Opinion
CA 00-0234-BH-C
August 10, 2000
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Joseph Randolph Craig, who currently remains out on bond, has petitioned this Court for federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter has been referred to the undersigned for entry of a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(c)(4). It is recommended that the petition be DENIED since this Court is precluded from reviewing petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim(s).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner was convicted in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama on May 14, 1998 of possessing more than 2.2 (but less than 100) pounds of marijuana in violation of Ala. Code § 13A-12-231 and on June 19, 1998 was sentenced to a term of three years imprisonment. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 2 3) Petitioner's conviction and sentence were upheld on appeal by memorandum opinion entered May 28, 1999. ( See Id. at ¶ 5) Craig's petition for rehearing was overruled without opinion on July 9, 1999 ( Id. Exhibit 2) and his petition for writ of certiorari to the Alabama Supreme Court was denied without opinion on December 17, 1999 ( id. at ¶ 6 Exhibit 1). Thereafter, petitioner filed the instant habeas corpus petition on March 16, 2000 (Doc. 1), rather than directly appealing his conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of the United States or collaterally attacking his conviction and sentence via Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. Craig has specifically chosen to forego a state collateral attack on his conviction and sentence in light of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals' failure to address the application of the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in United States v. Guapi, 144 F.3d 1393 (11th Cir. 1998) to the facts of his case. ( See Doc. 1, ¶¶ 7 8)
Craig contends in the instant habeas corpus petition that his conviction was obtained by the use of evidence gained pursuant to an unconstitutional search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ( See Id. at ¶ 9) "Essentially, the key issue is whether or not the search and seizure of the passengers and materials at the bus station is the same as the Guapi search and seizure thus requir[ing] the evidence seized to be suppressed and, if necessary, then is the claim of voluntary abandonment valid in light of the actions of the state in conducting a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment[, see United States v. Washington, 151 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1998)]." ( Id. at ¶ 10)
U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
The respondent has yet to respond to the petition for writ of habeas corpus, though service of the complaint was made upon the Attorney General of the State of Alabama, Bill Pryor, on March 16, 2000 (Doc. 1, at 6) and this Court by order gave respondent a period of twenty days following service on the Attorney General to answer the complaint (Doc. 2). The foregoing court order, though dated April 17, 2000, was not mailed to the respondent until June 2, 2000 due to en error in the Clerk's office. ( Compare Doc. 2 with Doc. 3) Respondent's time within which to answer the complaint was extended to July 5, 2000. (Doc. 3) Instead of filing an answer on or before July 5, 2000, respondent mailed a request for additional time to respond on July 5, 2000; this motion was actually filed in this Court on July 7, 2000. (Doc. 5) Respondent requested a period of time up to and including the close of business on August 2, 2000 to respond to the petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 5); this request was granted by order dated July 13, 2000, respondent being granted until August 4, 2000 to file a response (Doc. 6). Instead of filing an answer on August 4, 2000, respondent filed a second request for additional time within which to respond. (Doc. 7) In response to this second request for additional time to respond, counsel for the petitioner has asked this Court "to deny the request for extension of time to file a response to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and allow the Petitioner to proceed on the unrefuted allegations of the Petition as filed or, alternatively, allow the Petitioner to file a Motion for Default Judgment and for such other and further and different relief as may be deemed meet and proper, the premises considered." (Doc. 8, at 2) While there is no provision in the habeas rules for holding the respondent in default, this Court need not wait for an answer from the defendant before addressing the Fourth Amendment issues raised in the petition, cf. Kiser v. Johnson, 163 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a district court has the power under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 cases "to examine and dismiss frivolous habeas petitions prior to any answer or other pleading by the state."), and therefore, the undersigned considers Craig's petition for writ of habeas corpus.
This Court need not discuss the facts of this habeas case at length. It is clear, based upon the documents provided by the petitioner, that the trial court conducted a suppression hearing prior to Craig's trial on May 14, 1998 and denied his motion to suppress marijuana seized from a tote bag. (Doc. 1, Exhibits 12 13, Tr. 4-46). Moreover, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals entered a lengthy memorandum opinion affirming the trial court's denial of the suppression motion. (Doc. 1, Exhibit 3) In its memorandum decision affirming the denial of the suppression motion, the appellate court made no mention of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Guapi, supra, though that case was factually on all fours with this case, but instead focused its analysis, as did the Guapi panel, on the Supreme Court's decision in Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). Compare Doc. 1, Exhibit 3 with Guapi, supra, 144 F.3d at 1393-1397.
In order to review Craig's Fourth Amendment claim(s), this Court need conclude that petitioner "did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim in a state court proceeding." Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1125 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-495, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3052-3053, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) ("[W]here the state has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial."); Bradley v. Nagle, 212 F.3d 559, 564 (11th Cir. 2000) ("The Supreme Court . . . has held that federal courts are precluded from conducting post-conviction review of Fourth Amendment claims where state courts have provided `an opportunity for full and fair litigation' of those claims."); Huynh v. King, 95 F.3d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1996) ("In this circuit, we have construed Stone v. Powell to bar consideration of a Fourth Amendment claim if the state has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of the claim `whether or not the defendant employs those processes.'"). Full and fair consideration in the Fourth Amendment context is different depending upon whether the facts are disputed or undisputed. See Mincey, supra, 206 F.3d at 1126.
For a claim to be fully and fairly considered by the state courts, where there are facts in dispute, full and fair consideration requires consideration by the fact-finding court, and at least the availability of meaningful review by a higher state court. Where, however, the facts are undisputed, and there is nothing to be served by ordering a new evidentiary hearing, the full and fair consideration requirement is satisfied where the state appellate court, presented with an undisputed factual record, gives full consideration to defendant's Fourth Amendment claims.Id., quoting Tukes v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 508, 513-514 (11th Cir. 1990) (other citations omitted); see also Bradley, supra, 212 F.3d at 565 ("`[F]ull and fair consideration' in the context of the Fourth amendment includes `at least one evidentiary hearing in a trial court and the availability of meaningful appellate review when there are facts in dispute, and full consideration by an appellate court when the facts are not in dispute.'").
Nowhere in the instant petition does Craig contend that he was denied the opportunity to present facts to the trial court or to argue the suppression issue(s) before Alabama's appellate courts, and in fact he presented facts to the trial court at a fairly lengthy suppression hearing and argued the denial of the suppression motion both to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and to the Supreme Court of Alabama in numerous briefs filed in those courts. Rather, Craig's sole argument in this Court is that this Court should hear and decide the suppression issue(s) presented in this case because of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals' failure, in its lengthy memorandum opinion affirming the trial court's denial of the suppression motion, to apply the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Guapi in evaluating his claim(s). It is all too clear that courts can and do disagree upon the application of Supreme Court precedent to identical factual scenarios as did the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals in this case and the Eleventh Circuit in Guapi. Compare Doc. 1, Exhibit 3 with Guapi, supra (the two courts analyzed almost identical factual scenarios in light of Florida v. Bostick). Just because a state court reaches a different conclusion than its federal counterpart on almost identical facts and in so doing fails to address its federal counterpart's decision does not mean that full and fair consideration was not given to the suppression claim particularly where both courts' analysis of the issue was based upon application of Supreme Court precedent. As was recently stated by a panel of the Eleventh Circuit in Bradley, supra, "[w]e cannot now say that [petitioner] was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claims, even were we to disagree with the state courts' analysis or conclusion. To do so would vitiate the Supreme Court's decision in Stone, which we are not empowered to do." 212 F.3d at 565.
This Court should be no more inclined to vitiate the Stone decision in this case and therefore, the undersigned recommends that the Court find that it is precluded from reviewing Craig's Fourth Amendment claim(s).
CONCLUSION
The Magistrate Judge recommends that Craig's request for habeas corpus relief be denied because this Court is precluded from conducting post-conviction review of Fourth Amendment claims where, as here, Alabama's state courts have provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of those claims.
The attached sheet contains important information regarding objections to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.
DONE.