Opinion
No. 343, 2001
Decided: January 15, 2002
Superior Court New Castle County Cr.A. Nos. IN99-05-0430; 1742; 1743 IN99-08-1097; 1099; 1101.
Affirmed
Unpublished Opinion is below.
WARREN E. COVERDALE, Defendant Below-Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below-Appellee. No. 343, 2001 Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. Decided: January 15, 2002
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices
ORDER
This 15th day of January 2002, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The defendant-appellant, Warren E. Coverdale, filed an appeal from the July 3, 2001 order of the Superior Court denying his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. We find no merit to the appeal. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
(2) In this appeal, Coverdale claims that his counsel provided ineffective representation by failing to: a) file a motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds of insufficient evidence and an untimely indictment; b) request discovery material from the State; and c) investigate the circumstances of the charges against him. He contends that his counsel's ineffective assistance caused him to enter a coerced guilty plea.
Coverdale also claims that the Superior Court abused its discretion by not requiring the State to file a response to his motion for postconviction relief.
(3) In August 2000, Coverdale pleaded guilty to Trafficking in Heroin, Use of a Vehicle for Keeping Controlled Substances, Resisting Arrest, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Assault in the Second Degree, and Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited. He was sentenced to a total of 20 years at Level V incarceration, to be suspended after 14 years for decreasing levels of probation.
SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 11(e)(1)(C).
In return for his guilty plea, the State dismissed additional pending charges of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, Assault in the First Degree, Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, Conspiracy in the Second Degree and Reckless Endangering in the First Degree.
(4) We have reviewed carefully the transcript of Coverdale's plea colloquy and sentencing. In response to the questions of the Superior Court during the plea colloquy, Coverdale confirmed that he was entering the guilty plea freely and voluntarily, he was in fact guilty of each of the charges to which he was pleading guilty and he had been afforded sufficient time to review the plea carefully with his counsel. The transcript clearly reflects that Coverdale's guilty plea was knowingly and intelligently entered. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Coverdale is bound by his representations at the time he entered his plea.
Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997).
Moreover, Coverdale's voluntary plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of any defects or errors occurring prior to the entry of the plea.
Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309, 312-13 (Del. 1988).
(6) There is no support for Coverdale's allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel. There is no evidence in the record reflecting that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or prejudiced him. In the context of Coverdale's guilty plea, it is his burden to demonstrate that, but for counsel's alleged errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. While Coverdale recites the correct standard in his brief, he provides no factual support for his claim.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984).
Id.
(7) Coverdale's final claim that the Superior Court abused its discretion by not requiring the State to respond to his postconviction motion is also without merit. It was within the Superior Court's discretion to determine whether a response from the State or additional materials were required before a decision on Coverdale's motion for postconviction relief could be rendered. The record reflects no abuse of discretion on the part of the Superior Court in summarily dismissing Coverdale's motion.
SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(f)(1).
SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(g)(2).
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.