Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Superior Court of Imperial County, Joseph W. Zimmerman, Judge, Super. Ct. No. ECU-02397
McINTYRE, J.
Walter Cress appeals a judgment entered after the trial court denied his petition for a peremptory writ of mandate seeking to compel the Board of Retirement (the Board) of the Imperial County Employees' Retirement System (the Retirement System) to reverse its decision denying his application for service connected disability retirement benefits. He contends that reversal is necessary because (1) the Board violated its duty to protect his rights as a pensioner by transferring his application to the staff of the San Diego County Employees' Retirement Association (the San Diego Association) for processing and then "rubber stamping" the San Diego Association's recommendation that the application be denied; (2) the administrative hearing officer improperly (a) quashed his subpoena duces tecum in violation of the Board's by-laws, (b) admitted a medical opinion of one of the Board's experts, and (c) excluded certain evidence presented by him in support of his application; and (3) there is no substantial evidence to support a finding that he was not disabled. He also appeals the superior court's order denying his request to vacate the judgment and reopen the proceedings on his request for a writ of mandate, contending that his failure to timely serve the motion on the Board did not deprive the superior court of jurisdiction to rule on the motion. We find Cress's arguments unavailing and affirm the judgment and order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
From November of 1988 until September of 2001, Cress worked as an attorney at the office of the County Counsel for Imperial County (the County). During his tenure, the majority of Cress's work involved the Retirement System, and its administrator, County Treasurer Dan Brown, and consisted of overseeing the processing of disability retirement applications and any appeals or litigation arising from the denial thereof. Beginning in the late 1990s, Cress began to take on some additional duties from Brown, who was increasingly absent due to significant health problems.
While working as the assistant County counsel, Cress twice ran for election to fill vacant judicial positions, but did not win. In 1999, Cress applied to fill the recently-vacated County counsel position but was passed over by the County for the job. (Cress appealed the County's hiring decision to the Employment Appeals Board, alleging in part that the decision resulted from age discrimination, although his appeal was apparently unsuccessful. He also represented himself in two subsequent legal actions alleging retaliation, age discrimination and breach of contract arising out of the County's hiring decision.)
In April 2001, Cress (who was then 57-years old) contacted psychiatrist Eva McCullers, the physician who regularly advised the Board on disability retirement claims arising out of alleged psychological injury, for treatment of various problems he was experiencing. Dr. McCullars examined Cress in July 2001, at which time he reported suffering from severe daily headaches, neck and shoulder pain, recurring skin rashes, memory lapses, sleeplessness and fatigue. Cress told Dr. McCullars that he had several stressors in his life, including his mother's recent serious medical problems, Brown's failing health and the resulting increase in his responsibilities at work and raising his 11-year-old son. Dr. McCullars concluded that Cress suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and prescribed the antidepressant Wellbutrin for him.
In June 2001, Cress applied to teach at a high school in the Calexico Unified School District; his resume submitted with the job application indicated that he was in "excellent" health. Shortly thereafter, Cress resigned from the Assistant County Counsel position to take a job as a middle school teacher. At about the same time, he applied to act as a hearing officer for the Tulare County Employees Retirement Association. In October 2001, Cress's mother died.
In December 2001, Cress submitted an application to the Board for service-related disability retirement benefits pursuant to the County Employees Retirement Law of 1937 (§§ 31450 et seq. (CERL)). The application included a written evaluation by Dr. McCullars concluding that Cress had post-traumatic stress disorder and was disabled from performing the job responsibilities of the Assistant County Counsel and that his disability was service related.
In April 2002, the Board transferred Cress's application to the San Diego Association for processing to avoid "any appearance of a conflict of interest" in light of Cress's previous employment as the Retirement System attorney, but specified that the San Diego Association was to follow the Retirement System's bylaws and procedures. Cress was examined by San Diego Association psychiatrist Stephen Signer, who concluded that Cress was not disabled from performing the responsibilities of the Assistant County Counsel and that the ultimate cause of Cress's work dissatisfaction was having been passed over for the County Counsel position rather than job stress.
Cress was also examined by psychiatrist David Reiss in connection with a separate proceeding filed by him for workers' compensation benefits; Dr. Reiss's written report concluded that Cress was not disabled as a result of any psychiatric illness or condition, but had symptoms arising out of job dissatisfaction. County Health Officer Dr. Stephen Munday reviewed Cress's medical records and reports, as well as certain other materials submitted by Cress, and prepared a report opining that Cress was not permanently incapacitated and that any conclusion Cress's symptoms arose from job-related stress was purely speculative.
Based on the foregoing written medical reports, the Board denied Cress's application without a hearing. (See Imperial County Employees Retirement System Bylaws and Regulations (the Retirement System Bylaws), ch. 7, art. 10, § 91(a).) Cress then requested reconsideration of his application.) The Board denied his reconsideration request and Cress requested an administrative hearing.
In early 2003, Cress started serving as a hearing officer for San Bernardino County. In July 2003, Cress retired from teaching and began drawing a pension from the Retirement System pending the outcome of these proceedings.
At the administrative hearing in 2004, Dr. McCullars testified that Cress began exhibiting medical symptoms in the early 2000s and that, although those symptoms improved after he started taking Wellbutrin, he had suffered post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of being passed over for the County Counsel position and from the high level of stress from the demands of his job, which he told her had required him to perform 1-1/2 to 2 times a normal workload. She opined that Cress was disabled from performing his prior duties as the Assistant County Counsel, although she admitted on cross-examination that her opinion would be different if Cress had not had to work excessive hours and perform more than the usual required duties of the job, as he had reported to her.
Cress testified that, as shown by his performance evaluations, he had carried out his job responsibilities in exemplary fashion, but that it had been difficult working for Brown, who had a "strong personality," particularly in situations where Brown and County supervisors and/or department heads disagreed with each other. He also testified that the 1993 transfer of Brown's assistant treasurer and the elimination of the retirement investigator position in 1996 increased his workload and that he was required to spend an inordinate amount of time training his secretarial staff based on the high turnover in that position.
Cress indicated that as a result of Brown's deteriorating health, he was required to make various decisions that Brown would otherwise have made, including decisions on disability retirement applications. He admitted, however, that despite taking over these additional duties, he continued to work approximately 40 hours a week and never complained to his supervisors about difficulties in getting the work completed in a timely fashion.
Dr. Munday testified as to his opinion that Cress was not incapacitated from doing his job as a result of work-related stress and opined that no objective criteria supported a conclusion that Cress suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of on-going stress in his working environment. Dr. Signer testified that he conducted an extensive evaluation of Cress and developed a diagnosis of Cress in accordance with the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders Text Revision (4th ed. 2000) (DSM-IV); based on the evaluation, he concluded that although Cress may have suffered from depression, Cress did not have post-traumatic stress disorder and was not unable to perform the duties of the Assistant County Counsel.
In a 58-page opinion, the hearing officer found that Cress did not suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder and had not established either that he was permanently incapacitated or that, if such incapacity had existed, his county employment substantially contributed to it. The officer noted that Cress had performed his job well throughout his employment and that there was a distinction between an applicant who was "medically unable to perform his usual duties and one who has become unwilling to do so." (See Haywood v. American River Fire Protection Dist. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1304.) Based on these findings, the hearing officer's report recommended that the Board deny Cress's application.
In August 2004, the Board adopted the hearing officer's findings and recommendations in their entirety and denied Cress's disability retirement application. It subsequently denied Cress's request for reconsideration.
In March 2005, Cress, acting in propria persona, filed a petition for a peremptory writ of mandate seeking to compel the Board to grant his application for service-related disability retirement benefits. The superior court issued a statement of decision, finding in part that Cress had not met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was permanently incapacitated to perform the usual duties of the Assistant County Counsel position or that any such incapacity was caused by his employment and that the Retirement System's evidence was sufficient to show that Cress was not incapacitated. The court denied Cress's petition and entered judgment in the Board's favor.
Cress moved to vacate the judgment and reopen the case, but the superior court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to grant the motion, which was not timely served on the Board, and denied the motion. Cress appeals from the judgment and the order denying his motion to vacate.
DISCUSSION
1. General Principles Relating to Mandamus Relief and the Standard of Review
Mandamus relief is available to correct an abuse of discretion by an administrative agency. (McIntyre v. Santa Barbara County Employees' Retirement System (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 730, 733.) Where, as here, relief is sought pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, the critical inquiry is whether the agency proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction, whether it provided a fair trial and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (b).) An abuse of discretion is established if the agency failed to proceed in the manner required by law, its decision is not supported by its findings or its findings are not supported by the evidence. (Ibid.)
In a writ proceeding challenging an agency's decision that affects a petitioner's fundamental vested rights, the petitioner may establish an abuse of discretion by showing that the agency's findings "are not supported by the weight of the evidence." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (c); see Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 32, 45-46.) In such situations, the trial court engages in an independent review of the evidence in the administrative record, although there is a strong presumption that the administrative findings are correct and the party challenging the administrative decision has the burden of convincing the court otherwise. (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817; Pellerin v. Kern County Employees' Retirement Assn. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1105.) On appeal from a trial court's decision denying writ relief, we review the court's factual findings for substantial evidence and exercise our independent judgment only as to the legal issues presented. (Pellerin v. Kern County Employees' Retirement Assn., supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 1105.)
2. CERL
The County employee retirement system is governed by CERL, a comprehensive statutory scheme that guides the manner in which a county may provide retirement benefits to its employees. (Gov. Code, § 31450 et seq.; all further statutory references are to the Government Code except as otherwise noted.) Pursuant to CERL, the Board is generally responsible for managing the Retirement System and has the authority to make rules and regulations relating to its administrative procedures. (§ 31520, 31525, 31526, subd. (a).) It has the exclusive authority to determine whether an applicant is entitled to receive service-related disability retirement benefits and, in that regard, must resolve the factual issues of whether an applicant member is permanently incapacitated from performing his or her job duties and whether the disability is service connected. (§§ 31520, 31725; see Masters v. San Bernardino County Employees Retirement Assn. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 30, 45; Curtis v. Board of Retirement (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 293, 297-298.)
The Board owes a fiduciary duty of good faith and loyalty to the county employees who are members of the Retirement System (see Hittle v. Santa Barbara County Employees Retirement Assn. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 374, 392-393) and must administer the system "in a manner to best provide benefits to the participants of the plan." (McIntyre v. Santa Barbara County Employees' Retirement System, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 734.) To comply with this obligation, the Board must prudently review disability retirement applications and pay benefits only to those members who are eligible for them. (Ibid., and authorities cited therein.) For this reason, the Board is deemed to fulfill rather than breach its fiduciary obligations to system participants in retaining staff, lawyers and medical providers to investigate whether a particular applicant qualifies for disability pension benefits and to represent it at an administrative hearing challenging a decision to deny such benefit. (Id. at pp. 734-735.)
3. The Transfer of Cress's Application to the San Diego Association
Cress contends that the Board acted under a "misplaced concern" about the possible appearance of a conflict of interest and, in transferring the matter to the staff of the San Diego Association and then accepting the San Diego Association's recommendation, it violated its primary obligation to act in his best interests. However, the Board's fiduciary obligations extend to all members of the Retirement System, not simply to the particular applicant currently seeking retirement benefits. (McIntyre v. Santa Barbara County Employees' Retirement System, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 734.) Further, given that Cress had been the Retirement System's attorney for many years, the trial court found that the Board was justifiably concerned that having the same people who worked with him on a daily basis during his tenure process his application for such benefits might create a perception (or a real risk) of an actual bias in his favor, to the possible detriment of other members of the Retirement System.
Cress also complains that the Retirement System's bylaws (which were adopted by the Board) did not authorize such a transfer. However, although the bylaws do not expressly authorize transfers of applications for investigation purposes, neither do they expressly disallow such a transfer. Further, Cress does not point to any provision of law that would preclude the Board from determining that such a transfer was appropriate (and even necessary) to fulfill its fiduciary obligations to system members without a bylaw specifically authorizing it to do so. In any event, the trial court found, and we agree, that the bylaws' broad definition of "Retirement Administrator" gave the Board the authority to make the decision it did here. (Retirement System Bylaws, ch. 7, art. 1, § 61(za).)
Cress's brief makes passing reference to the fact that although the state statute and the Retirement System Bylaws authorize the Board to appoint a hearing officer to preside over the administrative appeal from the denial of an application for retirement benefits (§ 31533; Retirement System Bylaws, ch. 7, art. 1, §§ 61(y), 71), the Board had never made such an appointment before and thus did not have any procedures in place to govern the proceedings. The brief does not, however, make any specific argument in this regard, nor does it cite to any relevant authority on the issue and we thus deem the issue waived. (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408; Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.)
Finally, contrary to Cress's suggestion, there simply is no indication in the record that the Board abdicated its obligation to make the ultimate determination as to his entitlement to service-connected disability retirement benefits. The fact that the Board adopted the recommendations of the staff of the San Diego Association and thereafter the same recommendation by the hearing officer, standing alone, does not substantiate Cress's claim. (See, e.g., Marathon Nat. Bank v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1261.) (In this regard, we note that Cress has made no allegation or evidentiary showing that either the association or the hearing officer was anything other than a neutral third party or that either would have had a bias in favor of, or against, his application.) The trial court found that the Board duly considered Cress's application on five occasions, at least one of which was based on additional evidence submitted by him in support of his request for reconsideration, and the evidence in the record suffices to support this finding. Cress has not met his burden to show that the trial court erred in upholding the Board's decision to transfer his application to the San Diego Association for processing.
4. The Evidentiary Rulings
A party to an administrative proceeding relating to his application for benefits from the Retirement System has various rights, including the right to call and examine witnesses, the right to introduce exhibits, the right to rebut the evidence against any witness and the right to obtain subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum from the Board. (Retirement System Bylaws, ch. 7, art. 9, § 89(a) & art. 12, § 98(b); § 31535.) The Retirement System Bylaws provide that the formal rules of evidence are not applicable in such proceedings and that "any relevant evidence shall be admitted if it is the sort of evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs, regardless of the existence of any common law or statutory rule which might make improper the admission of such evidence over objections in civil actions." (Retirement System Bylaws, ch. 7, art. 12, § 98(a) & (c).) In a proceeding before a hearing officer, the hearing officer determines whether proffered evidence is admissible pursuant to the foregoing standard. (Retirement System Bylaws, ch. 7, art. 12, § 99.)
A. Quashing the Subpoena
Seven days prior to the administrative hearing, Cress served a subpoena duces tecum on the County requesting that its Director and Assistant Director of Human Resources and Risk Management appear as witnesses at the hearing and produce the following categories of documents:
1. documents including the rankings of Cress and Ralph Cordova (the person hired to fill the County Counsel position for which Cress was passed over) given by the screening panel;
2. documents describing actions taken by the County Board of Supervisors to appoint Dr. Munday as the County Health Officer; and
3. documents reflecting action taken by the Board to appoint the San Diego Association to process Cress's disability retirement application.
The County filed a written objection to the subpoena, arguing that Cress could not have the documents admitted into evidence at the hearing because he failed to file them with the Board no later than 15 days prior to the hearing, the subpoena itself was untimely under state law and, insofar as items 1 and 2 sought production of "personal information" of third parties, the subpoena was procedurally defective because Cress had never served it on those third parties. The County also objected that all the requested documents were irrelevant to Cress's disability retirement application.
At the administrative hearing, the hearing officer heard extensive argument by Cress, the County and the Board regarding the subpoena and the objections thereto. He granted the County's motion to quash the subpoena insofar as it sought documentary evidence, but allowed Cress to call the individuals as witnesses (although Cress ultimately called only one of them).)
Cress now contends that the hearing officer violated the Retirement System Bylaws and prevented him from developing his case in quashing the subpoena as to the document requests. However, he did not raise this argument in the administrative hearing or in the proceedings before the trial court and will not be permitted to raise this challenge for the first time on appeal. (See Coalition for Student Action v. City of Fullerton (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 1194, 1197-1198; Royster v. Montanez (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 362, 367.)
B. Admission of Dr. Munday's Testimony and Reports
Cress also objects that the hearing officer erred in admitting Dr. Munday's testimony and reports on the ground that Dr. Munday never personally examined him. However, he failed to raise this issue in the underlying proceedings or in the trial court and thus, in accordance with the authorities cited above, he has waived it. Further, as the testimony and reports of the other medical experts supported the hearing officer's finding that Cress was not disabled, the admission of Dr. Munday's testimony, even if erroneous, would not provide a basis for a reversal here. (Cal. Const., art. VI § 13; Evid. Code, § 354.)
C. Exclusion of Evidence
Cress also contends that the hearing officer erred in excluding (1) numerous on-line articles he proffered to establish a connection between stress and the types of symptoms that he had been suffering; (2) the findings and decision of the Employment Appeals Board on Cress's appeal from the decision to award the County Counsel job to Ralph Cordova; and (3) an affidavit appointing him as the County's Deputy Treasurer in August 1989. The essence of Cress's argument is that because the hearing officer erroneously excluded the evidence, the trial court should have considered that evidence in determining whether he was entitled to writ relief. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, subd. (e); Sierra Club v. California Coastal Com'n (2005) 35 Cal.4th 839, 863.) We review the trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion and will not disturb those rulings absent "manifest abuse." (Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 93, 101.)
We find no such abuse here. Cress presented no evidence as to the reliability of the source articles he sought to introduce, which the trial court could have reasonably concluded to be duplicative of the testimony and written reports of Cress's medical providers. Further, Cress does not explain how the Employment Appeals Board's findings and decision on his appeal relating to the County Counsel position were relevant or helpful to his claim of work-related disability, particularly given that the findings and decision were not favorable to him and that Dr. McCullars did not rely on the underlying facts (except for the undisputed fact that he did not get the County Counsel position) as a basis for her opinion that he was disabled. Finally, in light of Cress's uncontroverted testimony that he served as the "de facto assistant treasurer", the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the 1989 affidavit was unnecessary and duplicative.
For these reasons, we conclude that the record does not establish a manifest abuse of discretion by the trial court.
5. The Finding of No Disability
A person is disabled for purposes of CERL if he is "permanently incapacitated for the performance of duty" (§ 31720), i.e., he has a "substantial inability to perform the usual duties of the job." (See Thelander v. City of El Monte (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 736, 742, fn. omitted; Mansperger v. Public Employees' Retirement System (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 873, 876; also Retirement System Bylaws, ch. 7, art. 1, § 60(z)(6)-(8).) Cress contends that the trial court's finding of no disability in this case is not supported by substantial evidence.
Except insofar as Cress challenges the standards applied by the testifying doctors, his argument essentially seeks to have this court reweigh the evidence and reach a different conclusion than the trial court did (and the Board before it) regarding the credibility of the medical records, the testimony of the medical experts and Cress's own testimony. However, as noted above, while the trial court properly exercises its independent judgment in reviewing evidence submitted at an administrative hearing on an application for disability retirement benefits, our review of the trial court's decision is limited to a determination of whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. (Fukuda v. City of Angels, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 816-817, 824; Levingston v. Retirement Board (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 996, 1000.) If such substantial evidence exists, we must affirm the trial court's judgment, even if the record also contains evidence to support a contrary conclusion (see Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors (1939) 13 Cal.2d 75, 86) and Cress bears the burden of showing that no such substantial evidence exists. (Vernon Fire Fighters Assn. v. City of Vernon (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 710, 718.) He has not met that burden.
Based on a comprehensive medical evaluation, Dr. Signer opined that Cress was not permanently incapacitated from performing as the Assistant County Counsel but instead was dissatisfied with the job and having been passed over for the County Counsel position. (Cress so much as admitted his upset about the rankings of the applicants for the County Counsel position was the reason and the basis for his inability to perform "as the Assistant County Counsel.) Although Cress argues that Dr. Signer relied on an inappropriate standard as the basis for his opinions (see generally Pearl v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 189, 197 [acknowledging that although both the Public Employees' Retirement Law and the workers' compensation law are aimed at the same general goals with regard to the welfare of employees and their dependents, they represent distinct legislative schemes and do not necessarily have the same standards]), Dr. Signer testified that he had 7 to 8 years of experience in evaluating applicants for disability retirement benefits and that in evaluating Cress, he diagnosed Cress in accordance with the DSM-IV. More importantly, Dr. Signer specifically testified on cross-examination that his opinion regarding Cress's lack of disability was based on the conclusion that Cress was "able to perform the job duties" of the Assistant County Counsel position. This testimony establishes that Dr. Signer applied the correct standard in finding that Cress was not disabled under CERL, thus rendering this evidence sufficient to support the trial court's finding of no disability.
Further, the testimony of Cress's own expert witness was sufficient to support the trial court's determination. Although Dr. McCullars testified that Cress suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and was disabled from performing the Assistant County Counsel job, she also admitted that she would have reached a different conclusion if the job did not require him to work excessive hours or perform extraordinary duties. Based on this testimony and the uncontroverted evidence in the record (including Cress's own testimony) that he had not been required to work excessive hours or undertake unusual or extraordinary job responsibilities while acting as the Assistant County Counsel, the trial court could have properly concluded that Cress was not disabled, even in the absence of Dr. Signer's testimony. The evidence in the record amply supports the trial court's finding on that issue.
6. The Denial of Cress's Request to Vacate and Reopen
After hearing argument and taking the matter under submission, the superior court issued a statement of decision denying the petition and entered judgment in the Board's favor on November 28, 2006 and the Board served Cress with notice of the entry of judgment the next day. (All subsequent dates are in 2006, except as otherwise noted.) On December 7, Cress filed a motion to vacate the judgment and reopen the case in the superior court. However, although Cress attempted to serve the Board with his papers by mail on that same day, the papers were returned to him for inadequate postage. Cress corrected the problem and placed the materials back in the mail on December 16. The Board's opposition to the motion argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear it based on the untimely service and that Cress had not met the standards for establishing a basis for the relief sought. The court found the jurisdictional argument persuasive.
Cress contends that the superior court erred in denying his motion to vacate the judgment and reopen the matter. However, he admits that he did not properly serve the motion until 2 days after the statutory deadline for doing so. Although the time requirements specified in Code of Civil Procedure section 633a are generally considered jurisdictional (Advanced Building Maintenance v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1394; see County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 1178, 1183; see also San Mateo Federation of Teachers v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 150, 155), Cress contends that his initial error in attempting to serve the Board is not fatal because the Code of Civil Procedure does not require a party to put adequate postage on materials to be served.
Cress's interpretation of the law would facilitate gamesmanship and provide an incentive for parties to intentionally put insufficient postage on service copies of their papers to gain an advantage over their opponents. Fortunately, however, his interpretation is simply wrong. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1013 [requiring papers served by mail to be deposited in a sealed envelope "with postage paid"]; Lee v. Placer Title Co. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 503, 509 [noting that strict compliance with the service requirements, including those specified in Code Civ. Proc., § 1013, is required]; see Moghaddam v. Bone (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 283, 288 [notice of appeal addressed using the wrong zip code was not sufficient to comply with service requirements].)
The superior court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to vacate the judgment and reopen the case.
DISPOSITION
The judgment and order are affirmed. The Board is awarded its costs of appeal.
WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P.J., O'ROURKE, J.