Opinion
Case No. 13-cv-04065-VC
06-28-2016
PATRICK COTTER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. LYFT, INC., Defendant.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO INTERVENE
Re: Dkt. No. 213
Alex Zamora and Rayshon Clark, the named plaintiffs in a related case, Zamora v. Lyft, Inc., No. 16-cv-02558-VC, have filed a motion to intervene in this case, Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., No. 13-cv-04065-VC, in which they are also class members. The Zamora plaintiffs argue either that they are entitled to intervene as of right, or that they should be granted permissive intervention. The motion is denied.
The Zamora plaintiffs are not entitled to intervene as of right. "An applicant seeking intervention as of right must show that: (1) it has a 'significant protectable interest' relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (2) the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect its interest; (3) the application is timely; and (4) the existing parties may not adequately represent the applicant's interest." Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 409 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1050, 1061 (9th Cir. 1997)); see also California ex rel. Lockyer v. United States, 450 F.3d 436, 440-41 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1481 (9th Cir. 1993). The Zamora plaintiffs' ability to protect their interest in the claims released by the Cotter action will not be impaired by the Cotter settlement, because the Zamora plaintiffs may file formal objections and appear at the final approval hearing, or opt out of the Cotter settlement and continue to pursue their claims against Lyft if they wish. See, e.g., Hofstetter v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. 10-cv-01313-WHA, 2011 WL 5415073, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) (citing Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. United States, 450 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2006); Bergman v. Thelen LLP, No. 08-cv-05322-EDL, 2009 WL 1308019, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2009) (citing Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs., No. 06-cv-4068-MMC, 2007 WL 474936, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2007)); see also Allen v. Bedolla, 787 F.3d 1218, 1222 (9th Cir. 2015).
Nor have the Zamora plaintiffs shown that the Court should exercise its discretion to grant them permissive intervention. "An applicant who seeks permissive intervention must prove that it meets three threshold requirements: (1) it shares a common question of law or fact with the main action; (2) its motion is timely; and (3) the court has an independent basis for jurisdiction over the applicant's claims." Donnelly v. Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 412 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 839 (9th Cir. 1996)). Even if the proposed intervenor meets those requirements, however, a district court has discretion to deny the motion if "intervention will unduly delay the main action or will unfairly prejudice the existing parties." Id. Here, permitting the Zamora plaintiffs to intervene for the purpose of carving their claims out of the Cotter release would either unduly delay or scuttle the parties' long-negotiated settlement, to the detriment of both Lyft and the Cotter plaintiff class. Given that the Zamora gratuity claims appear to be worth significantly less to the Cotter class members than the Cotter reimbursement claims, and given that the Cotter settlement as a whole is fair, reasonable, and adequate on the current record, it would unfairly prejudice the Cotter parties if their settlement were undone by the Zamora plaintiffs at this stage.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: June 28, 2016
/s/_________
VINCE CHHABRIA
United States District Judge