Opinion
20-P-721
12-27-2021
COMMONWEALTH v. Ronald J. WOODS, Jr.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant, Robert J. Woods, Jr., was convicted of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor following a jury trial in the District Court. On appeal, the defendant argues that the judge erred in denying his motion for a required finding of not guilty. We affirm.
We summarize the facts that the jury could have found, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979). Just after midnight on April 8, 2017, a black Mercedes automobile was stopped at a sobriety checkpoint on Gallivan Boulevard in Dorchester and ordered to enter a parking area for further screening of the driver's possible intoxication. When the car arrived in the screening area, State Police Trooper John McCarthy, who was on duty as a screening officer at the checkpoint, approached the vehicle's open driver's side window and observed the defendant in the driver's seat and another individual in a passenger seat. The defendant provided his license and registration to McCarthy without issue.
The defendant's eyes were red, glassy, and bloodshot, and the inside of the vehicle smelled of beer. He told McCarthy that he had had one drink at 7 P.M. His voice "wasn't slurred, it was, like, stuttered." When McCarthy asked the defendant to recite the alphabet from A to Z, however, "there was a barrage of letters ... slurred together," and he tried and failed four times. McCarthy then asked the defendant to exit the car to perform the "one-legged stand" sobriety test. He explained and demonstrated the test, which consisted of lifting one leg six inches off the ground and counting to twelve. After lifting his leg, the defendant waved his arms and lost his balance by the time he had counted to six. The laces of the defendant's ankle-high dress boots were tied, and the parking lot was flat, dry, and well-lit. McCarthy concluded that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol and placed him under arrest. He then performed a quick inventory of the vehicle and observed a beer can and spilled beer on the backseat.
The defendant contends that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to show that he operated the vehicle and was impaired by the influence of intoxicating liquor. See G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a ) (1). We consider whether any rational trier of fact could have found both elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. AdonSoto, 475 Mass. 497, 509 (2016). The Commonwealth can satisfy its burden of proof on both elements entirely with circumstantial evidence. See Commonwealth v. Petersen, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 49, 52 (2006), quoting Commonwealth v. Cromwell, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 436, 438 (2002).
The jury could have reasonably inferred that the defendant operated the vehicle. When McCarthy approached the Mercedes, shortly after it arrived at the screening area from the checkpoint, the defendant was in the driver's seat. He complied with McCarthy's requests to provide his license and registration and perform field sobriety tests. See Petersen, 67 Mass. App. Ct. at 52. No rational view of the evidence suggested that the defendant and passenger might have switched places between the checkpoint and the screening area. Contrast Commonwealth v. Leonard, 401 Mass. 470, 471-472 (1988) (defendant and wife were first seen fighting at side of road beside parked vehicle, wife had possession of keys, and wife testified that she had been driving and vehicle was hers); Commonwealth v. Mullen, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 25, 26-27 (1975) (at least equally likely that deceased co-occupant had been driving prior to crash where defendant was thrown fully from car and co-occupant was thrown partially from car). The passenger's mere presence in the vehicle does not establish a reasonable possibility that she, rather than the defendant, was driving when the car arrived at the checkpoint. See Commonwealth v. Russell, 470 Mass. 464, 477 (2015) ("Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt").
The jury could also have reasonably concluded that the defendant's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol. Disregarding the defendant's stutter and the evidence of the smell of alcohol emanating from the back seat, the other evidence was sufficient to satisfy the Commonwealth's burden of proof. The defendant's eyes were glassy and bloodshot; on four occasions he recited the alphabet "out of sequence" or with "slurred together" letters; he lost his balance after counting to six while standing on one foot in a flat, well-lit parking lot; and a beer can and freshly spilled beer were found on the backseat. See Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 385, 392-393 (2017).
Judgment affirmed.