Opinion
I.D. No. 9607013229
Date Submitted: April 26, 2001
Date Decided: July 31, 2001
On Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief. Denied.
James Apostolico, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for the State.
Maurice Cooper, Delaware Correctional Institution, Smyrna, Delaware. Pro Se.
ORDER
This 31st day of July, 2001, upon consideration of the defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief filed in accordance with Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, it appears that:
1. The defendant, Maurice Cooper, was arrested on July 20, 1996 by Wilmington Police in connection with the robbery of the China Wall Restaurant on July 13, 1996. During the robbery, one of the defendant's accomplices shot and killed an employee of the restaurant with a 45-caliber handgun. As a result, defendant was charged with Murder First Degree, Robbery First Degree and Conspiracy First Degree.
2. On November 21, 1997, the defendant plead guilty to the charges of Murder Second Degree, Robbery First Degree and Conspiracy Second Degree and agreed to cooperate and testify against his co-defendants. Sentencing was delayed until after the trial of the remaining defendants with the defendant being sentenced on April 21, 1998 to 25 years at level 5 suspended after 15 years for Level 3 and Level 2 probation. The sentencing was consistent with the Rule 11(e)(1)(c) plea entered by the defendant.
3. The defendant filed no direct appeal, but the Court did deny a Motion to Reduce his sentence filed on June 14, 2000. The defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief was received by the Prothonotary's Office on March 2, 2001 within the applicable time limitations.
4. Defendant raises several grounds for relief: (1) abuse of discretion, (2) ineffective assistance of counsel, (3) conflict of interest, (4) that his counsel forged the defendant's name and then coerced him to sign his signature on the plea agreement, and (5) prosecutorial misconduct.
5. The defendant first claims that the court abused its discretion when sentencing him because the court was informed during the plea colloquy that the defendant was verbally promised a sentence of 12 years at level 5. Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 11(c), before accepting a plea of guilty, "the court must address the defendant personally in open court" to determine that the defendant understands the plea agreement and all of its ramifications. The Court has reviewed the transcript of the plea hearing and finds the defendant's claim is not supported by the record. After reviewing with the defendant the charges to which he intended to plea guilty, the following statements were made by the Court to the defendant:
In return for that the State has agreed to nol. pros. all of the remaining counts that are set forth in the indictment as they relate to you, recommend that a presentence investigation be undertaken, and pursuant to Rule 11(e)(1)(c) that the sentence that's been agreed to will be 25 years at Level 5 incarceration, suspended after 15 years for Level III and Level II probation, and the sentencing will be deferred until the supplemental could be completed.
The Rule 11(e)(1)(c) is a rule of the Court that allows the parties to come to an agreement as to what they believe the appropriate sentence would be. If the Court accepts the plea it will be bound to give you that particular sentence. So you are protected in a sense that if the court wanted to give you more time than is set forth in the document, you would be able to withdraw the plea and start over again. So the limitations that are set forth in the document is also a limitation on the Court, and you would not receive any more incarceration or sentence greater than that that's set forth therein.
See page 6 of transcript of plea colloquy held on November 21, 1997.
Since the prosecutor had also stated the terms of the plea agreement in his introductory comments, the Court notes that within a span of probably less than 5 minutes the defendant had been advised twice as to the number of years of incarceration included in the agreement. Later in the colloquy the Court inquired of the defendant whether what the Court had reviewed with the defendant was his understanding of the plea agreement and he responded "yes." Finally the Court inquired if there had been any other promises made to him regarding the plea agreement to which the defendant responded "no." Based upon the above, the defendant's claim is simply without merit and is summarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 61(d)(4).
See page 8 of transcript of plea colloquy held on November 21, 1997.
In fairness to the defendant, the Court does note that the Truth In Sentencing guilty plea form prepared with the plea agreement does indicate that by entering the plea he would be subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 12 years. However, even the defendant does not allege that this was an area of confusion and the record is clear that the defendant was only advised that if the Court accepts the agreement it would be required to impose a sentence of 15 years of Level 5 incarceration.
6. Defendant next claims that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorneys allowed defendant to plead guilty when they had knowledge that other promises as to his sentence had been made to the defendant that were not stated in the written plea agreement. As evidence of unreasonable conduct, defendant claims that his attorneys should not have allowed the plea colloquy to continue after defendant answered "Yes" to the question, "Have there been any other promises or representations made to you in regards to this matter?" Unfortunately for the defendant, the record of the plea colloquy clearly shows that defendant answered "No" to the cited question. Defendant has offered no other evidence that his attorneys' conduct was unreasonable or that he was prejudiced as a result. In addition, when asked during the plea colloquy if he was satisfied with the advice and counsel provided by his attorneys, he responded "Yes." Therefore, defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is summarily dismissed under Rule 61(d)(4).
7. Defendant next claims that a conflict of interest arose when his attorneys knowingly accepted a plea that was unconstitutional. Again, defendant offers no evidence or reasoning to support his claim and the allegation is merely a conclusory statement without further explanation. As such, this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is also summarily dismissed under Rule 61(d)(4).
8. The defendant's next claim is that his attorney, Howard Hillis, forged his name on the plea agreement and then coerced him into signing his signature. Even though there is nothing in the record to support such an assertion and the plea agreement as well as the Truth In Sentencing Guilty Plea Form appear to be signed by Mr. Cooper, even if the Court was to accept Mr. Cooper's assertion, it would provided no basis to attack his conviction. The Court during the plea colloquy fully reviewed the details of the plea agreement with the defendant and he acknowledged their accuracy and accepted their terms. Therefore, this claim is also summarily dismissed under Rule 61(d)(4).
9. The defendant finally claims that there was prosecutorial misconduct when the State knowingly offered a plea agreement that was unreasonable under Delaware Law, when the State knew that the agreement was for a 12 year term of incarceration, not 15, and failed to advise the Court of that agreement. Again the Court's review of the transcript of the plea colloquy reveals that there was nothing for the State to correct since the defendant received exactly what he bargained for and which was contained in the plea agreement. Therefore, defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct is summarily dismissed under Rule 61(d)(4).
10. For the foregoing reasons, defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief filed pursuant to Rule 61 of the Superior Court Criminal Rules is DENIED.