Opinion
No. 37257.
Filed May 8, 1970.
1. Trespass: Words and Phrases. Trespass to land is a breaking of the close; an invasion of one's property or any encroachment thereon. It was anciently referred to as trespass quare clausum fregit. 2. Trespass: Negligence: Damages. If injury or damage to a property owner or to a member of his household results primarily and directly from the act of trespass, the trespasser is liable therefor even though his act is not negligent or willful. 3. ___: ___: ___. A trespass to land does not make the trespasser an insurer of the landowner and members of his household for injuries or damages which may be a secondary, indirect, or consequential result of his trespass. 4. ___: ___: ___. An action in tort or negligence, known at common law as trespass on the case, is the proper action to recover for secondary, indirect, or consequential injuries or damages resulting from a trespass. 5. ___: ___: ___. In a trespass on the case action the recovery is based on negligence. In such a case contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and other defenses common to tort actions may be relied on by the trespasser. 6. Trespass: Negligence: Trial. A trespass which merely produces a condition cannot be considered to be the proximate cause of an accident which would not have occurred except for the subsequent independent act of a third person. Where reasonable minds could not differ on the facts adduced it is the duty of the court to decide this issue and not submit it to the jury.
Appeal from the district court for Douglas County: JOHN C. BURKE, Judge. Affirmed.
Seymour L. Smith and Eisenstatt, Morrison, Higgins, Miller, Kinnamon Morrison, for appellant.
Fraser, Stryker, Marshall Veach, for appellee.
Heard before WHITE, C.J., CARTER, SPENCER, BOSLAUGH, McCOWN, and NEWTON, JJ., and KOKJER, District Judge.
The plaintiff was injured by electricity when a metal flagpole he was helping to lower came in contact with a wire of defendant's transmission line. He claims that defendant is liable for his damages because the wire, at the point of contact, hung over the property of plaintiff's family 54/100ths of a foot. No negligence on the part of the defendant was proved. The claim for recovery is based on the asserted trespass of defendant upon the property. When the evidence was completed, defendant moved for a directed verdict or for a dismissal of the case. The motion was sustained and the case was dismissed. Plaintiff appealed.
The evidence, construed most favorably to plaintiff, as it must be in this situation, sustains the trespass. The power line had been constructed along the east line of the property in the year 1930. Plaintiff's father bought the lot in the year 1959. He started to construct a house on it in 1962. Some work was done the same year on the line but the location of the wires had not been changed between the time the house was constructed and the date of the accident on July 3, 1965. Plaintiff's father testified that he believed they had moved into the house in March 1964.
Shortly before July 3, 1965, plaintiff's father had poured a concrete base rising 6 to 8 inches above the ground, and included therein a hole in which to insert a flagpole. The base was 2.61 feet west of the west wire of the transmission line and 3.15 feet west of the east property line. The wire at that point on April 15, 1967, was 30.24 feet above the ground. The plaintiff's father had assembled a flagpole by taking a section of pipe, inserting a smaller pipe into it, bolting them together, then inserting a still smaller pipe into that one, and bolting them together. The length of the finished flagpole was 33 feet, 5 inches.
On July 3, 1965, plaintiff, plaintiff's father, and a neighbor placed the butt end of the flagpole against the concrete base. Taking hold of the outer end, they walked toward the base, lifting the outer end of the pole higher as they walked, until it was vertical, and then slipped the butt end into the hole in the base. The neighbor went home and plaintiff's uncle then arrived. It was discovered that the pulley rope to which the flag was to be attached was too high to be reached, and they decided to take the pole down and cut off some of the bottom of it. The three of them took hold of the pole and, after lifting it up out of the hole, set it on top of the concrete base.
On direct examination plaintiff's father testified as follows: "Q. Go ahead and tell the Jury then what happened. A. I don't know what happened after that hit us or the length of time, I wouldn't know this, but evidently if it had struck that wire up there, which that evidently is what it did, then we fell away to the ground unconscious."
On cross-examination plaintiff's father testified as follows: "Q. And as you stood there, was there any particular length of time went by before this accident occurred? A. It was a very short while, very, very short while after we had it out of the socket that it made contact with, I would imagine, the electric wire. Q. Well, there is no doubt in your mind but what the electric wire was contacted, is there? A. No doubt, no sir."
An electric shock injured plaintiff severely and also injured his father and uncle to a degree not disclosed by the record.
Both plaintiff and his father admitted they knew that it was dangerous to contact an electric wire. They knew the wires were there but as they proceeded to erect the flagpole they paid no attention to them and did not discuss the possibility of danger.
An engineer testified that on April 15, 1967, somewhat over a year and 9 months after the incident he, with the assistance of two boys, by use of a transit, a method known as triangulation, and trigonometry, determined that on that date the westernmost wire of the transmission line hung 54/100ths of a foot, a little more than 6 inches, inside the property line.
Later, plaintiff, a minor, by his mother and next friend, filed this suit against defendant to recover for his injuries.
Plaintiff's attorneys had evidently decided that the facts would not sustain a suit against the defendant for any negligence on its part; and that if plaintiff were to recover at all, it would have to be on the theory that defendant had trespassed upon the property of plaintiff's family. They asked the court to require the defendant to pay for plaintiff's damages on the following theories:
(1) A trespasser on land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to the possessor thereof, or to the members of his household, by the trespass, irrespective of whether the trespasser's conduct is such as would subject him to liability were he not a trespasser.
(2) Trespass and negligence are distinguishable. To recover against a trespasser, it is not necessary to prove negligence.
(3) Neither contributory negligence nor assumption of risk constitutes a defense in an action for trespass.
(4) Proximate cause is ordinarily a question for the jury. It is that cause which is an efficient agent in producing a given result. Where several causes concur to produce a certain result, either may be termed proximate cause if it is an efficient cause of the result in question.
The district court sustained one other of plaintiff's theories and held there was a reasonable inference of trespass, but held that plaintiff's case based on trespass to real estate, anciently referred to as trespass quare clausum fregit, had to rest on proof that the injury complained of was the immediate and direct result of the trespass, and this proof was lacking. The district court also held that, even construing the action as one for negligence, anciently referred to as trespass on the case, it would be defeated by negligence of plaintiff and his father which were the proximate cause of the injuries.
Since nearly every violation of one's rights was anciently considered a trespass, there are literally hundreds of cases dealing with trespass vi et armis, trespass de bonis asportatis, trespass quare clausum fregit, trespass on the case, and so forth. In many of the reported cases the distinctions are blurred, and a negligence case may be treated loosely as one for trespass. The opinions frequently commingled the theories.
"Generally speaking, trespass on the case lies for an injury resulting from a wrongful act other than physical force, or for an injury resulting from nonfeasance or negligence, or for an injury which is a consequential, as distinguished from a direct or immediate, result of the wrongful act." 52 Am. Jur., Trespass on the Case, 5, p. 901.
Such would be an action for injuries contributed to by an electric company's negligence in permitting wires to sag so the wind might blow them and cause a dangerous condition; or to construct their lines too low or too close to a place where contact with any person or thing could be reasonably expected.
"An injury is considered as immediate and therefore remediable by an action of trespass, as distinguished from trespass on the case, only when it is directly occasioned by, and is not merely a consequence resulting from, the act complained of." 52 Am. Jur., Trespass on the Case, 5, p. 901.
Such would be an act directly damaging a person's house or garden or trees during line construction, and perhaps initially energizing a new line into a home without providing an adequate transformer, so that by that act excessively high voltages would burn out appliances, cause a fire, or personally injure the home owner's family.
The difficulty in applying the correct rules in this area of the law is summarized in Corpus Juris as follows:
"Case and trespass are clearly distinguishable, although the distinction is somewhat subtle and sometimes difficult of application. As ordinarily stated, the distinction is that where the injury resulting from a particular act is direct and immediate, trespass is the proper remedy, but that where it is not direct, but merely consequential, the proper remedy is case. * * * but it has been suggested that the true gist of the distinction intended lies not so much in the proximate or remote character of the damage as in the primary or secondary nature of the trespass." 1 C.J., Actions, 117, p. 996.
"While theoretically the distinction between the actions of case and trespass is clear and well settled, yet it is one which is often difficult to apply to the facts and circumstances of particular cases." 1 C.J., Actions, 126, p. 999.
In note 75 to the above section appears the following: "The probability of injury resulting from the act done, under the circumstances of the particular case, is an element to be considered in determining the directness of the injury as affecting the proper form of action Cole v. Fisher, 11 Mass. 137. See also Loubz v. Hafner, 12 N.C. 185."
There are cases where the distinction is not precise which would appear to lend support to the theories advanced by plaintiff's attorneys. One of these upon which they rely is Kopka v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania, 171 Pa. 444, 91 A.2d 232, in which the defendant unlawfully dug a hole on plaintiff's property. Plaintiff was advised of this fact by a neighbor, and, while searching for it, fell into the hole and sustained injury. There the court said: "The liability of defendant Company for the trespass in the digging of the hole on plaintiff's land, without his knowledge or consent being thus established, does liability extend to the personal injuries sustained by him as the result of his falling into the hole? The authorities are clear to the effect that where the complaint is for trespass on land the trespasser becomes liable not only for personal injuries resulting directly and proximately from the trespass but also for those which are indirect or consequential."
It will be noted that there was no immediate or direct injury to plaintiff's person from the digging of the hole, although there was to his land, so the recovery for injury to his body could not have been properly allowed for trespass. However, it could have been and apparently was allowed on the theory of a consequential injury for defendant's negligence in leaving an unguarded hole at a place where it could be reasonably anticipated that some person might fall into it. This would be an action for trespass on the case to which contributory negligence, if any, would be a defense. This case and others like it merely illuminate the manner in which the distinction between trespass and trespass on the case is confused.
Plaintiff herein proposes a rule which would make a power district or other proprietor of an electric transmission line an insurer for all time of a property owner and his family so long as the transmission line hangs over the property to any degree, even though it is constructed and maintained without negligence. Such a rule would require payment of damages regardless of any reckless, negligent, or even willful act of the property owner and his family. There is no sound basis in reason, statute, or applicable case law for such a rule.
Plaintiff claims that the district court erred in not submitting the question of proximate cause to the jury. It is true that ordinarily this is a jury question. Could it be in this case where: (1) Defendant cannot be held liable, in any event, on the theory of trespass for an act which was not a direct, immediate, or primary result of the injury; and (2) there is no proof whatever of any negligence on the part of the defendant? We think not.
The district court held correctly, we think, that defendant could not be held liable in trespass for injuries which were indirect and consequential. The court then stated that even construing the action as one based on negligence, there was gross negligence on the part of plaintiff's father. The rule in Steenbock v. Omaha Country Club, 110 Neb. 794, 195 N.W. 117, and Bruno v. Gunnison Contractors, Inc., 176 Neb. 462, 126 N.W.2d 477, where the negligence charged furnishes only a condition by which the injury is made possible, and a subsequent independent act of a third party causes the injury, the two acts are not concurrent, and the existence of the condition is not the proximate cause of the injury is applicable here. Under the facts of this case, the district court was correct in not submitting the question of proximate cause to the jury.
The judgment of the district court was correct and it is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.