Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from an Order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Ct. No. ZE 031342, Clifford Klein, Judge.
Richard B. Lennon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Appellant Alexander E.
Ellen S. Finkelberg, under appointment by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County for Respondent Gail E.
ZELON, J.
Alexander E. appeals an order appointing a conservator of his person and estate pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, Welfare & Institutions Code sections 5000, et seq. (LPS). He contends substantial evidence does not support the jury’s finding that he was gravely disabled, and in excluding from the jury’s consideration the provision to him of government aid and assistance in evaluating whether he was gravely disabled. We affirm.
All statutory references herein are to the Welfare & Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 2, 2007, Gail E., Alexander’s mother, filed a petition for the appointment of a conservator for the person and estate of Alexander pursuant to section 5350. The petition alleged that Alexander was 25, and unable to provide for his basic needs of food, clothing and shelter due to a mental disability. The court appointed Marvin Southard temporary conservator, and issued temporary letters of conservatorship on April 2, 2007.
The matter was set for a jury trial to commence on July 10, 2007. Alexander represented himself at trial.
Pursuant to section 5350, subdivision (d), the person for whom a conservatorship is sought has the right to a jury or court trial on the issue of their grave disability.
Nathalie Maullin, a psychiatrist, testified she had treated Alexander since his hospitalization in March 2007. In her opinion, Alexander has schizophrenia, chronic, paranoid type. He has disorders in his thought processes and content. Schizophrenics can have auditory or visual hallucinations, delusions that people are trying to harm them; they can be grandiose and believe they are entitled to things, and can lack motivation and goal-directed activity. She has observed hallucinations in Alexander, delusions of paranoia and grandeur, lack of motivation, and apathy.
She does not believe Alexander understands his condition, and he does not believe he is mentally ill. Alexander takes anti-psychotic medication and Abilify, but he remains hospitalized because he is not in compliance with his medication.
In her opinion, Alexander’s mental condition and his problematic behaviors affect his ability to independently take care of his needs for food, clothing and shelter. His mother has found him homeless on at least two occasions. When he lived with others, they took advantage of him and assaulted him, breaking his nose. He cannot hold a job because of his illness. Alexander is unable to accept community housing or welfare because he refuses to fill out the forms, and denies he has schizophrenia.
Derrik Distelhorst testified he has known Alexander for three and one-half years. Alexander has come over to his house uninvited twice in the last 12 months, and taken food. When they went to lunch, Alexander did not have enough money to pay.
Gail E., Alexander’s mother, moved to California in 2003 to be near Alexander because he had been calling her for help. She found him homeless in Santa Ana.
On March 16, 2007, she came home to find that Alexander had blocked off the road with his car so that he could skateboard. The next day, Alexander got up at 2:00 p.m.; he was anxious, irritable, and frustrated. He told her, “I can’t do this anymore. I can’t take care of you any longer. You have to go to the doctor.” Alexander told her that she was seriously depressed and suicidal. She tried to calm him down. Alexander ordered her to go to the hospital. When they got to the hospital, she was able to let them know about Alexander’s illness. Alexander was placed on hold and transferred to Kaiser Mental Health, where he has been since that time. She sees him about four times a week.
During the last 12 months, Alexander has on three occasions either lived in his car, with friends, or in the woods. Alexander does not shower, change his clothes, or brush his teeth. His parents have paid his bills, including his car payment, motorcycle payment, automobile insurance, federal taxes, and his Visa card.
Alexander testified that when he was admitted to the hospital in March, he was employed. He has a bachelor’s degree from Louisiana State University in mathematics, and signed a teaching contract with Los Angeles Unified School District for $36,000, but was terminated. Alexander stated that he knows how to use a bank and credit card and to apply for social services, including social security, disability, or unemployment.
At trial, the court instructed the jury with CACI No. 4007, which provides in relevant part that “A person is not ‘gravely disabled’ if he can survive safely with the help of third party assistance. Third party assistance is the aid of family, friends, or others who are responsible, willing, and able to help provide for the person’s basic needs for food, clothing and shelter. [¶] You must not consider offers by family, friends, or others unless they have testified to or stated specifically in writing their willingness and ability to help provide Alexander [E.] with food, clothing, or shelter. Well-intended offers of assistance are not sufficient unless they will ensure the person can survive safely.” Alexander did not object to this instruction.
The jury returned a unanimous verdict finding that Alexander was gravely disabled due to a mental disorder.
DISCUSSION
1. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Finding that Alexander Was Gravely Disabled.
Alexander contends that the finding he is gravely disabled is not supported by substantial evidence because there is evidence that when he left his mother’s home, he was able to meet his essential needs. He contends the evidence established that he was able to clothe himself, did not suffer from malnutrition, and he was able to utilize shelter services when necessary.
The LPS Act was designed to end “the inappropriate, indefinite, and involuntary commitment of mentally disordered persons . . .” and “[t]o guarantee and protect public safety.” (§ 5001.) Because civil commitment is an involuntary deprivation of a person’s liberty (Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 225) “[t]he law must . . . strive to make certain that only those truly unable to take care of themselves are being assigned conservators under the LPS Act and committed to mental hospitals against their will.” (Ibid.) As a result, the petitioner must establish, on a unanimous jury verdict, beyond a reasonable doubt that the proposed conservatee is gravely disabled. (§§ 5008, subd. (h)(1); 5350; Roulet, supra, pp.225-226, 235.)
Respondent asserts that the matter is moot because an LPS conservatorship is effective only for one year, and the conservatorship that is the subject of this appeal has expired. (§ 5361; see Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 542.) Although respondent has filed a petition for reappointment, she contends the factual issues underlying Alexander’s disability at the time of trial in July 2007 are specific as of that date, and that the issue is not one of public interest and does not concern issues which are likely to recur. We decline to consider this case moot because otherwise, the matter would be unreviewable due to the short term of LPS conservatorships. (Conservatorship of Jones (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 292, 298 [appellate review justified where collateral consequences remain after termination of conservatorship, such as legal questions arising from incapacity]; Conservatorship of Johnson (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 693, 696, fn.2; In re Michael D. (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 522, 524, fn.1.)
Under section 5008, subdivision (h)(1)(A), “gravely disabled” is defined as “[a] condition in which a person, as a result of a mental disorder, is unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing or shelter.” The term “mental disorder” is not defined in the LPS Act, but in Conservatorship of Chambers (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 277, 282, fn. 2 the court noted that the term was “limited to those disorders listed by the American Psychiatric Association in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.”
We affirm the jury’s factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. (Conservatorship of Isaac O. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 50, 57.) Substantial evidence is evidence of “ponderable legal significance.” We resolve all conflicts in the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury’s findings. (Conservatorship of Ramirez (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 390, 401.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the jury’s conclusion. Dr. Maullin testified that Alexander refuses to take his medication, denies he has a mental disorder, is unable to hold a job because of his disorder, would have trouble providing for his basic needs of food, clothing, and shelter, and would benefit from a treatment program where he would receive medication and be reintegrated back into the community with the help of a supervisor. Gail E. testified to Alexander’s troubles with his roommates, his difficulty handling money and paying his bills, his inappropriate behavior when he is not medicated, and his episodes of homelessness. Derrik Distelhorst testified to Alexander’s problems handling money and his lack of social skills. Together, this evidence satisfies the petitioner’s burden of proof.
2. No Instructional Error.
Alexander contends that the trial court erred in explaining to the jury that it could not consider help provided by others unless those others were both responsible to provide such care, and either testified in court or agreed in writing to undertake their responsibilities. He contends that to the extent persons can provide for their own needs by utilizing governmental services, they are not unable to provide for their needs, and that the court’s instruction required him to prove that he could work for a living and earn enough to support himself.
Section 5350, subdivision (e)(1) provides that a person is not gravely disabled if “that person can survive safely without involuntary detention with the help of responsible family, friends, or others who are both willing and able to help provide for the person’s basic personal needs for food, clothing or shelter.” (§ 5350, subd. (e)(1); Conservatorship of Davis (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 313, 321 (Davis); Conservatorship of Johnson (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 693, 698.) “The California Supreme Court in Conservatorship of Early [(1983) 35 Cal.3d 244, 250] . . . concluded although a person might be gravely disabled if left to his or her own devices, he or she may be able to function successfully in freedom with the support and assistance of family and friends.” (Conservatorship of Jones, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. (Jones).)
Alexander has cited no case or statutory authority that section 5350, subdivision (e)(1) includes social services agencies as persons who may provide third-party assistance. Jones recognized that section 5350, subdivision (e)(1) was an important procedural safeguard accorded nondangerous conservatees “to allow their showing of available third party assistance in the community, potentially allowing them to maintain a noncustodial status” to be presented to the factfinder. (Jones, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 299.) Jones noted that prior law had construed “third party assistance” to include spouses, siblings, and parents. “Thus far, only the help of family members has been recognized as the type of ‘safety net’ third party assistance which may preclude a finding of grave disability.” (Ibid.) In Conservatorship of Law (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1336, 1341, the court declined to find that a board and care facility constituted third party assistance, and Jones explicitly rejected the conservatee’s contention that the Department of Corrections could be a provider of third party assistance. (Jones, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 302.)
The instruction, CACI No. 4007, precisely tracks the language of section 5350, subdivision (e)(2). Contrary to Alexander’s argument, nothing in this language, or in the language of the statute, precludes a proposed conservatee from making a showing that he or she is not gravely disabled because he or she has obtained governmental assistance and thus is able to provide for his or her own needs without the help of family, friends, or others. Thus, Alexander was not precluded from putting on evidence that he had obtained government benefits and thus could survive safely. However, the record here indicates that Alexander made no such showing; rather, he only stated that he knew how to apply for such assistance. There is no error shown on this record.
Although the burden is not on Alexander to establish the existence of such assistance, some credible evidence must be presented at trial on this issue in order for the instruction to be required. “Knowledge of the availability of third-party assistance normally would be in the possession of the proposed conservatee or of those acting on his or her behalf. However, they are not necessarily the exclusive sources of such information, and we see no need to cast the burden on adducing evidence of third party assistance on any particular party to these proceedings. Rather, we hold only that the trier of fact on the issue of grave disability must consider the availability of third party assistance to meet the basic needs of the proposed conservatee for food, clothing or shelter only if credible evidence of such assistance is adduced from any source at the trial of the issue.” (Conservatorship of Early, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 254.)
Furthermore, even if we were to agree with Alexander, any error in the court’s instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Conservatorship of Wilson (1982) 137 Cal.App.3d 132, 135.) The evidence was overwhelming that Alexander, even if he received public assistance or shelter care, was not capable of caring for himself. He had previously been in and out of shelters, and had lived in his car or on the street. When he lived with others, they took advantage of him and assaulted him, causing serious injury. He cannot manage money, as evidenced by the fact his parents pay his bills and he does not take along enough money to eat in a restaurant. Finally, the record indicates that Alexander had been resistant to applying for benefits on his own, making his contentions that such aid would permit him to live on his own speculative at best.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of the superior court is affirmed.
We concur: WOODS, Acting P. J., JACKSON, J.