Opinion
No. 856 C.D. 2011
05-23-2012
Crawford Village McKeesport Housing Authority, Appellant v. Glover Huston
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, President Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
This case was assigned to the opinion writer on or before January 6, 2012, when President Judge Leadbetter completed her term as President Judge.
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE BROBSON
Appellant Crawford Village McKeesport Housing Authority (Housing Authority) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court). The trial court's order granted an "Emergency Motion to Stay" the eviction of a tenant of the Housing Authority, Glover Huston (Huston). The trial court's order had the effect of setting aside a Magisterial District Judge's (MDJ) judgment for delivery of possession in favor of the Housing Authority and against Huston. The trial court's order also had the effect of permanently staying an order for possession (that would have enabled the Housing Authority to evict Huston), which the Housing Authority obtained based upon the MDJ's judgment. We reverse the trial court's order.
The Housing Authority initiated an action on February 15, 2011, before the MDJ against Huston, seeking possession of Housing Authority property in which Huston resided. (Housing Authority Brief at 7.) The Housing Authority averred that police had charged Huston as a proprietor of a disorderly house after police responded to and investigated a complaint on January 28, 2011, regarding loud noise emanating from Huston's residence. (Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 41a.) The police found marijuana and drug paraphernalia when they investigated the residence. (Id.) Ultimately, on an unidentified date, but presumably between February 15, 2011, and March 29, 2011, the MDJ granted judgment in favor of the Housing Authority for delivery of possession of Huston's residence. On March 29, 2011, the Housing Authority, in reliance on Huston's failure to appeal the MDJ's judgment for delivery of possession, obtained an order for possession, which it served on Huston on April 1, 2011. (R.R. at 8a.) This order included a "notice to defendant to vacate." (Id.) Huston did not appeal the MDJ's March 29, 2011 order granting judgment in favor of the Housing Authority, but rather, on April 11, 2011, filed with the trial court a pleading that he captioned as an emergency motion to stay the eviction.
The order for possession is apparently signed by the MDJ (in this case, on March 29, 2011), and directs Joseph F. Clemente (a sheriff or constable) to deliver possession of the subject property to the Housing Authority. Mr. Clemente apparently served the notice on Huston on April 1, 2011.
In his motion for an emergency stay of the eviction, Huston claimed that the charges that gave rise to the judgment of possession had been dismissed. On April 14, 2011, the trial court, after conducting a hearing at which the trial court accepted evidence indicating that the criminal charges against Huston had been dismissed, issued an order granting Huston's request for a stay and, essentially, set aside the judgment for delivery of possession, without prejudice to the Housing Authority to file an action in the future if Huston failed to pay his rent or if he violated the terms of his lease.
In fact, the trial court noted that the criminal charges against Huston were dismissed on February 25, 2011.
The Housing Authority appealed that order, asserting in its matters complained of on appeal that the trial court erred in granting Huston's emergency motion to stay the eviction. In support, the Housing Authority argued that (1) Huston did not challenge the underlying judgment of possession, (2) the trial court's order staying the eviction constituted an improper grant of an appeal nunc pro tunc, and (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence concerning the dismissal of the charge against Huston and relying upon that evidence as a basis for staying, and, in essence, setting aside the civil judgment for possession.
In the opinion the trial court issued in support of its order, the trial court concluded that Huston's emergency motion was more in the nature of a motion to open and/or strike a judgment, rather than a nunc pro tunc appeal. The trial court identified the analysis applicable in a landlord-tenant dispute involving a motion to open judgment as requiring the party seeking relief to demonstrate three elements: (1) a reasonable explanation as to why the judgment is inappropriate; (2) a defense on the merits; and (3) a prompt filing of the petition to open judgment. The trial court disagreed with the Housing Authority's claim that, once Huston failed to challenge in a timely manner the MDJ's judgment for delivery of possession, Huston could not seek to challenge that underlying judgment.
In this appeal, the Housing Authority raises the same challenges that the trial court considered. Because of the unusual approach that the trial court took in response to Huston's motion, we will first consider whether the trial court correctly regarded Huston's motion as one to open and/or strike the judgment entered by the MDJ.
We discuss below the standard of review that is applicable in this case.
The trial court, in addressing the issue of whether it was appropriate to open the MDJ's judgment, relied upon the decision of our Supreme Court in Simmons v. Luallen, 563 Pa. 589, 763 A.2d 810 (2000). In that case, however, the trial court order that was at issue related to a motion to open a judgment of the trial court, not a judgment of an MDJ. In that case, an MDJ had issued a judgment in favor of a landlord. Thereafter, the tenant against whom the MDJ entered judgment filed a notice of appeal of the MDJ's order and a praecipe requesting the prothonotary of the court of common pleas to issue a rule upon the landlord to file a complaint within twenty days after service of the rule or suffer the entry of judgment non pros. When the landlord did not respond to the rule by filing a complaint, the tenant moved for a default judgment, which the trial court granted. Thereafter, the landlord filed a motion with the trial court to open the default judgment it had entered. This case, where Huston did not file an appeal, is significantly different from Simmons, because the trial court was not acting upon an order it entered, but rather on an order from a different judicial entity. Counsel for Huston candidly acknowledges this point, admitting that, if the trial court could exercise jurisdiction over an untimely appeal in accordance with the rules governing appeals from MDJs, the proper course for the trial court to take would have been to conduct a hearing de novo on the merits of the Housing Authority's petition for judgment of possession. (Huston Brief at 9.)
The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure Governing Actions and Proceedings Before Magisterial District Judges (the MDJ Rules) govern the practice before MDJs and appeals from judgments and decisions of MDJs. MDJ Rule 1002 provides, in pertinent part, that
Pa. R.C.P.M.D.J. Nos. 201-1211. MDJ Rules 501-582, Pa. R.C.P.M.D.J. Nos. 501-582, relate to "actions for the recovery of possession of real property," and MDJ Rules 1001-1015, Pa. R.C.P.M.D.J. Nos. 1001-1015, relate to "appellate proceedings with respect to judgments and other decisions of [MDJs] in civil matters."
[a] party aggrieved by a judgment for the delivery of possession of real property arising out of a residential lease may appeal therefrom within ten (10) days after the date of the entry of judgment by filing with the prothonotary of the court of common pleas a notice of appeal . . . together with a copy of the Notice of Judgment issued by the magisterial district judge. The prothonotary shall not accept an appeal from an aggrieved party which is presented for filing more than ten (10) days after the date of entry of judgment without leave of court and upon good cause shown.Moreover, under MDJ Rule 1004-B, an appellant seeking review of a magisterial district judge's judgment must also file with his notice of appeal "a praecipe requesting the prothonotary to enter a rule as of course upon the appellee to file a complaint within twenty (20) days after service of the rule or suffer entry of a judgment of non pros." This is exactly the process that the Supreme Court evaluated in Simmons. Clearly, Huston followed none of the prerequisites for a valid appeal on the merits of the MDJ's order.
Pa. R.C.P.M.D.J. No. 1004-B.
Thus, as suggested by both parties, this Court must consider whether the trial court erred by treating Huston's motion as a request to review an untimely appeal under MDJ Rule 1002-B, or, as the Housing Authority claims, an improper grant of an appeal nunc pro tunc.,
Pa. R.C.P.M.D.J. No. 1002-B.
For the reasons expressed above regarding the trial court's attempt to exercise jurisdiction over an order it viewed as being void ab initio, we reiterate that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain a motion to strike the MDJ's judgment. The trial court relied upon the Superior Court's decision in Mother's Restaurant, Inc. v. Krystkiewicz, 861 A.2d 327 (Pa. Super. 2004). In that case, the Superior Court held that an unauthorized entry of a default judgment by a common pleas court's prothonotary was void ab initio, and a litigant could challenge that order at any time. In this case, the trial court delved into the substance of the proceedings before the MDJ, but the trial court lacked both complete knowledge of the applicable law and the facts presented to the MDJ when it addressed the underlying merits of the matter and concluded that the judgment was void ab initio. Further, a trial court considering a motion to strike a judgment is limited to considering "fatal defects on the face of the record." Cintas Corp. v. Lee's Cleaning Services, Inc., 549 Pa. 84, 90, 700 A.2d 915, 917 (1997). The trial court in this case went beyond those limits in evaluating Huston's motion.
This Court's review of a trial court's decision permitting an untimely appeal to proceed for evaluation of the merits is limited to considering whether the trial court abused its discretion or erred as a matter of law. Connor v. Westmoreland Cty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 598 A.2d 610 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991).
Counsel for Huston argues that the trial court may have acted within its authority based upon either its application of MDJ Rule 1002-B, which provides a prothonotary with the authority to accept an untimely appeal only "with leave of court and upon good cause shown," or as a properly granted nunc pro tunc appeal. With regard to MDJ Rule 1002-B, Huston argues that this standard is lower than the standard applicable for nunc pro tunc appeals.
We conclude that we need not delve into the question of whether the Supreme Court, in adopting MDJ Rule 1002-B, intended to adopt a more lenient standard for accepting untimely appeals. Generally, in any matter in which either standard would apply, the focus of the inquiry must be upon the question of whether a party had good cause with regard to the reasons for his delay in filing an appeal, not whether good cause exists to examine allegedly erroneous aspects of the underlying judgment. In this case, there is no information in the record explaining why Huston did not file a timely appeal, other than references to the fact that he did not have legal counsel. While we are sympathetic to such a dilemma, we cannot conclude that such an explanation provides good cause for an untimely appeal under MDJ Rule 1002-B.
The typical bases upon which a trial court may grant a nunc pro tunc appeal relate to matters concerning fraud and breakdowns in the courts or the administrative process, rather than a party's delayed decision to challenge an order or judgment. Clark v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd. (Keystone Lawn Spray), 672 A.2d 348 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). We note here, however, that there is support for the proposition that a trial court may grant a request for nunc pro tunc review of the merits of an untimely appeal from an order of an administrative agency when the law indicates that an administrative agency issued an order that was not authorized. In Conroy v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 825 A.2d 799 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), the record clearly demonstrated that the Department of Transportation (DOT) had unlawfully attached as a condition of a driver's license suspension that the licensee install interlock devices on all of his vehicles. One year later, the licensee appealed DOT's order. This Court noted a decision we had issued after DOT's order in which we concluded that the Bureau of Driver Licensing had no authority to order the installation of interlock devices. We held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering the untimely appeal because "the requirement imposed on [the licensee] was imposed without the authority of the law and was void ab initio." Id. at 801. The Court relied on the doctrine that "equitable relief, if necessary, is appropriate in such an extraordinary circumstance." Id., citing Watterson v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 816 A.2d 1225 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003); Criss v. Wise, 566 Pa. 437, 781 A.2d 1156 (2001). This case is distinguishable from Conroy, because the record at best indicates that a criminal charge upon which the Housing Authority relied in presenting its case to the MDJ was dismissed. The record contains no other indication regarding what occurred in the proceeding before the MDJ, and the trial court's decision reflected speculation regarding the facts and the applicable law involved. Thus, we cannot conclude that the MDJ's order was void ab initio and supported the trial court's decision to consider Huston's untimely appeal.
We note that Huston at no time has alleged that the conduct underlying the criminal charges did not occur. The transcript of the trial court's hearing indicates that the police found several minors in Huston's residence and drug paraphernalia. As counsel for the Housing Authority noted in colloquy with the trial court, a prosecutor may elect to drop criminal charges for a number of reasons, and the fact that a prosecutor has dropped charges does not mean that the Housing Authority did not or could not have established that the conduct occurred for the purpose of the civil judgment for a delivery of possession proceeding. Further, according to Huston, the MDJ issued the order granting judgment for delivery of possession on February 15, 2011, and the prosecutor dismissed the criminal charge against Huston on February 25, 2011. Thus, Huston knew within approximately ten days of the date of the MDJ's order that the criminal charges had been dropped, but did not take any action to challenge the MDJ's order until April 2011.
Based upon our resolution of this issue, we need not address the remaining issues that the parties have raised.
Accordingly, we reverse the order of the trial court.
/s/_________
P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
ORDER
AND NOW, this 23rd day of May, 2012, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County is REVERSED.
/s/_________
P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, President Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH
I respectfully dissent.
The above-captioned appeal involves the enforcement of, and the purported untimely appeal of, a civil judgment for delivery of possession. However, the civil judgment for delivery of possession is not part of the certified record of this appeal. It is well settled that an appellate court is limited to considering only those facts that have been duly certified in the record on appeal. City of Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations v. DeFelice, 782 A.2d 586, 593 n. 10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). For purposes of appellate review, that which is not part of the certified record does not exist. Id. As there is no civil judgment for delivery of possession to support the instant eviction, unlike the majority, I would affirm the trial court's order. See Ario v. Ingram Micro, Inc., 600 Pa. 305, 315-16, 965 A.2d 1194, 1200 (2009) (holding that an appellate court can affirm an order of a trial court for any reason appearing in the record).
Although it is undisputed that a civil judgment for delivery of possession was entered in this case, the judgment was never made a part of the certified record and the trial court did not take judicial notice of its contents. Without any facts in the certified record regarding when the civil judgment was entered, I believe that it is impossible for this Court to consider the timeliness of Huston's appeal of that judgment. Moreover, as the appellant, it was the duty of Crawford Village McKeesport Housing Authority to provide this Court with sufficient facts to perform appellate review of the trial court's order. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 637 A.2d 622, 623-624 (Pa. Super. 1993), appeal denied, 539 Pa. 680, 652 A.2d 1325 (1994) ("[I]t is the responsibility of the Appellant to supply this Court with a complete record for purposes of review ... [and] a failure by an Appellant to insure that the original record certified for appeal contains sufficient information to conduct a proper review constitutes a waiver of the issue(s) sought to be examined.") (emphasis in original and citations omitted). In sum, I am extremely wary of reversing the trial court's order in this case on the basis that Huston did not timely appeal the civil judgment for delivery where, as here, there are no facts in the certified record indicating when the judgment was, in fact, entered. --------
/s/_________
PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge