Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-1838-M.
June 8, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant John Taylor's Application for Attorneys' Fees, filed on April 23, 2004, which requests an award of fees in the amount of $18,471.44 under MISS. CODE. ANN. § 75-87-7 (2003), and Plaintiff's objections thereto. Having considered Defendant's Application, Plaintiff's objections, and the applicable law, for the reasons stated below, the Court awards Defendant attorneys' fees in the amount of $10,000.
ANALYSIS
A court calculating attorneys' fees under Mississippi law follows the lodestar method adopted by the United States Supreme Court. See In re Gillies, 830 So.2d 640, 645 (Miss. 2002) (noting Mississippi's adoption of the lodestar method). Under that method, a court must first calculate the lodestar amount by multiplying the number of hours reasonably spent on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. Ruthersford v. Harris Cty, Tex., 197 F.3d 173, 192 (5th Cir. 1999). The court may then deviate from the lodestar amount by considering factors set out in Rule 1.5 of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct. These factors, which are almost identical to the twelve factors set out by the Fifth Circuit inJohnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), are:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
MISS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5.
The Court must first determine the number of hours reasonably spent on Defendant Taylor's counterclaim. Defendant's Application seeks compensation for 100.2 attorney hours and 11.34 paralegal hours. Reviewing the time records included with Defendant's Application, the Court concludes that Defendant may not recover fees for the 11.34 hours of work performed by paralegals because such work was not legal in nature. See Vela v. City of Houston, 276 F.3d 659, 681 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that fees for work performed by paralegals may only be recovered if it is legal rather than clerical). The Court further finds that 7.33 of Defendant's claimed attorney hours were unrelated to his counterclaim, but rather involved Defendant's third-party claims against Plaintiff's shareholders, which were dismissed from this suit prior to trial. The Court therefore concludes that Defendant reasonably spent 92.87 hours on his counterclaim.
Next the Court must determine what constitutes a reasonable hourly rate for this case. In the Application, Defendant's counsel does not proffer his normal hourly rate. Rather, he states that his fee agreement in this case is $125 per attorney hour plus 1/3 of any award, which in this case is $4,600.20 — 1/3 of $13,801.80. If the Court recalculates Defendant's requested recovery as a purely hourly rate — by multiplying 100.2, the number of claimed attorney hours, by $125, adding $4600.20, and dividing by 100.2 — the hourly rate works out to be $170.91, which the Court finds is a reasonable hourly rate for this case in this community.
Multiplying 92.87 by $171, the Court finds the lodestar amount to be $15,880.77. The Court must then consider whether any of the Rule 1.5 factors counsel in favor of a departure from this amount.
Considering factor one, the Court finds that the attorney time and labor spent on the counterclaim is what a reasonable client would expect an attorney to spend on this matter, and thus does not warrant a deviation from the lodestar amount. The Court further finds that the legal questions involved were neither novel nor complex, and thus did not require any special skill that would justify a departure from the lodestar.
There is no evidence or contention that counsel's representation of Defendant Taylor prevented counsel from pursuing additional employment opportunities, or that Defendant Taylor was aware of any such limitations on counsel's employment opportunities. Thus, the Court finds that the second factor does not justify deviation from the lodestar amount.
The Court further finds that the hourly rate of $171 is in accord with that customarily charged in this locality, and therefore finds that factor three does not warrant a deviation from the lodestar.
Under factor four, the Court considers the amount involved and the results obtained. Here, Defendant recovered $13,801.80-twice the amount of his unpaid commissions. Because this amount is less than the attorney fee calculated by the lodestar amount, the Court finds a downward deviation appropriate.
The Court finds that there is no evidence or contention that Defendant Taylor put any time constraints on counsel, and thus, a deviation from the lodestar amount based on the fifth factor is unwarranted.
There is no evidence regarding the nature and/or length of the professional relationship between Defendant Taylor and counsel. Thus, the Court concludes that factor six does not justify departure from the lodestar.
Noting that no evidence or contentions regarding counsel's experience, reputation, and/or ability are before the Court, the Court finds that no deviation under factor seven is appropriate.
Finally, because the fee agreement between Defendant Taylor and counsel was a mixed fixed-contingency agreement, and because the agreement ensured that counsel would be compensated some amount regardless of the outcome, the Court finds that factor eight does not justify a deviation from the lodestar amount.
Having considered the Rule 1.5 factors, the Court concludes that a deviation of $5,880.77 from the lodestar amount is appropriate in this case.