Opinion
18-P-511
04-01-2020
COMMONWEALTH v. ZITO Z., a juvenile.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The Commonwealth filed this interlocutory appeal from orders allowing the juvenile's motions to suppress his statements made to a police detective. The Commonwealth now argues that the judge erroneously suppressed the juvenile's statements because the juvenile was not in custody during his interrogation by the detective. We disagree, and affirm.
Background. "Mindful that assessment of witness credibility is the province of the motion judge, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact, supplementing them with uncontested testimony from the suppression hearing that the judge explicitly or implicitly credited." Commonwealth v. Bermudez, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 46, 47-48 (2012). In March 2017, a police detective learned that the juvenile had posted a video recording (video) on Snapchat depicting himself and another student having sexual intercourse. The detective called the juvenile's mother, who lives "a distance away," and asked her to bring her son to the police station to speak with the detective about a video. The mother agreed, and arrived at the police station "late at night." She first came into the station alone, and inquired into the "details about what was going on." The detective explained that he wanted to speak with the juvenile because the juvenile "had sent a video of himself and a girl having sex. They were both underage, and ... he had sent it out on Snapchat to a group of people." Following this conversation, the mother left the station and came back with the juvenile about ten minutes later.
The detective had interviewed the student who reported the video to the school, as well as the other student depicted in the video. Both students identified the juvenile as the second party in the video.
The police station was locked from the outside, so the juvenile and his mother had to be "buzzed in," but they could leave the station by "push[ing] the door open." The detective brought the defendant and his mother into the front office of the station, where officers usually write reports. That office had a "full glass door," which the detective "shut ... for privacy." The detective, the juvenile, and the juvenile's mother were the only people in the office. The detective sat against the wall opposite the door, while the defendant sat in the chair next to the door, and his mother sat to his right.
The detective was aware that the juvenile was fourteen years old at the time of the interview. The detective did not provide the juvenile with Miranda warnings before beginning the interview because he considered that the juvenile "was free to leave"; critically, however, the detective did not testify that he communicated that fact to either the juvenile or his mother. When the detective asked the juvenile if he knew why he was brought down to the station by his mother, the juvenile said that he did. The detective then asked the juvenile if he still had the video. The juvenile said he didn't because he "deleted it." When the detective asked to see the juvenile's Snapchat account, the juvenile said he had deleted the application "[b]ecause he knew that [the detective] would want to look at it."
The interview lasted between fifteen and twenty minutes. The detective characterized the interview as "low-key" and "casual," describing the juvenile as "cooperative" throughout the interview, and that "[n]o one got upset." When the interview ended, the juvenile and his mother left the station without any interference from the detective or other officers. The detective maintained that he conducted the interview to "find out who had the video and to then go meet with them and have the video deleted in front of [him]." At the time the interview ended, the juvenile was not charged with any crimes.
Thereafter, in April 2017, a delinquency complaint issued charging the juvenile with (1) dissemination of a visual image of the sexual or intimate parts of a person without knowledge that the image was unlawfully obtained and without permission of the person; and (2) dissemination of material depicting sexual conduct by a child under the age of eighteen. In June 2017, a second delinquency complaint issued charging the juvenile with videotaping an unsuspecting nude or partially nude person. The juvenile filed a motion to suppress his statements to the detective in each case.
The Commonwealth subsequently entered a nolle prosequi on the second charge.
The judge allowed the motions from the bench after an evidentiary hearing, finding:
"I agree with [defense counsel] that the [d]etective had all the information he needed to charge [the juvenile] before he even brought him to the police station. So ... any questioning involving the video and this young man's involvement in the video would be likely to elicit an incriminating response. So, I find that it is, in fact, interrogation.... We have a kid that's brought to the police station at the request of the police by his adult supervisor, his mother. [He was] brought into a police station, placed in a separate office in the station, with the mother who brought him, and the Detective who was investigating the case and asking [the] mother to bring him in. It is reasonable to believe, based on his deletion of the Snapchat, etcetera, that this young man knew he might be in trouble, or possibly even a suspect. So, based on those issues, I find that the [juvenile] did not feel free to leave, that Miranda did, in fact, attach. It was custodial interrogation, and the motion is allowed."
Discussion. When reviewing a judge's ruling on a motion to suppress, "we accept[ ] the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error, give[ ] substantial deference to the judge's ultimate findings and conclusions of law, but independently review[ ] the correctness of the judge's application of constitutional principles to the facts found" (quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Quinones, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 156, 158-159 (2019).
"Statements obtained as a result of custodial interrogation absent appropriate Miranda warnings ordinarily are inadmissible at trial" (citation omitted). Quinones, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 159. "It is the defendant's burden to establish that he was subject to custodial interrogation." Id. at 161, quoting Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 476 Mass. 725, 735 (2017). Here, where the parties do not dispute that the detective interrogated the juvenile, our inquiry focuses on whether the juvenile was in custody during his interview with the police detective. An interview becomes custodial "whenever [the person] is deprived of his [or her] freedom of action in any significant way" (quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Cawthron, 479 Mass. 612, 617 (2018). "The critical question in determining whether an individual is in custody is whether a reasonable person in the individual's position would feel free to leave." Commonwealth v. Simon, 456 Mass. 280, 287 (2010). See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271 (2011) (subjective beliefs regarding custody irrelevant).
The Commonwealth concedes in its brief that the interview was an interrogation. There is an additional requirement that "juveniles between fourteen and seventeen years old ... be afforded the opportunity to consult with an interested adult" before waiving their Miranda rights (quotation omitted). Commonwealth v. Smith, 471 Mass. 161, 165 (2015). In this case, however, where the detective did not read the juvenile his Miranda rights and the judge found that the juvenile's mother was an "interested adult," this issue is not in dispute on appeal.
"On the question whether the juvenile was in custody, the test is how a reasonable person in the juvenile's position would have understood his situation." Quinones, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 160, quoting Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 402 Mass. 275, 277 (1988). A defendant's age may "affect[ ] how a reasonable person in the [defendant's] position would perceive his or her freedom to leave" (quotation and citation omitted). J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 271-272. Although age is not determinative, children are generally "less mature and responsible than adults," and "often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them," leaving them "more vulnerable or susceptible to ... outside pressures than adults" (quotations and citations omitted). Id. at 272. As a result, "children will often feel bound to submit to police questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave" (citation omitted). Quinones, supra. Notably, a child's adult supervisor may constrain the child's ability to decline to speak with law enforcement officers. See A Juvenile, supra at 277-278 (interview custodial where juvenile under "continuous supervision" and "[t]here was no realistic way" for juvenile to avoid questioning). Given children's inherently different perceptions of potentially custodial situations, a judge may consider age without "damag[ing] ... the objective nature" of the custody analysis. Quinones, supra, quoting J.D.B., supra at 272.
The location of an interrogation may be relevant if the defendant is physically unable to leave. See Commonwealth v. Molina, 467 Mass. 65, 74 (2014) (police "standing almost over ... the defendant" contributed to custodial nature of interrogation); Commonwealth v. Coleman, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 150, 154 (2000) (presence of "three officers in a small room" blocking path to "closed door" created "isolating and coercive" custodial environment [citation omitted] ). The judge may also consider:
"(1) the place of the interrogation; (2) whether the officers have conveyed to the person being questioned any belief or opinion that that person is a suspect; (3) the nature of the interrogation, including whether the interview was aggressive or, instead, informal and influenced in its contours by the person being interviewed; and (4) whether, at the time the incriminating statement was made, the person was free to end the interview by leaving the locus of the interrogation" (citation omitted).
Cawthron, 479 Mass. at 617-618. The judge should "consider whether all the objective circumstances add up to custody rather than evaluating the circumstances one by one." Bermudez, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 51.
Here, we discern no basis for disturbing the motion judge's conclusion that the juvenile was in custody during his interview. Consistent with the judge's findings, we conclude that a reasonable fourteen year old "in the same circumstances" as the juvenile would not have felt free to leave. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 264. See Quinones, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 161 ("It would be artificial to evaluate the circumstances of this case through the eyes of a reasonable adult, when the officer's guidance was premised upon the fact that the defendant was a juvenile"). Although the tone of the interview may have been "casual," the circumstances surrounding the interview significantly deprived the juvenile of his "freedom of action" (citation omitted). Cawthron, 479 Mass. at 617. There was no realistic way for the juvenile to avoid the interview with the detective, given that his mother lived "a distance away," and that she drove him to the police station "late at night" at the detective's request. See id. at 617-618 ; A Juvenile, 402 Mass. at 277. Unlike the defendant in Bermudez, who was "a few months shy of his eighteenth birthday ... on the cusp of majority," 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 53, here, the juvenile was only fourteen years old, making him more susceptible to the "consequences of [his] immaturity." Commonwealth v. A Juvenile (No. 1), 389 Mass. 128, 132 (1983).
The physical setting of the interview further impeded the juvenile's ability to leave. The juvenile and his mother had to be "buzzed" into the police station -- an act suggestive of a locked door -- and the detective then shut the door to the office before beginning the interview. Additionally, as the judge found, the interview took place "in a separate office in the [police] station, with the mother who brought [the juvenile], and the [d]etective who was investigating the case and asking [the] mother to bring him in." Given the physical obstructions in the police station, and the close supervision of the juvenile's mother, it would have been reasonable for a fourteen year old in the juvenile's position to conclude that he could not "end the interview" at his discretion. Cawthron, 479 Mass. at 618. See Molina, 467 Mass. at 74-75 ; A Juvenile, 402 Mass. at 277-278 ; Quinones, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 160 ; Bermudez, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 52 ; Coleman, 49 Mass. App. Ct. at 154. Furthermore, in contrast to Bermudez, where the questioning officers "repeatedly told the [juvenile] ... that he would be allowed to return home," here, the detective never told the juvenile or his mother that they were free to leave. 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 52. Rather, the detective strongly implied to the mother that the juvenile was a suspect by telling her that he needed to speak with the juvenile about "a video of [the juvenile] and a girl having sex." The juvenile's decision to delete his Snapchat application prior to meeting with the detective further supported the judge's finding that the juvenile "knew he might be in trouble, or possibly even a suspect" at the time of the interview.
Considering these circumstances in the aggregate, we discern no error in the motion judge's finding that the juvenile "did not feel free to leave." See Quinones, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 159-160. Accordingly, we affirm the judge's orders allowing the motions to suppress the juvenile's statements.
We think it insignificant that the judge did not express this finding, dictated from the bench, in terms of an objective standard -- e.g., that "a reasonable person in the juvenile's position" would have felt he was not free to leave (citation omitted). Quinones, 95 Mass. App. Ct. at 160. As we have said, based on this record, the judge's finding was entirely consistent with the conclusion that a reasonable fourteen year old "in the same circumstances" would not have felt free to leave. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 264.
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So ordered.
Affirmed.