Opinion
No. HHB-CV-05-4005715
August 18, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
I.
This is an April 19, 2005 appeal from the Probate Court, District of Newington. James Connelly met the plaintiff, Margaret Solimene in 1981. He, then 51, was residing in New York City and she, 45, was living in Hartford, Connecticut. Connelly had already married and divorced prior to meeting Margaret Solimene. By his former marriage which ended in 1977, he had two adult children.
Connelly graduated from high school and attended Becket Junior College in New York for two years. Additionally, his employment history involved the armed forces, a training program at the Waldorf Astoria and 11-12 years working for the Rheingold Beer Company. Thereafter, he began his own business, Connecticut Dye Cutting and Mounting, which he subsequently sold. All during this time, Connelly was represented by counsel in connection with his business dealings, his will, and the divorce from his first wife.
Mr. Connelly moved into Margaret Solimene's Hartford apartment during the early part of 1982 and lived with her approximately eighteen (18) months prior to their marrying on June 12, 1983. At that time, both parties paid the rent and the maintenance of the apartment and shared household expenses. Prior to marrying, the parties lived together for eighteen months when Connelly proposed marriage in February of 1983.
On June 10, 1983, James Connelly and Margaret Solimene signed a pre-nuptial agreement (agreement) drafted by Attorney McVane. This document was executed in McVane's law office and provided in relevant part:
. . . both are desirous of making certain financial arrangements . . . upon marriage and in the event of dissolution of their marriage, and . . . the parties acknowledge and understand that each will as a result of their marriage have an interest in the estate of the other under law, and . . . each party has separate estate and James has children from a prior marriage; and . . . it is the intent of each to renounce any interest in the estate of the other except as is hereinafter provided in this Agreement and to make certain financial and estate arrangements with respect thereto to be effective upon marriage and in the event of dissolution of their marriage . . . in consideration of the premises and of the promises each to the other made it is agreed as follows:
1. James renounces and disavows any interest in the property and/or estate of Margaret as such estate may now be or as it shall be upon her death.
2. Margaret renounces and disavows any interest in the property and/or estate of James as such estate may now be or as it shall be upon his death.
3. In the event of a dissolution of the marriage of James or Margaret, regardless of fault, each party agrees that they shall not make claim for alimony, support or for any other allowance, property or settlement.
4. Each party acknowledges that he is now familiar with the financial position of the other, state of health, age and reasonable prospects and likelihood of any change in the financial condition of either.
5. In the event of the death of either party the other party agrees that he or she shall not make any claim against the estate of the decedent and that in the event of incapacity of either that this agreement may be exhibited as evidence of the renunciation of interest in the estate of the other, and each party for himself and his heirs does hereby bind himself to the renunciation of interest in the estate of the other as it is herein provided, acknowledging that any share that might otherwise accrue to the other as an heir under the laws of the State of Connecticut which would result in an interest in the estate of the other is totally, completely and absolutely renounced.
6. The parties understand and do hereby acknowledge that this agreement is for the stated purpose and in no way is indicative of any other condition or state of facts which in any way now impairs or would otherwise be expected to impair the marital relationship which they fully believe and state to be based upon personal love, affection and feeling for each other sufficient to sustain their marriage.
After their marriage, Margaret Connelly, on July 1, 1986, received a conveyance of real estate known as 327 Ridge Road, Wethersfield, Connecticut. Subsequently, in 1994, the parties separated. On June 26, 2003, Margaret Connelly died intestate but at her death remained the lawful wife of James Connelly.
On April 28, 2005, James Connelly sought to obtain a spousal share of Margaret Connelly's estate and a ruling that the prenuptial agreement signed by the parties on June 10, 1983 was an invalid contract. The Probate Court ruled against James Connelly and made the following order and decree:
The prenuptial agreement executed on June 10, 1983 is a valid and enforceable contract. The contract bars James from receiving a spousal share pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-437. The sole heir of the estate of Margaret is Michael P. Solimene, the decedent's brother, pursuant to § 45a-439(2).
On April 29, 2005, a decree allowing appeal from Probate was granted and on June 9, 2005, James Connelly filed his reasons of appeal from Probate. The appeal is now before us.
The case was tried on July 18, 2006, and James Connelly was the only witness. He testified that the prenuptial agreement was executed at the insistence of Margaret Connelly's family and that the attorney who prepared the agreement was not his attorney but Margaret Solimene's counsel. He related that he did not talk to anyone about the prenuptial agreement nor did he retain his own attorney. During trial, he also testified that Attorney McVane did not indicate to him that McVane might have a conflict representing each of the parties to the prenuptial agreement or that Connelly was waiving any such legal rights. He stated that he thought the prenuptial agreement would only be efficacious if he and his then wife divorced. He also testified that he had knowledge that his wife had a one-bedroom condominium in Florida prior to their marriage but he did not know the value of that property. Additionally, he related that there was no exchange of financial information between himself and his wife prior to the signing of their prenuptial agreement and that he did not read or understand the document.
II
"The function of the Superior Court in appeals from a Probate Court is to take jurisdiction of the order or decree appealed from and to try that issue de novo. Baskin's Appeal from Probate, 194 Conn. 635, 641, 484 A.2d 934 (1984). Thereafter, upon "consideration of all evidence presented on the appeal which would have been admissible in the probate court, the superior court should exercise the same power of judgment which the probate court possessed and decide the appeal as an original proposition unfettered by, and ignoring, the result reached in the probate court." Prince v. Sheffield, 158 Conn. 286, 298, 259 A.2d 621 (1969).
In Connecticut, all prenuptial agreements signed prior to October 1, 1995 are governed by the common law and the cases of Sacksell v. Barrett, 132 Conn. 139, 43 A.2d 79 (1945), and McHugh v. McHugh, 181 Conn. 482, 436 A.2d 8 (1980). See Winchester v. McCue, 91 Conn.App. 721, 730-31; 882 A.2d 143 (2005). "Prenuptial agreements entered into after October 1, 1995, are governed by the Connecticut Premarital Agreement Act, General Statutes § 46b-36a et seq." Winchester v. McCue, supra, 91 Conn.App. 725 n. 1. The agreement before us was executed on June 10, 1983, and therefore, its validity is determined by the common law and the cases of Sacksell, supra and McHugh, supra. See L. Parley, "Premarital Agreements In Connecticut Where We Are and Where We Are Going," 69 Connecticut Bar Journal 495, 500-01 (1995) (for inclusive law review article which covers cases dealing with premarital agreements).
General Statutes § 46b-36g provides in relevant part: "Enforcement of premarital agreement.
(a) A premarital agreement or amendment shall not be enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves that: (1) Such party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; or (2) The agreement as unconscionable when it was executed or when enforcement is sought; or (3) Before execution of the agreement, such party was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the amount, character and value of property, financial obligations and income of the other party; or (4) Such party was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult with independent counsel. (b) If a provision of a premarital agreement codifies or eliminates spousal support and such modification or elimination causes one party to the agreement to be eligible for support under a program of public assistance at the time of separation or marital dissolution, a court, notwithstanding the terms of the agreement, may require the other party to provide support to the extent necessary to avoid such eligibility. (c) An issue of unconscionability of a premarital agreement shall be decided by the court as a matter of law." General Statutes § 46b-36g "endorses, clarifies and codifies the McHugh standards." Dornemann v. Dornemann, 48 Conn.Sup. 502, 511, 850 A.2d 273 (2004); see also Dornemann v. Dornemann, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford, Docket No. FA03-0194829 (August 13, 2004, Winslow J.) (for further proceedings).
In McHugh, the Supreme Court set forth a thee-pronged test by which courts determine the validity of a prenuptial agreement. "The validity of an antenuptial contract depends upon the circumstances of the particular case . . . Antenuptial agreements relating to the property of the parties, and more specifically, to the rights of the parties to that property upon the dissolution of the marriage, are generally enforceable where three conditions are satisfied: (1) the contract was validly entered into; (2) its terms do not violate statute or public policy; and (3) the circumstances of the parties at the time the marriage is dissolved are not so beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was entered into as to cause its enforcement to work injustice. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Winchester v. McCue, supra, 91 Conn.App. 725.
This court concludes, today, that the prenuptial agreement signed by the parties on June 10, 1983 is a valid and enforceable legal document which divests Connelly of his statutory share of the decedent's (Margaret Connelly's) estate because:
1. The contract was validly entered into;
2. its terms do not violate statute or public policy; and
3. the circumstances of the parties at the time the marriage is dissolved are not so beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was entered into as to cause its enforcement to work injustice. McHugh v. McHugh, supra, 181 Conn. 485-86.
Concerning the first prong of the McHugh three-part test, "courts will inquire whether any waiver of statutory or common-law rights, or the right to a judicial determination in any matter, was voluntary and knowing . . . [and] [a] party must, of course, be aware of any right that he possesses prior to a proper waiver of it . . . The duty of each party to disclose the amount, character, and value of individually owned property, absent the other's independent knowledge of the same, is an essential prerequisite to a valid antenuptial agreement containing a waiver of property rights . . . The burden is not on either party to inquire, but on each to inform, for it is only by requiring full disclosure of the amount, character, and value of the parties' respective assets that courts can ensure intelligent waiver of the statutory rights involved." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 727.
In this case, James Connelly testified to the following facts. The attorney who prepared the agreement was not his attorney and he was never told to seek advice from his own attorney. He was not aware of the decedent's financial information prior to signing the agreement. Specifically, he was unaware that the decedent had over $100,000 in savings prior to signing the agreement. He was only aware of a condominium that the decedent owned in Florida prior to signing the agreement. Connelly argues that the prenuptial agreement was not validly entered into most notably because of the lack of disclosure of assets and because Connelly had no independent legal advice as to his statutory inheritance rights. He cites the cases of Pite v. Pite, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. FA 99 0429262 (February 20, 2001, Alander, J.); and Krawczynski v. Krawczynski, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 100143 (September 4, 1992, Harrigan, J.) ( 7 Conn. L. Rptr. 783), for the proposition that the prenuptial agreement at issue is invalid. However, neither Pite nor Krawczynski are persuasive to us today in this case.
In Pite, the court invalidated a prenuptial agreement because the defendant did not disclose the amount, character and value of his assets or income prior to signing the agreement. The defendant was a wealthy dentist with substantial real estate holdings, and the defendant owned and operated a private dentist practice for over thirty years. At the time of the marriage and signing of the agreement "the defendant . . . received income from his dental practice of $293,000; owned real estate with a total net equity of $2,699,297; possessed personal savings totaling $699,607; owned a business with $298,861 in assets and possessed pension plans worth $905,371." Pite v. Pite, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. FA 99 0429262. The court found that the defendant established partnerships, trusts, and transferred assets so that the plaintiff could not secure an interest in them. The plaintiff signed away all her rights to any of the defendant's estate without knowledge of the defendant's substantial assets. The court found that "the plaintiff lacked sufficient financial information to knowingly waive, upon dissolution of the marriage, her right to alimony, or her right to a division of the defendant's property and pension." Id.
In Krawczynski, the court ruled that a prenuptial agreement was invalid because there was no intelligent waiver by the plaintiff wife of her statutory common-law rights because her husband failed to disclose his real estate and income values to the plaintiff. In Krawczynski the plaintiff was an immigrant from Poland who entered the United States via the political asylum process in 1976. Her written English was imperfect and the attorney who prepared the agreement was her husband's attorney. See also Krawczynski v. Krawczynski, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 0100143 (February 24, 1993, Harrigan, J.) (ordering dissolution and dividing assets).
Here, Connelly was not in the vulnerable position as the plaintiff in Krawczynski. He was not an immigrant nor did he have any deficiencies in speaking, reading, or writing the English language. When Connelly signed the agreement, he was a middle-aged man who graduated high school and completed two years of junior college. He worked in the armed forces, in hotel management, and then spent 11-12 years working for a beer company before owning and operating a successful cutting and mounting business. Further, there is no indication that Margaret Connelly was deliberately hiding substantial assets as in Pite. On July 1, 1986, Margaret Connelly received, with her husband's knowledge, a conveyance of real property known as 327 Ridge Road, Wethersfield, Connecticut.
The credible facts at trial revealed that the parties had lived together and acted as husband and wife for eighteen months prior to marriage during which time each party became knowledgeable of each others' living standards. As observed in McHugh, "failure to disclose financial information in the prenuptial agreement is not fatal so long as the other party has independent knowledge of the same." Id., 727. Connelly moved into Margaret Solimene's apartment and was living with her for approximately eighteen months before marriage. Here, the parties paid the rent and the maintenance of the apartment and both shared the cost of food and household items. This, of course, was a valid basis for an enforceable prenuptial agreement. See Winchester v. McCue, supra, 91 Conn.App. 721, 728. In Winchester, the court followed the McHugh decision and found that the plaintiffs had sufficient knowledge of each other's financial situation making the prenuptial agreement valid. The court also found that the parties dated for several years before they were married, shared expenses, and became knowledgeable of the other's standard of living. Id., 727. In this case, as in Winchester, Connelly had sufficient knowledge of Margaret Solimene's financial circumstances to enter into a valid prenuptial agreement.
The plaintiffs argument that the prenuptial agreement was invalid because Connelly did not have an attorney representing him and that he did not read or understand the agreement is without merit. See Wassell v. Wassell, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. FA 05-4007168 (October 13, 2005, Epstein, J.). In Wassell, the plaintiff husband signed a prenuptial contract prior to the marriage. He claimed that he did not have an understanding of the contract when he signed the agreement. He further claimed that he did not have an attorney and his wife's attorney prepared the agreement and represented the parties. The court held that the plaintiff voluntarily entered into a valid contract despite the fact that he had difficulty reading and was not represented by counsel because he discussed the terms of the agreement before signing it and counsel gave him an explanation of the document.
In this case, James Connelly had been represented by attorneys prior to June 10, 1983 when he signed the prenuptial agreement with Margaret Solimene. He had retained a lawyer when he sold his business, he had a lawyer for a will, and he was represented by counsel during the divorce proceedings concerning his first wife and family, all prior to June 10, 1983. Additionally, Connelly impressed the court as a "savvy" person. This court is not persuaded that he did not read or understand the prenuptial agreement prior to signing it. The court concludes that the prenuptial agreement was legally entered into and enforceable.
Concerning the second prong of the McHugh test, there is no evidence in this record that the agreement violated any existing statute or public policy. According to the third prong of the McHugh test, a prenuptial agreement will not be enforced when the circumstances of the parties at the time the marriage dissolves has changed so dramatically that the events could not have been conceived at the time the agreement was signed. The court also stated that, "[a]bsent such unusual circumstances, however, [prenuptial] agreements freely and fairly entered into will be honored and enforced by the courts as written." (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) McHugh v. McHugh, supra, 181 Conn. 489. In this case, Connelly offered no evidence of any dramatic change or unusual circumstances that would have invalidated the agreement. The court concludes that upon the record as a whole, the prenuptial agreement was validly entered into by James and Margaret Connelly and consequently, Connelly is not entitled to a statutory share of Margaret Connelly's estate.
This appeal is denied. CT Page 15637