Opinion
24A-CR-43
07-24-2024
Sean Michael Craft, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Christopher Tayor-Price Taylor-Price Law, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Andrew A. Kobe Section Chief, Criminal Appeals Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Sullivan Circuit Court Trial Court Cause No. 77C01-2308-F6-399 The Honorable Robert E. Hunley II, Judge
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Christopher Tayor-Price Taylor-Price Law, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Andrew A. Kobe Section Chief, Criminal Appeals Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Tavitas, Judge
Case Summary
[¶1] Sean Craft was convicted of attempted residential entry, a Level 6 felony, and adjudicated to be an habitual offender. During the trial, the State elicited evidence regarding: (1) a trespass warning Craft received from a different location on the night of the offense; and (2) Craft's previous conviction for burglary. Craft appeals and argues that the admission of this evidence constitutes fundamental error. Based on the overwhelming evidence against Craft, we find no merit to this argument. Accordingly, we affirm.
Issue
[¶2] Craft raises one issue, which we restate as whether the admission of evidence regarding the trespass warning and previous burglary conviction constitutes fundamental error.
Facts
[¶3] In August 2023, Indiana State Police ("ISP") Trooper Matthew Rea lived in a house in Cass County. The house is connected to a garage by a breezeway with a breezeway door. The garage is located at the end of an eighty- to ninety-foot driveway.
[¶4] On August 17, 2023, Trooper Rea was on a work assignment in Indianapolis. Shortly after midnight that night, Trooper Rea's home security cameras captured a video of Craft riding his bicycle to the breezeway door at the end of Trooper Rea's driveway, where Craft looked to his right and left and then back toward the street. Craft then rode to the garage attached to the house and again looked back toward the street. At the garage door, he pressed up against one of the higher panels with his hand and then pulled up on one of the lower panels. The garage would not open. Craft then rode away from the house. No one in Trooper Rea's household gave Craft permission to be on the property.
[¶5] Trooper Rea received a notification from his home security system. He watched the security footage and, later that morning, forwarded it to another ISP trooper, who in turn forwarded it to ISP Trooper Justin Bell. Trooper Bell had seen Craft earlier that morning walking along the street. After watching the security footage, Trooper Bell encountered Craft walking along the street again later that day. Craft was wearing essentially the same clothes as he had worn in the security footage.
[¶6] Trooper Bell's encounter with Craft was captured on Trooper Bell's bodycam. Trooper Bell asked Craft if he was "around houses around town last night," and Craft told him that Craft had already spoken with other officers and "got that cleared up." State's Ex. 9 at 0:47. Craft stated that he "knocked on one door cause - It was the wrong f*****g house, man." Id. at 1:02. Trooper Bell informed Craft that he was a suspect, and Craft stated, "[T]here's enough evidence for your guys's side [sic] . . . For whatever you're gonna take me to jail for." Id. at 1:49. Trooper Bell arrested Craft. In a subsequent search incident to arrest, Trooper Bell discovered in Craft's pocket a yellow "Criminal Trespass Warning" from the Sullivan County Sheriff's Office regarding a Casey's gas station. Id. at 4:31.
[¶7] The State ultimately charged Craft with attempted residential entry, a Level 6 felony, and alleged that Craft was an habitual offender. Prior to trial, Craft filed a motion in limine to preclude the State from introducing evidence regarding "uncharged prior criminal conduct or acts of the Defendant outside the scope of the charging information," which the trial court granted. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 61.
[¶8] A bifurcated jury trial commenced on October 31, 2023. In the first phase of the trial, the security footage capturing the incident was admitted into evidence. Additionally, Trooper Bell testified that, during the search incident to arrest, he discovered the trespass warning, which he described as a "criminal trespass order," in Craft's pocket. Tr. Vol. II p. 146. The following exchange then took place:
Prosecutor: So, that was the yellow piece of paper you took out of his pocket?
Trooper Bell: Yes, that was the yellow piece of paper.
Prosecutor: It was the No Trespass Order? Trooper Bell: Yes.
Prosecutor: Did you happen to read what the date was on that No Trespass Order?
Trooper Bell: It was the same date, August 17th.
Prosecutor: So, not only did the Defendant commit attempted residential [e]ntry that night. He was also trespassed from Casey's that night?
Trooper Bell: Yes[,] the Casey's [g]as [s]tation.Id.
[¶9] Craft testified in his own defense. He admitted that he was the person in the security footage, that he "pushed" and "pull[ed] up" on the garage door panels, and that he did not have permission to be at the house. Id. at 165. According to Craft, he was "looking for a girl" who was "[i]n her teens. 16, 17." Id. at 157. Craft claimed he had been sent by the girl's aunt, and this was the first time Craft had been sent to look for her. Craft testified that he did not go to the front door because "whenever I left the house [the aunt] told me to check in the garage cause, uh, the girl I was looking for was with her boyfriend and I didn't want to get anybody in trouble.... I thought about knocking but, I didn't want to wake anybody up or, get anybody in trouble." Id. at 158. Craft further testified that he was "just going to open the [garage] door" but was not going to "enter the residence." Id. at 169.
[¶10] During the State's cross-examination of Craft, the following exchange took place:
Prosecutor: So, on the same night, you just admitted that you tried to pull up on his garage door, that you didn't
have permission to, were you kicked out of any place else that you shouldn't have been?
Craft: [I] got a No Trespass Order on Casey's.
Prosecutor: From that night?
Craft: Yes.
Prosecutor: So, on the same night you were also trespassed from Casey's [g]as [s]tation?
Craft: There's no loitering there.
Prosecutor: The gas station right down here on the corner across from the high school?
Craft: Yes, Ma'am.
Prosecutor: Was that before or after you attempted to break into Mr. Rea's house?
Craft: I believe it was afterwards.
Prosecutor: So, you admit that you attempted to break into his house?
Craft: No, I did not admit that I attempted to break into his house.
* * * * *
Prosecutor: Have you ever been convicted of burglary?
Craft: Yes, Ma'am.Id. at 165-66. Craft never objected to the evidence regarding the trespass warning or the burglary conviction. Craft later testified that he told people at the Casey's gas station that he was looking for the girl, but when asked why he did not tell Trooper Bell that he was looking for the girl, Craft only answered, "Um ...." Id. at 170.
[¶11] The jury found Craft guilty of attempted residential entry. In the second phase of the trial, Craft admitted to being an habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Craft to two years for the attempted residential entry conviction, and five and one-half years for the habitual offender enhancement. Craft now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶12] Craft argues that the trial court committed fundamental error by admitting evidence regarding the trespass warning and burglary conviction. We are not persuaded that the admission of this evidence constitutes fundamental error.
A. Standard of Review
[¶13] We generally review challenges to the admission of evidence for an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Combs v. State, 168 N.E.3d 985, 990 (Ind. 2021). Here, however, because Craft did not object to any of the challenged evidence, he must show that the admission thereof constitutes fundamental error. Sincere v. State, 228 N.E.3d 439, 447 (Ind.Ct.App. 2024), trans. denied. An error is fundamental if it made a fair trial impossible or was a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process that presented an undeniable and substantial potential for harm. Id. Fundamental error "is an 'extremely narrow doctrine.'" Dean v. State, 222 N.E.3d 976, 987 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023) (quoting Isom v. State, 170 N.E.3d 623, 651 (Ind. 2021)), trans. denied.
B. The admission of the trespass warning and burglary conviction does not constitute fundamental error.
[¶14] Craft argues that the admission of the trespass warning and burglary conviction violates Evidence Rule 404(b) and the motion in limine. Evidence Rule 404(b) provides that "[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character." Evid. R. 404(b)(1). The rule "is designed to prevent the jury from making the 'forbidden inference' that prior wrongful conduct suggests present guilt." Hardiman v. State, 222 N.E.3d 1049, 1055 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023) (quoting Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 681 (Ind. 2013)), trans. denied. Evidence of prior wrongful acts, however, may be admissible "'for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.'" Id. (quoting Evid. R. 404(b)(2)).
[¶15] The State does not contest that the admission of the trespass warning constitutes evidence of a prior wrongful act. The State, however, argues that this evidence was admissible under Evidence Rule 404(b)(2) "because it was relevant to Defendant's opportunity to commit the present crime and its prejudicial value was limited." Appellee's Br. p. 7. The State does not address Craft's challenge to the evidence of the burglary conviction.
[¶16] Even if we assume that the evidence of the trespass warning and prior burglary conviction should not have been admitted at trial, we conclude here that, based on the overwhelming evidence of Craft's guilt, the challenged evidence would not have impacted the jury's verdict. Any error in the admission of the challenged evidence, therefore, would not be fundamental.
[¶17] Residential entry is governed by Indiana Code Section 35-43-2-1.5, which provides: "A person who knowingly or intentionally breaks and enters the dwelling of another person commits residential entry, a Level 6 felony." Our courts have determined that an attached garage may constitute part of a dwelling. See, e.g., Shepard v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1268, 1270 (Ind.Ct.App. 2005); see also Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-107 (defining "dwelling" as "a building, structure, or other enclosed space, permanent or temporary, movable or fixed, that is a person's home or place of lodging").
[¶18] Here, the security footage shows Craft pushing and pulling up on the panels of the garage door. Before doing so, he behaved suspiciously by looking in all directions to check his surroundings. Craft admitted that he was the man in the security footage, that he did not have permission to be on the property, and that he pushed and pulled up on the panels because he wanted to open the garage door. This constitutes strong evidence that Craft committed attempted residential entry. See Cupello v. State, 27 N.E.3d 1122, 1130 (Ind.Ct.App. 2015) (noting that, "in Indiana, 'any breach of the threshold, however slight, by any part of the body' constitutes criminal residential entry") (quoting Williams v. State, 873. N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007); Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.5).
[¶19] Craft claimed at trial that he was merely looking for a missing girl and that he did not intend to enter the garage. In the security footage, however, Craft never called the girl's name nor knocked on any of the doors. Moreover, when Trooper Bell later spoke with Craft, Craft stated that he was in the area and knocked on a door, but Craft never mentioned that he was looking for a girl. Craft's testimony was inconsistent in several other areas as well.
[¶20] We conclude that, based on the overwhelming evidence of Craft's guilt, the admission of the challenged evidence did not result in fundamental error. See Halliburton, 1 N.E.3d at 683 n.7 (noting that, even if evidence of previous burglary conviction was inadmissible, the error would not be fundamental when the evidence of guilt was "overwhelming"). The trial court, therefore, did not commit fundamental error.
Conclusion
[¶21] Any error in the admission of the challenged evidence was harmless, and, therefore, the trial court did not commit fundamental error. Accordingly, we affirm.
[¶22] Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Bradford, J., concur.