Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-2513 (RMU), Document No. 68.
March 22, 2005
MEMORANDUM ORDER
DENYING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT I. INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the court on the plaintiff's motion to alter or amend judgment. The pro se plaintiff requests this court to revisit and reverse its March 3, 2005 decision denying the plaintiff's motion for relief from judgment or order and Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson's July 13, 2004 decision dismissing the plaintiff's complaint. Because the plaintiff fails to meet the criteria of set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), the court denies the plaintiff's motion.
While the plaintiff styles his motion as a motion to set aside judgment or order of dismissal, because the plaintiff filed this motion within a ten-day period after this court's March 3, 2005 decision, the court treats it as a motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Zyko v. Dep't of Def., 180 F. Supp. 2d 89, 90-91 (D.D.C. 2001); see also United States v. Emmons, 107 F.3d 762, 764 (10th Cir. 1997); Small v. Hunt, 98 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 1996).
II. BACKGROUND
The plaintiff is a Bahamian citizen currently incarcerated at the U.S. Penitentiary in Coleman, Florida, serving a life sentence on drug trafficking charges. Mem. Op. at 1 (May 28, 2003). The plaintiff has been engaged in an enduring quest under FOIA to obtain all records related to his arrest and prosecution, in the hopes of uncovering documents that he believes will prove that the investigation that led to his conviction was illegal. Id. at 1-2. In these consolidated FOIA cases, the plaintiff brings complaints against the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ"), the U.S. Marshals Service ("USMS"), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF"), the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"), and the U.S. Customs Service ("Customs"). Id.On May 28, 2003, Judge Jackson granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Mem. Op. at 1 (May 28, 2003). Finding that the defendants had responded to the plaintiff's FOIA requests with adequate and thorough searches, the court held that the government had fully complied with their FOIA obligations. Id.
On June 17, 2004, the D.C. Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case back to the district court. Cooper v. Dept. of Justice, 2004 WL 895748 at *1 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The D.C. Circuit was concerned with three cashier's checks used as evidence in the plaintiff's criminal trial. Id. The defendants had neither found the checks nor turned them over to the plaintiff because, according to the defendants, the plaintiff's FOIA request did not specifically identify the checks. Id. at *2. The D.C. Circuit rejected this argument because the plaintiff-appellant requested "all records pertaining to his criminal case, and the government has a duty to construe FOIA requests liberally." Id. The D.C. Circuit concluded that because the USMS search did not reveal the three checks and the defendant-appellees did not offer an explanation as to why the search would not have revealed the checks, the defendant-appellees did not rebut the evidence presented by the plaintiff-appellant of an inadequate USMS search. Id. Accordingly, unresolved factual disputes made summary judgment inappropriate and the D.C. Circuit vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment, with the status of the three checks being the sole remaining issue on remand. Id.
On April 2, 2004, the defendants discovered the checks at issue, and promptly mailed copies to the plaintiff. Pl.'s Mot. to Appear Before the Court Electronically ("Pl.'s Mot. to Appear") at 2 (dated July 8, 2004). On July 13, 2004, Judge Jackson held a status conference on mandate from the D.C. Circuit. None of the parties appeared. Judge Jackson dismissed the case from the bench because the cashier's checks in dispute had been turned over to the plaintiff, leaving no viable claim in dispute. Id.
On July 29, 2004, the plaintiff filed a motion styled as one for reconsideration but treated by the court as a motion seeking relief from judgment or order. On October 28, 2004, the court's calendar committee reassigned this case to this member of the court. On March 3, 2005, this court denied the plaintiff's motion. Quickly thereafter, on March 7, 2005, the plaintiff filed the instant motion seeking to alter or amend judgment of the court's denial of relief from judgment or order. The court now turns to that motion.
III. ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard for Rule 59(e) Motion
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) provides that a motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed within 10 days of the entry of the judgment at issue. FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e); see also Mashpee Wamponoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (stating that a Rule 59(e) motion "must be filed within 10 days of the challenged order, not including weekends, certain specified national holidays (including Christmas Day and New Year's Day), or any other day appointed as a holiday by the President"). While the court has considerable discretion in ruling on a Rule 59(e) motion, the reconsideration and amendment of a previous order is an unusual measure. Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ( per curiam); McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999). Rule 59(e) motions "need not be granted unless the district court finds that there is an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear legal error or prevent manifest injustice." Ciralsky v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 355 F.3d 661, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Firestone, 76 F.3d at 1208). Moreover, "[a] Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider is not simply an opportunity to reargue facts and theories upon which a court has already ruled," New York v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 37, 38 (D.D.C. 1995), or a vehicle for presenting theories or arguments that could have been advanced earlier. Kattan v. District of Columbia, 995 F.2d 274, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1993); W.C. A.N. Miller Cos. v. United States, 173 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1997).
B. The Court Denies the Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
The plaintiff first insists that this court, in its March 3, 2005 memorandum opinion, improperly applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) to the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, as opposed to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). The court agrees with the pro se prisoner plaintiff on this point. The court's order dismissing the case was issued on July 13, 2004. The plaintiff must have filed his Rule 59(e) motion within ten days of the court's decision, or by no later than July 27, 2004. Although the plaintiff's motion was not filed until July 29, 2004, he delivered it to the prison authorities on July 22, 2004. Because a pro se prisoner is afforded the "mailbox rule" in Rule 59(e) motions, the plaintiff's motion is deemed filed upon being deposited with the prison authorities on July 22, 2004. Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 151 F.3d 1053, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Edwards v. United States, 266 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, the court treats the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration as timely filed for Rule 59(e) purposes, and therefore one to alter or amend judgment as opposed to one seeking relief from judgment or order under Rule 60(b). The court notes that contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the three day extension for service by mail does not apply to the filing requirement for Rule 59(e) motions. Derrington-Bey v. Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Corr., 39 F.3d 1224, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
The plaintiff next insists that this court erred in denying his motion for reconsideration and that Judge Jackson erred in dismissing the case at the status conference on July 13, 2004, and therefore seeks to alter or amend these judgments. While the court reexamines the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration as a motion to alter or amend judgment and concurrently examines the plaintiff's recent motion to alter or amend judgment, the court is unconvinced under the criteria of Rule 59(e), as it is unconvinced under the criteria of Rule 60(b). The plaintiff fails to clear the hurdles he must overcome to prevail on a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend judgment. As the court previously noted, Rule 59(e) motions "need not be granted unless the district court finds that there is an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear legal error or prevent manifest injustice." Ciralsky, 355 F.3d at 671 (quoting Firestone, 76 F.3d at 1208). The plaintiff does not allege in either of his motions to alter or amend judgment an intervening change in controlling law or the availability of new evidence. The plaintiff does not persuasively argue that manifest injustice will ensue due to a clear legal error that must be corrected. The only material issue on remand from the D.C. Circuit — the location of the missing cashier's checks — was resolved when the defendant discovered the checks and mailed them to the plaintiff. Once the checks were found, no issue in dispute remained and Judge Jackson properly dismissed the case.
Apparently not wanting the sun to set on his case, the plaintiff continues to request additional bites at the juridical apple. The court mirrors sentiments of other members of this court, that parties "are urged not to file motions for reconsideration unless fully justified under the Firestone standard. The Court will consider Rule 11 sanctions for frivolous motions which merely waste everyone's time by repeating arguments which have already been rejected." Mekuria v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 45 F. Supp. 2d 19, 31 n. 10 (D.D.C. 1999) (emphasis in original).
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is this 22nd day of March 2005, hereby
ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion to alter or amend judgment is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.