violated section 57.085(5) by removing the $10 balance of Appellee's inmate trust account after he received another $10 deposit on December 12, 2011. DOC asserted that Appellee misinterpreted the statute. DOC filed a motion for sanctions, asserting that Appellee had raised the same issue in its previous mandamus petition and arguing that Appellee's current mandamus petition should be dismissed as frivolous and sanctions should be imposed for his attempt to re-litigate the issue. DOC's motion did not reference the doctrine of res judicata, but argued that the petition should be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to section 57.085(9)(c),(d).
The Leon County Circuit Court entered an order granting mandamus relief, agreeing with Appellee's interpretation of section 57.085(5). DOC filed a motion for rehearing, asserting that the court failed to address why res judicata did not bar Appellee from re-litigating the same issue from his previous case, which was adversely decided against him and in favor of the opposing party. In response, the lower court entered an amended order granting mandamus relief, but did not address DOC's res judicata argument and only amended its original order to reflect that Appellee should be refunded $9.50 from the clerk of court and the 50¢ processing fee from DOC.
Analysis
Before addressing the statutory interpretation issue, this court will address DOC's argument that the lower tribunal erred in interpreting section 57.085, as the doctrine of res judicata barred Appellee from re-litigating the issue after being denied relief in another court. Whether the application of res judicata was proper is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Engle v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246, 1259 (Fla. 2006).
"Res judicata bars a subsequent lawsuit when there is: (1) identity of the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the parties; and (4) identity of the quality in the person for or against whom the claim is made." AMEC Civil, LLC v. State, Dep't of Transp., 41 So. 3d 235, 239-40 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
Here, because DOC has failed to establish that all four elements have been met, we find that res judicata does not apply. In particular, the identity of the thing sued for has not been established, as Appellee's second mandamus petition was not based upon DOC's removal of the same $10 from his inmate trust account as in the previous proceeding. See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 94 So. 3d 677 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (holding that a second petition to authorize treatment and administration of psychotropic medication was for a different 90-day period and was therefore not the same thing sued for previously and res judicata did not apply).
Merits
"Matters of statutory interpretation are subject to de novo review." State v. Joseph, 94 So. 3d 672, 673 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (citing State v. Burris, 875 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 2004)). DOC asserts that the lower court erred by not giving deference to its interpretation of the statute. This court has made clear that
nothing requires 'that we defer to an implausible and unreasonable statutory interpretation adopted by an administrative agency.' [quoting Office of Fire Code Official of Collier Cnty. Fire Control & Rescue Dists. v. Fla. Dep't of Fin. Servs., 869 So. 2d 1233, 1237 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)]. If the agency's interpretation is within the range of possible and reasonable interpretations, it is not clearly erroneous and should be affirmed,' Fla. Dep't of Educ. v. Cooper, 858 So.2d 394, 396 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), but 'judicial adherence to the agency's view is not demanded when it is contrary to the statute's plain meaning.' Werner v. Dep't of Ins. & Treasurer, 689 So.2d 1211, 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (quoting PAC for Equal. v. Dep't of State, Fla. Elections Comm'n, 542 So.2d 459, 460 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)).Sullivan v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 890 So. 2d 417, 420 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (emphasis added).
Here, we find that the lower court's interpretation of the statute is consistent with the plain meaning of statute, and we are not compelled to adhere to the agency's view, as it is contrary to the statute's plain meaning. Section 57.085, Florida Statutes (2012), states in pertinent part:
(5) When the clerk has found the prisoner to be indigent, the court shall order the prisoner to make monthly payments of no less than 20 percent of the balance of the prisoner's trust account as payment of court costs and fees. When a court orders such payment, the Department of Corrections or the local detention facility shall place a
lien on the inmate's trust account for the full amount of the court costs and fees, and shall withdraw money maintained in that trust account and forward the money, when the balance exceeds $10, to the appropriate clerk of the court until the prisoner's court costs and fees are paid in full.
DOC asserts that the clause "when the balance exceeds $10" gives effect to when DOC shall forward to the appropriate clerk of court the money already withdrawn from an inmate's account, and does not, as interpreted by the lower court, give effect to when the DOC shall withdraw funds from an inmate's trust account. This argument, however, ignores the plain language of the statute. The only mention of a "balance" or an "account" is in reference to the inmate's trust account, and not some unreferenced account that DOC has created for holding up to $10 in funds that have been removed from an inmate's trust account, and held until the balance is more than $10 and then forwarded to the appropriate clerk of court. DOC maintains that the "when the balance exceeds $10" clause alters the phrase immediately preceding it, meaning that it only can be read to alter the phrase "forward the money." This interpretation ignores that the phrase immediately preceding the clause "shall withdraw money maintained in the trust account and forward the money" supports the plain reading that the clause references the balance for the only account referenced in this subsection, the inmate's trust account. DOC's interpretation seems far more illogical than the lower court's interpretation. Under DOC's interpretation, it has to maintain a separate account for each inmate from whom DOC removes any sum under $10 from the inmate's account and keep until that balance is over $10 before transmitting to the appropriate clerk of court.
Moreover, the lower court's interpretation is supported by the Senate staff analyses on Chapter 96-106, Laws of Florida, which enacted section 57.085. In particular, the Senate staff analysis and economic impact statement, in discussing the private sector impact of section 57.085, states:
There would be a fiscal impact upon prisoners who would be inclined to file civil lawsuits that have no merit and courts determine to be frivolous or malicious. Prisoners would be required to pay at least a 20-percent portion of their inmate trust account as payment of court costs and fees, if ordered by the court. If indigent prisoners are ordered to pay, a lien would be able to be placed upon the prisoner's bank accounts that exceed $10. Money from the prisoner's bank account would then [be] forwarded to the appropriate court clerk until the prisoner's court costs and fees are paid in full.Fla. S. Comm. on Crim. Just., CS for SB 8 (1996) Staff Analysis 10 (Oct. 11, 1995) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Fla. State Archives, Tallahassee, Fla.) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the lower court's interpretation is reinforced by the federal courts' interpretation of a similarly worded federal statute. See Reed v. Mims, 711 So. 2d 169, 172 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (holding that section 57.085 was patterned after federal law and, as a result, federal precedent was persuasive). The corresponding federal law addressing frivolous lawsuits by indigent inmates states in pertinent part:
After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall be required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account. The agency having custody of the prisoner shall forward payments from the prisoner's account to the clerk of the court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the filing fees are paid.28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) (emphasis added). We do not agree with DOC's assertion that the Florida Legislature did not word section 57.085(5) the same or close to section 1915, even though the Florida Legislature did not use the same language of "the amount in the account exceeds $10." As previously noted, in section 57.085(5), Florida Statutes, the only reference to an account that would carry a balance is a reference to the inmate's trust account. Similarly, in the United States Code, the only reference to an account is to a prisoner's account. Furthermore, the federal courts have recognized that 28 United States Code section 1915 was designed to
ensure that prisoners need not 'totally deprive themselves of those small amenities of life which they are permitted to acquire in a prison or mental hospital beyond the food, clothing, and lodging already furnished by the state,' . . . section 1915 allows payment to be taken from the prisoner's account only where 'the amount in the account exceeds $10....' 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).Roller v. Gunn, 107 F. 3d 227 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal citation omitted).
We hold that DOC was not permitted to remove funds from Appellee's account until the balance exceeded $10. Accordingly, we affirm the lower court's order granting mandamus relief.
AFFIRMED. BENTON and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., CONCUR.