Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-1658.
May 28, 2003.
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Robert J. Conti ("Plaintiff") sought damages and other relief arising out of the termination of Plaintiff's employment by CSX Intermodal ("Defendant"), allegedly in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601et seq. (the "FMLA"). After a three day trial, a jury found for Defendant and judgment was entered in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff. Plaintiff moves this Court for a new trial pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a), or, in the alternative, for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
I. Rule 59 Motion
A. Legal Standard
Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a trial court, in its discretion, to grant a new trial "on all or part of the issues in an action where there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States." FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1). Such an endeavor is not, however, lightly undertaken, because it necessarily "effects a denigration of the jury system and to the extent that new trials are granted the judge takes over, if he does not usurp, the prime function of the jury as the trier of the facts." Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 90 (3d Cir. 1960) (en banc). Therefore, "[a] new trial may be granted [only] when the verdict is contrary to the great is weight of the evidence; that is, `where a miscarriage of justice would result if the verdict were to stand.'" Pryer v. C.O. 3 Slavic, 251 F.3d 448, 453 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Olefins Trading, Inc. v. Han Yang Chem. Corp., 9 F.3d 282, 289 (3d Cir. 1993)). When, as here, the asserted basis for a new trial is trial error, "the court's inquiry . . . is twofold. It must first determine whether an error was made in the course of the trial, and then must determine whether the error was so prejudicial that refusal to grant a new trial would be inconsistent with substantial justice." Farra v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1021, 1026 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
B. Discussion
Plaintiff argues that he should be granted a new trial because the Court erred in its jury interrogatories, which are attached hereto. Plaintiff contends that it was error to require the jury to decide Plaintiff s ability to return to work and to perform the essential functions of his job at the end of his FMLA leave, before allowing the jury to consider whether Defendant should be equitably estopped from asserting its defense that Plaintiff was unable to return to work. (Mem. Supp. Post-Trial Mot. at 2-3.) However, Plaintiff presents no legal support for this argument. Plaintiff further contends that if the jury had the opportunity to reach the issue of equitable estoppel, its determination that Plaintiff failed to prove that he could return to work and perform the essential functions of his job at the end of his FMLA leave would be against the weight of the evidence. Id. at 3-4.
The ability to return to work and to perform the essential functions of his job before the expiration of his leave is an essential element of a FMLA claim, which Plaintiff has the burden to establish. Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Corp., 292 F.3d 375, 384 (3d Cir. 2002). Thus, the Court finds that it was not error for it to require the jury to find that Plaintiff had established the essential elements of his FMLA claim before determining whether Defendant should be equitably estopped from asserting its defense that Plaintiff was unable to return to work.
In addition, although the parties were given a copy of the jury interrogatories during the charge conference with counsel, Plaintiff's counsel did not object to the jury interrogatories. It was not until after the Court instructed the jury and gave the jury interrogatories to the jury that Plaintiff's counsel objected to the jury interrogatories. The Court, therefore, finds that Plaintiff waived his objection to the jury interrogatories. Cf. Inter Medical Supplies, Ltd. v. EBI Medical Sys., Inc., 181 F.3d 446, 463 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding waiver for failure to object to jury interrogatories "when they were presented," although opinion does not make clear exactly when in the trial the interrogatories were presented to counsel for the first time).
The Court also finds that the jury's finding that Plaintiff was unable to return to work and to perform the essential functions of his job is not against the clear weight of the evidence. Plaintiff argues that the jury's finding is against the clear weight of the evidence because: (1) Plaintiff testified that there were no reasons why he could not perform his job duties and responsibilities; and (2) Dr. Renzi testified that Plaintiff could have returned to work as of July 23, 2001. (Mem. Supp. Post-Trial Mot. at 4). Defendant presented evidence that although Plaintiff knew he was required to present a doctor's note before returning to work, Plaintiff did not present such a note until September 2001, which was well after the end of his FMLA leave. The evidence at trial on the issue of whether and when Plaintiff was medically able to return to work was in dispute. Plaintiff has not secured the trial testimony. The Court recalls this issue as one for the jury, and the jury found for Defendant.
The Court finds that a new trial is not warranted because there was no error in its jury instructions or interrogatories and the jury's verdict was not contrary to the great weight of the evidence.
II. Rule 50 Motion
A. Legal Standard
Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in the aftermath of a jury trial, a court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law if it determines that there was "no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found for a particular party on an issue," and that, without a favorable finding on that issue, the party cannot maintain his claim under controlling law. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). In determining whether to grant judgment as a matter of law, the court "must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and determine whether the record contains the `minimum quantum of evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief.'" Glenn Distribs. Corp. v. Carlisle Plastics, Inc., 297 F.3d 294, 299 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Mosley v. Wilson, 102 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 1996)). Indeed, a court may grant judgment as a matter of law "only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could find liability." LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 2003 U.S.App. LEXIS 5757, Nos. 00-1368 00-1473, slip op. at 6 (3d Cir. Mar. 25, 2003) (quoting Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993)).
In this endeavor, "the court may not weigh evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses or substitute its version of the facts for that of the jury," but rather may grant a Rule 50 motion only "if upon review of the record it can be said as a matter of law that the verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence." Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 691-92 (3d Cir. 1993); see also LePage's, 2003 U.S.App. LEXIS 5757, slip op. at 6 ("Review of the jury's verdict is limited to determining whether some evidence in the record supports the jury's verdict."); Glenn Distribs., 297 F.3d at 299 (stating that "the standard for granting summary judgment under Rule 56 `mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)"') (quotingAnderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986)).
II. Discussion
Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict because there is "no legally sufficient basis" for the jury's finding that Plaintiff failed to prove that he could return to work and perform the essential functions of his job at the end of his FMLA leave. (Mem. Supp. Post-Trial Mot. at 4.) As stated above, there is evidence to support the jury's finding that Plaintiff failed to prove that he could return to work and perform the essential functions of his job at the end of his FMLA leave. Thus, the Court cannot say as a matter of law that the verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence. The Court, therefore, will deny Plaintiff's Motion for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court will deny Plaintiff's Post-Trial Motion Pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a) and 50(b)
An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 28th day of May, 2003, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Post-Trial Motion Pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a) and 50(b) (Docket No. 39), and Defendant's response thereto (Docket No. 40), it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED.