Opinion
No. 05-10-00704-CR
01-06-2012
HENRY DUKE COPPOLA, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
AFFIRM; Opinion Filed January 6, 2012.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 7
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-0955347-Y
OPINION
Before Justices FitzGerald, Murphy, and Myers
Opinion By Justice Myers
Appellant, Henry Duke Coppola, was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison. In four points of error, he argues sufficiency of the evidence, jury charge error, and lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.
Background and Procedural History
On the afternoon of May 7, 2009, Dallas Police crime scene officer Scott Bazan responded to a report of a murder at 3413 Meredith, Dallas County, Texas, which was a property rented by the complainant, Gillian Stone. Bazan testified that it looked like the front door of the house had been pried or "jimmied" open, and that Stone's body was found in the master bedroom. She was lying on her right side "kind of in the fetal position," and she appeared to have been beaten "from the chest up."
Several months earlier, in mid-to-late February of 2009, Detective Mark Brown of the Dallas Police Department responded to a call at appellant's residence, which was a trailer located on the "back side" of Stone's property. While talking to appellant, Brown noticed a framed picture "in the back seat of a vehicle in the driveway that [appellant] was standing next to." Brown could see that the picture "had bullet holes in it," and he asked appellant about it. Appellant showed Brown the picture, which "looked like a hand scribbled drawing like crayons or something." Underneath the picture was written the name "Gillian." Brown asked appellant, "What are you doing with this?" Appellant responded, "I hate that fucking bitch, and I'm going to even hang this up on my side of the property so that she knows not to fuck with me ever again." The detective told appellant that if anything ever happened to Stone, appellant would "be suspect number one." Appellant replied that he would display the picture nonetheless, and that "[s]he's not going to fuck with me ever again."
On May 3, 2009, Officer Stephen Cleary of the Dallas Police Department responded to a disturbance call from Stone's house. Stone told Cleary, who had been to the property several times, that she and appellant had "lived together for some time, and for whatever reason their relationship had fallen apart." Stone also said that the property was rented and her name was on the lease. At some point appellant "had moved out of the house, but rather than leave the property he had moved to the back side of the property, put up a makeshift fence[,] and was living in a trailer out there." Stone alleged that appellant was refusing to leave the property, and that he was luring her two dogs to his side of the property and preventing them from returning. Cleary testified that Stone was "noticeably very emotional, shaken, almost to the point that she was frightened of [appellant]." Stone was afraid to go to appellant's side of the property alone. Cleary interviewed appellant and recalled that he "seemed very angry" with Stone, that when talking about her appellant "became very animated," that his fists and jaw were clenched, and that "[h]e continued to raise his voice" and "almost show[ed] the signs of someone fixing to fight."
Cleary also responded to a disturbance call from Stone's house in April of 2009. That earlier call, according to Cleary's testimony, was "very similar to the other call." Cleary testified that Stone was "very emotional" and was "very choked up almost to the point of crying several times." Stone complained that appellant "was continuing to harass her, take her dogs, but she was also afraid because of an item that had been placed up on [appellant's] trailer." Cleary described this item as "a shooting target that had been placed up on the back part of the trailer." He noted that "[t]he middle part of the target had been shot several times," and that the name "Gillian" was written across the top of the target. Cleary and his partner asked appellant about the target. Appellant replied that "he didn't actually shoot the target," and that he "mainly" intended it not as a threat "but as means of just . . . pissing her off." Cleary characterized appellant's demeanor on both occasions as "very agitated" and "very angry."
On May 5, 2009, less than two days before Stone's body was found, Officer Mellissa Miller- Scott of the Dallas Police Department responded to a call from Stone's house regarding a stolen vehicle. Miller-Scott testified that appellant was "in an extremely agitated state" and "was yelling and screaming." Appellant complained that his motorcycle had been stolen, and he said, "That bitch took my bike. That bitch, she will never fuck with me again." Miller-Scott asked appellant who he was referring to. He pointed to the house and replied, "That bitch that lives here."
Monica Toland testified that she and Stone had known each other "on and off for about five years," and that for the six months preceding Stone's death they saw each other perhaps "two to three times a week." On the night of May 6, 2009, Stone called Toland and told her that appellant had "taken one of her dogs." Toland went to Stone's house to comfort her, arriving there between 11:30 p.m. and midnight. Toland testified that Stone was "freaking out" and "hysterical," and that "she was afraid for her life." They spent approximately forty-five minutes at the house before driving to a nearby bar and then to a Wal-Mart store, finally returning to Stone's house at around 3:30 or 4:00 a.m. Toland testified that she left Stone's house at approximately 5:00 a.m. As she was driving away, Toland saw a red pickup truck only one or two blocks from Stone's house, and there was not much traffic in the area at that hour of the morning. Toland was frightened by the sight of the red pickup truck because she recalled that Stone "had talked about [appellant] having a red truck."
Katherine Smith testified that appellant had been her boyfriend for about a year and a half.
On May 6, 2009, according to her testimony, she was with appellant "fixing . . . up" his "other property," which was located on Clarendon, in Oak Cliff. Smith met appellant at Stone's property and they "rode over together in his truck," a red Ford F150 pickup. They did not return to Stone's property until approximately 11:30 p.m. that night. When they got back to the Meredith property, two pit bull dogs "came out from behind the fence and were starting to jump into" Smith's car, a Honda Accord. Stone was on the other side of the fence "yelling and screaming" at either the dogs or appellant, and appellant indicated that Smith should "hurry up and get out of here."
Smith drove back to her apartment in Mesquite, arriving there at "about midnight." Smith testified that appellant arrived "about 20 minutes after I did." Appellant "took a shower and left again" for "[a]bout an hour." He did not say anything or indicate where he was going. He returned at between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m. Smith left again to "collect money"--she acknowledged that she "sold dope"--and did not return until 4:00 a.m. The next thing Smith remembered was that appellant woke her as he was searching for the keys to Smith's car. He became frustrated when he was unable to find them, and then left in his red pickup truck. Smith was awakened again at 8:00 a.m. by a frantic telephone call from appellant, who stated that he had vomited in his truck from drinking "month-old milk or something," and he wanted her to have cleaning supplies "ready to clean out his truck." Appellant "arrive[d] about 20 minutes later." Smith testified that, almost immediately after he walked in the door, appellant removed his clothes, placed them in a bag, and got in the shower. While appellant showered, Smith went to a nearby car wash and cleaned out the inside of his truck.
Later that day, Smith noticed "police all over the place at" Stone's house. Smith asked appellant about the police cars. Appellant told her "he didn't know what happened," and he would have to call her back. Smith testified that appellant "called me back and told me [Stone] had been murdered and they had found the body." Appellant asked Smith to meet him at a car wash near her apartment. Smith met appellant at the car wash but could not recall what was said between them except that she held up appellant's bag of clothes, saying, "Well, I guess you need to get rid of these, huh?" Appellant "freaked out" and grabbed the clothes from Smith. She did not know what he did with them. That night, Smith, suspecting that appellant had murdered Stone, asked him, "[W]as it worth it, you know, was it worth all of this?" Appellant responded, "Hell yes, I wasn't supposed to let her get away with it." Appellant also told Smith that Stone had grabbed him and that, when she fell, the dog bit her in the face, penetrating her skull, thus leaving him "no choice but to finish her off."
Approximately two and a half weeks later, Smith sought out a Dallas police officer who was investigating the murder, Detective Lopez, and told him what had happened. Before speaking to the police, Smith left appellant a voice message indicating she did not "want to live with this on my shoulders anymore," and that she "didn't want to be scared anymore." Appellant threatened Smith that "if he went down, everyone was going down." Appellant reminded Smith that she had cleaned out his truck, and he alleged he had a syringe of her blood that he could squirt on the murder weapon. Smith also testified that she had hesitated to say anything to the police because she "didn't want [appellant] to get in trouble," and because she was afraid they would discover that she supplemented her income by selling drugs.
The jury convicted appellant of murder as charged in the indictment, and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The trial court denied appellant's motion for new trial, and this appeal followed.
Discussion
Sufficiency
In his first point of error, appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's verdict. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the jury's determination of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony because the jury is the sole judge of those matters. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899-900; Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
Appellant was indicted for murder. A person commits murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual, or intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1), (b)(2) (West 2011).
The jury's verdict is supported by legally sufficient evidence. The jury heard that appellant and Stone had been involved in romantic relationship that fell apart, that appellant expressed his anger towards Stone on several occasions, and that Stone feared to be alone with appellant. Stone suspected that appellant was luring her dogs to his side of the property and not allowing them to return, and appellant suspected that Stone had taken his motorcycle. Toland testified that she saw a red pickup truck in the vicinity of Stone's house at approximately 5:00 a.m. on the morning of May 7, 2009, and that she was concerned because she knew appellant drove a red pickup. Smith testified that appellant was unable to find the keys to her Honda when he left her apartment some time after 4:00 a.m. on May 7, and that he drove away in his red Ford F150 pickup truck. Suspecting that appellant murdered Stone, Smith later asked him, "[W]as it worth it, you know, was it worth all of this?" Appellant responded, "Hell yes, I wasn't supposed to let her get away with it." Appellant also said that Stone grabbed him and that, when she fell, the dog bit her, penetrating her skull, thus leaving him "no choice but to finish her off." Appellant subsequently threatened to implicate Smith in the crime, reminding her that she had cleaned out his truck and he had a syringe of her blood that he could squirt on the murder weapon.
As the sole judge of a witness's credibility and the weight of the testimony, the jury may choose to believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness's testimony. See Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The jury was also free to resolve conflicts in testimony, and having done so, the jury could rationally find all of the essential elements of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Viewed under the appropriate standard, the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's verdict. We overrule appellant's first point of error.
Reasonable Doubt
In his second point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred by including a definition of reasonable doubt in the jury charge. He specifically complains about the following language in the charge: "It is not required that the prosecution prove guilt beyond all possible doubt; it is required that the prosecution's proof excludes a 'reasonable doubt' concerning the defendant's guilt."
This Court has rejected appellant's argument in other cases. See, e.g., Bates v. State, 164 S.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2005, no pet.); Bratton v. State, 156 S.W.3d 689, 696-97 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2005, pet. ref'd); O'Canas v. State, 140 S.W.3d 695, 702 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2003, pet. ref'd). We decline to decide the issue differently in this case. We overrule appellant's second point.
Instruction Regarding Good Conduct Time
In his third point of error, appellant contends that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury, during the punishment phase of the trial, on sentence credit for good conduct time. The court's jury instruction, which tracked article 37.07, section 4(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, reads in part as follows: .Under the law applicable in this case, the defendant, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, may earn time off the period of incarceration imposed through the award of good conduct time.. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 37.07, § 4(a) (West 2006). Appellant does not dispute that this instruction tracked article 37.07, section 4(a), but he argues the instruction was erroneous and prejudicial because he is ineligible to receive good conduct time credit pursuant to section 508.149(a) of the Texas Government Code. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 508.149(a)(2) (West Supp. 2011). He did not object to the instruction, so he argues it caused him egregious harm by misleading the jury regarding his eligibility for good conduct time credit. The State agrees that appellant is ineligible for good conduct time credit, and it argues the charge was proper or, alternatively, did not cause egregious harm.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected appellant's argument in Luquis v. State, 72 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). In that case, the court acknowledged that the instruction dictated by the code of criminal procedure may appear to be misleading and inapplicable to some defendants. Id. at 363. Nonetheless, it construed article 37.07, section 4(a) of the code of criminal procedure to be an absolute command that the good conduct time instruction be given to the jury. Id. Accordingly, a trial court that gives the instruction does not commit error. Id. We overrule appellant's third point of error.
Jurisdiction
In his final point of error, appellant argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear the instant case because the case was not transferred to its docket. The clerk's record shows that a grand jury impaneled by the 292nd Judicial District Court charged appellant by indictment on July 28, 2009, and that the indictment was presented to Criminal District Court No. 1. Furthermore, the supplemental clerk's record shows that the case was subsequently transferred from Criminal District Court No. 1 to Criminal District Court No. 7, the court of adjudication, pursuant to a transfer order dated April 5, 2010. The record has been supplemented to include the transfer order. We therefore overrule appellant's final point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Pursuant to rule 34.5(c)(1) of the rules of appellate procedure, the State requested the district clerk to supplement the clerk's record with the transfer order.
LANA MYERS
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
100704F.U05