Craig v. State

Full title: CLIFFORD ORAN CRAIG APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

Court: COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH

Date published: Feb 20, 2014

NO. 02-12-00544-CR (Tex. App. Feb. 20, 2014)

Opinion

NO. 02-12-00544-CR

02-20-2014

CLIFFORD ORAN CRAIG APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

PER CURIAM

FROM THE 297TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

MEMORANDUM OPINION¹

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

Appellant Clifford Oran Craig was convicted in 1985 of aggravated sexual assault of a child. The jury assessed his punishment at life imprisonment, the trial court sentenced him accordingly, and we affirmed his conviction.² In August 2009, Appellant filed a pro se motion for postconviction DNA testing in the trial court under chapter 64 of the code of criminal procedure.³ He received appointed counsel the next day and filed a supplemental motion in July 2010. The trial court denied the motion on March 30, 2011.

2 See Craig v. State, 704 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1986, pet. ref'd).

3 See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.01 (West Supp. 2013).

Appellant's court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In the brief, counsel avers that, in his professional opinion, this appeal is frivolous. Counsel's brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California⁴ by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for appeal.⁵ This court gave Appellant the opportunity to file a brief on his own behalf, and Appellant filed a pro se brief raising two issues. The State also filed a brief.

4 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967).

5 See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922-23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.).

After an appellant's court-appointed counsel files a motion to withdraw on the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, we are obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record to see if there is any arguable ground that may be raised on his behalf.⁶ Only then may we grant counsel's motion to withdraw.⁷

6 See Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511; Mays, 904 S.W.2d at 923.

7 See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82-83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).

We have carefully reviewed the record and the briefs filed by Appellant, his counsel, and the State. We agree with counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in the record that arguably might support any appeal.⁸ Accordingly, we grant the motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court's order denying DNA testing.

8 See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
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PER CURIAM PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ. DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)