Opinion
Civil Action 4:21-cv-3797-MGL-TER
01-09-2023
CHAVIS COX, Plaintiff, v. JOEL ANDERSON, DENNIS PATTERSON, JOSEPH STINES, STACEY RICHARDSON, ESTHER LABRADOR, JANA HOLLIS, SHERRY MACKEY, STEPHANIE SKEWES, and BRANDON BYRD, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Thomas E. Rogers, III United States Magistrate Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging various violations of his constitutional rights while detained at the Kirkland Correctional Institution. Presently before the Court are Plaintiff's Motions for Preliminary Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (ECF Nos. 36, 49). All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02 (B)(2)(e), DSC. This report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.
Other motions are pending and will be addressed by separate order.
II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff alleges in December 2020 he was transferred to Kirkland and placed in the Substantial Security Risk (SSR) unit, a supermax facility, by Defendant Anderson. Am. Compl. ¶ 20 (ECF No. 14). Plaintiff was stripped and given a smock and a mattress with no sheets for 72 hours. Am. Compl. ¶ 21. Plaintiff alleges there were freezing temperatures, even with mobile heating units, and no windows to have access to natural light. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24, 26. Plaintiff alleges that confinement in the SSR unit deprives him of basic human needs such as meaningful social contact, environmental stimuli, adequate sleep and exercise, natural sunlight, and care for mental health and physical health. Am. Compl. ¶ 29.
Plaintiff alleges that the policies in place for administrative review of SSR placement are constitutionally inadequate to protect his liberty and avoid long-term solitary confinement. Am. Compl. ¶ 30. He alleges he was placed on security detention in February of 2021 and was not afforded the right to attend the hearing. Am. Compl. ¶ 39. Another review was held June 8, 2021, and Plaintiff was recommended for max custody by Defendants Hollis and Mackey. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40, 43. The recommendation was forwarded to the RHU Multidisciplinary Committee, which included Defendant Anderson, Patterson, Stines, Richardson, Byrd, Labrador, and Skewes on June 22, 2021. Am. Compl. ¶ 45. Another placement review was held September 9, 2021, and Defendant Hollis informed Plaintiff that he would remain in SSR until Defendant Anderson deemed it necessary for him to be released to another institution. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51, 52. Plaintiff's next review was November 4, 2021, and it was recommended that Plaintiff remain in max custody. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 54, 55.
Plaintiff complains that his placement in SSR restricts or severely limits his ability to purchase canteen or general writing materials like paper, envelopes, and pens, his phone usage is limited to 15 minutes, and he is unable to purchase books. Am. Compl. ¶ 56. Plaintiff is required to be strip-searched anytime he exits his cell for any reason at all, there is mold everywhere, expired food has been served, he is not provided bleach on a daily basis and is only provided chemicals to clean two days a week. Am. Compl. ¶ 57. He has not been provided access to a kiosk or tablet. Am. Compl. ¶ 60. He has not been provided with adequate mental health treatment. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 65-66.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hollis conducted a random shakedown on December 15, 2021, and confiscated six to eight People magazines from Plaintiff, though they were approved by the postal director. Am. Compl. ¶ 35. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Hollis further deprived him of the opportunity to participate in a Legal Assistant/Paralegal course because of his placement in segregation. Am. Compl. ¶ 37.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff seeks the same relief in his motions. He seeks “an order enjoining and restraining Defendant Joel Anderson ... from housing Plaintiff in Supermax SSR unit or any other unit with Supermax likeness and similar customs, in addition, assigning Plaintiff to any max custody level related to SSR.” ECF No. 36; see also ECF No. 49.
In Capital Associated Industries, Inc. v. Cooper, 129 F.Supp.3d 281, 287-88 (M.D. N.C. 2015), the court succinctly set forth the applicable Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit law regarding preliminary injunctions:
“The standard for granting either a TRO or preliminary injunction is the same.” Sarsour v. Trump, 245 F.Supp.3d 719, 728 (E.D. Va. 2017).
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy involving the exercise of a very far-reaching power that is only to be employed in the limited circumstances that demand it. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008); In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir.2003), abrogated on other grounds by eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006). Whether to grant this relief is in the sound discretion of the court. Winter, 555 U.S. at 24, 129 S.Ct. 365. Courts generally employ preliminary injunctions for the limited purpose of preserving the status quo during the course of litigation in order to prevent irreparable harm and to preserve the ability of the court to render meaningful relief on the merits. Microsoft, 333 F.3d at 525. The Fourth Circuit has defined the status quo as the “last uncontested status between the parties which preceded the controversy.”
Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 320 (4th Cir.2013) (quoting Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co., 675 F.3d 355, 378 (4th Cir.2012)). The party seeking a preliminary injunction bears the burden of justifying such relief. Wagner v. Bd. of Educ., 335 F.3d 297, 302 (4th Cir.2003). To prevail on a motion for preliminary injunction, a party must establish “[1] that [it] is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that [it] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in its favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 365.
Such a remedy “is a matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow from success on the merits as a matter of course.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 32, 129 S.Ct. 365. “In each case, courts ‘must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.' ”Id. at 24, 129 S.Ct. 365 (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542, 107 S.Ct. 1396, 94 L.Ed.2d 542 (1987)). In doing so, the Supreme Court has instructed federal courts to “pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” Id. Even in cases where a plaintiff has shown likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm, the balance of equities and the public interest factors can weigh in favor of denying a preliminary injunction. See id. at 23-24, 31 n. 5, 129 S.Ct. 365.
In his motions, Plaintiff asserts that he can show a likelihood of success on the merits on both his Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim and his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from cruel and unusual living conditions. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). “[T]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons,” however, and conditions that are “restrictive and even harsh ... are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Id. at 347-49. It is well established that “only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). To sustain a living conditions claim, a prisoner must show that (1) objectively, the deprivation was sufficiently serious, in that the challenged official acts caused the denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities”; and (2) subjectively, the defendant prison officials acted with “deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). In addition, to establish a procedural due process violation in this case, Plaintiff must first demonstrate that he had a protected liberty interest in avoiding solitary confinement. Smith v. Collins, 964 F.3d 266, 274 (4th Cir. 2020). A convicted prisoner “does not have an inherent, constitutionally protected liberty interest in [avoiding or] release from solitary confinement.” Id. at 275. Thus, first, “he must identify a state-created liberty interest in avoiding solitary confinement,” by showing “a basis for an interest or expectation in state regulations” for avoiding such confinement, and second, [he must show] that the conditions impose atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. (applying principles outlined in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)).
While Plaintiff presents several articles discussing solitary confinement, they are not sufficient to show a likelihood of success on the merits of his particular claims. Plaintiff asserts that he has “adequately alleged that he has suffered weight loss, vitamin D deficiency, sensory and sleep deprivation, and has pre-existing mental illness that is at substantial risk of further exacerbation and serious harm. ECF No. 36-1, p. 4. However, as set forth above, “the burden placed upon Plaintiff[ ] to show that each requirement of a preliminary injunction is met is high. Consequently, merely ‘providing sufficient factual allegations to meet the [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 12(b)(6) standard of Twombly and Iqbal' does not show a likelihood of success on the merits.” J.O.P. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 338 F.R.D. 33, 60 (D. Md. 2020) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Warns, Civil No. CCB-11-1846, 2012 WL 681792, at *14 (D. Md. Feb. 29, 2012)). “Courts have declined to issue a preliminary injunction when there are significant factual disputes.” Chattery Int'l, Inc. v. JoLida, Inc., Civil No. WDQ-10-2236, 2011 WL 1230822, at *9 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2011). To demonstrate a likelihood of success on a claim, a “plaintiff need not establish a ‘certainty of success,' but must make a clear showing that he is likely to succeed at trial.” Di Biase v. SPX Corp., 872 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Pashby, 709 F.3d at 321). Plaintiff has failed to do so.
As to irreparable harm, the movant must show the harm to be “neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent.” Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Medical Group, 952 F.2d 802, 812 (4th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). “Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with [the Supreme Court's] characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)).
The remaining factors, the balance of equities and public interest factors, find in favor of denying a preliminary injunction as well. With respect to the balance of equities, the Fourth Circuit has long held that “absent the most extraordinary circumstances, federal courts are not to immerse themselves in the management of state prisons.” Taylor v. Freeman, 34 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 1994). In Taylor, the Fourth Circuit stated that “sweeping intervention in the management of state prisons is rarely appropriate when exercising the equitable powers of the federal courts. This is true where conditions at the prison have been adjudged unconstitutional following trial on the merits. It is especially true where mandatory injunctive relief is sought and only preliminary findings as to the plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits have been made.” Id. at 269; see also Price v. City of Fayetteville, N.C. , No. 5:13-CV-150-FL, 2013 WL 1751391, at *4 (E.D. N.C. Apr. 23, 2013) (citing E. Tenn. Nat. Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 828 (4th Cir.2004); Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir.1980)) (noting that the Fourth Circuit has recognized that a stricter standard is required for a mandatory preliminary injunction, which does not preserve the status quo, and that such an injunction is only granted in very specific circumstances, usually only when extreme or serious damage will result). The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that “ ‘[t]he difficulties of operating a detention center must not be underestimated by the courts,” and that “correctional officials ... must have substantial discretion to devise reasonable solutions to the problems they face.' ” Prieto, 780 F.3d at 255 (quoting Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 326, 132 S.Ct. 1510, 1515-16 (2012)). At least one court has noted that corrections facilities are “likely to be harmed by injunctions that ‘would interfere with the daily execution of prison policies and practices,' and ‘[s]uch an interference is not the place of federal courts, which do not stand in the position of overseeing the daily operations of prisons.' ” Holloway v. Coakley, No. 2:17-CV-74, 2018 WL 1287417, at *6 (N.D. W.Va. Mar. 13, 2018) (citing Dunn v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 2013 WL 365257, at *2 (N.D. W.Va. 2013)).
Here, Plaintiff has not shown the extraordinary circumstances necessary to warrant this court's interference in the management of SCDC prior to a full adjudication on the merits. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 291 (4th Cir.1980) (holding that where “substantial issues of constitutional dimensions” are before the court, those issues “should be fully developed at trial in order to [e]nsure a proper and just resolution”); Price v. City of Fayetteville, No. 5:13-CV-150-FL, 2013 WL 1751391, at *4 (E.D. N.C. Apr. 23, 2013) (“‘On an application for preliminary injunction, the court is not bound to decide doubtful and difficult questions of law or disputed questions of fact,' and ‘[a]s a prerequisite to the issuance of an interlocutory injunction, ... [t]here must be no disputed issues of fact'” (quoting Gantt v. Clemson Agric. Coll. of S.C., 208 F.Supp. 416, 418-19 (W.D.S.C.1962)).
With respect to whether the preliminary injunction is in the public interest, this question “certainly presents conflicting considerations. On one hand, the general public has an interest in ensuring that the constitutional protections afforded to the public, including those imprisoned, are vindicated; on the other hand, the public most certainly has an interest in the effective management of the prison system, both for the safety of the general public and those in the prison system, whether they be inmates or administrators.” Holloway, 2018 WL 1287417, at *7. Nevertheless, given the Supreme Court's “consistent counseling to give great deference to the experience of prison administrators, particularly when the decisions relate to security, id. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)); see also Florence, 566 U.S. at 326 (“[C]orrectional officials ... must have substantial discretion to devise reasonable solutions to the problems they face.”); Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132, 123 S.Ct. 2162, 2168 (2003) (holding that in the prison setting, courts should give substantial deference to the judgment of prison administrators), Plaintiff fails to show that his requested injunction would be in the public interest.
Failure to satisfy any one of the relevant Winter factors mandates denial of the preliminary injunction. The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 575 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, 559 U.S. 1089, 130 S.Ct. 2371, 176 L.Ed.2d 764 (2010). Accordingly, because Plaintiff fails to meet all four Winter factors, the requested preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order for release from the Supermax SSR unit should be denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Plaintiff's Motions for Preliminary Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (ECF Nos. 36, 49) be denied.
The parties are directed to the important information on the following page.