Coronado v. Veolia N. Am.

Full title: HEIDI ALBERTO CORONADO Plaintiff v. VEOLIA NORTH AMERICA INC…

Court: Supreme Court, New York County

Date published: Jan 22, 2024

2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 30287 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2024)

Opinion

Index No. 450319/2019 Motion Seq. No. 008

01-22-2024

HEIDI ALBERTO CORONADO Plaintiff v. VEOLIA NORTH AMERICA INC. &SUBSIDIARIES, HAROLD EDDINS, NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, METROPOLITAN TRANSIT AUTHORITY, MV TRANSPORTATION, INC., RELIANT TRANSPORTATION INC., TIMOTHY EDWARDS Defendants

HON. DENISE M DOMINGUEZ Justice

Unpublished Opinion

DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION

HON. DENISE M DOMINGUEZ Justice

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 008) 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208,209, 210, 211,212, 213, 214 were read on this motion to/for JUDGMENT - SUMMARY.

For the reasons that follow and following oral argument, Plaintiffs motion seeking summary judgment against Defendants VEOLIA NORTH AMERICA INC. &SUBSIDIARIES and HAROLD EDDINS is granted.

Background

This personal injury matter arises out of a June 6, 2017 motor vehicle collision at an apparent enclosed dead-end non-exit road for the purpose of ambulance entrances and apparently also used for taxis and other vehicles to pick up and drop people to the Weil Cornel Center Hospital and the NY Presbyterian Hospital, at or about East 70^th Street between York Avenue and FDR in Manhattan. Plaintiff alleges that while a passenger on a stationed "Access-A-Ride" vehicle, another vehicle operated by Defendant HAROLD EDDINS (EDDINS) and owned by VEOLIA NORTH AMERICA INC. &SUBSIDIARIES (VEOLIA NORTH AMERICA, collectively VEOLIA DEFENDANTS) struck the Access-A-Ride vehicle causing her serious injuries.

Pre-discovery Plaintiff moved for summary judgment against Veolia Defendants (Motion Seq. 1). By Order of Judge Lisa Ann Sokoloff, dated October 11, 2019, the motion was denied with leave to renew following the depositions of the parties. Plaintiff appealed the decision and the Appellate Division, First Department by Order dated November 17, 2020, affirmed Judge Sokoloff's decision.

Following the completion of the depositions, Plaintiff filed a motion to renew/reargue the summary judgment motion (Motion Seq. 5). Plaintiff's motion was denied as it wasn't seeking a proper remedy and Plaintiff was granted leave to refile a summary judgment motion in accordance with 22 NYCRR 202.8-g[d] and Part 21 rules (NYSCEF Doc. 173). Instead of refiling the summary judgment motion, Plaintiff again filed a motion to renew/reargue (Motion Seq. 7), which was again denied as procedurally improper and Plaintiff was again directed to refile the summary judgment motion, which Plaintiff has now done. (NYSCEF Doc. 192).

Plaintiff now moves again for summary judgment against Veolia Defendants (Motion Seq. 8). Plaintiff also seeks dismissal of all affirmative defenses as to liability. Veolia Defendants oppose.

Discussion

Pursuant to CPLR 3212, any party in any action, including in a negligence action may move for summary judgment (CPLR 3212 [a], Andre v. Pomeroy, 35 N.Y.2d 361 [1974]). However, the movant has the high burden of establishing entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with evidence in admissible form that dispels all material questions of fact requiring a trial (see CPLR 3212 [b], Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320 [1986], see also Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557 [1980]).

Furthermore, it is well settled that an innocent passenger in a motor vehicle accident generally has the right to summary judgment regardless of comparative negligence between the drivers or the different versions of how the accident occurred (see Garcia v. Tri-Cnty. Ambulette Serv., Inc., 282 A.D.2d 206 [1^st Dept 2001]; see Petty v. Dumont, 77 A.D.3d 466 [1^st Dept 2010]; Hobbs v MTA Bus Co., 211 A.D.3d 471, 472 [1^st Dept 2022]; Mello v Narco Cab Corp., 105 A.D.3d 634, 635 [1^st Dept 2013]; Campbell v Mincello, 184 A.D.3d 412 [1st Dept 2020]; Johnson v. Phillips, 261 A.D.2d 269 [1^st Dept 1999]; Service v McCoy, 131 A.D.3d 1038 [2^nd Dept 2015]; see e.g. Oluwatayo v Dulinayan, 142 A.D.3d 113 [1^st Dept 2016]).

In addition, under certain circumstances, the rear-end presumption of negligence may be applicable when a driver of a vehicle strikes a stopped vehicle. The rear-end collision presumption is based on the logical inference that a vehicle that strikes a stopped vehicle or a vehicle coming to a stop, lacked prudent driving, did not maintain a safe distance to avoid a collision, nor maintained control of the operation of the vehicle (see e.g., VTL §1129; Kalair v Fajerman, 202 A.D.3d 625 [1st Dept 2022] citing Urena v GVC Ltd., 160 A.D.3d 467[1^st Dept 2018]; see also Williams v. Kadri, 112 A.D.3d 442 [1^st Dept 2013]; Matos v. Sanchez, 147 A.D.3d 585 [1^st Dept 2017; Service, 131 A.D.3d 1038], Thus, even if the striking is not at the rear of the stationed or parked vehicle, the presumption of negligence may apply (see e.g., id).

Here in support of the motion, Plaintiff establishes its burden with her deposition testimony, the deposition testimony of Eddins, and an accident report. Upon review, the following is undisputed. Plaintiff was a passenger in a stationed/parked Access-A-Ride vehicle at the time of the accident. The Access-A-Ride vehicle was at the hospital's loading dock area picking up Plaintiff and her child and or children. As per Eddins' sworn testimony he saw the stationed Access-Ride vehicle as it entered the loading dock area. He also testified that in attempting to park and pick up a passenger, he collided with the Access-Ride- vehicle.

In opposition, the Veolia Defendants argue that issues of fact exist as to whether Access-A-Ride Defendants also bear liability for the collision, as the Access-A-Ride vehicle was stopped five feet from the curb and did not have its hazard lights engaged. However, under the facts and circumstances here, this Court finds that it is immaterial whether the Access-A-Ride vehicle was parked five or two feet from the curb or had its hazard lights on. As negligent driving can be inferred by Eddins, and the Veolia Defendants have not provided a non-negligent explanation for failing to maintain a safe distance from the stationed Access-A-Ride vehicle (see e.g., Kalair, 202 A.D.3d 625; Urena, 160 A.D.3d 467). Here the accident occurred on a loading dock/ dead end road of the hospitals for the ambulances to park. It was not a highway nor a crowed multiple lane street. The Access-A-Ride vehicle was not moving at the time of the collision, and the Veolia Defendants through the sworn testimony of the driver admitted to seeing the parked Access-A-Ride vehicle as he entered East 70^thStreet and the collision occurred while the Veolia vehicle was attempting to park.

Thus, Plaintiff has met her prima facie burden in establishing entitlement to judgment as a matter of law as an innocent passenger and establishing that the Veolia Defendants were negligent in operating the vehicle resulting in Plaintiffs injuries. Moreover, Defendants have not raised a material issue of fact warranting a trial.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion seeking summary judgment against Defendants VEOLIA NORTH AMERICA INC. &SUBSIDIARIES and HAROLD EDDINS is granted; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiffs motion to dismiss Defendants' affirmative defenses regarding comparative fault/culpable conduct is also granted; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve a copy of this order with notice of entry upon the parties within 30 days and upon the Clerk of the Court (60 Centre Street, Room 14 IB) and the Clerk of the General Clerk's Office (60 Centre Street, Room 119), who are directed to mark the court's records.