Opinion
5-21-0146
09-30-2021
ANNE SCHLAFLY CORI, Individually and as Trustee of the Phyllis Schlafly Irrevocable Insurance Trust, dated February 14, 1994, f/b/o Anne Schlafly Cori, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANDREW SCHLAFLY, Individually and as the Successor Trustee of the Phyllis Schlafly Irrevocable Insurance Trust, dated February 14, 1994, et al., Defendant-Appellant.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison County. No. 17-CH-608 Honorable Sarah D. Smith, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Boie and Justice Welch concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
CATES, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: Where the terms of the trust were unambiguous and there were no genuine issues of material fact, the circuit court did not err in granting a partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and ordering the trustee to distribute to plaintiff her share of the trust assets to be held in trust by her as trustee of her share and to provide an accounting of how her share was created.
¶ 2 The defendant, Andrew Schlafly, in his capacity as successor trustee of the Phyllis Schlafly Irrevocable Insurance Trust, dated February 14, 1994, appeals from an order of the circuit court granting a partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Anne Schlafly Cori, and against him. Andrew Schlafly claims that the circuit court acted contrary to the terms of the trust in ordering him to distribute a one-sixth share of the trust assets to the plaintiff to be held by her as the trustee of her share and to provide a detailed accounting of how that share was created. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Andrew Schlafly acted pro se throughout the proceedings in the trial court and in this appeal.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 This case arose from a dispute over the interpretation of the provisions in the Phyllis Schlafly Irrevocable Insurance Trust, dated February 14, 1994 (Trust). Phyllis Schlafly executed the Trust on February 14, 1994, and she died on September 5, 2015. She was survived by her six children: Anne Schlafly Cori, Andrew Schlafly, John Schlafly, Roger Schlafly, Liza Schlafly Forshaw, and Bruce Schlafly. John was appointed as the initial trustee of the Trust.
For clarity, we refer to the children of Phyllis Schlafly by their first names throughout the remainder of this disposition.
¶ 5 The Trust provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
"ARTICLE III - DISPOSITION OF REMAINING ASSETS OF TRUST UPON DEATH OF GRANTOR
Upon the death of the grantor, all of the assets of the trust estate *** shall be divided into as many equal share [sic] as shall be necessary to provide one of such equal shares for each of the grantor's children who survives the grantor and one of such equal shares for the descendants, collectively, of any child of the grantor who predeceases the grantor ***, and the trustee shall thereupon hold in further trust or distribute such shares as follows:
A. One of such shares shall be held in trust for the benefit of each of the grantor's children who survive her, with income and principal administered pursuant to the provisions of ARTICLE IV hereof.
B. One of such shares shall be distributed, per stirpes, to the descendants of each of the grantor's children who predecease the grantor ***, subject, however, in the case of any such descendant who is less than twenty-five (25) years of age, to the provisions of Article V hereof.
ARTICLE IV - SEPARATE TRUSTS FOR CHILDREN OF GRANTOR
The assets to be held in a trust estate for the benefit of any child of the grantor pursuant to the provisions of this ARTICLE shall be held by the trustee as a separate trust estate for the primary benefit of such child (hereinafter in this ARTICLE referred to as 'the beneficiary') with income and principal used, applied and distributed as follows:
Section 1. Distribution of Income
The trustee shall distribute all of the net income of the trust estate to the beneficiary in regular installments not less frequently than quarter-annually.
* * *
Section 5. Distribution of Principal
5.1 Upon the death of the beneficiary, all of the remaining assets of the trust estate, including both principal and accumulated and undistributed income, shall be distributed to or among any charitable organizations, the beneficiary's surviving spouse and the grantor's descendants (other than the beneficiary), in trust or otherwise, and in such proportions, as shall be designated by the beneficiary by and in his or her last will and testament ***.
5.2. Upon the death of the beneficiary, all of the remaining assets of the trust estate which are not effectively appointed by the beneficiary pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 5.1, above, shall be distributed, per stirpes, to the descendants of the beneficiary who survive him or her, or, if the beneficiary is not survived by one or more descendants, to the grantor's descendants who survive the beneficiary, per stirpes ***.
* * *
ARTICLE VII - THE TRUSTEE
1. The grantor's son, JOHN F. SCHLAFLY, shall serve as the initial trustee. If the grantor's son shall fail or cease to serve as trustee for any reason, he shall be succeeded as trustee by the following, who shall serve one at a time, in the order named: LIZA SCHLAFLY FORSHAW; ANNE VALLE SCHLAFLY; BRUCE SCHLAFLY; MERCANTILE TRUST COMPANY, St. Louis, Missouri.
2. Notwithstanding Paragraph 1, above, the child of the grantor who is the primary beneficiary of the trust shall serve as sole trustee of the trust for his or her primary benefit under ARTICLE IV hereof. If such child shall fail or cease to serve
as trustee of such trust for any reason, the trustee designated in Paragraph 1, above, shall serve as the trustee."
¶ 6 Article V of the Trust provided that the separate trusts for any grandchildren and more remote descendants of the grantor who were under 25 years of age would be held by the trustee, with specific instructions on the application, distribution, and use of the income and the principal. Article XI of the Trust provided that all questions pertaining to the Trust, including the validity, administration, and construction of the Trust, "shall be determined in accordance with the laws of Illinois."
¶ 7 After the death of Phyllis Schlafly, and pursuant to the terms of the Trust, John, acting as trustee, distributed one-sixth shares of the Trust's assets to his siblings Roger, Liza, Andrew, and Bruce to be held in separate trusts with each to act as trustee of his or her own trust. John did not distribute a one-sixth share to the plaintiff or to himself.
¶ 8 On September 28, 2017, the plaintiff filed a petition in the circuit court of Madison County against John Schlafly, individually and in his capacity as the trustee of the Trust, seeking to compel distribution of her share of the Trust and other relief. The plaintiff also named her four siblings who were "the sole current income and principal beneficiaries of the Trust" as party-respondents. A copy of the Trust was attached to the plaintiff's petition.
¶ 9 In his answer to the petition, John admitted that he had administered the Trust and had provided an accounting, but he denied that he was currently administering the Trust. In an affirmative defense, John stated that he had resigned as trustee of the Trust, effective December 31, 2017, and that his brother, Andrew, became the sole successor trustee of the Trust on that date. Based upon the representations made in John's pleadings, the plaintiff sought and was granted leave to amend her complaint to substitute Andrew as the successor trustee of the Trust and a party defendant.
John apparently appointed Andrew pursuant to article VII, section 3 of the Trust. Article VII, section 3 provided: "Any individual trustee, while serving as sole trustee of any trust hereunder, shall have the right to designate an individual or individuals) and/or a corporation to serve as his or her co-trustee(s) or successor trustee(s)."
¶ 10 On August 10, 2018, the plaintiff filed her first amended complaint against Andrew, individually and in his capacity as the successor trustee. The first amended complaint contained counts for an accounting (count I), a distribution of the plaintiff's one-sixth share of the trust assets (count II), an award of damages for breach of trust (count III), and an order removing Andrew as trustee due to unfitness (count IV). In the allegations common to all counts, the plaintiff alleged that she and her five siblings were the sole current income and principal beneficiaries of the Trust. Pursuant to article III of the Trust, each principal beneficiary was to receive an equal share of the Trust's assets, and pursuant to article IV, each beneficiary's share was to be held in a separate trust for his or her benefit. The plaintiff further alleged that under article VII, John was to serve as the trustee of the Trust, and each of the principal beneficiaries "shall serve as the sole trustee of his or her share."
¶ 11 In count II of the first amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged that John, in his capacity as former trustee of the Trust, distributed $4.1 million for the benefit of siblings Andrew, Bruce, Roger, and Liza, and nothing for the benefit of the plaintiff. The plaintiff further alleged that the Trust required the "immediate and mandatory distribution" of the plaintiff's share to the plaintiff; that John had refused to distribute the plaintiff's share to her in accordance with the terms of the Trust; and that Andrew, as the successor trustee, ratified and acquiesced in John's actions and erroneous interpretations of the Trust and failed to distribute plaintiff's share to her. The plaintiff claimed that Andrew's actions were willful, wanton, and malicious, demonstrating a deliberate intent to harm the plaintiff, and justified punitive damages in a sum sufficient to deter Andrew and others from engaging in similar actions in the future. The plaintiff prayed for an order compelling Andrew to distribute the plaintiff's one-sixth share to the plaintiff, to be held by her as the trustee of her own share. She also sought an award of punitive damages, along with reasonable attorney fees and costs.
Because the summary judgment was entered only as to count II of the first amended petition, our discussion is limited to the allegations in count II.
¶ 12 On August 27, 2018, Andrew filed a motion to dismiss the first amended complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to section 2-301 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-301 (West 2018)). Andrew claimed that he lived in New Jersey, that none of the Trust's assets were located in Illinois, and that the plaintiff failed to show that he had sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois to subject him to the jurisdiction of the Illinois courts. In response, the plaintiff noted that when the lawsuit was initially filed on September 28, 2017, John was the trustee of the Trust and a resident of Madison County, Illinois, and that John administered the Trust's assets in Madison County, Illinois, from February 14, 1994, to December 31, 2017. The plaintiff argued that the circuit court had jurisdiction over the trustee and the Trust when the suit was filed, that the conduct giving rise to the suit occurred in Illinois during John's tenure as trustee, and that the subsequent appointment of a nonresident trustee did not destroy jurisdiction in Illinois. On January 10, 2019, the circuit court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction against Andrew as successor trustee of the Trust but granted the motion as to Andrew in his individual capacity.
¶ 13 On February 8, 2019, Andrew, as the successor trustee, filed an answer, affirmative defenses, and a counterclaim. In the counterclaim, Andrew alleged that the Trust was a generation-skipping trust, that the assets were to be held in trust for the primary benefit of the grandchildren of Phyllis Schlafly, and that the plaintiff was, at most, a potential future trustee who was required to preserve her fraction of the Trust for the benefit of the grandchildren. Andrew further alleged that the plaintiff breached her fiduciary duties and encumbered the Trust when she made demands upon the trustee and filed her lawsuit. Andrew sought an order prohibiting the plaintiff from serving as a trustee of the Trust, an accounting of the plaintiff's personal liabilities, and an award of actual and punitive damages for the plaintiff's breach of trust.
¶ 14 On March 1, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss Andrew's counterclaim. The plaintiff argued that Andrew could not state claims against her for a breach of trust, an accounting, and removal because she had never acted as a trustee for the Trust and had not received a distribution of any trust assets. The plaintiff also argued that the trustee had no authority to demand an accounting of the plaintiff's personal finances. In an order entered May 16, 2019, the circuit court granted the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim but permitted the defendant to raise those matters as affirmative defenses. Pursuant to the court's order, Andrew filed an amended answer and affirmative defenses reflecting the allegations that had been set out in his counterclaim.
¶ 15 On August 29, 2019, Andrew filed a motion for partial summary judgment. Andrew initially claimed that he was entitled to a summary judgment as to counts I and II of the first amended complaint, arguing that the Trust was a generation-skipping trust, that the legal beneficiaries of the Trust were the grandchildren of Phyllis Schlafly, and that the plaintiff was not a grandchild, and therefore, not a legal beneficiary with any right to an accounting or a distribution of a share of trust assets. Andrew argued that he was entitled to summary judgment on the count for breach of trust because he owed a fiduciary duty only to the grantor's legal beneficiaries. Next, Andrew argued that he was entitled to summary judgment on the count seeking his removal as trustee because the Trust did not contain an express provision for removal of a trustee and the plaintiff failed to satisfy the Illinois requirements for the removal of a trustee. Finally, Andrew argued that the Trust was a spendthrift thrust, and that summary judgment should be granted to prohibit the plaintiff from using the Trust's assets to pay debts incurred by the plaintiff. Andrew submitted a supporting affidavit, in which he averred that he was the sole trustee of the Trust, and that he had not taken any compensation for his service administering the Trust. He also attached a letter from John to Andrew, dated December 15, 2017, wherein John advised that he intended to resign as trustee effective December 31, 2017, and that he named Andrew as successor trustee of the Trust.
¶ 16 On August 30, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the interpretation of the Trust's terms and on count II of the first amended complaint. The plaintiff claimed that there were no genuine issues of material fact regarding the validity of the Trust, the death of Phyllis Schlafly, and the fact that the plaintiff was one of Phyllis Schlafly's six living children and a principal beneficiary of the Trust. The plaintiff argued that disputes regarding the interpretation of the Trust's terms involved matters of law for the trial court to decide.
¶ 17 Relying upon articles III, IV, and VII of the Trust, the plaintiff argued that upon the death of Phyllis Schlafly, the trustee was required to distribute to the plaintiff "a trust share consisting of 1/6 of the Trust's assets," that her share was to be held in trust for her benefit, and that as a primary beneficiary of the Trust, she was to serve as the sole trustee of her share. The plaintiff also argued that she was to receive all of the net income of her trust share not less frequently than quarter-annually, and that, as the proper trustee of her share, the plaintiff should make all decisions related to the principal distributions in accordance with the Trust's terms. The plaintiff claimed that there were no preconditions to the creation of her trust share and that no Trust term permitted the trustee to withhold her share or prevent her from serving as the trustee for her share. The plaintiff asked the court to find that pursuant to the terms of the Trust, the trustee was required to distribute to the plaintiff "her 1/6 share of the Trust's assets as the trustee of her share" and to order the trustee to distribute that share to her. In support of her motion, the plaintiff attached a copy of the Trust, the death certificate of Phyllis Schlafly, the first amended complaint and Andrew's answer thereto, and a supporting affidavit. In the affidavit, the plaintiff averred that she was one of Phyllis Schlafly's six living children, and that she had not received any distribution or transfer of the Trust's assets.
¶ 18 On September 30, 2019, Andrew, as the successor trustee of the Trust, filed a motion in opposition to the plaintiff's partial motion for summary judgment. Andrew again asserted that the Trust was a generation-skipping, spendthrift trust established for the primary benefit of the grandchildren of Phyllis Schlafly, and that as the trustee of the Trust, he owed a fiduciary duty to those grandchildren. Andrew argued that under article III of the Trust, he had full authority to decide whether to "hold in further trust or distribute" the plaintiff's share to her, and that the provision in article VII, section 2, directing that the grantor's child "shall serve as the sole trustee" of his or her share, only applied if a distribution was actually made. He reasoned that since he decided to hold the plaintiff's share in further trust, the provision in article VII, section 2 was not operative. Andrew claimed that the plaintiff's demands and lawsuit seeking a distribution of her share could result in the dissipation or encumbrance of the assets of the Trust for her own benefit, and thereby cause irreparable harm to the grantor's intended beneficiaries, i.e., the grandchildren. He further claimed that the plaintiff had not satisfied conditions precedent to a distribution because she failed to answer discovery requests and failed to disclose her assets and liabilities. Andrew concluded that as trustee, he alone had discretion to decide whether to hold in further trust or distribute the plaintiff's one-sixth share, and that under section 1.27 of article VIII, his decisions were conclusive on all parties in interest unless bad faith was proven.
¶ 19 Andrew attached a supporting affidavit in which he admitted that he was the sole trustee of the Trust and that the plaintiff was the daughter of the grantor. In his affidavit, Andrew asserted that the grantor had removed the plaintiff as the co-trustee of another trust, suggesting that the grantor had done so for good cause, and that the plaintiff had filed five other lawsuits and had "apparently incurred legal expenses in excess of $1 million." Andrew also asserted that the plaintiff's refusal to fully answer two interrogatories prevented him from fully responding to the partial motion for summary judgment, and he attached the plaintiff's responses to the interrogatories. The complained of interrogatories asked the plaintiff to identify any current financial need she had for a distribution from the Trust, and to identify any debts, obligations, or liabilities that she intended to pay from the Trust. In other interrogatories, qualified by the phrase "if you were to obtain a distribution from the Trust," the plaintiff was asked whether she thought she had a right to invest assets of the Trust in any of her business endeavors, whether she thought she had a right to spend any distributions on legal fees, and whether she had a plan to protect the interests of the beneficiaries of the trust.
¶ 20 In reply, the plaintiff argued that the Trust required the trustee to divide the trust assets into equal shares for each of the grantor's six children, with each child serving as trustee over his or her respective share, and that each child was to receive the net income of that trust share not less than quarter-annually. The plaintiff claimed that there was no legal basis upon which to deny her right to serve as the trustee of her share. She also claimed that Andrew's affidavit contained allegations that were not based on personal knowledge, legal conclusions unsupported by evidence, and content immaterial to the issues in her motion for partial summary judgment.
¶ 21 On October 18, 2019, the parties' motions for partial summary judgment were argued and taken under advisement. Subsequently, the trial judge recused himself, and the case was reassigned. The parties argued their motions for partial summary judgment before the newly assigned judge on June 18, 2020, and, upon motion of the plaintiff, the parties reargued those motions on April 20, 2021.
There are no reports of the proceedings, nor any bystander's reports from the hearings on the partial motions for summary judgment.
¶ 22 On May 7, 2021, the circuit court issued an order granting the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. The court found that upon the death of Phyllis Schlafly, the Trust required that the trustee create and distribute a trust share consisting of one-sixth of the Trust's assets for the plaintiff's benefit and that the plaintiff serve as trustee of her share. The court further found that there were no preconditions to the distribution of the plaintiff's share or the plaintiff's right to become trustee of her share, and that the spendthrift provision in the Trust did not authorize the trustee to disregard mandatory provisions in the Trust. The court noted that the trustee had a fiduciary duty to act impartially and to treat the beneficiaries equitably in light of the purposes and terms of the Trust. The court ordered Andrew to distribute to the plaintiff her one-sixth share of the Trust's assets to be held by her as the trustee of her share, and to provide an accounting of how that share was created. The court also denied Andrew's partial motion for summary judgment. Andrew filed an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rules 304(b)(1) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016) and 307(a)(1) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017).
¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 24 On appeal, Andrew contends that the circuit court erred in granting a partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Andrew claims that the circuit court's decision to compel the trustee to distribute the plaintiff's one-sixth share of the Trust's assets to the plaintiff was contrary to the express terms of the Trust and the discretion of the trustee. He further claims that the court erred in compelling the distribution from a generation-skipping trust to the plaintiff without permitting the trustee to require reasonable safeguards against improper dissipation of assets.
¶ 25 Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2020). A trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo. Citizens National Bank of Paris v. Kids Hope United, Inc., 235 Ill.2d 565, 573 (2009).
¶ 26 Trust documents are construed according to the same principles as wills. Citizens National Bank of Paris, 235 Ill.2d at 574. The goal is to determine the settlor's intent, which the court will effectuate if it is not contrary to the law or public policy. Citizens National Bank of Paris, 235 Ill.2d at 574. In determining the settlor's intent, courts will consider the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used, taking into consideration the entire document. Citizens National Bank of Paris, 235 Ill.2d at 574. In examining the language used, the trust instrument should be considered as a whole and the provisions in the trust should not be read in isolation. Bank of America, N.A. v. Carpenter, 401 Ill.App.3d 788, 797 (2010). If possible, a court should construe a will or trust so that no language used by the grantor is treated as surplusage or rendered void or insignificant. Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Donovan, 145 Ill.2d 166, 172 (1991). When the language in the document is clear and unambiguous, the trial court should not modify or create new terms. Gearhart v. Gearhart, 2020 IL App (1st) 190042, ¶ 124. When the language in a trust is ambiguous and the settlor's intent cannot be determined, a trial court may rely upon extrinsic evidence to aid construction. Gearhart, 2020 IL App (1st) 190042, ¶ 124. Language is ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning. Gearhart, 2020 IL App (1st) 190042, ¶ 124. A trust provision is not ambiguous merely because the parties do not agree on its meaning. Espevik v. Kaye, 277 Ill.App.3d 689, 694 (1996).
¶ 27 Upon reviewing the language of the trust document and reading its provisions in their entirety, we find that the circuit court correctly interpreted the provisions of the Trust. The grantor provided a clear and orderly scheme for the distribution of the Trust's assets to her children, and there was no need to consider any extrinsic evidence to aid in construction of the Trust. Article III provided that upon the death of the grantor, the trustee shall divide all of the Trust's assets into equal shares for each of the grantor's living children. Article III further provided that each child's share was to be held in trust for the benefit of that child, with income and principal distributed according to the provisions in article IV. Article IV provided that each child's share shall be held as a separate trust estate for the primary benefit of that child, and that the child was to receive all of the net income of his or her respective trust estate in regular installments not less frequently than quarter-annually. Article IV also addressed the distribution of the principal of each child's trust estate upon the death of that child, and provided, in part, that all remaining assets in his or her trust shall be distributed to or among charitable organizations, a surviving spouse, and the grantor's descendants, as designated by the child in his or her last will and testament. Article VII, section 2 expressly provided that each child shall serve as the sole trustee of the trust estate created under article IV.
Article III also provided for one equal share for the descendants of any child who predeceased the grantor. Here, however, all six children survived the grantor. Thus, the provisions in article III regarding the creation of a share for the descendants of any child who predeceased the grantor are not applicable.
¶ 28 The plaintiff is one of the grantor's living children and an intended beneficiary of the Trust. Thus, Andrew, as successor trustee, owes a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff, and is obligated to carry out the Trust according to its terms and to act with the highest degree fidelity and good faith. See generally Gearhart, 2020 IL App (1st) 190042, ¶ 144; Bank of America, 401 Ill.App.3d at 801. Based upon the plain and unambiguous language of the aforementioned Trust provisions, upon the death of grantor, the trustee is required to create a one-sixth share of the Trust's assets and distribute that share into a separate trust for the benefit of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff shall serve as the sole trustee of her trust. In addition, the plaintiff is entitled to receive net income from her share in installments not less frequently than quarter-annually. There are no provisions or exceptions in the Trust that permit the trustee to disregard these mandatory provisions.
¶ 29 Andrew claims article III expressly authorized the trustee to "hold in further trust or distribute" the Trust's assets, and that he, as trustee, chose to hold the plaintiff's share "in further trust" in order to safeguard it against improper dissipation by the plaintiff who wrongly asserted that the assets were for her benefit. However, Andrew's claim is based upon reading a provision of the Trust in isolation. As noted above, a trust instrument should be considered as a whole and its provisions should not be read in isolation. Bank of America, 401 Ill.App.3d at 797. Upon considering the provisions in articles III, IV, and VII together, the plaintiff's share is to be "held in further trust," but with the plaintiff, not the trustee, serving as the sole trustee of her share.
¶ 30 Andrew next claims that the circuit court erred in compelling the distribution from a generation-skipping trust to the plaintiff without permitting the trustee to require reasonable safeguards against improper dissipation of assets. In this case, the plaintiff is the trustee of her own share, and as a trustee, she is required to abide by the provisions of the Trust, including the spendthrift provision. The spendthrift provision is set forth in article VIII of the Trust. Article VIII addresses administrative duties applicable to each trust estate provided for in the Trust. The spendthrift provision restricts the ability of the beneficiary to alienate her interests and the ability of the beneficiary's creditors to attach the corpus of the trust. In re Marriage of Sharp, 369 Ill.App.3d 271, 281 (2006). Andrew has not shown that the plaintiff violated the spendthrift provision of the Trust. Andrew's speculation about how the plaintiff may administer her trust share in the future does not negate Andrew's duty to distribute the plaintiff's one-sixth share to be held in a separate trust for the plaintiff's benefit or impair the plaintiff's right to serve as the trustee of that trust.
¶ 31 Finally, Andrew claims that the circuit court erred in granting a partial summary judgment where the plaintiff refused to comply with her basic discovery obligations, and thereby withheld evidence that was necessary for the court to resolve any ambiguity in the Trust's terms and to properly consider the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. We disagree. In this case, the court entered a summary judgment only as to the plaintiff's rights to a distribution of her share of the Trust's assets and to serve as trustee of her share. The Trust provided a clear and orderly scheme for the distribution of the Trust's assets to the children of the grantor and extrinsic evidence was not required to aid in construction of the Trust. Furthermore, Andrew has not shown how the information requested in the interrogatories regarding the plaintiff's debts had any bearing on the trial court's interpretation of the Trust or its consideration of the plaintiff's motion for a partial summary judgment as to count II of the first amended complaint.
¶ 32 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 33 The circuit court did not err in interpreting the provisions of the Trust and ordering Andrew Schlafly, in his capacity as trustee of the Trust, to distribute to the plaintiff her one-sixth share of the Trust's assets to be held in trust by the plaintiff as the trustee of her share and to provide an accounting of how that share was created. Accordingly, the order of the circuit court granting a partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against defendant Andrew Schlafly, in his capacity as trustee of the Trust, is affirmed.
¶ 34 Affirmed.