Opinion
September 10, 1982.
Unemployment compensation — Willful misconduct — Burden of proof — Refusal to obey orders — Good cause — Hearsay.
1. A claimant is ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits when the employer proves that the employe was discharged for wilful misconduct, and proof of insubordination or the refusal to obey a directive can properly be found to constitute wilful misconduct precluding receipt of benefits unless the employe proves that there existed good cause for the refusal. [637]
2. In an unemployment compensation case hearsay unobjected to will be given its natural probative value if corroborated by other competent evidence, and such hearsay may properly be considered when corroborated by admissions of the claimant. [638]
3. The repeated refusal of an employe, involved in work which was inherently dangerous to his fellow workers, to report as ordered to see a doctor may properly be held to constitute wilful misconduct precluding his receipt of unemployment compensation benefits when he is discharged as a result of such refusals. [638]
Submitted on briefs June 11, 1982, to Judges BLATT, WILLIAMS, JR. and DOYLE, sitting as a panel of three.
Appeal, No. 848 C.D. 1981, from the Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in case of In Re: Claim of John F. Connelly, Jr., No. B-193366.
Application with the Office of Employment Security for unemployment compensation benefits. Application denied. Applicant appealed to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. Denial affirmed. Applicant appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Affirmed.
Richard L. Raymond, Schroeder, Jenkins Raymond, for petitioner.
Joel G. Cavicchia, Associate Counsel, with him Richard L. Cole, Jr., Chief Counsel, for respondent.
John F. Connelly, Jr. (claimant) asserts that he should not have been denied benefits by the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) which found that his unemployment was due to his own willful misconduct.
Section 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law), Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P. S. § 802(e).
The claimant was last employed by the Atlantic Richfield Company (employer) as a control room operator and was required to monitor and control the temperature, flow, and pressure of furnace oil and gasoline. Any neglect or error in the performance of such duties could have caused explosions or fires and could also have endangered the safety of other employees. On the claimant's last day of work, when he allegedly misused a company radio, he was given a direct order by his immediate supervisor to report to the employer's dispensary to see the doctor. He refused to report as instructed. About one hour later his unit manager gave the same directive, which he similarly refused. When the labor relations representative of the employer became aware that the claimant still had not reported to the dispensary, he repeated the order to the claimant and once more the claimant refused. He was then suspended and later discharged.
It is well-settled that an employer bears the burden of establishing willful misconduct and that, where such misconduct involves insubordination or the refusal to obey an employer's directive, the employee bears the burden of proving good cause for his refusal. "Good cause" has been described as requiring a "balanc[ing of] the reasonableness of the supervisor's directive against the reasonableness of [the claimant's] refusal." Patterson v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 60 Pa. Commw. 53, 57, 430 A.2d 1011, 1014 (1981).
Zuraw v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 61 Pa. Commw. 548, 434 A.2d 1312 (1981). Our scope of review in this matter is limited to whether or not an error of law was committed by the Board or any necessary findings were made without substantial evidence being in the record. Id.
Gane v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 41 Pa. Commw. 292, 398 A.2d 1110 (1979).
The claimant argues that his actions here did not constitute willful misconduct and that the findings of the Board are not supported by substantial evidence because the employer's sole witness admittedly had no personal knowledge of the alleged willful misconduct.
We have previously recognized that where hearsay evidence has been admitted without objection, it will be given its natural probative effect and may support the Board's findings only if it is corroborated by any competent evidence in the record. Maxwell v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 54 Pa. Commw. 604, 423 A.2d 430 (1980). Here, the record discloses that the claimant personally admitted at the referee's hearing that he had refused three times to comply with his employer's order, and, inasmuch as such admission constitutes competent corroborative evidence, his hearsay challenge must fail.
In view of the inherently dangerous endeavor involved here and of the fact that any error or neglect by the claimant in his performance could cause injury to himself, his fellow employees and to the employer's property, we agree with the Board that it was reasonable for this employer to direct the claimant to the dispensary so that an investigation could be made as to any actions which might raise a modicum of suspicion about his capabilities — physical, mental, or otherwise — and that it was unreasonable for him to refuse to comply with the order three times.
Our review of the record leads us to believe that this conclusion by the Board was based on facts determined without a capricious disregard of competent evidence. See Sweigart v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 47 Pa. Commw. 421, 408 A.2d 561 (1979).
Inasmuch, therefore, as a refusal of a reasonable directive constitutes willful misconduct, Gane, we will affirm the order of the Board.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 10th day of September, 1982, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in the above-captioned matter is hereby affirmed.