Opinion
Index No. EF20211336
02-08-2022
In the Matter of the Application pursuant to CPLR Article 78 for a Writ of Certiorari and/or Mandamus, Spencer HELLWIG, Petitioner, v. COUNTY OF SARATOGA and Saratoga County Board of Supervisors, Respondents.
For Petitioner: Michael Koenig, Esq., Hinckley Allen For Respondents: Michael Hartnett, Esq., Saratoga County Attorney
For Petitioner: Michael Koenig, Esq., Hinckley Allen
For Respondents: Michael Hartnett, Esq., Saratoga County Attorney
Thomas D. Buchanan, J. This matter comes before the Court on a motion by Respondents, pursuant to CPLR § 3211, to dismiss the Verified Petition. Petitioner, formerly the County Administrator for the County of Saratoga, brought this proceeding seeking review of Respondents' decision to terminate his employment and seeking an order reinstating him to his former position.
Respondents point out that Petitioner's position was created by Local Law 7 of 1979, which specifies that the County Administrator is appointed by the Board of Supervisors and "shall serve at the pleasure of the Board." Respondents also point out that, as an "unclassified" employee, Petitioner was not entitled to the protections afforded by Civil Service Law § 75. Respondents thus argue that Petitioner was an at-will employee who could be terminated at any time at the discretion of the Board of Supervisors ( Phillips v. Town of Glenville , 160 A.D.3d 1264, 75 N.Y.S.3d 629 [3d Dept. 2018] ). Therefore, Respondents ask that the Petition be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Petitioner makes two arguments in response. First, Petitioner asserts that the Board of Supervisors did not have unfettered discretion. He cites case law for the proposition that he could not be terminated in bad faith or for improper or impermissible reasons (see e.g. Duncan v. Kelly , 9 N.Y.3d 1024, 853 N.Y.S.2d 260, 882 N.E.2d 872 [2008] ). Petitioner argues that Respondents acted in bad faith and with improper motives by "scapegoating" him for an unpopular decision by the Board of Supervisors to increase compensation for essential employees who worked during the COVID-19 pandemic shutdown. Second, Petitioner argues that the Board of Supervisors ignored the County's own policies, including its progressive discipline policy and work rules, by terminating him without pursuing progressive measures and affording him a hearing.
Petitioner's first argument fails because it relies upon a line of cases dealing with termination of probationary employees. Petitioner was not a probationary employee — having been a County employee for over thirty years and having worked as County Administrator for ten of those years—and was thus not entitled to the protections that are sometimes afforded to probationary employees (see e.g. Zaretsky v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp. , 196 A.D.2d 454, 601 N.Y.S.2d 290 [1st Dept. 1993] ). Petitioner's second argument fails because Respondent's Disciplinary Action policy, which states that appropriate procedures for termination of most employees can be found in the applicable collective bargaining agreement or in Civil Service Law § 75, further specifies that unclassified employees like Petitioner are not protected by either of those procedures.
Petitioner's job was created by local law, which specifically provides that he served at the pleasure of the Board of Supervisors. He was an at-will employee who could be terminated at any time for any reason or for no reason ( Phillips , 160 A.D.3d at 1267, 75 N.Y.S.3d 629 ; see Maldonado v. DiBre , 140 A.D.3d 1501, 35 N.Y.S.3d 731 [3d Dept. 2016] ). Petitioner fails to identify a constitutionally impermissible purpose or statutory proscription that would provide an exception to this rule (see Smalley v. The Dreyfus Corp. , 10 N.Y.3d 55, 58, 853 N.Y.S.2d 270, 882 N.E.2d 882 [2008] ).
The parties' remaining contentions have been considered, but do not alter the outcome of this motion. Therefore, in consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED, that the motion by Respondents is granted in all respects, and the Verified Petition in this proceeding is hereby dismissed.