Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-2323 SECTION: "R" (4)
August 16, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are defendants' motion for summary judgment and defendants' motion in limine. For the following reasons, the Court denies both motions.
I. Background
Plaintiff Chad Crawford worked for defendant Hospitality Enterprises ("Hospitality") for seven years. In early 1999, Crawford joined the Hospitality Human Resources department, where he was responsible for recruiting, interviewing, and rating persons who applied for employment. His job entailed marching an applicant with an advertised position, and then sending the person for further interviews. If the person was acceptable to the interviewer, he offered the person employment and processed the paperwork to hire the person.
The corporate defendants named in this lawsuit — Hospitality and New Orleans Tours, Inc. — are separate legal entities with common ownership.
In June 1999, defendant Anne Adams became Crawford's supervisor. In mid-August, she gave Crawford a positive job performance evaluation. Crawford was terminated two months later. Crawford asserts that he was terminated in violation of Title VII for opposing Adams' discriminatory hiring practices Defendants assert that Crawford was terminated because he and Adams did not get along because they disagreed about the appropriate interpretation of the company dress code. Defendants further assert that Crawford and Adams had issues with each other's lifestyles and that their argumentative relationship disrupted the functioning of the office.
II. Discussion
A. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
1. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2551 (1986). The court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party or, in other words, "that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor.' Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1445 (5th Cir. 1993). A factual dispute precludes a grant of summary judgment if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare System, LLC, 2001 WL 1650961 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted)
If the dispositive issue is one for which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving pasty may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2552; Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553
2. Discussion
In Title VII retaliation cases, the plaintiff must first make a prima facie showing "(1) that he engaged in activity protected by Title VII, (2) that an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse action." Gee v. Principal, 289 F.3d 342, 345 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Raggs v. Miss. Power Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 471 (5th Cir. 2002) The requirement or a causal link does not rise to the level of a "but for" standard. Id. Once the plaintiff has established his prima facie case, the burden shifts to defendants to demonstrate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory purpose for the adverse employment action. Id.; Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2106 (2000). If defendants satisfy this burden, then plaintiff must establish that the nondiscriminatory purpose asserted by defendants is "merely a pretext for the real, discriminatory purpose." Gee, 289 F.3d at 345; Rubinstein v. Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 399 (5th Cir. 2000). To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant need only establish that an issue of material fact exists as to whether the legitimate reason for the adverse employment action that is proffered by defendants is merely a pretext. Gee, 289 F.3d at 345.
a. Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case
The first step is to determine whether plaintiff has established a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of Title VII. First, plaintiff asserts that he engaged in the protected conduct of opposing his supervisor's discriminatory hiring practices. Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee "because [that employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (a) (2002). Employment practices that are prohibited by this subchapter include depriving any individual of employment opportunities "because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (a)(2).
Plaintiff asserts that his supervisor, Anne Adams, discriminated against African-Americans (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A, and Pl.'s Opp. to Def's Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A., Deposition of Chad Crawford, at 49), gays (Id. at 52, 64, 73 and 99), single mothers (Id. at 49 and 76), smokers (Id. at 52), and foreigners with English as a second language (Id. at 49). Crawford specifically asserts that Adams discriminated against blacks with gold teeth, blacks with braids, and blacks with jerry curls or greasy hair. (Id. at 52-53.) Further, Crawford asserts that Adams referred to company employees who were black as "damn nigger" and "stupid nigger." (Id. at 99.) Melissa Kariker, Crawford's colleague, noted that Adams' inappropriate racial slurs "made a discriminating atmosphere in that office. It tied your hands as to who you could and couldn't hire." (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. D., and Pl's Opp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. D, Deposition of Melissa Kariker, at 38.) Kariker further stated that "[Adams] stepped in and stopped [Crawford] from doing his job effectively because of what I believe is the race card (Id.)
Plaintiff asserts that he opposed Adams' discriminatory hiring practices by voicing objections to both Adams and to her supervisor. The Fifth Circuit recognizes that Title VII's "opposition clause" applies to the filing of formal complaints and lawsuits, but also to informal complaints and boycotts that are intended by the employee to oppose discriminatory practices. See Smith v. Texas Department of Water Resources, 818 F.2d 363, 375 (5th Cir. 1987); Payne v. McLemore's Wholesale Retail Stores, 654 F.2d 1130, 1136-37 (5th Cir. 1981). The opposition clause requires the employee to demonstrate that he had at least a "reasonable belief" that the practices he opposed were unlawful. Payne, 654 F.2d at 1140. Here, Crawford testified that he "repeatedly" objected to Adams about her discriminatory practices. (Crawford Dep., at 62.) He also said that he complained to Tony Moore, Adams' supervisor, about his "concerns" and that he did so with the expectation that Moore would initiate an inquiry into the situation. (Id. at 155-156.) Because this conduct constitutes opposition to discriminatory practices, plaintiff has established that he was engaging in conduct protected by Title VII.
Second, plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the existence of an adverse employment action. The adverse employment action occurred in October 1999, when plaintiff was terminated. (Id.)
Third, and finally, plaintiff must establish a causal connection between his protected conduct and the adverse employment action. The Fifth Circuit has found that a plaintiff can satisfy prong three of the prima facie case by showing that only a short amount of time lapsed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 354 (5th Cir. 2001). In August 1999, soon after Adams became Crawford's supervisor, Adams gave Crawford high marks in a job evaluation. (Pl.'s Opp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Employee Performance Evaluation, Ex. F.) Two months later, Crawford was fired. During those two months, Crawford opposed what he believed to be Adams' discriminatory practices and, just before his termination, voiced his concerns to Adams' supervisor. (Crawford Dep., at 155-56.) The timing of these events is enough to make out a prima facie case that a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.
b. Defendants' Legitimate Purpose
Because plaintiff has established his prima facie case, the burden shifts to defendants to demonstrate a legitimate and nondiscriminatory purpose for the adverse employment action. Gee, 289 F.3d at 345; Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142, 120 S.Ct. at 2106. Defendants assert that Crawford was terminated not for his protected conduct but instead because he acted unreasonably and interfered with the employer's ability to run its business. Defendants assert that plaintiff and Adams simply disagreed about the proper interpretation of the company's dress code. The Fifth Circuit has held that "[t]here may arise instances where the employee's conduct in protest of an unlawful employment practice so interferes with the performance of his job that it renders him ineffective in the position for which he was employed." Jones v. Flagship International, 793 F.2d 714, 728 (5th Cir.) (quoting Rosser v. Laborers' International Union, Local 438, 616 F.2d 221. 223 (5th Cir. 1980). Courts therefore balance the employer's right to run his business against the rights of an employee to express his grievances and promote his own welfare. Id. In Jones, for example, the Fifth Circuit found that an employer has a legitimate reason to take adverse employment action against an employee who (1) represented the employer before the EEOC, and then (2) filed her own discrimination suit against the employer, announced that a class action may follow, and solicited others to join in the lawsuit. Id.
Crawford stated that because he challenged Adams' hiring decisions, their working relationship was "an ongoing battle." (Crawford Dep., at 100.) Crawford noted that his disagreements with Adams "would get heated and frustrated." (Id. at 158.) These heated disagreements, defendants assert, disrupted the efficient functioning of Hospitality's Human Resources office. The office consisted of only seven employees who worked in close proximity to one another. (Kariker Dep., at 71.) Kariker, who worked in the office along with Adams and Crawford, attested that "there was often a lot of friction between [Adams] and [Crawford]" because of their disagreements over the company' s hiring decisions. (Id. at 37.) Kariker noted that she "could hear them through the wall," and that "there were times when they were out in the open kind of public area." (Id. at 39.) Another colleague, Jennifer Pfister, attested that "small things could turn into big arguments" between Adams and Crawford. (Def. "s Reply to Pl.'s Opp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Deposition of Jennifer Pfister, Ex. F., at 10.) Pfister would often leave the office when these arguments took place. (Id. at 11.)
Adams herself indicated that Crawford "would constantly challenge my hiring decisions. His ongoing complaints were frustrating, aggravated me and interfered with my ability to run the department." (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Affidavit of Anne Adams, Ex. E, at 2.) Indeed, defendants assert that plaintiff's conduct was so disruptive that it is not protected by Title VII See Jones 793 F.2d at 728; Smith, 818 F.2d at 365. Finally, defendants further point out that Adams and Crawford had divergent lifestyles and did not mesh well together. Specifically, Adams did not want to work with Crawford because he was gay and because he smoked. (Kariker Dep., at 11-12.)
Defendants have presented sufficient evidence that Crawford was terminated for a legitimate reason — disruptive behavior and an ineffective working relationship with his supervisor. The burden then shifts back to Crawford to establish that this legitimate reason is merely a pretext for the real, discriminatory purpose. Gee, 289 F.3d at 345.
c. Plaintiff's Showing of Pretext
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, Crawford must "demonstrate a material issue of disputed fact as to whether [defendants'] proffered explanation was merely a pretext for retaliation." Gee, 289 F.3d at 347. Crawford may establish pretext directly, by showing that a discriminatory reason motivated management, or indirectly, by showing that the reasons given for management's actions are simply not believable. Rios v. Rossotti, 252 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147, 120 S.Ct. at 2108.
Here, Crawford presents evidence to establish that a discriminatory reason motivated management's decision to terminate him. First, there is evidence in the record suggesting that Crawford's disputes with Adams were directly related to instances when Crawford challenged Adams' discriminatory practices. Kariker, for example, notes that "when [Crawford] challenged [Adam's] hiring practices . . . this bothered [Crawford] and would cause arguments." (Id. at 37.)
Second, the timing of Crawford's termination suggests that defendants' proffered justification may be mere pretext. Evans, 246 F.3d at 354-56. Adams worked for the company for seven years and had recently received a promotion. In August, two months after Adams became his supervisor, Crawford received a positive job evaluation in which Adams described him as a "team player." (Employee Performance Evaluation, at 3.) Crawford then opposed Adams' hiring practices and discussed his concerns with Adams supervisor. Soon after, Crawford was terminated.
Third, in Fierros, the Fifth Circuit recognized that circumstantial evidence of retaliation includes situations in which the person whose practices were challenged by an employee was the same person that decided to take an adverse employment action against that employee. Pierros v. Texas Department of Health, 274 F.3d 187, 195-96 (5th Cir. 2001). Here, Crawford was terminated by the very individual whose employment practices he challenged.
Fourth, and finally, the Fifth Circuit has recognized that pretext may be established when the employee did not receive an'; disciplinary warnings prior to termination, and the employer's proffered justification for termination is unsupported by any contemporaneous evidence. Fierros, 274 F.3d at 196; Evans, 246 F.3d at 355. Here, defendants present no contemporaneous evidence supporting their proffered justification. There is no evidence of write-ups or reprimands for disruptive behavior. There is instead evidence that Adams singled Crawford out for minor infractions, noting, for example, that Crawford would occasionally show up for work a few minutes late when other employees in the office routinely did the same without adverse consequences. (Kariker Dep., at 59-61.)
The Court finds that there is sufficient evidence in the record that might lead a factfinder to determine that defendants' legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for taking adverse employment action against Crawford is merely a pretext. Indeed, after an investigation of the matter, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") found that defendants' justifications for terminating Crawford were not credible. (Pl.'s Mot. in Limine, EEOC Determination, Ex. A., at 2.) of course, in Title VII retaliation claims, the final burden rests with the plaintiff "to demonstrate that the adverse employment action would not have occurred `but for' the protected activity." Rios, 252 F.3d at 380; see also Nato v. Baldauf, 267 P.36 444 450 (5th Cir. 2001). Nevertheless, the motivation behind defendants' decision to terminate Crawford remains an outstanding issue of material fact. Therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate.
B. Defendants' Motion in Limine
Defendants also move to exclude the report and reasonable cause determination of the EEOC pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which provides that, "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
A district court has "broad discretion" in assessing admissibility under Rule 403. EEOC v. Manville Sales Corporation, 27 F.3d 1089, 1095 (5th Cir. 1994); Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Company. 977 F.2d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 1992). The Fifth Circuit has noted that EEOC determinations of reasonable cause are presumptively admissible because they are "highly probative" of discrimination. Manville Sales, 27 F.3d at 1095; McClure v. Mexia Independent School District, 750 F.2d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 1985) Further, courts should not exclude evidence pursuant to Rule 403 "in such a way that would end the presumption that evaluative reports are admissible hearsay under Rule 803(8)(C)." Cortes, 977 F.2d at 201.
Although the Fifth Circuit has recognized that EEOC determinations of reasonable cause are "highly probative," defendants argue that the EEOC determination is more prejudicial than probative. First, defendants fault the EEOC determination for focusing on the alleged "coding" of employment applications. The EEOC determination, however, was based on much more than the alleged "coding," and the Court does not find that the inclusion of this issue in the reasonable cause determination renders the determination prejudicial. Second, defendants argue that the EEOC failed to consider whether defendants terminated Crawford for his disruptive and argumentative conduct. To the contrary the EEOC determined that it did "not find [defendants'] explanation for [Crawford's] termination to be credible." (EEOC Determination, at 2.) To the extent that the issue was not raised before the EEOC, the Court finds it probative, and certainly not prejudicial, that defendants declined to mention to the EEOC what they now assert to be the legitimate justification for Crawford's dismissal.
The Court notes that defendants move to exclude only the EEOC determination, and not the investigative reports and affidavits upon which the EEOC presumably relied.
There is, however, one legal conclusion in the EEOC determination that has prejudicial potential. The Fifth Circuit has recognized that "letters of violation" are more likely to be prejudicial than determinations of reasonable cause because they state "a categorical legal conclusion that a violation has taken place." Manville Sales, 27 F.3d at 1095; see also Beachy v. Boise Cascade Corporation, 191 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 1999) Here, the EEOC writes that, "[b]ased on this analysis, [the EEOC has] determined that the evidence obtained during this investigation establishes a violation of the statute." (EEOC Determination, at 2.) The Court finds this legal conclusion to be prejudicial and orders that it be redacted before the document may be used at trial.
In exercising its discretion pursuant to Rule 403, the Court finds the EEOC determination to be "highly probative," and certainly more probative than prejudicial. Accordingly, the Court denies defendants' motion to exclude the EEOC report and reasonable cause determination, except that the Court orders that the sentence stating a legal conclusion be redacted before the document may be used at trial.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court denies defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court also denies defendants' motion to exclude the EEOC's report and reasonable cause determination pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, except that the Court orders redacted that portion of the document where the EEOC states that "[b]ased on this analysis, [the EEOC has] determined that the evidence obtained during this investigation establishes a violation of the statute."