Opinion
Mashburn s&sTaylor by W.H. Taylor, Putmans&sMaglothin by Jennifer Morris Horan, Fayetteville, for appellants.
Ray Bunch, Rogers, for appellee.
PURTLE, Justice.
This appeal involves a defamation action brought by appellee Michael Prather against appellants Paul Cornett and Michael Smith. The complaint alleged that the appellants published defamatory statements concerning the appellee, who at the time of said publication held the rank of Captain/Chief Deputy for the Benton County Sheriff's Department. The case was tried before a jury and a verdict was rendered against the appellants in the amount of $50,000 upon a specific finding by the jury that the appellants had "negligently published defamatory statements" concerning the appellee. Appellants subsequently moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which motion was denied by the trial court. It is the court's denial of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict that is the sole issue in this appeal. See Cornett v. Prather, 290 Ark. 262, 718 S.W.2d 433 (1986).
It appears that there had been a great deal of controversy in Benton County of considerable public interest prior to and at the time this matter arose. The elected sheriff, Donald H. Rystrom, had just been removed from office because of alleged wrongdoing and Don Townsend had been appointed his successor by the Benton County Quorum Court. See Karr v. Townsend, 606 F.Supp. 1121 (W.D.Ark.1985). Sheriff Townsend promoted appellee Michael Prather to the position of Captain/Chief Deputy in March of 1984. Paul Cornett had been in the Benton County Reserves for a number of years. When Townsend became sheriff, he did not recommission Cornett.
On May 25, 1984, the appellants scheduled a press conference in which a taped interview between appellant Cornett and Ms. Carol Dopp was played. The tape contained statements by Ms. Dopp that the appellee had asked her certain questions of a sexual nature during her May 11, 1984, job interview with the Benton County Sheriff's Department. Accounts of the news conference were subsequently published by various media entities in the Benton County area. Thereafter, at a press conference held on June 8, 1984, Ms. Dopp retracted her allegations against the appellee and stated that he had not conducted himself improperly during the job interview. On June 20, 1984, Prather brought this lawsuit, alleging that the appellants had published the defamatory statements "with malice."
The case was tried before a jury in late March, 1986. Ms. Dopp testified at the trial as a witness for the plaintiff. She testified that the appellee had not conducted himself improperly during the job interview and also that the appellants had told her that they would check with her before "going public" with the allegations concerning the appellee. She testified that the appellants had not talked to her before calling the press conference. The jury was instructed on both negligence and "actual malice," as that term was defined in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964). The jury found that the appellants had "negligently published defamatory statements" concerning the appellee and awarded the appellee $50,000 in compensatory damages. Judgment was entered in this amount on April 8, 1986.
On April 15, 1986, appellants moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which motion challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, assessing as error the trial court's failure to classify the appellee as a "public official." This motion was denied by the trial court on June 19, 1986. On July 9, 1986, the appellants filed their notice of appeal from both the judgment against them and the denial of their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The clerk of this Court declined to docket the appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal was not timely. The appellants subsequently filed a motion in this Court for a rule on the clerk.
In a November 3, 1986, Per Curiam, this Court held that the notice of appeal from the judgment was not timely, but the notice of appeal from the order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was timely. Cornett v. Prather, 290 Ark. 262, 718 S.W.2d 433 (1986). The Per Curiam stated that "[w]e recognize a distinction between the two types of appeals ... and on appeal from denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict we will review only the question whether there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury." The appellants make essentially the same arguments on appeal as they did in their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The appellants argue that: (1) because the plaintiff was a "public official," and (2) because courts are prohibited from drawing a distinction between media and non-media defendants, that the jury must find "actual malice" (knowledge of falsity or a reckless disregard for the truth), before the verdict may be allowed to stand. The appellants did not timely appeal from the jury verdict, nor did they move for a new trial. Therefore, the only issue before us is the denial of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
It is well settled that the trial court may enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict only if there is no substantial evidence to support the jury verdict. Northside Construction Co. v. Huffman, 287 Ark. 145, 697 S.W.2d 89 (1985); and McCuiston v. City of Siloam Springs, 268 Ark. 148, 594 S.W.2d 233 (1980). On appeal we review the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was sought. Northside, supra; McCuiston, supra. We therefore will affirm the trial court's denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict unless there was no substantial evidence to support the jury verdict that the appellants negligently published defamatory statements concerning the appellee.
The witness Dopp testified that she was told by appellants that they would not make her statements public without prior consultation with her. At the June 8th press conference and at the trial she stated the appellee had not done the things she previously had told the appellants. She testified at the trial that, despite the appellants' assurances to the contrary, they had not checked with her before calling the May 25th press conference. We hold there was substantial evidence from which the jury could have properly found the appellants negligently defamed the appellee.
The appeal, as ultimately perfected, is only from the denial of the motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and that procedural enigma limits us to the issue of whether there was substantial evidence to support the jury verdict. Since the matter is not properly before us, we do not reach the question whether the trial judge erred in refusing to classify the appellee as a "public official."
Affirmed.
HICKMAN and GLAZE, JJ., concur.
GLAZE, Justice, concurring.
I concur. The majority court does not reach the question concerning whether the appellee is a public official. Because we are limited in our review to the sufficiency of evidence issue only, I agree this court need not answer the legal issue pertaining to whether appellee was a public official. I am concurring because I do not want anyone to infer from the decision that I agree with the trial court's holding that appellee is not a public official. My opinion is a deputy sheriff clearly is one. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968) and Lancaster v. The Daily Banner-News Publishing Co., 274 Ark. 145, 622 S.W.2d 671 (1981).
Because this case is here only on the trial court's denial of appellants' motion for judgment n.o.v., I do agree with the majority decision that the jury verdict is supported by substantial evidence.
HICKMAN, J., joins in this concurrence.