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applying same actor inference to race discrimination claim
Summary of this case from Varno v. Jefferson Cnty. Dep't of PlanningOpinion
00 CV 5921 (SJ).
January 26, 2004
PRINCELLA COOKSEY, Long Island City, N.Y., Plaintiff, Pro Se.
CONSTANGY, BROOKS SMITH, LLC, Atlanta, Georgia, By: Frank B. Shuster, Esq., Timothy L. Williams, Esq., STANTON, HUGHES, DIANA, CERRA, MARIANI MARGELLO, P.C., Morristown, New Jersey, Attorneys for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Princella Cooksey ("Plaintiff"), who is appearing pro se, brings this instant action against Defendants Hertz Corporation ("Hertz"), Mark Pankow ("Mr. Pankow"), Debbie Patrazino ("Ms. Patrazino"), and Chris Duvally ("Mr. Duvally") (collectively, "Defendants") alleging that she was discriminated against on the basis of her national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). Currently before this Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was referred to Hertz for employment through the Wildcat program, which is designed to help people on welfare return to the workplace. (Defs.' Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 2). On June 29, 1999, Plaintiff applied for employment with Hertz. Id. After an interview with Mr. Pankow, Ms. Patranzino, and Mr. Duvally, Plaintiff was hired as a counter and sales representative ("CSR"). Id. at ¶ 11. On July 10, 1999, Plaintiff began her employment with Hertz. (Dec. of Mr. Pankow at ¶ 5.) Under the collective bargaining agreement, CSRs are hired as probationary employees and must complete a sixty-day probationary period. (Defs.' Rule 56.1 Statement at ¶ 14.) During the course of Plaintiff's employment, Hertz evaluated Plaintiff and found her work performance deficient in various areas. After Plaintiff failed to correct these deficiencies, Mr. Pankow and Mr. Duvally terminated Plaintiff for unsatisfactory performance on September 9, 1999. Id. at ¶ 73. Prior to her termination, Plaintiff complained that she was discriminated against because she was Native-American and that her co-workers and supervisors acted inappropriately toward her. On October 2, 2000, Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint alleging various Title VII violations.
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment Standard
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The burden is on the movant to establish the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323; see also Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995).
Once the movant has made a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to present "significantly probative" supporting evidence showing that there is a material factual issue for trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Summary judgment should be granted "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; see also Sim v. New York Mailers' Union No. 6, 166 F.3d 465, 469 (2d Cir. 1999).
II. Title VII claims
A. Discriminatory Discharge Claim
In order to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under Title VII, an employee must show that: (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was performing her duties satisfactorily; (3) she was discharged; and (4) her discharge occurred in circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination on the basis of her membership in that class.See Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir. 2000). Even if an employee succeeds in setting forth a prima facie case, the employer may rebut that showing by articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment action.Id. Once the employer articulates a non-discriminatory reason for the employment action, the employee must come forward with evidence that the employer's proffered non-discriminatory reason is a mere pretext for actual discrimination. Id.
Defendants concedes that Plaintiff established the first and third prongs of her prima facie case. Defendants, however, argue that Plaintiff fail to meet the remaining prongs because she was not performing her job duties satisfactorily and that the comments made to Plaintiff did not give rise to an inference of discrimination. Furthermore, Defendants maintain that employees with records of poor performance during their new-hire probation period cannot establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge under Title VII. See Mclee v. Chrysler Corp., 109 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 1997).
Defendants made numerous complaints to Plaintiff regarding her work performance:
Plaintiff's supervisors and trainers evaluated her as deficient in fourteen of the twenty-five, thirteen of the twenty and twelve of the twenty-one areas evaluated during Plaintiff's first three weeks as a CSR. Ms. Patrazino noted that Plaintiff needed to improve in the areas of checking corporate identification; fleet messages at rental and return, selecting the correct reservation, product knowledge and using the point of sale material. Ms. Patranzino also noted that Plaintiff continually had problems finding information on drivers' licenses and needed to wear her glasses.
(Def.'s Mem. of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 4.)
In her opposition to Defendants' motion to dismiss, Plaintiff offers a host of explanations for incidents complained of and highlights the actions of her supervisors, trainers, and co-workers. Plaintiff also maintains that she performed her duties satisfactorily. Specifically, Plaintiff notes that she received "praise for [her] performance." (Pl's Aff./Affirm. In Opp. to Def.'s Motion at 6). Defendants counter that although Plaintiff had improved in some areas, her performance was deficient in most areas. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to prove that she was performing her job duties in a satisfactory manner. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Even if she could establish a prima facie case, Defendants have put forth a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her, namely, her poor performance. Moreover, as pointed out by Defendants, Hertz has repeatedly terminated persons of all races during their probationary period for poor performance. Defendants also persuasively argue that the same actor inference applies in this case as Plaintiff was hired by Mr. Duvally, Mr. Pankow, and Ms. Patranzino and fired by Mr. Pankow and Mr. Duvally. See Grady v. Affiliated Cent., Inc., 130 F.3d 553, 560 (2d Cir. 1997) ("where the hirer and firer are the same individual and the termination of employment occurs within a relatively short time span following the hiring, a strong inference exists that discrimination was not a determining factor for the adverse action taken by the employer"). Finally, Plaintiff fails to point to any substantial evidence of pretext so as to rebut Hertz's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her employment. As such, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted on Plaintiff's discriminatory discharge claim.
B. Retaliation Claim
In order to establish a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation, an employee must demonstrate that: (1) she was engaged in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) the employer was aware of the employee's participation in the protected activity; (3) the employer took adverse action against the employee; and (4) a causal connected existed between the employee's protected activity and the adverse action taken by the employer. See Gordon v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2000). Upon a showing, the defendant must demonstrate legitimate reasons for its actions, whereupon the Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the defendant's explanations are pretext for the true discriminatory motive. See Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1308 (2d Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff contends that Hertz terminated her because she complained of the alleged harassment against her. Even if Plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of retaliation, as stated above, Defendants have shown a valid reason for terminating Plaintiff, to wit, her poor work performance. See Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708, 714 (2d Cir. 1996). Moreover, after Plaintiff complained about the alleged discrimination, Hertz re-assigned her to a more-experienced CSR trainer and branch managers. Therefore, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to Plaintiff's retaliation claim.
C. Harassment Claim
To state a Title VII harassment claim, an employee must establish: (1) harassment that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment, creating an abusive working environment, and (2) a sufficient basis for imputing the conduct that created the hostile environment to her employer. See Ferris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 136 (2d Cir. 2001). "A hostile work environment exists where the workplace is `permeated with discriminatory intimidating, ridicule and insult' that is sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment." Brennan v. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n, Inc., 192 F.3d 310, 318 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). Thus, a Title VII hostile work environment will only succeed where the conduct at issue is so severe or pervasive as to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment, and where the victim subjectively perceives the environment to be abusive. See Richardson v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 436 (2d Cir. 1999). In determining whether a given workplace is permeated with discrimination so "severe or pervasive as to support a Title VII claim, the Supreme Court has identified the following factors deemed to be relevant: (1) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; (3) its severity; (3) whether the conduct was physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; (4) whether the conduct unreasonably interfered with plaintiff's work; and (5) what psychological harm, if any, resulted. Id. at 437 (citing Harris, 530 U.S. at 23.)
Plaintiff alleges that her co-workers and supervisors' statements and conduct created a hostile work environment. Plaintiff alleges that her co-workers made the following discriminatory comments: (1) "Native Americans feel they have been cheated;" (2) "Native Americans are the forgotten people;" and (3) "your people did not know anything about religion until the white man came and your religion involved basement rituals and killing chickens." (Def's Mem. of Law at 17.) Plaintiff further alleges that one or more of her co-workers (1) failed to make room for her at the break room lunch table; (2) did not like her and acted distant toward her; (3) yelled and screamed at her and made noise when she was trying to learn; (4) refused to work with her and failed to adequately train her; and (5) turned a pad face down when she tried to look at it. Id. at 19; Def.'s Reply Mem. of Law, at 5 n. 1.
Plaintiff also alleges that her supervisors made the following discriminatory comments: (1) Ms. Alvarez stated that she had too many chiefs and not enough Indians, and (2) Ms. Patranzino stated that she "made a deal with the devil." Id. at 23. Plaintiff further alleges that the following conduct created a hostile work environment: (1) a supervisor at Hertz asked Plaintiff whether she meant to indicate that she was Native American on the Voluntary Self-Identification — Applicants form; (2) Ms. Alvarez bumped her off the computer and override company policy; (3) Mr. Godfrey yelled at her; and (4) Ms. Patranzino failed to train her. Id.
Defendants offer numerous reasons why the comments and conduct of both Plaintiff's supervisors and co-workers were nondiscriminatory. The Court need not address Defendants' justifications as Plaintiff has failed to show that the comments or conduct created a work environment permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and insult so as to alter the conditions of her employment. See Stembridge v. City of New York, 88 F. Supp.2d 276, 286 (E.D.N.Y, 2000); Regis v. Metropolitian Jewish Geriatric, No. 97-0906, 2000 WL 264336, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2000). The Court highlights that the frequency of the use of racial epithets toward Plaintiff over her short tenure at Hertz are few in number. See Brennan, 192 F.3d at 318 ("Isolated, minor acts or occasional episodes do not warrant relief"); see also Turner v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 181 F. Supp.2d 122, 133 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) ("[i]ncidents that are `few in number' and that occur `over a short period of time' may fail to demonstrate a hostile work environment"). Thus, Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's harassment claim is granted.
Defendants set forth the following justifications regarding the conduct of Plaintiff's supervisors. Defendants argue that although Ms. Alvarez used the term Indian, it was used as a figure of speech to describe the speaker's inability to train other managers and was neither directed at nor meant to be demeaning of Plaintiff. Defendants contend that Ms. Patranzino's comment was made in relation to a conversation with another Hertz manager about switching locations with him that day. With respect to bumping her off of the computer, overriding policy, and Mr. Godfrey yelling at her, Defendants contend that this was done not because of any racial animus, but rather was done in response to Plaintiff's poor performance. Defendants contend that when Hertz supervisors inquired as to Plaintiff's status for the Voluntary Self-Identification form it was to insure that they were recording her status appropriately in accordance with its affirmative action policy.
Defendants also set forth the following justifications for the conduct of Plaintiff's co-workers. Defendants contend that all of the comments with the exception of the statement that "your people did not anything about religion until the white man came . . ." were not made as a result of Plaintiff's national origin. In fact, Defendants argue that a plain reading of some of the comments reflect sympathy and compassion for Native Americans. Even if Plaintiff can show that national origin motivated her co-workers comments, Defendants contend that "they are insufficient to establish severe and pervasive conduct." (Def's Mem. of Law, at 19.) Defendants further contend that the co-workers conduct was fueled by personality conflicts, rather than racial animus.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.