Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-2060-CM
June 19, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case was tried to a jury on plaintiff's claim of wrongful termination in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C, § 2601 et seq. The jury returned a verdict in defendant's favor. This matter is before the court on Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and for New Trial (Doc. 66).
I. Standards
Plaintiff has moved to alter or amend the judgment and for a new trial. A motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) may be granted only if the moving party can establish: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that could not have been obtained previously through the exercise of due diligence; or (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Brumark Corp. v. Samson Res. Corp., 57 F.3d 941, 948 (10th Cir. 1995). Such a motion does not permit a losing party to rehash arguments previously addressed or to present new legal theories or facts that could have been raised earlier. Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 101 F.3d 1324, 1332 (10th Cir. 1996).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) authorizes a court to grant a new trial "for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States." Motions for a new trial are generally regarded with disfavor and "`should only be granted with great caution.'" United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant, Inc., 21 F. Supp.2d 1247, 1250 (D.Kan. 1998) (quoting United States v. Thornbrugh, 962 F.2d 1438, 1443 (10th Cir. 1992)).
A party moving for a new trial based upon errors of law must show that error occurred and that the error affected the substantial rights of the parties. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 61; Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. P.B. Hoidale Co., 804 F. Supp. 137, 141 (D.Kan. 1992). As such, the court should "`ignore errors that do not affect the essential fairness of the trial.'" Id. (quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984)).
I. Discussion
Plaintiff first argues that the jury verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, as this court must, see Lampkin v. Int'l Union, 154 F.3d 1136, 1143 (10th Cir. 1998), the court concludes that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict in favor of defendant. More specifically, the evidence supports a jury finding that plaintiff's employment was terminated because of her dishonesty and not because she took FMLA leave in August 2000.
Foremost, the evidence showed that plaintiff lied to Janice Wallace on August 14, 2000, when Ms. Wallace questioned plaintiff about her attendance at the Leavenworth County Fair (the Fair) on August 8 and about whether she camped at the Fair that week. Additionally, evidence was presented that defendant received information from plaintiff's doctor's office that, if plaintiff were well enough to go to the Fair, then plaintiff was well enough to work, and that plaintiff's doctor's office did not believe plaintiff could attend the fair with such severe symptoms. Plaintiff's supervisor recommended plaintiff's termination based on plaintiff's dishonesty, and the recommendation was approved on that basis.
The court finds that the jury's verdict was not clearly, decidedly or overwhelmingly against the weight of the evidence. To the contrary, there was evidence presented at trial that plaintiff had been dishonest, that dishonesty was against defendant's company policy, and that defendant terminated plaintiff's employment because of her dishonesty. The court denies plaintiff's request for a new trial or relief from judgment on this basis.
Plaintiff also argues that the instructions given to the jury were erroneous. Specifically, plaintiff contends that Instruction Number 16 was vague, confusing, and directed a verdict for defendant. Instruction Number 16 stated as follows:
An employer who discharges an employee based upon a reasonable and honest belief that the employee has been dishonest would not be in violation of the FMLA, even if its conclusion is mistaken.
This instruction, also known as the "honest belief" charge, has been approved by the Tenth Circuit in Medley v. Polk Co., 260 F.3d 1202, 1208 (10th Cir. 2001). In Medley, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred in declining to give the following jury instruction:
An employer who honestly believes that it is discharging an employee for misusing FMLA is not liable even if the employer is mistaken.Id. In so holding, the Tenth Circuit recognized that a number of jurisdictions have accepted the doctrine that an employer who discharges an employee honestly believing that the employee is not using FMLA leave for its intended purpose would not be in violation of the FMLA for discharging the employee, even if the employer's conclusion was mistaken.
In the case at hand, there was evidence that defendant honestly believed, based upon information from plaintiff's doctor's office, that if plaintiff was well enough to go to the Fair, then she was well enough to work. Under Medley, defendant was entitled to the "honest belief" charge. Moreover, the court concludes that Instruction Number 16 is substantially similar to the instruction given in Medley and is an accurate statement of the law.
Finally, plaintiff asserts that the jury verdict was against the law and the evidence at trial, which, plaintiff claims, established that defendant violated the FMLA and that plaintiff's exercise of her rights under the FMLA was at least a motivating factor in her discharge. The court disagrees. At trial, plaintiff called seven managers involved in the decision to terminate plaintiff's employment, all of whom testified that plaintiff's dishonesty was the reason for plaintiff's discharge. On the other hand, there was virtually no evidence presented at trial that defendant was motivated by plaintiff's exercise of her FMLA rights. The court concludes that the jury verdict was not against the law and the weight of the evidence presented at trial.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and for New Trial (Doc. 66) is denied.