Opinion
For Opinion on Hearing, see 92 Cal.Rptr. 294, 479 P.2d 654.
Opinion on pages 549 to 558 omitted
HEARING GRANTED
See 3 Cal.3d 962 for subsequent opinion.
Keith C. Sorenson, Carolee Houser, Redwood City, for plaintiff.
Dinkelspiel & Dinkelspiel, Redwood City, for defendant.
SIMS, Associate Justice.
Defendant, whose mother is the recipient of aid to the aged under the provisions of the state Old Age Security Law (Welf. & Inst.Code, div. 9, pt. 1, ch. 3, § 12000 et seq.), has appealed from a judgment awarding the county $820 on account of aid granted his mother in the past, and ordering him to pay the sum of $20 per month, or such other sum per month as may be determined by the designated county department, pursuant to law, to be the amount which he is able to and should contribute each month to the support of his mother. (See, §§ 12100 and 12101.)
Section 12100 provides in pertinent part, 'If an adult child living within this state fails to contribute to the support of his parent as required by Section 12101, the county granting aid under this chapter may proceed against such child.' Similar provisions, governing the period prior to the effective date of section 12100 (Stats. 1965, ch. 1784, § 5, p. 4025), September 17, 1965, were contained in former section 2224 (Stats.1961, ch. 1997, § 2, p. 4210).
The son contends that it is unconscionable and unconstitutional to require an adult child to support a parent who has property of her own without providing for the return of the advancement if and when the property is sold, or when the parent dies.
The case was submitted to the trial court on the following stipulated facts: '1. Defendant, [88 Cal.Rptr. 390] Lawrence Boss, is the adult son of Johanna Boss.
'2. Johanna Boss is and has been receiving aid pursuant to the provisions of the Old Age Security Law since at least February 9, 1965 in the amount of at least $116.90 per month.
'3. On or before February 25, 1965 the San Mateo County Department of Public Health and Welfare determined the sum of $20.00 per month to be the amount which defendant was able to and should contribute each month to the support of his monther, said Johanna Boss.
'4. On October 5, 1965, defendant was notified by said Department of his obligation to contribute $20.00 per month toward the support of his mother and demand was made upon him to contribute said sum for such support.
'5. Defendant refused and still refuses to comply with said demand; that from February 25, 1965 to and including October 31, 1967, there became due and is now due and unpaid the sum of $640.00.
'6. Johanna Boss is 66 years of age and is no longer able to work. She receives social security in the amount of $64.60 per month and old age security in the amount of $116.90. She owns and lives in a house at 220 West Bellevue Avenue, San Mateo, California, which has a value of $31,800.00. Aside from said house, she owns no other real property or interest therein; she has no automobile, savings, life insurance or securities, or any other personal property of any value. Aside from occasional small sums of money from relatives, she receives no income other than social security and old age security.
'7. On or before February 25, 1965 defendant was earning $755.00 per month as a tool room mechanic supervisor. Defendant is presently earning $800.80 per month as a leading-man tool room mechanic. At no time herein was any other person dependent upon the income of defendant.'
The provisions now found in section 12100 and section 12101 have been generally enforced against adult children. (County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente (1942) 20 Cal.2d 870, 878, 129 P.2d 378; County of Alameda v. Aberle (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 424, 425, 73 Cal.Rptr. 926; County of Los Angeles v. Kasparian (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 537, 539-540, 336 P.2d 34; County of Los Angeles v. Lane (1952) 113 Cal.App.2d 476, 478, 248 P.2d 479; Kelley v. State Board of Social Welfare (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 627, 632, 186 P.2d 429; Garcia v. Superior Court (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 31, 36, 113 P.2d 470; County of Los Angeles v. Hurlbut (1941) 44 Cal.App.2d 88, 106, 111 P.2d 963, and County of Lake v. Forbes (1941) 42 Cal.App.2d 744, 746, 109 P.2d 972.)
The constitutionality of the grant of aid to the aged has been upheld against the contention that it is a gift of public moneys in violation of provisions now found in section 25 of article XIII (formerly § 31 of article IV) of the California Constitution, even though the recipients of such aid, because of the qualified property restrictions, do not constitute 'aged persons in indigent circumstances' as referred to in provisions now found in section 21 of article XIII (formerly § 22 of article IV). (County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente, supra, 20 Cal.2d 870, 875-878, 129 P.2d 378.) The court found that the care and relief of aged persons who are in need was a proper matter of state concern based upon a broad social policy to promote public health and welfare. ( Id., p. 877, 129 P.2d 378.) The principle of relative's responsibility has been upheld as against the contention that an unconstitutional discrimination is created by compelling a spouse or adult child to pay what should be a debt of the county. (Kelley v. State Board of Social Welfare, supra, 82 Cal.App.2d 627, 632, 186 P.2d 429, but cf. Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner (1964) 60 Cal.2d 716, 719-720, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720 .) It has also been ruled that the law, when it limited an action for reimbursement to those cases where the responsible relative filed an income tax [88 Cal.Rptr. 391] return, did not create a discrimination or privilege that offended the due process and equal protection of the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution, or the uniformity of operation required by section 11 of article I of the Constitution of California. (County of Los Angeles v. Hurlbut,supra, 44 Cal.App.2d 88, 92-94, 111 P.2d 963.)
In Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, supra, 60 Cal.2d 716, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720 (cert. granted (1964) 379 U.S. 811, 85 S.Ct. 39, 13 L.Ed.2d 26, remanded for further proceedings (1965) 380 U.S. 194, 85 S.Ct. 871, 13 L.Ed.2d 753 and reiterated solely on state constitutional grounds (1965) 62 Cal.2d 586, 43 Cal.Rptr. 329, 400 P.2d 321), the court ruled that the provisions of section 6650 (since July 1, 1969, found in § 7275) of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which impose liability on the children of a mentally ill person for the care, support and maintenance of the parent while he is an inmate of a state institution violated the basic constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the law. The extent to which the reasons advanced for this conclusion should be applied to other situations where the law attempts to make relatives responsible for county or state aid furnished to another has been the subject of further controversy.
The cases are summarized in In re Shaieb (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 553, 58 Cal.Rptr. 631, as follows: 'Where there exists, apart from the provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code, a legal obligation to support, that obligation may be enforced on behalf of the state or county that has furnished the needed support in a variety of situations: Against a husband under section 6650, Welfare and Institutions Code, for care of his wife in a state hospital for the insane (Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kolts, 247 Cal.App.2d 154, 55 Cal.Rptr. 437; Department of Mental Hygiene v. O'Connor. 246 Cal.App.2d 24, 54 Cal.Rptr. 432); against the parent of a feeble-minded adult to reimburse the county for payments made for care in a state hospital for the mentally deficient (In re Dudley, 239 Cal.App.2d 401, 48 Cal.Rptr. 790); against a parent for county hospital care of her minor, although emancipated, son (County of Alameda v. Kaiser, 238 Cal.App.2d 815, 48 Cal.Rptr. 343); against a parent for care of his son, a ward of the juvenile court, for the cost of care in the Juvenile Hall and in the Alameda County Boys Camp (County of Alameda v. Espinoza, 243 Cal.App.2d 534, 52 Cal.Rptr. 480)' (250 Cal.App.2d at pp. 557-558, 58 Cal.Rptr. at p. 633.) Shaieb upholds the obligation of parents, under the provisions of section 903 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, to reimburse the county for $25 per month paid to the Youth Authority to which their son had been committed by the juvenile court. ( Id., pp. 559-560, 58 Cal.Rptr. 631). A recent decision, Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Bank of America (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 949, 83 Cal.Rptr. 559 (hearing in S.Ct. denied, March 11, 1970), applies Kirchner broadly and concludes that the liability imposed on a relative by Welfare and Institutions Code section 6650 [7275] cannot be constitutionally imposed on the estate of the adult patient's father. It concludes, 'Under the reasoning of Kirchner emphasizing that it is the general public's responsibility alone to maintain adult relatives, other than spouses, in mental institutions, Civ.Code § 206, as applied to the instant case, is subject to the same constitutional infirmity as is Welfare and Institutions Code section 6650.' (3 Cal.App.3d at p. 954, 83 Cal.Rptr. at p. 503.) See also, ten Broek, California's Dual System of Family Law, part III (1965) 17 Stan.L. Rev. 614 at pp. 638-640; Graham, Public Assistance: The Right to Receive; The Obligation to Repay (1968) 43 N.Y. U.L.Rev. 451, 475 et seq.; Lewis and Levy, Family Law and Welfare Policies: The Case for 'Dual Systems' (1966) 54 Cal.L.Rev. 748, 759-761; Bendich, Privacy, Poverty and the Constitution (1966) 54 Cal.L.Rev. 407, 430, fn. 59; Rosenblum, Controlling the Bureaucracy of the Antipoverty Program (1966) 31 Law & Contemp.Prob. 187, 197; Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues (1965) 74 Yale L.J. 1245, 1248 and 1254-1255; Note (1965) 12 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 605; Note (1965) 38 So.Cal.L.Rev. 355; Note (1964) 49 Cornell L.Q. 516; Note (1964) 16 Hastings L.J. 129; Note (1957) 45 Cal.L.Rev. 77; tenBroek, The Impact of Welfare Law Upon Family Law (1954) 42 Cal.L.Rev. 458, 469-474; Annot. (1953) Old Age Assistance--Reimbursement, 29 A.L.R.2d 731, 736-737.)
This court phrased the issues as follows: 'If Kirchner stands for the proposition that [88 Cal.Rptr. 392] when the state, in the exercise of its promotion of the general welfare, commits a person either for the protection of society or for his protection or rehabilitation, or any combination thereof, it cannot thereafter seek reimbursement except from such person or his estate, that case then is determinative of the matter in issue. On the other hand, if Kirchner is limited to its facts and does not preclude the state from seeking reimbursement from those otherwise legally responsible for the care, support and maintenance of the person treated, inquiry must be directed to a determination of whether or not respondent is responsible for the support of her adult daughter; and, if so, whether the state has properly provided for the enforcement of any obligation arising from that responsibility.' (In re Dudley (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 401, 407, 48 Cal.Rptr. 790, 794, fns. omitted. See also, County of Alameda v. Espinoza (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 534, 541, 52 Cal.Rptr. 480, and Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. O'Connor (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 24, 27, 54 Cal.Rptr. 432.)
In this case the responsible relative does not seek to avoid responsibility on the broad ground that the furnishing of aid to the aged is a special matter of state concern in promoting health and welfare (see County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente, supra, 20 Cal.2d 870, 877, 129 P.2d 378), and that therefore the costs of such program 'cannot be arbitrarily charged to one class in the society' without violating the equal protection clause. (See, Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, supra, 60 Cal.2d 716, 720, 36 Cal.Rptr. 488, 388 P.2d 720, and Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Bank of America (1970) 3 Cal.3d 949, 954, 83 Cal.Rptr. 559, but cf. Kelley v. State Board of Social Welfare, supra, 82 Cal.App.2d 627, 632, 186 P.2d 429 .) He rests on the more limited aspect of Kirchner which relates to the fact that the mother who was the recipient of the state's care had an estate of $11,000. There the court stated, 'Section 6650 [7275] by its terms imposes absolute liability upon, and does not even purport to vest in, the servient relatives any right of control over, or to recoup from, the assets of the patient. A statute obviously violates the equal protection clause if it selects one particular class of persons for a species of taxation and no rational basis supports such classification. [Citations.] Such a concept for the state's taking of a free man's property manifestly denies him equal protection of the law.' (60 Cal.2d at pp. 722-723, 36 Cal.Rptr. at p. 492, 388 P.2d at p. 724.) Having shown that his mother has an estate valued at $31,800, the son justifiably contends that even under the narrowest of interpretations of Kirchner he is unconstitutionally burdened because he is being deprived of his property to preserve an estate which his mother may devise to another.
Since 1937 no lien has been imposed on property which the recipient of aid to the aged is permitted to hold under the provisions governing property qualifications. (§ 11007. See Stats.1935, ch. 633, § 4, pp. 1769-1770; Stats.1937, ch. 369, §§ 2224 and 2225, pp. 1093-1094, and amendments thereto by ch. 405, p. 1345; County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente (1942) 20 Cal.2d 870, at pp. 874-875, 129 P.2d 378, and County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276 at pp. 278-279, 106 P.2d 11.)
The county urges that liability may be imposed on the principle suggested in the second portion of the paragraph quoted from Dudley. The question then is whether the son is legally responsible for the support of his mother, and, if so, whether the state has properly provided that the county may enforce any obligation arising from that responsibility. The county must rely upon section 206 of the Civil Code which provides: 'It is the duty of the father, the mother, and the children of any poor person who is unable to maintain himself by work, to maintain such person to the extent of their ability. The promise of an adult child to pay for necessaries previously furnished to such parent is binding.' (See also, Pen. Code, § 270c.)
In the case of aid to the aged the courts have already distinguished between the obligation imposed by sections 12100 and [88 Cal.Rptr. 393] 12101 (former § 2224) and the liability imposed by the provisions of section 206 of the Civil Code. In County of Contra Costa v. Lasky (1954) 43 Cal.2d 506, 275 P.2d 452, the court stated: 'There is a conflict in the cases as to whether the basic liability of responsible relatives is section 206 of the Civil Code or the provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code. It has been held that the latter code provisions are complete in themselves and the liability of responsible relatives to the county is thereby established. County of Lake v. Forbes, 42 Cal.App.2d 744, 109 P.2d 972; County of Los Angeles v. Lane, 113 Cal.App.2d 476, 248 P.2d 479; County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente, 20 Cal.2d 870, 129 P.2d 378. Seemingly to the contrary are Garcia v. Superior Court, 45 Cal.App.2d 31, 113 P.2d 470, and Kelley v. State Board of Social Welfare, 82 Cal.App.2d 627, 186 P.2d 429. Although it is not important in this case, we believe the matter is adequately covered by the Welfare & Institutions Code and it is the measure of the extent of the responsible relative's liability to the county. It is to it we must look to ascertain whether the relative is required, in a particular case, to reimburse the county.' (43 Cal.2d at p. 509, 275 P.2d at p. 454. See also, County of San Bernardino v. Simmons (1956) 46 Cal.2d 394, 398-399, 296 P.2d 329.) In Simmons, the court ruled that the provisions of section 206 of the Civil Code did not give the county, as subrogee, a right to bring a direct action against a child for old age security paid to the parent because of the reason expressed above in Lasky. Inconsistent implications in Garcia and Kelley were disapproved (46 Cal.2d at p. 399, 296 P.2d 329). In Dudley this court distinguished that facet of Simmons as follows: 'The problem herein, however, is not in determining whether or not appellant can recover in an action brought solely under the provisions of section 206 of the Civil Code, but whether the existence of the liability thereby created demonstrates that it is not a denial of equal protection of the law to require a person subject to that liability to reimburse the county for the care, which in the absence of that furnished by the state and charged to the county (§§ 7009-7011), he would otherwise be required to furnish personally.' (239 Cal.App.2d at p. 410, 48 Cal.Rptr. at p. 796, fn. omitted. See also, County of Alameda v. Espinoza, supra, 243 Cal.App.2d 534, 544, 52 Cal.Rptr. 480.)
The county's argument founders on the fact that the liability it seeks to impose is not that which is contemplated by the Civil Code section. In Simmons, as an alternative ground of decision, the court stated: 'The following argument of defendant furnishes a further reason for holding that there is no right of the county to recover from the child of a poor parent under section 206 of the Civil Code: The county is required by the Welfare and Institutions Code to pay aid to the aged who are 'in need' (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 2001, 2022 [cf. current § 12050]). The sections which set out the amount of aid allowed and the resources which an aged person may own without being disqualified from receiving aid, delineate the financial situation of one who is considered 'in need.' Manifestly, this is not the same as being 'poor' and 'unable to maintain himself by work' (Civ.Code, § 206). The county is required to pay old age security to persons who, although they are 'in need' according to the Welfare and Institutions Code, have considerable income and property, and who may be able to maintain themselves by work. The payment of old age security, therefore, cannot be considered to be the performance of a duty to support a poor person unable to maintain himself by work, and the theory of subrogation [citations] is inappropriate.' (46 Cal.2d at pp. 399-400, 296 P.2d at p. 332, fns. omitted.) In [88 Cal.Rptr. 394] footnotes the court pointed out 'Section 2020 [cf. current §§ 12150 and 12151] of the Welfare and Institutions Code now provides that the amount of aid to which an applicant is entitled is 'when added to the income (including the value of currently used resources, but excepting casual income and inconsequential resources) of the applicant from all other sources' $85 a month, or a greater amount if 'actual need' is greater'; and 'He may own personal property valued at $1,200 (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 2163 [cf. current § 11154]) and real property of an assessed value of as much as $3,500 (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 2164 [cf. current § 11153, $5,000]). He may own future interests of unlimited value (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 2163.1 [cf. current § 11155]) and personal effects, clothing, furniture, household equipment, food, fuel, and personal jewelry of unlimited value (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 2163.2).' (46 Cal.2d at p. 400, 296 P.2d at p. 332, fns. 5 and 6. See generally, County of Los Angeles v. La Fuente, supra, 20 Cal.2d 870, 876-878, 129 P.2d 378, and County of Lake v. Forbes (1941) 42 Cal.App.2d 744, 747, 109 P.2d 972, current §§ 11150-11158; and cf. pt. 5, §§ 17000-17409, of div. 9 of the Welf. & Inst.Code, and County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie (1942) 19 Cal.2d 634, 645-646, 122 P.2d 526, which deal with county aid and relief to indigents.) Section 11152 now provides in part, 'An applicant or recipient may retain personal or real property owned by him, or in combination with any other person, without reference to its value, if it serves to provide the applicant or recipient with a home. The basic home may be a multiple-dwelling unit if the units not occupied by applicant or recipient are producing income for the support of the applicant or recipient consistent with their rental value.' (Emphasis added.)
The issue of whether the mother was in fact a needy and dependent person was tendered by the son through a demurrer, and by answer. The demurrer was apparently overruled, and the allegations of the answer were stricken on motion of the county.
It is obvious from the foregoing that the 'poor person who is unable to maintain himself by work' as described in section 206 of the Civil Code is not the same as a person entitled to public assistance under the provisions of part 3 of division 9 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. Section 11001 expressly provides: 'No person receiving aid under a public assistance program shall be considered a pauper or an indigent by reason thereof, and no warrant drawn in payment of the aid given shall contain any reference to indigency or pauperism.' The question really is whether the state can redistribute wealth between adult members of a family on the basis of age, and upon standards of need which are short of indigency or pauperism.
The statute excludes from the right to aid to the aged 'any person * * * who is * * * receiving adequate support from a * * * child able and responsible under the laws of this state to furnish such support * * *.' (§ 12050, subd. (d).) It may be argued that there is no deprivation of equal protection of the laws because the provisions of sections 12100 and 12101 which purport to impose liability on an adult child for the support of his parent, merely equalize the burden between the defaulting child and the child who by voluntarily fulfilling his obligation renders his parent ineligible for aid for the aged under the provisions of subdivision (d) of section 12050. (See Kelley v. State Board of Social Welfare, supra, 82 Cal.App.2d 627, 631-632, 186 P.2d 429.) Kelley's lustre is tarnished, however, by the disapproval voiced in Simmons which has been noticed above (46 Cal.2d at p. 399, 296 P.2d 329). Moreover, in Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Bank of America, supra, 3 Cal.3d 949, 83 Cal.Rptr. 559, the court indicated that section 206 of the Civil Code would be deemed unconstitutional if it were construed as imposing liability on a parent for the expenses which the state undertook as part of a general governmental program of committing the mentally ill to a state institution.
In Kirchner the court brought out the following historical background: 'At common law there was no liability on a child to support parents, or on parents to support an adult child. (See, e. g., County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie (1942) 19 Cal.2d [88 Cal.Rptr. 395] 634, 645 -646, 122 P.2d 526; Duffy v. Yordi (1906) 149 Cal. 140, 141-142, 84 P. 838, 4 L.R.A.,N.S., 1159 ('at common law there was no legal obligation on the part of the child to [support a parent] * * * such obligation depends entirely upon statutory provisions'); Napa State Hospital v. Flaherty (1901) 134 Cal. 315, 316-317, 66 P. 322, 323 ('The right to maintain any action against the father for the support of an adult child, if any such right exists, is purely a creation of the statute. No such right existed at common law'); 44 C.J.S. Insane Persons §§ 73-75, pp. 175, fn. 79; 176, fn. 81; 183, fn. 79; 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child §§ 17, 24, pp. 704-705, 727-728; 39 Am.Jur., pp. 710-712; 41 Am.Jur. pp. 684-687.) We recognize that various states have undertaken from time to time to create an obligation upon children to support indigent parents and upon parents to support indigent adult children; some states have even purported to create and impose a support obligation on brothers and sisters and on grandparents and grandchildren. (See 41 Am.Jur., pp. 684-686, §§ 6-7; 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 17, 24, pp. 705, 728.)' (60 Cal.2d at p. 718, 36 Cal.Rptr. at p. 489, 388 P.2d at p. 721, fn. 4. Cf. County of Los Angeles v. Hurlbut, supra, 44 Cal.2d 88, 103, 111 P.2d 963. ) The state prescribed system for imposing liability upon responsible relatives falls within the proscription of Kirchner when, as in this case, it seeks to impose liability on an adult child for the support of a parent at levels which are not related to indigency or pauperism, and gives no recourse to the responsible relative against property which the recipient of aid is permitted to retain.
'The duty of maintaining the indigent aged is instinctive. The obligation resting upon the spouse, the parent and the child has been reciprocal under custom from time immemorial. It is now expressed in the numerous statutes of this state. Sections of the Welfare and Institutions Code emphasize that duty in the responsibility of kindred for the support of indigents (secs. 2576-2579); of relatives for the support of the blind (sec. 3008); of relatives for cost of maintenance of those mentally disordered (sec. 5077) and of insane and feeble minded persons (secs. 5105.5, 5105.6, 6650-6664, 5150-5152, 5260); of narcotic addicts (sec. 5356); of sexual psychopaths (sec. 5515); psychopathic delinquents (sec. 7060); of inebriates (sec. 7106). Moreover, the obligation to one's parents is recognized by the law of this state as contained in Civil Code, section 206, adopted in 1872. Finally, as though to make the aged needy parent secure against his thoughtless or unnatural child, the lawmakers imposed criminal sanctions whereby the failure of every adult, pecuniarily able to do so, to support his parent, is made a misdemeanor. Pen.Code, sec. 270c.' County of Los Angeles v. Hurlbut (1941) 44 Cal.App.2d 88, at p. 103, 111 P.2d 963, at p. 971.
It also may be noted that application of the provisions of section 206 of the Civil Code to impose liability on a child for the support of his parent does not require that the parent be absolutely destitute. (Janes v. Edwards (1935) 4 Cal.App.2d 611, 612, 41 P.2d 370, and cf. County of Lake v. Forbes, supra, 42 Cal.App.2d 744, 747, 109 P.2d 972.) In the Janes case the facts showed that the real estate owned by the parent was mortgaged, that three payments on the mortgage were past due, that taxes were about due, and that the mother had mo money to meet these obligations. It also appeared that the gross income if all of the property were rented would have been barely sufficient to support her, and that she was unable to obtain work. Here there is no similar showing. From all that appears no part of the mother's $31,800 estate other than the reasonable value of the use, has been appropriated to the mother's needs. Under these circumstances the proscriptions of Kirchner and Simmons appear to govern.
The judgment is reversed.
MOLINARI, P. J., and ELKINGTON, J., concur.
Section 12101 provides in part, 'The ability of an adult child to contribute to the support of a parent shall be determined in accordance with this section. * * *' There follow provisions for determining the net income of the adult child, and a scale and formulae for determining the maximum required monthly contributions according to the child's net monthly income and the number of persons dependent upon that income. Similar provisions were contained in former section 2181 (Stats.1961, ch. 1997, § 1, p. 4208).