Opinion
HHDCV136047745S
09-08-2016
Connecticut Health Care Associates v. Town of Suffield et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #111
The matter before the court arises out of a dispute between Connecticut Health Care Associates, the plaintiff-labor union, and the defendants, the town of Suffield (town) and the town of Suffield Board of Education (board), involving the ability of one of the plaintiff's members to purchase certain pension credits. On August 4, 2016, this court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and indicated that a memorandum of decision would follow (Docket Entry #111.86).
I
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiff commenced this action by service of process on December 16, 2013. As presented by the plaintiff's revised complaint, which was filed on January 20, 2015, the plaintiff is a labor union representing the interests of many employees, including nurses, that work for the defendants. Pursuant to the town's charter, as alleged by the plaintiff, eligible employees are required to participate in a retirement pension plan (retirement plan). The retirement plan defines an " eligible employee" as an employee who works more than twenty hours per week that was hired after 1961. Eligible employees are entitled to opt out of the retirement plan, but are required to provide written notice of their intention to not participate. Those eligible employees who do participate, however, contribute to the retirement plan through automatic payroll deductions. Notably, the collective bargaining agreement between the plaintiff and the board, which governs the terms and conditions of employment for those employees working for the board and represented by the plaintiff, incorporates the retirement plan by reference. Additionally, the Suffield Retirement Commission (commission), a subdivision of the town, oversees the administration of the retirement plan.
The retirement plan was created by a town ordinance that is part of the " Suffield Code." See exhibit 1, attached to exhibit A; see also exhibits 1-4, attached to exhibit D.
On or about June 1, 1998, Mary Ann Baumann, a member of the plaintiff-labor union, was appointed to a full-time position as a nurse working at the town's schools and worked in excess of twenty hours per week during that time. From June 1, 1998, to August 1, 2002, pension contributions were not withheld from Baumaun's pay, and she, therefore, did not receive pension credits towards the retirement plan. On or about August 1, 2002, Baumann began working roughly thirty-six hours per week. At that time, the town sent Baumann a pension application package, which she signed and returned to the town, and began making contributions to the retirement plan through ordinary payroll deductions. On March 14, 2012, Baumann requested that the commission permit her to purchase pension credits for the time period of June 1, 1998, to August 1, 2002, which the commission denied.
The plaintiff now seeks a writ of mandamus; see General Statutes § 52-485; Practice Book § 23-45 et seq.; based on the foregoing facts. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between the parties when the commission denied Baumann's request to purchase pension credits. Specifically, the plaintiff seeks a mandamus directing the defendants to permit Baumann to purchase pension credits for the retirement plan for the time frame of June 1, 1998, to August 1, 2002. Additionally, the plaintiff requests a mandamus directing the defendants to provide adequate and sufficient notice to their employees of their ability to purchase pension credits for the retirement plan if they have not made contributions for a time period that they were, in fact, eligible to participate.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and an accompanying memorandum of law on September 30, 2015. The plaintiff filed its objection on January 20, 2016, and the defendants filed their reply on February 1, 2016. On May 4, 2016, this court held a hearing on the defendants' motion. Additional facts will be included as necessary.
II
DISCUSSION
The standard governing the court's review of a motion for summary judgment is well settled. " [S]ummary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact . . . A material fact . . . [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809, 820-21, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015); see also Practice Book § 17-49 (summary judgment standard).
At oral argument before this court on May 4, 2016, plaintiff's counsel conceded that there were no genuine issues of material fact in this case and noted that the plaintiff was relying entirely on the documents submitted by the defendants in support of their motion for summary judgment.
Among other reasons, the defendants base their motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff-labor union lacks associational standing. Specifically, the defendants argue that the claim asserted and the relief sought by the plaintiff-labor union require the participation of Baumann because the claim is essentially one for money damages. In response, the plaintiff argues that it has standing to bring a mandamus action because " a ruling in the [plaintiff's] favor will assist other bargaining unit members with a similar problem and help ensure that the rights of all union members are enforced." In other words, a ruling in the plaintiff's favor would have precedential effect. The defendants also argue that a writ of mandamus is not an appropriate remedy because a union member does not have a clear right to buy back pension credits. The plaintiff argues that the language of the pension plan unambiguously divests the commission of discretion and, therefore, a union member, such as Baumann, has a clear right to the relief sought.
Plaintiff's objection to defendant's motion for summary judgment, p. 4.
The defendants base their motion for summary judgment on the following: (1) the plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action in a representative capacity; (2) the plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the six-year statute of limitations applicable to contract claims; (3) the plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the equitable doctrine of laches; (4) the plaintiff has not established facts to support its breach of contract claim; (5) a writ of mandamus is not an appropriate remedy because the plaintiff is seeking money damages based on an alleged contractual right, which the plaintiff asserts after an excessive delay; and (6) a writ of mandamus is not an appropriate remedy because a union member does not have a clear right to purchase pension credits. The court concludes that the plaintiff has standing. Nonetheless, because the court agrees with the defendants' final contention, it does not address the remaining arguments asserted by the defendants.
A
Associational Standing
It is noteworthy that the defendants challenge the plaintiff's standing by way of a motion for summary judgment. Generally speaking, the proper vehicle to challenge a party's standing is a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Cadle Co. v. D'Addario, 268 Conn. 441, 445 n.5, 844 A.2d 836 (2004) (" The proper procedural vehicle for disputing a party's standing is a motion to dismiss."); Sethi v. Yagildere, 136 Conn.App. 767, 770 n.6, 47 A.3d 892, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 905, 53 A.3d 220 (2012) (proper vehicle to challenge standing is motion to dismiss); see also Practice Book § 10-30(a)(1) (motion to dismiss shall be used to assert lack of subject matter jurisdiction). Indeed, courts often treat motions for summary judgment as motions to dismiss where the motion is premised on the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to a party's alleged lack of standing. See, e.g., Cadle Co. v. D'Addario, supra, 445 n.5; Litvack v. Artusio, 137 Conn.App. 397, 401 n.3, 49 A.3d 762 (2012); Sethi v. Yagildere, supra, 770 n.6.
Nonetheless, our Appellate Court has indicated that, in limited circumstances, a party may challenge a court's jurisdiction by way of a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Manifold v. Ragaglia, 94 Conn.App. 103, 119-22, 891 A.2d 106 (2006). As noted by the Appellate Court, " the use of the motion for summary judgment to contest subject matter jurisdiction is appropriate in two circumstances: (1) when a party does not become aware of a jurisdictional defect until discovery has progressed; or (2) if, after a court has denied a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, discovery produces additional evidence that supports dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Id., 121-22 n.11; accord Bellman v. West Hartford, 96 Conn.App. 387, 393 n.4, 900 A.2d 82 (2006). " Once litigation has advanced through discovery, the requirement that a court rigidly apply the standard for a motion to dismiss to issues regarding subject matter jurisdiction, even if the issues is presented through a motion for summary judgment, seems . . . too narrow an interpretation of the rules of practice." Manifold v. Ragaglia, supra, 120-21.
Under the circumstances of the case presently before the court, the defendants may challenge the plaintiff's standing by way of a motion for summary judgment. Specifically, discovery has progressed in this case and the defendants claim that it is apparent, based on discovery, that the plaintiff seeks to assert the rights of only one of its members. " [S]tanding is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy . . . Nevertheless, [s]tanding is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented . . . If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fairchild Heights Residents Assn., Inc. v. Fairchild Heights, Inc., 310 Conn. 797, 820-21, 82 A.3d 602 (2014).
Connecticut has adopted the federal standard for associational or representational standing as delineated by the United States Supreme Court in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 337, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). See Connecticut Assn. of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Worrell, 199 Conn. 609, 616, 508 A.2d 743 (1986). " [A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; accord Fairchild Heights Residents Assn., Inc. v. Fairchild Heights, Inc., supra, 310 Conn. at 820-21; Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors v. Hartford, 251 Conn. 169, 185, 740 A.2d 813 (1999). Moreover, an association may advance the interests of any one of its members. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) (" The association must allege that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit." [Emphasis added.])
" Representational standing depends in substantial measure on the nature of the relief sought. If in a proper case the association seeks a declaration, injunction, or some other form of prospective relief, it can reasonably be supposed that the remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those members of the association actually injured . . . Associational standing is particularly appropriate . . . where the relief sought is . . . a declaratory judgment . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Assn. of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Worrell, supra, 199 Conn. at 616. With respect to the third prong of associational standing, " so long as the nature of the claim and of the relief sought does not make the individual participation of each injured party indispensable to proper resolution of the cause, the association may be an appropriate representative of its members, entitled to invoke the court's jurisdiction." Warth v. Seldin, supra, 422 U.S. 511, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343; accord Fairchild Heights Residents Assn., Inc. v. Fairchild Heights, Inc., supra, 310 Conn. at 821.
The defendants limit their attack on the plaintiff's standing to the third prong of the associational standing test. According to the defendants, the " real remedy" sought by the plaintiff's mandamus action is money damages, requiring an individualized assessment of the injury allegedly suffered by Baumann. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, supra, 422 U.S. 515-16, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (" [W]hatever injury may have been suffered is peculiar to the individual member concerned, and both the fact and extent of injury would require individualized proof"). The court concludes that the defendants overextend the limits of the plaintiff's claim and prayer for relief.
Defendants memorandum of law in support of motion for summary judgment, pp. 17-18.
In its revised complaint, the plaintiff requests, inter alia, the following: " [A]n order in the nature of a mandamus directing the town and its commission to allow Ms. Baumann to purchase pension credits for the [retirement plan] that would establish her credited service date effective August 1, 1998." As presently framed by the plaintiff's claim for a writ of mandamus and its prayer for relief, the suit essentially raises a pure question of law, namely, whether the town's charter and retirement plan require the defendants to allow Baumann to purchase pension credits. See, e.g., Morris v. Congdon, 277 Conn. 565, 569, 893 A.2d 413 (2006) (mandamus is proper where party against whom writ is sought has mandatory duty and plaintiff has clear legal right to have duty performed). Although the unique circumstances of Baumann's employment, including the actual value of the pension credits she seeks based on her salary, would have to be considered by the defendants and the commission if a mandamus were to enter, such a calculation is not necessary at this juncture. See International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 287-88, 106 S.Ct. 2523, 91 L.Ed.2d 228 (1986) (action brought by union did not directly seek certain monetary benefits, but rather attacked particular interpretation of statute's eligibility provisions for such benefits). The claim for a writ of mandamus in this case is, in effect, a claim for declaratory judgment, which does not require proof of the variant circumstances of Baumann. Under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiff is not specifically seeking money damages and can litigate this case without the participation of Baumann while ensuring that " the remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those members of the association actually injured." Warth v. Seldin, supra, 422 U.S. 515, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343; accord Connecticut Assn. of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Worrell, supra, 199 Conn. at 617. Accordingly, the court concludes that the plaintiff has the requisite associational standing to bring this action.
The plaintiff also requests the following: " [A]n order in the nature of a mandamus directing the town and its commission [to] provide adequate and sufficient notice to all employees covered by the [collective bargaining agreement] between [the plaintiff] and the board of their ability to purchase the pension credits for the [retirement plan] if they had not been made [sic] contributions for a time period when they were in fact eligible to participate and had not provided the commission written notice of their intent to opt out of the plan"; " Award [the plaintiff] with costs and reasonable attorneys fees as permitted by this court and costs under [General Statutes] § 52-486"; and " Grant such other and further relief and equity as may appertain."
Although the defendants do not specifically challenge the first and second prongs of the associational standing test, the court notes that the plaintiff satisfies these prongs. Baumann would have standing to sue in her own right based on the alleged violation of the collective bargaining agreement and the commission's denial of her request to purchase pension credits. Moreover, enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement is germane to the purpose of the plaintiff-labor union.
B
Writ of Mandamus
As our courts have consistently recognized, " [a] writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, available in limited circumstances for limited purposes . . . It is fundamental that the issuance of the writ rests in the discretion of the court, not an arbitrary discretion exercised as a result of caprice but a sound discretion exercised in accordance with recognized principles of law . . . That discretion will be exercised in favor of issuing the writ only where the plaintiff has a clear legal right to have done that which he seeks . . . The writ is proper only when (1) the law imposes on the party against whom the writ would run a duty the performance of which is mandatory and not discretionary; (2) the party applying for the writ has a clear legal right to have the duty performed; and (3) there is no other specific adequate remedy." (Internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added.) Morris v. Congdon, supra, 277 Conn. 569; see also McAllister v. Nichols, 193 Conn. 168, 171-72, 474 A.2d 792 (1984) (" Since mandamus neither gives nor defines rights which one does not already have, it cannot, and does not, act upon a doubtful and contested right" [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Moreover, " [a] town charter, whether adopted by special act of the General Assembly or . . . under the Home Rule Act; General Statutes § 7-188; constitutes the organic law of the municipality . . . It is well established that a [town's] charter is the fountainhead of municipal powers . . . The charter serves as an enabling act, both creating power and prescribing the form in which it must be exercised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Palermo v. Ulatowski, 97 Conn.App. 521, 524, 904 A.2d 1278, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 936, 909 A.2d 961 (2006). " [A] charter bears the same general relation to the ordinances of the city that the constitution of the state bears to the statutes . . . An ordinance is a legislative enactment of a municipality . . . It designates a local law of a municipal corporation, duly enacted by the proper authorities, prescribing general, uniform, and permanent rules of conduct relating to the corporate affairs of the municipality." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 524-25.
Under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiff, on behalf of Baumann, fails to satisfy both the first and second requirements for a writ of mandamus. In support of the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the defendants submitted a copy of the town's retirement plan. Notably, section 2-103 of the retirement plan, entitled " Participation, " provides in relevant part: " (a) Eligible employee. An employee who was a participant on July 1, 1989, will continue to be a participant. Each other employee will be eligible to become a participant of the plan at any time during the thirty (30) days following employment. Thereafter, the employee may elect to commence participation as of any subsequent July 1.
Because the plaintiff fails under the first and second requirements, the court does not address the third requirement for a writ of mandamus.
See defendants' exhibit 1, which was attached to exhibit A. As previously noted, the plaintiff conceded on the record before this court during the May 4, 2016 hearing that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that it was relying on the materials submitted by the defendants in connection with their motion. See also plaintiff's objection to defendants' motion for summary judgment, p. 1 n.1 (" For the purpose of this response, [p]laintiff will utilize the exhibits submitted by the [d]efendants in their original motion").
" (b) Required participation. Each eligible employee who entered the service of the town after September 1, 1961 will be required to participate in the pension plan unless, within six (6) months after entering the service of the town or within six (6) months after the establishment of this plan, he shall notify the retirement commission, in writing, of his intention not to participate in the plan . If any such employee now or hereafter employed shall give such notice of his intention to not participate or has not begun making contributions within thirty (30) days following employment, he shall not thereafter be admitted to the pension plan except on a future service basis and only upon application to participate starting on the next July 1st.
" (c) Date of participation. An employee will become a participant as of the first day of the month coinciding with or next following the date he begins making the contributions required under section 2-105." (Emphasis added.)
As an initial matter, the language of section 2-103 simultaneously suggests two inconsistent positions. First, under subsection (a), an employee " will be eligible to become a participant of the plan at any time during the thirty (30) days following employment, " who " may elect to commence participation" after thirty days following employment. Second, under subsection (b), an employee is " required to participate in the plan" unless the employee provides written notice of an intention to not participate or does not make contributions to the plan within thirty days of employment. These provisions suggest that an employee must act on his or her " eligibility" to become a participant in the retirement plan, while also requiring employees to participate in the retirement plan unless they provide written notice to not participate or fail to make contributions. Notwithstanding these inconsistencies, the plain language of this section indicates that not all employees are automatically enrolled in the retirement plan.
Moreover, there is no dispute that Baumann did not contribute to the retirement plan between June 1, 1998, to August 1, 2002. By not contributing to the retirement plan, under the clear terms of section 2-103(b), Baumann was not enrolled in the retirement plan for June 1, 1998, to August 1, 2002.
The defendants attached a copy of Baumann's deposition, as exhibit B, to their memorandum of law in support of their motion for summary judgment. In her deposition, Baumann acknowledges that she did contribute to the pension plan during June 1, 1998, to August 1, 2002.
Further, the defendants submitted an affidavit from Deborah J. Cerrato, who is the director of finance for the town and has knowledge of the town's retirement plan. In her affidavit, she avers that no provision in the retirement plan authorizes an employee to receive credited service for a period of time when the employee does not make contributions to the pension plan, and the commission has no obligation to allow buyback pension credits. Cerrato further avers that, on November 16, 2004, the commission discussed the issue of buyback pension credits and concluded that it was not going to offer such a buyback. Indeed, the minutes for the November 16, 2004 meeting, which the defendants attached to Cerrato's affidavit, indicate that the " consensus is that we are not going to offer a buyback." Cerrato also avers that no provision of the retirement plan requires that employees receive any specific form of notice, or any notice at all, regarding the employee's eligibility to participate in the retirement pension plan.
See defendants' exhibit A.
This court conducted its own independent review of the retirement plan and was unable to find a provision mandating that the commission allow an employee to buy back pension credits. Section 2-102, which is entitled " Credited Service, " addresses an employee's option to " buy back" pension credits. Pursuant to § 2-102(a), " [c]redited service means that portion of a participant's service which is used to determine the amount of retirement benefit he may become eligible to receive, as provided in [§ ]2-105."
See defendants' exhibit 3, attached to exhibit A.
The plaintiff has not pointed to any particular provision of the retirement plan requiring any specific form of notice regarding an employee's eligibility to participate in the plan or a particular provision mandating that the defendants, including the commission, provide notice of an employee's ability to purchase pension credits if the employee failed to contribute to the plan. This court's own independent review of the retirement plan fails to reveal any such provisions.
A mandamus cannot confer or define rights which an individual does not already have and is improper where the right is contested or doubtful. McAllister v. Nichols, supra, 193 Conn. 171-72. Moreover, to obtain the extraordinary writ of mandamus, the party against whom the writ is sought must have a mandatory duty to perform a clear legal duty to the benefit of the plaintiff. Morris v. Congdon, supra, 277 Conn. 569. The plaintiff cannot satisfy such requirements. As an initial matter, section 2-103 of the retirement plan is inconsistent, thereby creating doubt as to whether an employee is truly " required" to participate and, therefore, legally entitled to any pension credits at all for a period of time when he or she was otherwise " eligible" to participate. Additionally, no provision within the retirement plan mandates that the commission, or the defendants, allow Baumann to purchase pension credits. Indeed, those provisions dealing with purchasing buyback service credits indicate that the commission has " the full authority to set the rules regarding the time period in which [such] buy back option[s] may be exercised, " which it decided on November 16, 2004, that it was not going to offer. Thus, based on the documentation before the court, neither the commission nor the defendants have a mandatory duty to permit Baumann, or any other employee, to purchase service or pension credits. Further, neither Baumann nor other employees have a clear legal right to the award of such pension credits. Finally, no provision within the retirement plan mandates that the defendants provide specific notice that eligible employees are able to purchase pension credits if such employees failed to make contributions to the plan when they were, in fact, eligible to participate. Accordingly, the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law and, therefore, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.
III
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff has standing to commence this writ of mandamus action. Nonetheless, the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because they are not under a mandatory obligation to permit one of their employees to buy back pension credits, their employees, including Baumann, do not have a clear legal right to buy back pension credits, and the defendants are not under a mandatory obligation to provide employees with specific notice that they are eligible to purchase pension credits if such employees failed to make contributions to the retirement plan when they were otherwise eligible to participate.
Subsection (d) of § 2-102, entitled " Special credited service 'buy back' provision, " provides that " [a]ctive employees covered under the plan as of March 1, 1985 may elect to buy back service before age thirty (30) and all but one (1) year of service before they became eligible to participate. The retirement commission has full authority to set the rules regarding the time period in which this buy back option may be exercised and the formula to determine the participant's contribution required to buy back the service." Subsection (e) of § 2-102, entitled " Additional special credited service 'buy back' provisions, " provides that " [a]ctive employees covered under the plan as of January 1, 1987 may elect to buy back the first year of service with the town which previously was used towards the eligibility requirements to become a participant of this plan. Effective October 31, 1986, employees may immediately elect to join the plan in accordance with the plan's rules for participation. " Police officers may elect to buy back their 'supernumery' time as credited service effective December 1, 1986. Beginning on that date, earnings and service resulting from 'supernumery' duty will be considered eligible for treatment as monthly earnings and service for purposes of this plan. " The retirement commission has full authority to set the rules regarding the time period in which these buy back options may be exercised and the formula to determine the participant's contribution required to buy back the service." Although these provisions discuss an employee's option to elect to purchase buyback service or pension credits in certain circumstances, these provisions seemingly afford the commission with " full authority to set the rules regarding the time period in which [such] buy back option[s] may be exercised . . ." Significantly, these sections do not expressly mandate that the commission permit an employee to purchase service or pension credits for a period of time when the employee was otherwise " eligible" but failed to contribute to the plan.