Opinion
16-cv-07244-EMC
09-22-2023
COUPA SOFTWARE INCORPORATED, Plaintiff, v. DCR WORKFORCE, INC., Defendant.
ORDER CONDITIONALLY GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL
DOCKET NO. 43
EDWARD M. CHEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
In the instant case, Coupa Software, Inc. has filed suit against DCR Workforce, Inc. This case is related to an earlier case filed by DCR against Coupa. See DCR Workforce, Inc. v. Coupa Software Inc., No. C-21-6066 EMC (N.D. Cal.). That case shall hereinafter be referred to as DCR I.
DCR I reached a final resolution in May 2023 following a voluntary dismissal by DCR. DCR then filed a new suit - hereinafter referred to as DCR II - in state court, pursuing in part claims that it had voluntarily dismissed in DCR I. This led Coupa to file the pending action in which it seeks to enjoin the state court proceedings in DCR II. This Court held a hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction filed by Coupa. At the hearing, the Court indicated that it was not inclined to grant the motion. The Court also noted that the state court could address the merits of Coupa's position that DCR was barred from litigating DCR II based on DCR I (i.e., due to res judicata).
Now pending before the Court is Coupa's motion for voluntary dismissal of this suit. Coupa seeks a dismissal without prejudice. DCR opposes the motion, essentially indicating that the dismissal should be with prejudice. Alternatively, DCR argues that a dismissal without prejudice should be conditioned on Coupa paying DCR its attorneys' fees for litigating this case.
Having considered the parties' briefs and accompanying submissions, as well as all other evidence of record, the Court finds this matter suitable for resolution without oral argument and thus VACATES the hearing on Coupa's motion. Coupa's motion for voluntary dismissal is hereby CONDITIONALLY GRANTED. The granting of the motion is conditioned on Coupa's dismissal of this case with prejudice.
I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Cases
As indicated above, in addition to the pending case, there are two other cases are relevant for purposes of adjudicating the pending motion for voluntary dismissal.
DCR I. DCR filed this suit against Coupa in 2021. In its complaint, DCR alleged that it had entered into a contract with Coupa in 2018. Under the contract, known as the Asset Purchase Agreement, DCR sold, transferred, and assigned certain products to Coupa. In exchange, DCR was given certain compensation; furthermore, it was entitled to additional compensation if certain benchmarks were achieved. DCR initiated the suit claiming that Coupa had violated the terms of the Asset Purchase Agreement - e.g., by failing to issue the additional compensation that DCR was owed. See generally DCR I (Docket No. 68) (Order at 1-4). This Court granted Coupa's motion to dismiss and did not permit amendment because of futility. See DCR I (Docket No. 68) (Order at 21).
DCR appealed the dismissal in DCR I. Not all dismissed claims were appealed. See Compl. ¶ 5. The Ninth Circuit granted in part and reversed in part. The appellate court upheld dismissal of certain claims but held that, for other claims, this Court should have allowed DCR the opportunity to amend. See DCR I (Docket No. 97) (order). After the Ninth Circuit's mandate issued, DCR voluntarily dismissed DCR I without prejudice. See DCR I (Docket No. 99) (notice of dismissal); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i) (providing that a “plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by filing . . . a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment”).
DCR II. Following the voluntary dismissal of DCR I, DCR filed a new suit against Coupa - DCRII - in state court. According to Coupa, “DCRII seeks to relitigate the same primary right that [this] Court considered - and dismissed - in DCR I.” Compl. ¶ 6.
Pending suit. The pending suit filed by Coupa followed. Coupa alleges that
DCR should be barred from relitigating this same primary right. The federal All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, authorizes federal district courts to “issue all writs . . . in aid of” a federal court's jurisdiction. The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, authorizes federal district courts to enjoin state court proceedings “to protect or effectuate” a federal court's judgment. Equitable relief to enjoin DCR II is proper here because DCR's decision to split and relitigate its claims contravenes principles of res judicata and claim preclusion. DCR had the opportunity in DCR I to litigate all of the issues relating to the APA's earnout and Holdback Cash provisions and, further, to re-plead some of the allegations the District Court dismissed with prejudice. DCR squandered that opportunity when it voluntarily dismissed DCR I. In addition to prejudicing Coupa, DCR's tactics implicate important public interests because they threaten to waste precious judicial resources. Coupa therefore requests that this Court preliminarily and permanently enjoin DCR from pursuing DCR II.Compl. ¶ 7.
B. Motions Filed in this Suit
Shortly after it filed the complaint in this suit, Coupa filed a motion for preliminary injunction. In the motion, Coupa asked the Court to issue a preliminary injunction barring DCR from pursuing its claims against Coupa in DCR II. Coupa argued that “[f]ederal courts have authority under the All Writs Act to ‘enjoin state court proceedings in order to protect the res judicata effect of their own judgments.'” Docket No. 18 (Mot. at 1). In other words, Coupa took the position that, in light of what took place in DCR I, DCR II was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.
DCR opposed the preliminary injunction motion. In its opposition, it underscored that
an injunction of state-court proceedings pursuant to the relitigation exception of the Anti-Injunction Act (28 U.S.C. § 2283), in particular, is rare indeed because “[d]eciding whether and how prior litigation has preclusive effect is usually the bailiwick of the second court” (Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 307 (2011)). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit, noting that “the use of injunctions against [state court] relitigation poses a disturbing problem for our system of justice,” has held that there is a “strong presumption” against such injunctions. Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 49 F.4th 1300, 1307 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation and quotation marks omitted). For this Court to “resort[] to [the] heavy artillery” of
enjoining a state- court action, Plaintiff Coupa Software Incorporated (“Coupa”) must show that it is “clear beyond peradventure” that the state-court case filed by Defendant DCR Workforce, Inc. (“DCR”) is barred by res judicata.Docket No. 24 (Opp'n at 1) (emphasis added). DCR also went to address the merits of the res judicata issue.
Briefing on the preliminary injunction motion was completed in late July 2023. See Docket No. 26 (reply, filed on 7/24/2023). About a week later, DCR filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in which it made the same basic arguments that it had made in opposition to the preliminary injunction motion. See Docket No. 32 (motion, filed on 8/3/2023). A week after DCR filed its motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court held a hearing on Coupa's preliminary injunction motion. See Docket No. 35 (minutes for 8/10/2023 hearing). Both the transcript of the hearing and the minutes for the hearing reflect that the Court intended to deny the motion for a preliminary injunction because “[Coupa] has not shown that claim preclusion is clear beyond per adventure.” Docket No. 35 (minutes); see also Docket No. 39 (Tr. at 5-6, 14-15) (Court stating that “the question of claim preclusion or not . . . there are authorities on each side, but I don't see this as clear beyond peradventure”; “it seems to me the proper thing to do is to say the standard under the Anti-Injunction Act, a very rigorous standard, is not met here, and [this] Court should refrain . . . and let the state court decide the question of claim preclusion or not,” and, therefore, “I'm going to deny the injunction and let the state court exercise its intellectual muscle on this one”).
About two weeks after the preliminary injunction hearing, Coupa filed an opposition to DCR's motion for judgment on the pleadings (which, as noted above, made the same basic arguments that were made in DCR's opposition to the preliminary injunction motion). See Docket No. 42 (opposition). Then, a week later, Coupa filed the pending motion for voluntary dismissal.In the motion, Coupa asks for a dismissal without prejudice. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2).
Coupa had to move for relief because, in early August 2023, DCR filed an answer to Coupa's complaint. See Docket No. 30 (answer); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i) (providing that a “plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by filing . . . a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment”).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 provides in relevant part as follows: “Except as provided in Rule 41(a)(1), an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper....Unless the order states otherwise, a dismissal under this paragraph (2) is without prejudice.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2). “The purpose of Rule 41(a)(2) is to permit the plaintiff to dismiss the action while avoiding prejudice to the defendant through the imposition of curative conditions.” Moore's Fed. Prac. - Civ. § 41.40[1]; see also Stevedoring Serv. of Am. v. Armilla Int'l B.V., 889 F.2d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The purpose of the rule is to permit a plaintiff to dismiss an action without prejudice so long as the defendant will not be prejudiced.”). “A dismissal without prejudice should be denied when the defendant will suffer ‘plain legal prejudice,' but should normally be granted in absence of such prejudice.” Moore's § 41.40[5][a]; see also Smith v. Lenches, 263 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A district court should grant a motion for voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) unless a defendant can show that it will suffer some plain legal prejudice as a result.”).
“[L]egal prejudice” means “prejudice to some legal interest, some legal claim, some legal argument.” . . . “[U]ncertainty because a dispute remains unresolved” or because “the threat of future litigation . . . causes uncertainty” does not result in plain legal prejudice. Also, plain legal prejudice does not result merely because the defendant will be inconvenienced by having to defend in another forum or where a plaintiff would gain a tactical advantage by that dismissal.Id. at 976.
[C]ourts have enumerated a number of factors relevant to the consideration of whether the defendant will be prejudiced by the grant of a voluntary dismissal without prejudice. No one set of factors has been adopted in any particular circuit ....
Nevertheless, the factors most commonly considered on a motion for a voluntary dismissal are: (1) the extent to which the suit has progressed, including the defendant's effort and expense in preparing for trial, (2) the plaintiff's diligence in prosecuting the action or in bringing the motion, (3) the duplicative expense of relitigation, and (4) the adequacy of plaintiff's explanation for the need to dismiss. Other factors that have been cited include whether the motion is made after the defendant has made a dispositive
motion or at some other critical juncture in the case and any vexatious conduct or bad faith on plaintiff's part.
Moore's § 41.40[6]. Another factor particularly pertinent here is “‘whether the plaintiff is requesting a voluntary dismissal only to avoid a near-certain adverse ruling.'” Telegram Messenger Inc. v. Lantah, LLC, No. 18-cv-02811-CRB, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153614, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2020) (quoting Maxum Indem. Ins. Co. v. A-1 All Am. Roofing Co., 299 Fed.Appx. 664, 666 (9th Cir. 2008)); see also Moore's § 41.40[7][b][v] (“District courts have broad discretion to deny a motion for voluntary dismissal when the purpose is to avoid an adverse determination on the merits of the action.”).
B. Legal Prejudice
DCR argues that it would suffer plain legal prejudice if the Court were to dismiss without prejudice for two reasons: (1) Coupa is moving to dismiss without prejudice in order to avoid a near-certain adverse ruling (which would be a dismissal with prejudice); and (2) a dismissal without prejudice would mean that DCR could not assert prevailing party status, a predicate to attorneys' fees. DCR's first argument is persuasive.
At the time that Coupa filed its motion for voluntary dismissal, two things had already occurred: (1) the Court had held its hearing on Coupa's motion for preliminary injunction at which time it indicated that it would be denying the motion because it was not clear beyond peradventure that res judicata barred DCR II (and that therefore Coupa should take up the issue with the state court) and (2) DCR had filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings making the same basic argument that the Court should not enjoin DCR II since it was not clear beyond peradventure that res judicata was a bar. Since the Court indicated that it would be ruling against Coupa on the preliminary injunction motion (i.e., it would not enjoin DCR II), there is no reason why Coupa would expect to successfully oppose DCR's motion for judgment on the pleadings.
In its reply brief, Coupa argues that “there is no rule that a pending dispositive motion bars voluntary dismissal.” Reply at 3. This is true. However, Coupa ignores that the writing on the wall was clear as to how the motion for judgment on the pleadings would be resolved - i.e., against it and in DCR's favor. The case on which Coupa relies is distinguishable for this very reason. See Egan v. Singer, No. 14-00177 SOM/BMK, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119453, at *5 (D. Haw. Aug. 27, 2014) (noting that in a decision cited by the defendant, “the district court had indicated prior to the motion for voluntary dismissal how it intended to rule on the underlying claims,” but, “[i]n this case, the court has given no such indication”); see also Hepp v. Conoco, Inc., 97 Fed.Appx. 124, 125 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that defendant's “loss of an opportunity to raise a legal argument” was “not an injury to an actual legal right,” and therefore was not legal prejudice; “[b]ecause there is nothing in the record establishing that [the defendant] was entitled to have [its] motion granted in its favor, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the [plaintiffs'] motion for voluntary dismissal”).
Likewise, even if, as Coupa argues, some other factors commonly considered for Rule 41 motions weigh in Coupa's favor, that is not dispositive. For instance, even though this case has not progressed much and Coupa has acted fairly quickly in seeking dismissal, those considerations do not outweigh Coupa's attempt to avoid a near-certain adverse judgment.
Because DCR's first argument on legal prejudice has merit, the Court need not entertain DCR's second argument. The Court notes, however, that the second argument appears problematic. Even if the unpublished authority cited by DCR were binding, see United States v. Ito, 472 Fed.Appx. 841, 842 (9th Cir. 2012) (vacating dismissal without prejudice because “dismissal without prejudice precludes prevailing party status,” and “[w]ithout prevailing party status, the Itos were unable to bring their attorney's fees motion under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act[;] [t]he Itos suffered plain legal prejudice in losing their ability to move for attorney's fees”), DCR's claim that it would be entitled to fees incurred in this suit under the Asset Purchase Agreement is questionable. The Asset Purchase Agreement fee-shifting provision applies where a party prevails on a suit brought to enforce or interpret the agreement. DCR's claim that Coupa brought this case to enforce or interpret the Asset Purchase Agreement is dubious: Coupa filed this case to prevent what it considers relitigation, not to enforce the Agreement, and comparing the claims in DCR I and DCR II involves at most a “look to” or “reference to” the Asset Purchase Agreement. Cf. Ramirez v. Fox Tel. Station, 998 F.2d 743, 749 (9th Cir. 1993) (in evaluating preemption under § 301 of the LMRA, stating that “reference to or consideration of the terms of a collectivebargaining agreement is not the equivalent of interpreting the meaning of the terms”; “[a]lthough the line between reference to and interpretation of an agreement may be somewhat hazy, merely referring to an agreement does not threaten the goal that prompted preemption - the desire for uniform interpretation of labor contract terms”).
C. Remedy
Because DCR has established legal prejudice, Coupa's request for a voluntary dismissal without prejudice may be denied. The Court, however, has the authority to grant the motion for voluntary dismissal conditioned on a dismissal with prejudice. See, e.g., Moore's § 41.40[10][d][vii] (“The district court may impose a condition on a voluntary dismissal requiring that the dismissal be with prejudice. The factors considered in determining whether the dismissal should be with prejudice are essentially the same as those considered in determining whether the dismissal should be permitted at all .... The court may also consider whether the action or claim sought to be voluntarily dismissed is meritorious.”). This approach makes sense from an efficiency standpoint. Moreover, this approach does not materially affect Coupa as Coupa states outright that it “has no plans to refile in another court” and that “it has never suggested that it intends to do so.” Reply at 3. To be sure, Coupa argues that there should be a dismissal without prejudice to “avoid a situation in which DCR may attempt to argue that dismissal of this action has a res judicata effect on the state court action. While such an argument would undoubtedly be meritless, it would unnecessarily complicate an already complicated issue for the state court judge.” Reply at 3 n.1. This Court does not see how a dismissal of this action with prejudice would affect the res judicata analysis in which the state court would engage. Dismissal here is based on the reluctance of a federal court to interfere with a matter pending before a state court.
To be clear, the Court is not ruling or otherwise expressing any opinion on the issue of res judicata as that is an issue entirely within the province of the state court.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Coupa's motion for voluntary dismissal but CONDITIONED on Coupa agreeing to a dismissal with prejudice. Within a week of the date of this order, Coupa shall file a statement as to whether it agrees to a dismissal with prejudice. If Coupa does not agree, then its motion for voluntary dismissal shall be withdrawn, and the Court shall issue its ruling on the motion for a preliminary injunction and proceed with DCR's motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Beard v. Sheet Metal Workers Union, Local 150, 908 F.2d 474, 475-77 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that Rule 41(a)(2) language effectively provides “a reasonable period of time within which [either] to refuse the conditional voluntary dismissal by withdrawing [the] motion for dismissal or to accept the dismissal despite the imposition of conditions”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This order disposes of Docket No. 43.
IT IS SO ORDERED.