Commonwealth v. Womack

Full title: COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. MARCUS WOMACK, Appellant

Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Date published: May 31, 2024

110 MAP 2022 (Pa. May. 31, 2024)

Opinion

110 MAP 2022 J-49-2023

05-31-2024

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. MARCUS WOMACK, Appellant

MUNDY JUSTICE

ARGUED: September 14, 2023

Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court at No. 445 MDA 2021 dated April 29, 2022 Affirming the Judgment of Sentence of the Huntingdon County Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division, at No. CP-31-CR-0000851-2018 entered November 12, 2020.

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, JJ.

OPINION

MUNDY JUSTICE

I. Introduction

In this discretionary appeal, we consider the computation of time for the purposes of Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 where the Commonwealth files two different criminal complaints against a defendant arising out of the same criminal episode. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the Superior Court's order denying relief.

II. Background

On October 6, 2017, law enforcement officers, including Pennsylvania State Trooper Andrew Corl, executed a search warrant at the home of Tyler and Bobbi Martin in Huntingdon County. The search followed a year-long investigation, which revealed that Appellant, Marcus Womack, had been selling drugs from that location. During the search, law enforcement officers recovered from Appellant's person a large sum of money, drugs, and a stolen firearm. They also found an additional stolen firearm elsewhere in the residence. Appellant was placed under arrest. That same day, Trooper Corl filed a criminal complaint ("first complaint"), charging Appellant with nine offenses, including possession with intent to deliver ("PWID"), conspiracy to commit PWID, and possession of a firearm by a person prohibited. The trial court set Appellant's bail at $250,000.00. Unable to post bail, Appellant remained in custody.

Following the execution of the search warrant, Trooper Corl learned from the Martins and other arrestees more information about the scope of Appellant's drug enterprise, which extended to both Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. Law enforcement officers executed additional search warrants. Trooper Corl also reviewed data from Appellant's cell phone, which had been seized during the search that took place on October 6, 2017. His preliminary review of this information revealed the possibility of a more sophisticated operation than originally anticipated. Based on the foregoing, the Huntingdon County District Attorney's Office sought the assistance of the Office of the Attorney General ("OAG") in pursuing additional charges.

The OAG accepted jurisdiction and submitted the case to a statewide investigating grand jury. During this time, at the request of the OAG, the Huntingdon County District Attorney's Office placed the first complaint on hold. The grand jury investigation commenced in late 2017 and ended on October 23, 2018.¹ On October 31, 2018, the Commonwealth filed another criminal complaint ("second complaint"), charging Appellant with a total of twenty-eight offenses including four counts of PWID, conspiracy to commit PWID, and two counts of corrupt organizations. The charges alleged in the second complaint were not identical to the first complaint but were based upon evidence gathered by law enforcement before, during, and shortly after Appellant's arrest and the filing of charges in the first complaint. The OAG's grand jury investigation also led to the arrest of over thirty other individuals for drug-related criminal activity.

1 On April 10, 2018, Appellant, who remained incarcerated, moved for nominal bail pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(2). The trial court granted the motion, but Appellant remained in custody due to a parole detainer from a previous case in Philadelphia.

On February 13, 2019, Appellant moved to dismiss the second complaint pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(1).² After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. On March 13, 2019, Appellant similarly moved to dismiss the first complaint on Rule 600 grounds. The trial court granted this motion on May 9, 2019, and the Commonwealth did not appeal. Soon thereafter, the OAG filed an amended second complaint, reducing the number of charges from twenty-eight to thirteen and providing date ranges, some of which were after the filing of the initial complaint for the remaining counts of PWID.

2 Rule 600(D)(1) provides:

When a defendant has not been brought to trial within the time periods set forth in paragraph (A), at any time before trial, the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if unrepresented, may file a written motion requesting that the charges be dismissed with prejudice on the ground that this rule has been violated. A copy of the motion shall be served on the attorney for the Commonwealth concurrently with filing. The judge shall conduct a hearing on the motion.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(1).

On September 6, 2019, at a pre-trial conference, Appellant rejected the Commonwealth's plea offer of 11½ to 23 years' imprisonment, asserting the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss the second complaint under Rule 600. In light of this, Appellant asked the trial court to certify the issue for an interlocutory appeal nunc pro tunc. Though the trial court granted this request, Appellant failed to file such appeal and instead filed another Rule 600 motion alleging the Commonwealth attempted to circumvent Rule 600 by filing two criminal complaints based on the same criminal conduct. The trial court similarly denied this motion on August 11, 2020.³

3 Appellant, whose sentence on the Philadelphia case expired on August 7, 2020, was released from custody on his own recognizance.

On October 8, 2020, Appellant proceeded to a bench trial on the second complaint. The trial court found Appellant guilty of the following offenses: three counts of PWID, conspiracy to commit PWID, dealing in proceeds of unlawful activity, corrupt organizations, possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, carrying a firearm without a license, and criminal use of a communication facility. He was acquitted of the remaining charges. On November 12, 2020, Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 39 to 90 years' imprisonment. He received 224 days of credit for time served from October 6, 2017 to April 10, 2018. This spanned the period of time between Appellant's arrest on the first complaint and the date the state parole detainer was lodged. He timely appealed to the Superior Court, maintaining the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the second complaint and asserting that the computation of time for Rule 600 purposes should have been based on the filing date of the first complaint.

The Superior Court affirmed in a unanimous, unpublished memorandum decision. See Commonwealth v. Womack, 445 EDA 2021; 2022 WL 1284618 (Pa. Super. filed April 29, 2022). The court recognized that "Rule 600 does not specify which start date to use when two complaints are filed against one defendant," but explained that "the second complaint generally provides the starting point for the calculation" where "the first complaint was properly dismissed." Id. at *6 (citing Commonwealth v. Genovese, 425 A.2d 367, 370 (Pa. 1981)). It noted, however, that if the Commonwealth attempts to circumvent Rule 600, then the first complaint becomes the starting point for calculation purposes. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 359 A.2d 174, 177 (Pa. 1976); Commonwealth v. Lynn, 815 A.2d 1053, 1058 (Pa. Super. 2003)). The court also noted that the Commonwealth "does not get the benefit of the filing date of an identical second complaint" where it fails to exercise due diligence in "prosecuting its first complaint." Id. (citing Meadius, 870 A.2d at 808).

The court then discussed two cases it found particularly instructive. It first recounted this Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Earp, 382 A.2d 1215 (Pa. 1978). Id. Earp was charged with murder, conspiracy, and other offenses. Both the murder and conspiracy charges were dismissed after a preliminary hearing, while the remaining offenses were held for court. The Commonwealth subsequently arrested Earp for the same murder and conspiracy, which kept him confined between his first arrest and trial. Id. (citing Earp, 382 A.2d at 1216). A plurality of this Court determined that the speedy trial period "begins to run on all charges arising out of a criminal transaction upon the initiation of criminal proceedings charging the defendant with any offense arising out of that transaction." Id. (quoting Earp, 382 A.2d at 1217). It also found instructive Commonwealth v. Simms, 500 A.2d 801 (Pa. 1985), which involved a two-complaint scenario with different charges.⁴ Id. There, the Commonwealth initially filed a complaint charging Simms with aggravated assault, but following the victim's death, filed a second complaint charging Simms with criminal homicide. Id. (citing Simms, 500 A.2d at 802). In finding that the date of the second complaint controlled, this Court held that "[i]n cases where an aggravated assault charge is filed, the victim later dies, and, thereafter, a homicide complaint is filed, the [speedy trial] period for trial on the homicide charge should be deemed to commence with the filing of the latter complaint.⁵ Id. (citing Simms, 500 A.2d at 804).

4 It is unclear whether the first complaint in Simms was withdrawn, dismissed, or neither prior to the filing of the second complaint. Simms, 500 A.2d at 803 ("[T]he record does not reveal what disposition was made of the complaint initially filed against [Simms] charging him with the offense of aggravated assault. It is not clear that the complaint was ever formally withdrawn or dismissed, and there is no evidence that any judicial review of the matter occurred.").

5 Both Earp and Simms involved Pa.R.A.P. 1100, the predecessor to Rule 600. In contrast to the current version, Rule 1100 required the Commonwealth to bring a defendant to trial within 180 days of filing its complaint.

Based on the foregoing, the court discerned no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court's decision denying Appellant's motion to dismiss the second complaint. In its view, based on Simms, "[t]he difference between the offenses charged in the complaints demonstrates that the Commonwealth did not try to circumvent Rule 600." Id. at *7 (citing Simms, 500 A.2d at 803-04). As the second complaint was filed on October 31, 2018, the court used this as the starting point for its Rule 600 calculations. It explained that approximately 230 days of pre-trial delay were caused by Appellant. The court also recognized that Rule 600 was suspended from March 16, 2020 through October 8, 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic and thus time excludable. Even so, the court highlighted its skepticism concerning "the Commonwealth's tactics in leaving [the first complaint] open despite not intending to prosecute it." Id. at *8. It nevertheless concluded that the Commonwealth's lack of diligence in prosecuting the first complaint was "irrelevant [to] the Rule 600 calculation of [the second complaint]." Id. The court therefore affirmed Appellant's judgment of sentence.

Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which this Court granted to consider the following question:

Does Rule 600 run from the first or second criminal complaint when the first complaint is still pending against a defendant who is in pretrial detention and the second complaint is premised on grand jury proceedings that subsumed the case underlying the first complaint?

Commonwealth v. Womack, 288 A.3d 865 (Pa. 2022) (per curiam).

III. Parties' Arguments

Appellant asks this Court to find that "Rule 600 runs from the filing date of a first complaint unless the Commonwealth demonstrates that it exercised due diligence throughout the prosecution of the two complaints, which also focuses on the period of delay between the filing of the two complaints." Appellant's Brief at 29. Turning to the plain language of Rule 600, Appellant argues the rule clearly establishes that due diligence is required to obtain the benefit of prosecution. He then notes that the Comment to Rule 600 states:

In cases in which the Commonwealth files a criminal complaint, withdraws that complaint, and files a second complaint, the Commonwealth will be afforded the benefit of the date of the filing of the second complaint for purposes of calculating the time for trial when . . . the Commonwealth has exercised due diligence . . . .

Id. at 31 (quoting Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, Comment).⁶ In light of this Comment, Appellant asserts "there is no justifiable reason" that the due diligence standard does not also apply here, where the Commonwealth filed two complaints involving different charges. Id. at 31. He then explains that this Comment, derived from our decision in Commonwealth v. Meadius, 870 A.2d 802 (Pa. 2005), suggests that the Commonwealth must act with due diligence as to the first complaint and demonstrate that its use of an investigating grand jury was reasonable. Id. at 31-32.

6 This Comment is discussed infra, where it is reproduced in its entirety.

With regard to investigating grand juries, Appellant notes the Commonwealth is not required to submit its case to one in order to prosecute. Nor does any law prevent the prosecutor from withdrawing from one where it is apparent investigation is no longer necessary. He therefore concludes that requiring the Commonwealth to demonstrate the reasonable necessity of an investigating grand jury would not disturb the prosecutor's authority and would advance the dual purposes of Rule 600, those being "more effectively protect[ing] the right of criminal defendants to a speedy trial, and the efficient administration of justice." Id. at 32-33 (quoting Commonwealth v. Harth, 252 A.3d 600, 615 (Pa. 2021) (additional quotations omitted)). Appellant asserts that due diligence here would require the Commonwealth to present some evidence to justify his continued detention and the lack of action on his first complaint. Id. at 33.

To the extent the Commonwealth asserts due diligence only applies to the second complaint in this case, Appellant maintains we have declined to adopt such a construction. Id. at 34 (citing Meadius, 870 A.2d at 808-810 (Eakin, J., dissenting)). He argues this approach would allow the Commonwealth to "hide behind the sluggish [investigating grand jury] process - a product of [its own] operation - when the process may not be reasonably necessary to prosecute a particular defendant." Id. at 34.

Applying this test, Appellant asserts the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence. He maintains the first complaint served no purpose other than keeping him "on ice," knowing the initial complaint would never be pursued while continuing on with the investigating grand jury. He avers the Commonwealth has failed to present any evidence that the grand jury was necessary to shroud its investigation in secrecy or as a prosecutorial tool to investigate him in particular. Id. at 37. Appellant recognizes that the record demonstrates Trooper Corl compiled an extensive amount of evidence just prior to and after Appellant's arrest, which served as the "cornerstone of the Commonwealth's case." Id. The Commonwealth therefore knew most of what it learned about his involvement shortly after the first complaint was filed. Finally, Appellant suggests the Commonwealth had several courses of action it could have taken that did not involve the first complaint sitting in limbo while it pursued other options. Id. at 38. In conclusion, Appellant asks this Court to reverse the Superior Court's decision and find that Rule 600 began running when the first complaint was filed. Because Appellant's trial commenced more than 365 days after the first complaint was filed and the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate due diligence, dismissal was warranted.

Conversely, the Commonwealth maintains the lower courts applied longstanding speedy trial precedent concerning two complaint cases and reached the correct conclusion that the clock began when it filed the second complaint. It similarly points out that the Comment to Rule 600, which relies on Meadius, provides that the speedy trial period begins with the second complaint where the Commonwealth's new filing is "necessitated by factors beyond its control, the Commonwealth has exercised due diligence, and the refiling is not an attempt to circumvent the time limitation of Rule 600." Commonwealth's Brief at 22 (quoting Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, Comment). In its view, these considerations are especially compelling in cases like this one where the Commonwealth files new charges based upon new evidence.

The Commonwealth then discusses Simms, which it purports involved a two-complaint scenario similar to this case. As noted above, the Commonwealth charged Simms with aggravated assault, but following the victim's death, filed a second complaint charging Simms with homicide. This Court concluded that the speedy trial period began to run with the second complaint, considering "events beyond the control of the prosecution [ ] operated to change the nature of the offense for which [the] defendant [was] to be tried." Id. (citing Simms, 500 A.2d at 802-04). The Commonwealth avers that the difference in charges between the first and second complaint in Simms negated any inference that the Commonwealth attempted to circumvent then-Rule 1100, now Rule 600. Id. at 22-23. In its view, the critical question instantly is "whether the Commonwealth could have charged the crimes brought in the second complaint at the time of the filing of the first complaint, but instead chose to delay the charges in order to circumvent Rule 600." Id. at 23. The Commonwealth asserts that cannot be the case where the second complaint involves new charges that could not have been filed at the time of the first complaint. Id.

The Commonwealth rejects Appellant's assertion "that the Commonwealth knew enough at the time of the first complaint to charge him with all the crimes brought in the second complaint" as factually incorrect, as determined by the trial court, and also irrelevant. Id. at 23-24. The Commonwealth explains that any issue concerning delay in bringing the first trial is a moot point because that case was dismissed under Rule 600, and any delay in bringing the second case is a non-issue because Rule 600 does not begin until charges are brought. It goes on to explain that much of what was charged in the second complaint was not known when the first complaint was filed. Id. at 25-30 (citing Trial Ct. Op., 4/21/21, at 32-34).

The Commonwealth disagrees with Appellant's claim that it "nefariously used the first complaint as a 'placeholder' to keep him 'on ice' during the subsequent investigation." Id. at 30. It maintains it could not have known what evidence it would uncover from its investigation, which is the point of investigations. The Commonwealth goes on to explain that its investigation "produced over 20 new witnesses and revealed that [Appellant] was not the bit player he appeared to be when the charges were filed. He was a leading member of a sophisticated trafficking ring consisting of more than 30 other conspirators." Id. at 31. The Commonwealth acknowledges that it should have withdrawn the first complaint sooner after realizing the subsequent investigation produced significant evidence, but nonetheless points out that Appellant "received relief on those original charges, and sentencing credit for all the time he served on them." Id. In light of the foregoing, the Commonwealth asks us to affirm the Superior Court's order denying relief.⁷

7 Appellant's reply brief reiterates many of the same points addressed in his principal brief. See generally Appellant's Reply Brief.

IV. Analysis

Our standard of review in evaluating speedy trial issues is "whether the trial court abused its discretion, and our scope of review is limited to the trial court's findings and the evidence on the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party." Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 989 A.2d 883, 899 (Pa. 2010) (citing Meadius, 870 A.2d at 805). "An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will . . . discretion is abused." Commonwealth v. Bradford, 46 A.3d 693, 700 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted)).

This Court has previously explained that Rule 600 was adopted in order "to protect defendants' constitutional rights to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, in response to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). Id. at 701 (citation omitted). We have also recognized that "Rule 600 has the dual purpose of both protecting a defendant's constitutional speedy trial rights and protecting society's right to effective prosecution in criminal cases." Id. (citations omitted). "In determining whether an accused's right to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given to society's right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it." Simms, 500 A.2d at 805 (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 409 A.2d 308, 311 n.4 (Pa. 1979)).

Turning to its text, Rule 600 requires that "[t]rial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed." Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). Rule 600 further provides:

(C) Computation of Time

(1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has

failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the computation.

. . .

(D) Remedies

(1) When a defendant has not been brought to trial within the time periods set forth in paragraph (A), at any time before trial, the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if unrepresented, may file a written motion requesting that the charges be dismissed with prejudice on the ground that this rule has been violated. A copy of the motion shall be served on the attorney for the Commonwealth concurrently with filing. The judge shall conduct a hearing on the motion.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1)-(D)(1).

Rule 600 does not explicitly address the way in which two-complaint scenarios should be handled, and this Court has had minimal opportunity to examine the rule in that context. The most recent case addressing such a scenario is Meadius. There, the Commonwealth filed a criminal complaint charging Meadius with several offenses, including forgery and insurance fraud on January 16, 2001. Meadius, 870 A.2d at 803. The Commonwealth was unable to proceed with the preliminary hearing on three occasions for various reasons and ultimately withdrew the complaint. Id. On March 27, 2001, after receiving assurances from various witnesses concerning their ability to testify at a future preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth filed a second complaint alleging the identical offenses. Id. Meadius was scheduled to proceed to trial on February 4, 2002, which would have been more than one year after the first complaint, but not the second complaint, was filed. Id. Meadius moved to dismiss the charges with prejudice under Rule 600, asserting the Commonwealth failed to bring him to trial within the period of time required by law. Id. at 803-04.

The trial court granted Meadius' motion to dismiss, reasoning the Commonwealth failed to comply with Rule 600. Because the Commonwealth failed to bring Meadius to trial within one year of filing the first complaint, it was not entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the second identical complaint. Id. at 804. In doing so, the trial court rejected the Commonwealth's argument that the case was controlled by Commonwealth v. Whiting, 500 A.2d 806 (Pa. 1985). In Whiting, the Commonwealth sought dismissal of its case at the preliminary hearing and filed an identical second complaint almost one year later. This Court calculated the speedy trial period from the filing date of the second complaint, finding the record did not demonstrate any effort by the Commonwealth to evade or manipulate the speedy trial period. Id. (citing Whiting, 500 A.2d at 806-808). The trial court in Meadius distinguished Whiting on the basis that Whiting involved "dismissal by an impartial magistrate, not withdrawal of charges by executive action." Id. at 804. It instead found applicable the two-part test set forth in Commonwealth v. Sires, 424 A.2d 1386 (Pa. 1981). There, this Court found that the speedy trial period begins with the second complaint where: "(1) the first complaint was properly dismissed by a competent judicial authority; and (2) the record does not reveal any prosecutorial attempt to circumvent or evade the rule's mandate." Id. at 804 (citing Sires, 424 A.2d at 1387). Finding neither prong met, the trial court granted Meadius' motion to dismiss. The Superior Court reversed, applying Whiting. It viewed Whiting more broadly than the trial court, emphasizing the fact that "the initial complaint in Whiting was dismissed on the Commonwealth's motion without independent review by the district magistrate, thus prompting this Court to deem it 'a voluntary withdrawal of the prosecution by the Commonwealth.'" Id. at 804 (citation omitted). The Superior Court also found the Commonwealth had not attempted to circumvent or manipulate Rule 600. Id. at 804-05.

On appeal, the Meadius Court first examined the text of Rule 600 and noted its plain language makes clear that a trial court must grant a Rule 600 motion "unless it finds the Commonwealth has exercised due diligence and that the circumstances occasioning the postponement were beyond its control." Id. at 805. We acknowledged that previous case law, particularly Whiting, provided some support for the position that such Rule 600 matters should be disposed of based solely on whether the Commonwealth attempted to evade or manipulate the speedy trial requirements. Id. at 806 (citing Whiting, 500 A.2d at 808). We explained, however, that Whiting "did not consider a scenario where the Commonwealth's failure to act diligently precipitates a withdrawal of the complaint followed by a re-filing of identical charges." Id. at 807. In addition to considering the Commonwealth's intent to evade or manipulate Rule 600, the Meadius Court believed the appropriate test should also consider the Commonwealth's exercise of due diligence, explaining:

The rule's focus upon allowing the prosecution time extensions only where it has acted diligently and where the delays in question were caused by factors beyond its control supports an interpretation whereby it must forego the benefit of a second filing date when these conditions are not met. Indeed, a contrary result would undermine the rule's own facial requirements directed to prosecutorial diligence, as well its objectives, which include advancing society's interest in seeing those accused of crime prosecuted in a timely manner, as well as ensuring the efficient management of criminal cases as a means of avoiding substantial backlogs[.]

Id. at 808 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Applying this standard, in light of the trial court's findings, the Meadius Court found the Commonwealth failed to proceed with due diligence in bringing Meadius to trial in the required time period. It therefore reversed the Superior Court's decision and reinstated that of the trial court. Id.

Though the specific provision of Rule 600 at issue in Meadius is no longer present in the current version of the rule, Rule 600(C)(1) imposes a due diligence requirement on the Commonwealth. Additionally, the test developed in Meadius appears in the Comments of the current version of Rule 600 and continues to be applied to cases involving two-complaint scenarios. That Comment states:

In cases in which the Commonwealth files a criminal complaint, withdraws that complaint, and files a second complaint, the Commonwealth will be afforded the benefit of the date of the filing of the second complaint for purposes of calculating the time for trial when the withdrawal and re-filing of charges are necessitated by factors beyond its control, the Commonwealth has exercised due diligence, and the refiling is not an attempt to circumvent the time limitation of Rule 600. See Commonwealth v. Meadius, 582 Pa. 174, 870 A.2d 802 (2005).

See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, Comment.

We find the Meadius test applicable herein, as it seeks to reach a balance between the twin aims of Rule 600. We first address due diligence. This Court has explained that it is the Commonwealth's burden to demonstrate due diligence by a preponderance of the evidence to avail itself of an exclusion under Rule 600. See Commonwealth v. Selenski, 994 A.2d 1083, 1089 (Pa. 2010). Perhaps most importantly, this Court has recognized that "[d]ue diligence is fact-specific, to be determined case-by-case; it does not require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but merely a showing the Commonwealth has put forth a reasonable effort." Id. In the context of Meadius, and other similar two-complaint cases, the due diligence inquiry relates to whether the Commonwealth's basis for filing the second complaint was precipitated by its lack of diligence in prosecuting the first complaint. Meadius, 870 A.2d at 807. That is because, more often than not, two-complaint cases involve a situation where the Commonwealth re-files an identical complaint due to some barrier in prosecuting its initial complaint. When the Commonwealth fails to exercise diligence with respect to the first complaint, it does not receive the benefit of the filing date of the second identical complaint.

Here, the Commonwealth's filing of the second complaint cannot be attributed to a lack of diligence in prosecuting the first complaint, but is directly tied to its need for further investigation after discovering that Appellant's drug enterprise extended beyond the jurisdiction of Huntingdon County. The relevant period of time for due diligence purposes under the unique facts of this case therefore becomes the period of time between the filing of the first and second complaint. Here, the Commonwealth's undertaking of grand jury proceedings can only be understood as an exercise of due diligence. As mentioned previously, the OAG's grand jury investigation was necessitated by the revelation the Appellant's criminal conduct extended beyond Huntington County and throughout the Commonwealth. The OAG's investigation began almost immediately after learning additional information that grand jury proceedings would be necessary, and the second complaint was filed promptly after the conclusion of those proceedings. Although the Commonwealth concedes it could have withdrawn the first complaint while the investigation occurred, Appellant's Rule 600 challenge to the first complaint resulted in dismissal of that complaint. Dismissal of the second complaint, however, is clearly not the proper remedy. Appellant's retrospective focus on the result of the grand jury proceedings also misconstrues the due diligence inquiry, as due diligence is not outcome based but rather an assessment of the Commonwealth's affirmative actions. See Selenski, 994 A.2d at 1089. Nevertheless, it is clear the Commonwealth's grand jury investigation bore fruit in the form of additional charges against Appellant that were not, and could not have been, included in the Commonwealth's initial complaint. See Trial Ct. Op., 4/21/21, at 32-35. We reject Appellant's argument to the contrary as unsupported by the record. See Wholaver, 989 A.2d at 809; Bradford, 46 A.3d at 700.⁸

8 In his concurring opinion, Justice Wecht initially expresses hesitation with our decision not to "engage independently in the close, record-based inspection of the charges that is required in a case like this[,]" but ultimately agrees with our decision to do so given the thoroughness of the trial court's opinion. Wecht, J., Concurring at 12-13. To be clear, our reliance on the trial court's analysis in this case rests not only on the fact that the trial court's opinion was indeed extremely thorough, but also on the standard of review being an abuse of discretion. As such, the trial court's determinations carry a degree of deference. In many cases involving Rule 600, this Court has stressed the consideration owed to the trial court's factual findings and analysis, where supported by the record, in resolving motions for dismissal. See e.g., Meadius, 870 A.2d at 808.

We must now address the remaining Meadius factors, specifically, whether the Commonwealth's filing of the second complaint was necessitated by factors beyond its control and whether its actions were an attempt to circumvent or manipulate the timing requirements of Rule 600. Meadius, 870 A.2d at 808. As to the former, the Commonwealth's filing of the second complaint was the result of becoming aware of additional information after the first complaint was filed. This information was made available only after multiple arrestees came forward with additional information following the execution of the October 6, 2017 search warrant, which ultimately led the Commonwealth to conduct additional investigation through the grand jury process. As such, we conclude the Commonwealth's filing of the second complaint was necessitated by factors beyond its control.

With respect to the final factor, the Commonwealth's filing of the second complaint was not an attempt to manipulate the speedy trial requirements. As noted above, many two-complaint cases involve the re-filing of a second complaint with charges identical to the first complaint. In these cases, the goal is to extend the speedy trial clock where factors came in the way of a speedy prosecution the first time around. In contrast, the second complaint in this case involved some of the same charges from the first complaint but also included additional charges based on information discovered during the grand jury process. The filing of additional charges based on additional information is hardly an attempt to evade the speedy trial requirements, but rather an effort to hold Appellant accountable to the full extent of his criminal activity. We therefore conclude the Commonwealth's filing of the second complaint was not an attempt to manipulate the speedy trial requirements. As the Commonwealth has met each of the Meadius factors, the Superior Court properly denied Appellant's motion to dismiss.⁹

9 Appellant's argument focuses solely on which complaint controls the starting point of the Rule 600 calculation. He does not contend that his trial was untimely from the date of the second complaint to the commencement of his trial. In any event, we agree with the Superior Court that, considering the delays attributable to Appellant and the trial court, Rule 600 was not violated. See Womack, 2022 WL 1284618 at *9.

V. Conclusion

Where the Commonwealth files two different criminal complaints against a defendant, the Commonwealth receives the benefit of the filing date of the second complaint for Rule 600 purposes where it demonstrates that it acted with due diligence between the period in which the complaints were filed. The Commonwealth must also establish that the filing of the second complaint was necessitated by factors beyond its control and that its actions were not an attempt to circumvent or manipulate the speedy trial requirements. Under the specific facts of this case, the Commonwealth has met these requirements.¹⁰ We therefore affirm the order of the Superior Court denying Appellant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 600. Chief Justice Todd and Justices Dougherty, Wecht and Brobson join the opinion.

10 Justice Donohue authors a concurring opinion disagreeing with our application of the Meadius framework. She explains: "[I]t is only where the second set of charges is part of the same criminal episode as the first set of charges and where the evidentiary basis for those charges was available to the Commonwealth at the time the first complaint was filed that the Meadius test comes into play." Donohue, J., Concurring at 3 (emphasis added). With respect to the former, it is difficult to deny that the charges in both criminal complaints arose from the same underlying drug trafficking incident in a general sense, though much of the information supporting the charges in the second complaint was unknown to the authorities when the first complaint was filed. We acknowledge that the discovery of new information necessitating the filing of a second complaint does not lend itself to a straightforward application of the Meadius test, but nonetheless find its due diligence approach of assessing whether the charges in the second complaint could have been brought with the first is appropriate under the circumstances. We are hesitant to inject compulsory joinder principles into our analysis here where there is clearly no such issue. Section 110 details when a subsequent prosecution is barred by a former prosecution for different offenses and only applies where, inter alia, the first prosecution resulted in an acquittal or conviction. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 110. That is not the case herein. Additionally, Section 109 explains when a prosecution is barred by a former prosecution for the same offense and none of the circumstances contained therein apply instantly. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 109 (explaining when prosecution barred by former prosecution for same offense). Thus, although the Commonwealth filed two complaints arising from the same conduct, Appellant was never prosecuted for the offenses in the first as contemplated by Sections 109 and 110.

Justice Donohue files a concurring opinion.

Justice Wecht files a concurring opinion.

DONOHUE JUSTICE

I concur in the result.

This Court granted review to consider how Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 applies to the two prosecutions of Appellant, Marcus Womack that were commenced with consecutive complaints alleging different charges. More specifically, we granted review of the following question:

Does Rule 600 run from the first or second criminal complaint when the first complaint is still pending against a defendant who is in pretrial detention and the second complaint is premised on grand jury proceedings that subsumed the case underlying the first complaint?

Commonwealth v. Womack, 288 A.3d 865 (Pa. Nov. 30, 2022) (per curiam).¹ On one previous occasion, this Court addressed the application of the speedy trial rule in a scenario involving serial non-identical complaints.² There we emphasized that the first question the reviewing court must address is the relationship between the two sets of charges. We have more frequently addressed the application of Rule 600 where the Commonwealth filed and then refiled identical charges-often precipitated by its failure to meet its prima facie burden at the preliminary hearing-leading to the development of a test announced in Commonwealth v. Meadius to evaluate whether the Commonwealth is entitled to the filing date for the second complaint as the date to commence Rule 600 calculations.³ In contrast, the question presented in this appeal asks from which filing date does the Rule 600 clock start to run where the first complaint and second complaint are not identical? The Majority holds that the answer to this question also derives from the application of the Meadius test. I disagree.

1 This Concurring Opinion addresses the issue as presented based upon the findings of fact and legal conclusions of the trial court. The findings and conclusions regarding whether the conduct in the first complaint and the second complaint arose from the same criminal episode were never challenged on appeal. See infra note 14 (explaining that Womack initially asserted that the charges arose from the same criminal episode, that the trial court made factual findings and determined the charges were not from the same criminal episode, and that Womack expressly abandoned his argument that the charges were based on a "same criminal episode" analysis in his Superior Court brief). The Majority Opinion, in response to this Concurring Opinion, states that it believes that the charges in the two complaints arose from the same criminal episode. Majority Op. at 1 (stating that this case addresses the application of Rule 600 where the Commonwealth files two complaints against a defendant "arising out of the same criminal episode"), 18-19 n.10 (stating that the charges "arose from the same underlying drug trafficking incident in a general sense" and that they arise "from the same conduct"). This conclusion is directly contrary to the unchallenged findings of the trial court in this case. Trial Court Opinion, 4/21/2022, at 32-35. Further, the Majority Opinion rejects the analytical framework discussed in this Concurring Opinion for determining whether the two complaints arise out of the same criminal episode. Majority Op. at 18-19 n.10. Although the Majority Opinion rejects our framework (and the trial court's), it offers no guidance as to how a trial court or the prosecutor should consider the facts underlying two sets of charges to determine whether or not the conduct arises from the same criminal episode such that it is subject to the Meadius test. Id.

2 Commonwealth v. Simms, 500 A.2d 801, 802 (Pa. 1985). At that time, the speedy trial rule was Rule 1100 and it prescribed 180 days for the prosecutor to bring a case from commencement to trial. It was renumbered as Rule 600 in March of 2000.

3 The test to determine the Rule 600 run date in cases where identical charges have been filed was fully articulated in Commonwealth v. Meadius, 870 A.2d 802 (Pa. 2005), and it is now housed as a comment to Rule 600:

[T]he Commonwealth will be afforded the benefit of the date of the filing of the second complaint for purposes of calculating the time for trial when the withdrawal and re-filing of charges are necessitated by factors beyond its control, the Commonwealth has exercised due diligence, and the refiling is not an attempt to circumvent the time limitation of Rule 600.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, cmt. (citing Meadius, 870 A.2d at 802).

The rule announced in Commonwealth v. Meadius is irrelevant where, as here, the charges in the second complaint arise from a separate criminal episode than those in the first complaint. While none of the three Meadius factors fit under the circumstances presented here, the Majority's application of a "due diligence" requirement on the Commonwealth between the filing of the first and second complaint is particularly inapt. Rule 600, the speedy trial rule, requires the Commonwealth to exercise due diligence in the prosecution of a criminal complaint, not in the investigation of unrelated charges that are later filed. The Majority's approach is a quintessential example of forcing a square peg in a round hole.

In my view, faced with a Rule 600 challenge based on two non-identical complaints, it is only where the second set of charges is part of the same criminal episode as the first set of charges and where the evidentiary basis for those charges was available to the Commonwealth at the time the first complaint was filed that the Meadius test comes into play. Thus, while I concur in the result reached by the Majority, I disagree with its analytical framework.

The trial court⁴ identified the charge-specific analytical framework for deciding this case and correctly did so without reliance of Meadius. The trial court considered the interplay and overlap of the charges in the first and second complaint to determine the appropriate start date for the Rule 600 clock for the charges in the second complaint. It did so by considering the intersection of the speedy trial timing requirements and compulsory joinder principles, ⁵ultimately concluding, based on the charges, that Rule 600 runs from the filing date of the second complaint. Trial Court Opinion, 4/21/2021, at 34-35 (finding that "there are no compulsory joinder issues between the charges that were dismissed in the [first c]ase and the charges that resulted in convictions in the instant case, and thus the start date for Rule 600 purposes is October 31, 2018[]").

4 The trial judge was President Judge George N. Zanic, Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County. The Superior Court also endorsed the trial court's approach. Commonwealth v. Womack, 445 MDA 2021, 2022 WL 1284618 at *7-*8 (Pa. Super. Apr. 29, 2022) (non-precedential decision) (finding that the trial court's focus on what charges the Commonwealth could have brought when it filed the first complaint comports with Rule 600).

5 Trial Court Opinion, 4/21/2021, at 23 (citing U.S. Const. amend. V, VI; Pa.R.Crim.P. 600; 18 Pa.C.S. § 110).

In this appeal, Marcus Womack faced two separate complaints-the first filed in October 2017 and the second filed in October 2018-arising out of his involvement in a large drug-trafficking operation. With both sets of charges pending, and when the first case had been languishing for over a year, Womack filed a pre-trial motion to dismiss each of the cases pursuant to Rule 600.⁶ As to the first complaint, the trial court agreed with Womack that the Commonwealth failed to timely bring him to trial and dismissed the charges with prejudice. Id. ¶¶ 33, 35. As to the second complaint, i.e., the present case, Womack argued that the Rule 600 clock for the second set of charges should relate back to the filing date for the first complaint because all of the charges were part of one criminal transaction.⁷ Id. ¶ 32. The trial court denied the motion, and Womack proceeded to a bench trial where he was convicted of drug offenses, corrupt organizations, and firearms offenses. ⁸ Id. ¶¶ 32, 58, 69. In a post-sentence motion, Womack asserted that the trial court erred in denying his Rule 600 motion. The trial court issued its fifty-one-page opinion, accompanied by a chart, explaining his derivation of the relevant framework to analyze the non-identical two-complaint scenario and its application to the prosecutions of Womack. Relying on Commonwealth v. Earp, 382 A.2d 1215 (Pa. 1978) (plurality), the trial court stated that the speedy trial period begins to run "on all charges arising out of a criminal transaction upon the initiation of criminal proceedings charging the defendant with any offense arising out of that transaction." Trial Court Opinion, 4/21/2021, at 24 (citing Earp, 382 A.2d at 1217).

6 Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600, "Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed." Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a).

7 As the trial court would explain, given that all of the charges in the first complaint were dismissed pursuant to Rule 600, any of the charges in the second complaint placed on the same timeline would also be subject to dismissal under Rule 600. Trial Court Opinion, 4/21/2021, at 21 (explaining that "if [Womack] is correct that either some or all of the charges between the instant case and the [first c]ase overlap, the overlapping charges must be dismissed[]"). Additionally relevant, after the trial court denied the Rule 600 motion related to the second set of charges, on March 29, 2019, the Office of the Attorney General ("OAG") filed an amended criminal information reducing the overall number of charges and modifying the dates of some of the offenses. Id. ¶ 34. The trial court's analysis pertains only to the charges in the amended criminal information. Id. at 32 n.12 ("The evaluation would be very different for the original criminal information filed in the instant case, which included twenty-eight charges, many of which overlapped the [first c]ase.").

8 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) (two counts); 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 903, 5111(a), 911(b)(3), 6105, 6106(a)(1), 7512.

The facts of Earp clarify the rule it announced. Leslie Earp was charged with murder, conspiracy, and several other offenses in connection with the shooting death of Robert Davis. At the preliminary hearing, the murder and conspiracy charges were dismissed based on the Commonwealth's failure to establish a prima facie case. Earp continued to be held on the other offenses arising out of the death of the victim. The Commonwealth subsequently refiled the murder and conspiracy charges against Earp, and Earp sought dismissal of the charges under Rule 1100 because over 180 days had passed since the filing of the first complaint. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the 180-day calculation commenced with the second complaint, not the first. On appeal, a majority of this Court disagreed. Three Justices agreed with the plurality's reasoning, and a fourth Justice concurred in the result.

The plurality explained that the speedy trial rule contemplates commencement of the critical 180-day speedy trial period at the initiation of criminal proceedings. Earp, 382 A.2d at 1217. To define the initiation of criminal proceedings, it looked beyond the speedy trial rule, given that the rule's language did not answer the run date question. The plurality observed that the compulsory joinder rules treat "all charges arising out of a criminal transaction … as a single case." Id. (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 131(b) (providing that "[w]hen more than one offense is alleged to have been committed by one person arising out of the same incident, the issuing authority shall accept only one complaint, and shall docket the matter as a single case[]"). Reading the speedy trial rule and the joinder rule together, the plurality found that they "make clear that the 180[-]day speedy trial period set forth by Rule 1100 begins to run on all charges arising out of a criminal transaction upon the initiation of criminal proceedings charging the defendant with any offense arising out of that transaction." Id.

The Earp plurality concluded that the mandatory speedy trial period commenced with the filing of the first complaint, reasoning that "these charges arose out of the same criminal transaction[.]" Id. at 1218. By charging those offenses, the Commonwealth initiated criminal proceedings against Earp, and thus was obligated to bring Earp to trial within 180 days. Id. at 1218. It stated: "So long as a portion of the proceedings arising out of the shooting of Robert Davis remained pending, the Commonwealth's obligation to bring these proceedings against appellant to trial within 180 days remained unaltered." Id. In further support of this reasoning, the plurality cited to American Bar Association ("ABA") proposed standards addressing speedy trial calculations in two-complaint scenarios, which provided that the speedy trial period commences

from the date the charge is filed, except that if the defendant has been continuously held in custody or on bail or on recognizance until that date to answer for the same crime or a crime based on the same conduct arising from the same criminal episode, then the time for trial should commence running from the date he was held to answer.

Id. (citing ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to

Speedy Trial § 2.2(a) (Approved Draft, 1968) & Commentary) (emphasis added). Because Earp was held in continuous custody on the other offenses for the entire period, the dismissal of the murder and conspiracy charge did not relieve the Commonwealth of its obligation to bring the proceedings against Earp to trial for charges arising out of the same criminal transaction.

Drawing on the reasoning of Earp, the trial court explained that the subsequently charged offenses against Womack need not be the "precise same offenses as the initial complaint" for this rule to apply. Trial Court Opinion, 4/21/2021, at 25-26. Rather, it applies to "all charges arising out of a criminal transaction upon the initiation of criminal proceedings charging the defendant with any offense arising out of that transaction." Id.

The trial court also reviewed Simms. In Simms, faced with two non-identical criminal complaints and the question of when the clock starts running pursuant to Rule 1100, the Court determined that, on the facts of that case, the clock started with the filing of the second complaint. In reaching that conclusion, we acknowledged that "an abuse of the spirit of that Rule would occur if the Commonwealth were permitted to delay trials by simply, at will, withdrawing or dismissing complaints and filing new ones[.]" Simms, 500 A.2d at 803. Therefore, a body of case law had developed defining the limited circumstances under which the period for trial is deemed to run anew. Id. The circumstances where it ran from the first complaint involved "factual scenarios where complaints filed subsequent to the first complaint repeated the charge of an offense that had been set forth in the first complaint." Id. (emphasis added). In such circumstances, there was an "enhanced likelihood that the mechanism of repeatedly filing complaints" was being "utilized by the Commonwealth as a means of evading the [then] 180 day rule." Id.

We recognized that the rule had not been limited to identical offenses, echoing Earp's language that the clock begins to run "on all charges arising out of a criminal transaction upon the initiation of criminal proceedings charging the defendant with any offense arising out of that transaction[.]" Id. at 804 (citing Earp, 382 A.2d at 1217). The Simms Court then distinguished Earp on the grounds that Earp had been "narrowly interpreted by this Court and … limited in its application to the factual context presented in that case[.]"⁹ Id.

9 Earp's application was limited to circumstances where charges are filed against a defendant and some but not all of the charges are withdrawn or dismissed pre-second complaint, i.e., the scenario spelled out in the ABA proposed standard the Earp plurality relied upon. The cloud of the first set of charges hung over Earp from the filing of the first complaint and up until the time the second complaint was filed, but this was not so in the other cases. In the cases limiting Earp, the charges in the first complaint were dismissed prior to the filing of the second complaint. In Commonwealth v. Genovese, 425 A.2d 367 (Pa. 1981), the first set of charges was dismissed at the preliminary hearing before the second set of identical charges was refiled, and we explained that Earp's continuous confinement and incomplete dismissal of charges were the crucial factors in discharging him. Genovese, 425 A.2d at 369-70 & n.11; see similarly Commonwealth v. Johnson, 409 A.2d 308 (Pa. 1979) (distinguishing Earp on the basis that no charges survived the grand jury's first refusal to indict); Commonwealth v. Horner, 442 A.2d 682, 685 n.9 (Pa. 1982) (finding Earp factually inapposite because this case deals with the dismissal of an entire complaint prior to the filing of a new identical complaint). Based on those cases, Earp was limited to the factual scenarios where charges remained pending from the filing of the first complaint up until the filing of the second. These are the circumstances presented in this appeal.

Further, the Simms Court, relying on Earp's mandatory joinder principles without so stating, highlighted that the offense was complete and chargeable at the time of the first complaint in Earp. Simms, 500 A.2d at 804. By contrast, at the time of the first complaint in Simms, the homicide charge could not have been filed. The Court concluded that the speediness of trial would be measured from the second complaint because events beyond the prosecution's control "change[d] the nature of the offense[.]" Id.

In my view, the trial court appropriately honed in on the logic of applying compulsory joinder principles to determine whether the Commonwealth gets the benefit of the date of the filing of a second set of non-identical charges when calculating the run date on those charges filed in the second complaint. The relevant specific principle was first identified in Commonwealth v. Campana, 304 A.2d 432 (Pa. 1973) ("Campana I") (plurality): successive prosecutions based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode are barred. Id. at 439 (citing ALI Model Penal Code § 1.07(2)). We explained that "[b]y requiring that all causes of action arising from a set of operative facts be consolidated at one proceeding, the concept avoids repetitious litigation and assures finality without unduly burdening the judicial process."¹⁰ Id. at 440. This concept is now embedded in Section 110(1)(ii) of the Crimes Code with the additional proviso that the charges arising from the same criminal episode were known to the prosecutor when the first prosecution was "brought to trial."¹¹

10 The Campana plurality cited the following definition of "episode:" "an occurrence or connected series of occurrences and developments which may be viewed as distinctive and apart although part of a larger or more comprehensive series." Campana I, 304 A.2d at 429.

11 According to that provision,

§ 110. When prosecution barred by former prosecution for different offense

Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision of the statutes than a former prosecution or is based on different facts, it is barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances:

(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as defined in section 109 of this title (relating to when prosecution barred by former prosecution for the same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for:

* * *

(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, if such offense was known (continued…) to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial and occurred within the same judicial district as the former prosecution unless the court ordered a separate trial of the charge of such offense or the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted was a summary offense or a summary traffic offense[.]

18 Pa.C.S. § 110 (1)(ii) (emphasis added). The trial court cited this provision and the language providing that a subsequent prosecution is barred when the former prosecution "resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as defined in section 109 … and the subsequent prosecution is for: … (ii) any offense based on the same conduct

Compulsory joinder rules and Rule 600 serve similar purposes. Rule 600 has dual purposes: the protection of the defendant's speedy trial right and "the efficient administration of justice." Commonwealth v. Harth, 252 A.3d 600, 615 (Pa. 2021) (citing Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 297 A.2d 127, 133 (Pa. 1972) (referring to the Criminal Procedural Rules Committee the issue of the promulgation of a speedy trial rule setting a fixed time limit "in order to more effectively protect the right of criminal defendants to a speedy trial and also to help eliminate the backlog in criminal cases in the courts of Pennsylvania")); Commonwealth v. Dixon, 907 A.2d 468, 473 (Pa. 2006) (referring to Rule 600 as "a careful matrix protecting a defendant's rights to be free from prolonged pretrial incarceration and to a speedy trial, while maintaining the Commonwealth's ability to seek confinement of dangerous individuals and those posing a risk of flight, and to bring its cases in an orderly fashion[]"). These purposes likewise drive compulsory joinder principles. As the plurality recounted in Campana I, the same transaction test serves the defendant's rights and society's interest in efficient administration of justice. Campana I, 304 A.2d at 440-41 (citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). The test "not only enforces the ancient prohibition against vexatious multiple prosecutions embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause, but responds as well to the increasingly widespread recognition that the consolidation in one lawsuit of all issues arising out of a single transaction or occurrence best promotes justice, economy, and convenience." Ashe, 397 U.S. at 454 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Commonwealth v. Hude, 458 A.2d 177, 180 (Pa. 1983) (stating that Section 110 serves two policy considerations: to protect the accused from the harassment of successive trials to offenses stemming from the same criminal episode and "as a matter of judicial administration and economy, to assure finality without unduly burdening the judicial process by repetitious litigation"). Given that they share common purposes (the efficient administration of justice for the accused and society), the supporting principles of compulsory joinder are appropriate for an analysis of a Rule 600 challenge where two non-identical complaints are at issue.

After drawing attention to the common law roots of compulsory joinder, the trial court looked at additional precedent to address Womack's dual prosecutions. The trial court described Hude, 458 A.2d at 177, which it viewed as involving a "situation similar to what [Womack] claims occurred here[,]" i.e., that the Commonwealth sought to try Womack piecemeal for a series of drug deliveries. Trial Court Opinion, 4/21/2021, at 29.

In Hude, the defendant was tried piecemeal for twenty counts of possession with intent to deliver and one count of corruption of minors regarding marijuana based on incidents between October 1974 to January 1975. The Commonwealth brought Hude to trial on some of the charges, resulting in a not guilty verdict. Hude, 458 A.2d at 178. Subsequently, the Commonwealth brought Hude to trial ("second" trial), where he was convicted of seven of the remaining charges. Id. at 178-79. On appeal, Hude was granted a new "second" trial, and he subsequently filed a motion to bar the prosecution pursuant to Section 110. Addressing his claim, this Court described how Section 110, adopted by the General Assembly shortly after Campana I, essentially achieved the same result as the common law rule adopted in Campana I. Id. at 180. We recounted the two policy interests served by Section 110: to protect the accused from governmental harassment by being forced to undergo successive trials for a single criminal episode and to assure finality of justice without unduly burdening the system with repetitious litigation. Id. Applying the common law rule as codified in Section 110, this Court explained that the critical question before it was whether it was improper to try the alleged transactions separately given that they are a "single criminal episode." Id.

To determine whether there was a "single criminal episode" capturing the offenses, the Court looked to the "temporal sequence of events" and also to "the logical relationship between the acts[.]" Id. at 183. The Court characterized the single criminal episode test as follows:

[W]here a number of charges are logically and/or temporally related and share common issues of law and fact, a single criminal episode exists, and separate trials would involve substantial duplication and waste of scarce judicial resources. In such cases, failure to consolidate will bar successive prosecutions.

Id. The Hude Court determined that the successive prosecutions of Hude violated compulsory joinder principles. Id.

Attempting to consider together Earp, Simms, common law concepts of the "same criminal episode" and Hude, the trial court reasoned that if the instant charges have evidentiary bases that are both: "(1) independent of those that supported the [first] [c]ase; and (2) were not available to the Commonwealth at the time the [first complaint] was filed …, the start date for Rule 600 purposes is the date the complaint was filed in the [second] case[.]" Trial Court Opinion, 4/21/2022, at 32.¹²

12 After hearing argument regarding the Rule 600 motion, the trial court articulated the same two criteria. The trial court stated that it would look at the files to determine "whether these are the same matters[,]" i.e., whether they arise from the same criminal episode, and he was going to determine "what the Commonwealth knew and when did they know it." N.T., 3/7/2019, at 6.

The trial court reviewed each of the charges, comparing the evidence and applying the test. Id., Exhibit A. It concluded that none of the charges in the second complaint were part of the same criminal episode as those brought in the first complaint because they had an evidentiary basis independent from the charges in the first complaint. It also determined that the Commonwealth could not have brought the charges in the first complaint based on the information available to it.¹³ Id. at 34-35. Therefore, for Rule 600 purposes, the start date for the charges in the second complaint was the date of filing the second complaint. Id.¹⁴

13 At the bench trial, the trial court reached a not guilty verdict on the one charge which it later determined was subject to compulsory joinder. Trial Court Opinion, 4/21/2021, at 32. Although that charge would have hypothetically been subject to the earlier start date, the issue was mooted by the trial court's not guilty verdict.

14 Womack does not challenge the trial court's Rule 600 analysis of the computation of times following the filing of the second complaint. Trial Court Opinion, 4/21/2021, at 35-39. Significantly, Womack also has not challenged the trial court's charge-by-charge analysis of the evidentiary bases of the charges to determine whether they were part of the same criminal episode and whether the Commonwealth could have brought the charges when the first complaint was filed. He recognizes that the trial court's Rule 600 analysis involved determining what charges could have been brought in the first complaint. Womack's Brief at 25. Although the trial court applied the same analytical framework originally advocated by Womack, on appeal, he advances an entirely different analysis of the Rule 600 issue: "the Commonwealth does not get the benefit of a second complaint's filing date unless it exercised due diligence throughout the prosecution of the two complaints." Id. at 27. It appears that because the outcome of the analysis by the trial court did not inure to his benefit, on appeal to the Superior Court, Womack began advocating for application of the due diligence inquiry, stating that his previous position was not supported by the plain text of Rule 600. Womack's Superior Court Brief, at 48 n.13.

Based on the case law and principles from which the trial court's analysis was derived, after reaching the conclusion that the second set of charges were independent from the charges in the first complaint, the trial court's analysis of the charges for Rule 600 purposes should have ended. Earp, Simms and consideration of mandatory joinder requirements all make clear that charges based on an independent or separate criminal episode in a second complaint is the trigger for calculating the Rule 600 run date from the filing of the second complaint. By applying the second prong of its test (that the Commonwealth could not have brought these independent charges "based on the information available to it" when it filed the first complaint), the trial court conflated separate compulsory joinder considerations. See Trial Court Opinion 4/21/2021, at 32 (mistakenly suggesting that the test requires both criteria). Only when the charges in the second complaint are part of the same criminal episode charged in the first complaint is it necessary for an analysis of whether those charges were known to the Commonwealth at the time of the filing of the first complaint. If they were, the charges must be tried with the first set of charges and, in the Rule 600 context, the run date on those charges starts from the filing of the first complaint. Although the trial court did too much in its analysis of the charges, its conclusions, including that the charges in the second complaint were independent of the charges in the first complaint, are unchallenged.

The Majority Opinion ¹⁵ and Concurring Opinion ¹⁶ purport to rely on the trial court's reasoning. Yet, the Majority then disclaims the trial court's reasoning, and curiously adopts the Meadius test which it states applies in non-identical two-complaint scenarios to determine whether the Rule 600 period should start to run with the first or second complaint. Majority Op. at 15, 18. ¹⁷

15 Majority Op. at 16 & n.8 (stating that "our reliance on the trial court's analysis in this case rests not only on the fact that the trial court's opinion was indeed extremely thorough, but also on the standard of review being an abuse of discretion. As such, the trial court's determinations carry a degree of deference[]"). However, the Majority's response to this Concurring Opinion makes clear that it rejects the trial court's reasoning as well as its findings of fact. Id. at 1 (referring to both cases as arising out of the "same criminal episode"), 18-19 n.10 (stating that both cases "arose from the same underlying drug trafficking incident in a general sense" and arose "from the same conduct").

16 Concurring Op. at 13. The Concurrence applauds the trial court opinion as so well-reasoned and documented that "in this exceptional instance" it agrees with relying heavily upon the trial court's "meticulous, exemplary efforts." Concurring Op. at 13; see id. at 13 (stating that joinder is subject to the understanding that the Majority relied upon the trial court's efforts).

17 Although the Majority appears to determine that the second set of charges against Womack arose out of the same criminal episode as the first set of criminal charges, it does not explain the basis for this conclusion and does not expressly limit the application of the Meadius test to a scenario where the two sets of charges arise from the same criminal episode.

The Meadius test is found in the commentary to Rule 600 regarding the refiling of complaints. According to the relevant Comment,

in cases in which the Commonwealth files a criminal complaint, withdraws that complaint, and files a second complaint, the Commonwealth will be afforded the benefit of the date of the filing of the second complaint for purposes of calculating the time for trial when the withdrawal and re-filing of charges are necessitated by factors beyond its control, the Commonwealth has exercised due diligence, and the refiling is not an attempt to circumvent the time limitation of Rule 600.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, cmt. (citing Meadius, 870 A.2d at 802) (emphasis added). The Majority concludes that it should apply the Meadius test here for no other reason than that "it seeks to reach a balance between the twin aims of Rule 600." Id. at 15. It does so without regard for the fact that this case does not involve the filing and refiling of identical charges and without explaining why any other test would be necessary once it is determined that the charges in the second complaint were independent of the charges in the first complaint. Id. at 16.

It seems obvious that in a non-identical complaint scenario, the Meadius test would only apply if the first and second set of charges were part of the same criminal transaction and if the evidence of the additional charges was available to the prosecution at the time it filed the first set of charges. Stated simply, if the Commonwealth did not need to or could not have brought the charges in the second complaint at the time of filing the first complaint, there is no conceivable basis to have the run date for the second complaint relate back to the filing of the first complaint. By contrast, where the Commonwealth brings a second set of charges that are identical to, or arising out of the same criminal transaction as the first and it knew of the charges at the time of the first filing, then the question of the Commonwealth's exercise of due diligence as articulated in Meadius and the comment to Rule 600, come into play.

Based on the Majority's approach, all two-complaint scenarios are reviewed under the Meadius test. A trial court must conduct an assessment of the irrelevant question of whether the subsequent filing of charges based on a separate criminal episode was necessitated by factors beyond the Commonwealth's control. Moreover, it must determine whether the Commonwealth diligently conducted its investigation into such unrelated charges filed in a subsequent non-identical complaint against a defendant.¹⁸Majority Op. at 15 (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, cmt.). Rule 600 instructs courts to consider whether the Commonwealth brought the defendant to trial within 365 days of filing the complaint, Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 (A)(2), and in making that determination, courts include any periods of delay "caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence[,]" Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 (C)(1). Rule 600's due diligence inquiry is not focused on investigative efforts but instead on efforts in prosecuting the defendant after the filing of the complaint. See Commonwealth v. Barbour, 189 A.3d 944, 947 (Pa. 2018) ("By the terms of Rule 600, the Commonwealth must bring the defendant to trial within 365 days from the date upon which a written complaint is filed."); Commonwealth v. Bryant, 574 A.2d 590, 594-95 (Pa. 1990) (rejecting argument that the Rule 1100 clock started with initiation of pre-complaint disciplinary proceedings). The Majority's determination that the due diligence inquiry commences prior to the filing of the second complaint and focuses on the investigative efforts in this scenario threatens principles of separation of powers. See Majority Op. at 15-16 (inquiring into the Commonwealth's due diligence in investigating Womack prior to filing the second complaint).

18 Historically, claims of unlawful pre-arrest and pre-indictment delay are brought as Due Process violations or violations of the statute of limitations, not under Rule 600 which focuses on delay after the complaint is filed. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Louden, 803 A.2d 1181, 1184 (Pa. 2002) (stating that the primary protection against prosecution of "stale" crimes is the statutory period, and the secondary protection is in the requirements of due process).

Rule 600 provides a "concrete standard" to prevent "'undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.'" Commonwealth v. Barbour, 189 A.3d 944, 954 (Pa. 2018) (quoting United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966)). Rule 600 is a recognition that once a complaint has been filed, looming charges and pretrial incarceration jeopardize employment, reputation, and stability. Id. at 954-55. Therefore, Rule 600(A)(2)(a) provides that "[t]rial shall commence … within 365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed." Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). As explicitly provided in the Rule, the protections of Rule 600 commence with the filing of "the complaint[.]" Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Rule 600 clock begins to run with the filing of the relevant complaint, not with the commencement of separate unrelated proceedings in another case against the defendant and not with the conduct of an investigation before the second complaint is filed. Rule 600 is not a tool to question the Commonwealth's conduct of its pre-complaint investigations.

This Court granted review to consider how Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 applies to a two-complaint scenario where the complaints are not identical. Rather than provide a clear framework to cabin such an analysis, the Majority adopts an unwieldy approach that subjects pre-complaint investigations to due diligence inquiries. I believe that before addressing and applying the Meadius test, a trial court faced with non-identical complaints must decide whether the second charges were part of the same criminal episode as charged in the first complaint. The trial court here made that assessment and concluded that the second set of charges was independent from the first, and no one has challenged that conclusion. Because the charges under review were independent from the first set of charges, the mandatory speedy trial period for the second complaint commenced on the date of the filing of the second set of charges. That should be the end of our analysis.

For the foregoing reasons, I only concur in the result reached by the Majority.

CONCURRING OPINION

WECHT JUSTICE

In 2016, the Pennsylvania State Police ("PSP") commenced an investigation into a statewide trafficking operation that was funneling drugs into Huntingdon County. On October 6, 2017, following extensive surveillance, the use of confidential informants, and a number of controlled purchases, the PSP charged Marcus Womack with a litany of drug and firearm offenses arising from his participation in the drug operation. The Huntingdon County District Attorney ("the DA") commenced prosecution on the first set of charges. Meanwhile, the PSP continued to investigate, and soon discovered that the operation was much larger than the PSP originally had believed.

After the PSP amassed more evidence against Womack (and others), the Office of the Attorney General ("the OAG") took over the case and presented the new evidence to an investigating grand jury. On October 23, 2018, the grand jury returned a presentment detailing Womack's participation in drug trafficking. Following the presentment, the PSP filed a second criminal complaint against Womack. After a preliminary hearing on the second complaint, the OAG charged Womack by criminal information with twenty-eight offenses, some of which overlapped in both date and substance with some of the charges filed in the first case.

Meanwhile, in view of the OAG's developing work on the second case, the DA repeatedly delayed Womack's first proceeding. As a result, Womack filed a Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 speedy trial motion. Finding that the DA failed to act with due diligence, the trial court granted the motion, and dismissed the first case in its entirety. Womack also filed a Rule 600 motion in the second case. He argued that, due to the similarities in dates and substance, the second case was no more than an extension of the first case, and should be evaluated using the same initial filing date-October 6, 2017-for Rule 600 purposes. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. In the meantime, the OAG amended the information in the second case, adjusting the dates and reducing the number of charges from twenty-eight to thirteen.

After a number of other procedural events, and some further delay related to the 2020 pandemic, Womack renewed his Rule 600 motion, arguing once again that the two cases should be treated as one for Rule 600 purposes. The trial court denied the motion. Following a non-jury trial, Womack was convicted of nine of the charges and sentenced to a lengthy term of incarceration.

We granted allowance of appeal in order to determine how and when Rule 600's time provisions begin to tally against the Commonwealth in this dual-complaint case. We first confronted the interplay between our speedy trial rule and multiple criminal complaints in Commonwealth v. Earp.¹ In that case, the appellant was arrested and charged with murder, conspiracy, and a litany of other crimes. At the appellant's preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case on the murder and conspiracy charges, and those counts were dismissed. However, the other charges were held for trial. While Earp was still incarcerated on that first set of charges, the police re-arrested him and re-charged him with the murder and conspiracy charges.²

1 382 A.2d 1215 (Pa. 1978) (plurality).

2 Id. at 1216-17.

The appellant filed a Rule 600 (then designated as Rule 1100) motion. The trial court granted the motion as to the charges that remained from the initial complaint, but not as to the murder and conspiracy charges. The court explained that the murder and conspiracy charges were measured for speedy trial purposes from the date that those charges were re-filed, not from the date when they initially were filed (and then dismissed). The appellant proceeded to trial, was convicted of both charges, and was sentenced to life in prison.³

3 Id. at 1217.

On allowance of appeal, a plurality of this Court vacated the appellant's judgment of sentence. The plurality noted that speedy trial calculations begin when criminal proceedings are initiated,⁴ and, just as importantly, that the compulsory joinder rule in place at the time⁵ required that all offenses arising from the same incident be filed in the same complaint. Thus, taken together, the two rules required a speedy trial time calculation to begin "to run on all charges arising out of a criminal transaction upon the initiation of criminal proceedings charging the defendant with any offense arising out of that transaction." ⁶

4 Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 372 A.2d 826, 829 (Pa. 1977) (deeming it "clear" that our speedy trial rule "contemplates the commencement of the running of the mandatory period at the point criminal proceedings are initiated")).

5 In 1978, Pa.R.Crim.P. 131(b) stated that, "[w]hen more than one offense is alleged to have been committed by one person arising out of the same incident, the issuing authority shall accept only one complaint, and shall docket the matter as a single case." Presently, compulsory joinder is governed generally by 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 109-11.

6 Earp, 382 A.2d at 1217.

The plurality recognized that there are some exceptions to this strict rule, such as delays that can be attributed to the defendant or delays that occur despite the Commonwealth's exercise of due diligence at all relevant times.⁷However, no exception exists for the circumstance in which some charges in a complaint are dismissed and are then re-filed in a separate, subsequent complaint. To afford the Commonwealth the benefit of the later date, the plurality held, "would allow the Commonwealth to grant itself in cases such as this an extension of the time for trial, without in any way reducing the burdens of the accused or the public."⁸ "The accused . . . remains incarcerated for long periods, subject to pretrial suspicion and uncertainty. Society must also wait for extended periods of time, postponing the orderly enforcement of the law, and jeopardizing the continued availability of valuable evidence."⁹ The plurality emphasized that these avoidable consequences would be inconsistent with the purposes underlying the speedy trial rule.

7 Id. at 1217-18.

8 Id. at 1218.

9 Id.

This Court returned to the dual-complaint scenario seven years later in Commonwealth v. Simms ¹⁰In Simms, the appellant was charged by criminal complaint with aggravated assault after he stabbed and then burned his live-in girlfriend.¹¹ The victim died approximately six weeks later, and, as a result, the appellant was charged in a second complaint with first-degree murder. The question in the case was whether the first or second complaint served as the starting point for a Rule 600 calculation. If the clock began to run with the filing of the first complaint, then too much time had elapsed and the murder case had to be dismissed. If it began with the latter complaint, then the prosecution was timely. This Court held that the second of these two outcomes was the correct one.

10 500 A.2d 801 (Pa. 1985).

11 Id. at 802.

We cautioned against the abuses of Rule 600 that might occur if the Commonwealth is unrestrained in its ability to file multiple, or successive criminal complaints. "The keystone of judicial decisions applying [the rule] has been a recognition that an abuse of the spirit of that Rule would occur if the Commonwealth were permitted to delay trials by simply, at will, withdrawing or dismissing complaints and filing new ones, thereby beginning anew the [time] period for commencement of trial." ¹² In light of this concern, the Simms Court noted, our precedents had permitted a subsequent complaint to restart the Rule 600 clock only in limited circumstances, ¹³ such as when "(1) the earlier complaint was properly dismissed by a competent magisterial or judicial authority, and (2) [when] the record does not reveal evidence of a prosecution attempt to circumvent" the rule.¹⁴

12 Id. at 803.

13 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Horner, 442 A.2d 682 (Pa. 1982); Commonwealth v. Genovese, 425 A.2d 367 (Pa. 1981)).

14 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Ardolino, 450 A.2d 674, 677-79 (Pa. Super. 1982)).

The record in Simms did not indicate if, or how, the aggravated assault complaint was resolved. The Commonwealth asserted only that the complaint alleging that crime was moot. The appellant insisted that this meant that the first element of the test could not be met. We disagreed, emphasizing that the circumstances of the case deviated from cases in which the same charges were re-filed after some error or lack of diligence by the Commonwealth. In those latter scenarios, this Court acknowledged the potential that the second complaint was filed as an attempt to evade Rule 600's time constraints. In Simms, however, such evasion was not possible, because the murder charge was an entirely different count that could not have been filed at the time of the initial complaint. Thus, we held, the first element of the test was immaterial because the appellant could not establish the second one.¹⁵

15 Id.

We distinguished the case from our earlier decision in Earp, which, we remarked, had by that time been limited to its facts.¹⁶ Unlike Earp, Simms was not a case in which a charge that could have been filed earlier was withheld from the initial complaint. Unlike in Earp, where the murder and conspiracy charges were available from the outset, in Simms, there were no compulsory joinder problems because the victim had not yet died at the time of the first filing. The murder charge could not have been filed at the time that the initial complaint was filed.¹⁷

16 Id. at 804 (citing Horner, 442 A.2d at 685 n.9; Genovese, 425 A.2d at 370 n.11; Commonwealth v. Johnson, 409 A.2d 308, 311 n.3 (Pa. 1979)).

17 Id.

Rule 600, we stressed, was not designed to insulate defendants from good faith prosecutions that are delayed due to circumstances beyond the control of the Commonwealth. Thus, when a person is charged with aggravated assault and the victim later dies, that defendant is not entitled to escape prosecution on the murder charge, absent some bad faith or lack of diligence on the part of the Commonwealth. We held that "common sense dictates" that the subsequent filing of murder charges that arose since the initial filing cannot be considered an attempt to evade the rule.¹⁸ To decide otherwise would require the Commonwealth to adhere to one initial filing date, even as to crimes that have not yet been committed or completed.

18 Id.

We acknowledged that allowing multiple complaints might result in a defendant spending a significant period of time in jail before trial, perhaps even exceeding the time allowed by the rule. However, Rule 600 requires "a balancing of certain interests, such interests being the protection of the accused's speedy trial rights and the protection of society."¹⁹ That balance tips in the Commonwealth's favor when a second or subsequent complaint is based upon a crime that was not completed or committed at the time that the initial complaint was filed.

19 Id.

Prior to today's case, our most recent decision involving a dual-complaint scenario was Commonwealth v. Meadius.²⁰ In that case, the appellant's preliminary hearing was scheduled three times. On the first listed hearing date, the prosecuting attorney was unavailable. At the second listing, an essential Commonwealth witness was absent, and the case was again postponed. At the third, and final, listing, the Commonwealth again could not proceed because critical witnesses had failed to appear.²¹ The magisterial district judge denied the Commonwealth's request for another postponement and threatened to dismiss the complaint. The Commonwealth elected instead to withdraw the charges.²²

20 870 A.2d 802 (Pa. 2005).

21 Id. at 803.

22 Id.

The prosecutor dispatched the lead detective to locate the absent witnesses and determine their availability at future hearings. Those witnesses indicated to the detective that they would appear for all such hearings. Upon such assurances, the Commonwealth re-filed the charges, and all of the necessary witnesses appeared at the subsequent preliminary hearing. The appellant waived that hearing, and the charges were held for trial.²³

23 Id.

The appellant then filed a Rule 600 motion, which the trial court granted, finding that the filing of the first complaint triggered the commencement of Rule 600's time period, and concluding that the Commonwealth had failed to act with due diligence. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed. Upon further review, this Court agreed with the trial court.

We explained that, while Rule 600 "embrace[s] a fairly straightforward standard" for adjudicating single-complaint speedy trial claims, the rule says nothing about how to assess cases "where identical charges have been filed on two occasions."²⁴ The determination of the time at which the Rule 600 clock starts in dual-complaint scenarios has proved vexing for courts. This is so particularly because courts must be mindful of the Rule's purpose, the Commonwealth's duty of due diligence, and the risk that successive complaints could be used as a means to evade the consequences of violating the Rule's time limit. We noted that, in Simms, this Court advanced a two-part test with these considerations in mind.²⁵This test, along with the text of the Rule itself, bifurcated dual-complaint scenarios into two categories. The first arises when the circumstances necessitating the second filing are beyond the control of the Commonwealth.²⁶ In such circumstances, the Commonwealth is entitled to the benefit of the later filing date. The second arises when the Commonwealth acts with the intent to evade Rule 600. When that occurs, the clock starts to tick on the initial filing date.²⁷ Thus, the question for the Medius Court turned on the question of whether the lack of due diligence fell into the former or the latter category. We held that the failure to act with due diligence should be treated no differently than acting with an evasive intent.²⁸ "Indeed, a contrary result would undermine the rule's own facial requirements directed to prosecutorial diligence, as well its objectives, which include advancing society's interests in seeing those accused of crime prosecuted in a timely manner, as well as ensuring the efficient management of criminal cases as a means of avoiding substantial backlogs."²⁹ Because the Commonwealth failed to act with due diligence, we concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion in using the date of the filing of the first complaint for Rule 600 purposes.

24 Id. at 805.

25 Id. at 806.

26 Id. at 807-08 (citations omitted).

27 Id. at 808.

28 Id.

29 Id. (citations omitted).

While the text of Rule 600 does not speak to the dual-complaint scenario, the comment to the Rule offers the following:

In cases in which the Commonwealth files a criminal complaint, withdraws that complaint, and files a second complaint, the Commonwealth will be afforded the benefit of the date of the filing of the second complaint for purposes of calculating the time for trial when the withdrawal and re-filing of charges are necessitated by factors beyond its control, the Commonwealth has exercised due diligence, and the refiling is not an attempt to circumvent the time limitation of Rule 600.³⁰

30 Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, cmt.

In this case, the Commonwealth did not formally withdraw its initial complaint against Womack. The Majority nonetheless correctly extends the applicability of the

Rule's comment to the circumstances of the case at bar.³¹ It does not matter if the initial complaint was withdrawn or dismissed for lack of diligence or of evidence. The resulting analysis is the same. Thus, I agree with the Majority that, although the Commonwealth's prosecution of the first complaint lacked any semblance of diligence, there is no reason to believe that the second complaint was "precipitated by its lack of diligence in prosecuting the first complaint."³² To the contrary, at least with regard to the second complaint, the Commonwealth appears to have acted with due diligence at all times. The second complaint was the result of the PSP's discovery that the drug operation was much larger than originally believed, and that further investigation was necessary. Much of the evidence underlying the charges in the second complaint was not even discovered until after the first complaint was filed. There is no evidence here to suggest that the second complaint, as a whole, was an attempt by the Commonwealth to circumvent or manipulate Rule 600.³³

31 Maj. Op. at 15.

32 Id.

33 See Maj. Op. at 14-16.

The Majority concludes that the charges in the second complaint "were not, and could not have been, included in the Commonwealth's initial complaint." ³⁴I read this statement as the Majority's (correct) acknowledgment that second or successive complaints subjected to review under the Meadius test should not be treated as either failing or succeeding on a blanket basis. Even a complaint, such as the one under review here, that facially does not appear to be an attempt to evade Rule 600 still must be evaluated on a charge-by-charge basis. That is because the Commonwealth is entitled to the benefit of the second filing date only for charges that could not have been filed in the first complaint. I do not read the Majority's decision as contrary to this understanding.

34 Id. at 16 (citing Trial Ct. Op., 4/21/2021, at 32-35).

The second complaint in this case presents a new twist on the traditional dual-complaint scenario. This complaint was neither an amendment to the initial complaint nor an attempt to re-file the same or similar complaint after the first had been dismissed for a lack of evidence, witnesses, or prosecutorial diligence. It was instead a successive complaint born in good faith out of an ongoing investigation.

This type of complaint is in no way immune from our deep-seated concern that successive complaints might be used to evade the strictures of Rule 600. The potential for abuse is the same-if not even higher-in this context. A prosecutor can use a second complaint to revive individual charges just as easily as that prosecutor can do so to revive an entire complaint. Ongoing investigations naturally will have some overlap in facts and evidence. Those investigations often lead to new charges disconnected entirely from those investigated initially. At times, new or additional evidence concerning a crime that the police knew about, but could not prove, does not arise until later in the investigation. Courts must be vigilant in ensuring that the charges in a later complaint are predicated upon the new and previously unavailable evidence. A second complaint cannot include charges predicated upon previously known or available evidence that could have been brought in the earlier, dismissed complaint. To allow such charges would engender the very abuse against which our precedents have steadfastly guarded.

Nothing in our precedents requires a complaint to be treated as a whole. Rule 600 does not require consideration of complaints on an all or nothing basis. With regard to dismissal, the Rule does not use the word "complaint" or "case" or "information" or "indictment," as one would expect if the Rule intended the charging document to be treated as a whole. Instead, in its remedy section, the Rule provides that a defendant can ask to have "the charges" dismissed with prejudice.³⁵This necessarily means that, in a dual-complaint case, a court can dismiss all of the charges, or it can dismiss some of the charges -those that could have been brought in the earlier complaint-but not others-those that were entirely independent from the first complaint.

35 See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(D)(1).

The Majority does not engage independently in the close, record-based inspection of the charges that is required in a case like this. The Majority instead appears to rely entirely upon the trial court's own comparative analysis. Initially, this gave me pause, because adopting a lower court's analysis is not a typical protocol for this Court. However, in this case, such adoption is warranted. In seventy paragraphs, and with two charts, the trial court painstakingly outlined the facts and procedural history of this case.³⁶ The court then discussed each of the charges asserted in the second complaint.³⁷ The court found that either the police did not know about the nature and extent of the crimes before filing the first complaint, or the evidence necessary to prove such crimes did not become available until after the first complaint was filed.

36 See Trial Ct. Op., 4/21/2021, at 32-35.

37 Id. at 32-34. Notably, the court found that the receiving stolen property count should not have been brought in the second complaint, as it was based upon evidence known to the PSP at the time the first complaint was filed. However, Womack was acquitted of that count, so the court deemed any issues related to that count to be moot. Id. at 32.

The trial court did not stop there. The court also created "Exhibit A." Attached to the end of the trial court's opinion, "Exhibit A" is a detailed chart in which that court listed each charge, provided the statutory citation for each charge, identified the count numbers for each of the charges, ascertained whether there was an independent basis for the charge, queried whether it "could have been brought based upon information available on 10/06/2017," asked whether the particular count presented a joinder issue and, if so, stated the outcome of that joinder analysis.³⁸The court's conclusions are well-reasoned and supported by my review of the record. Any independent analysis by this Court could, in my view, offer little more than a recreation of the trial court's fine work in this chart. Such a duplicative effort is not necessary here. Accordingly, in this exceptional instance, I agree with the Majority's decision to rely so heavily upon the trial court's meticulous, exemplary efforts.

38 See Trial Ct. Op., 4/21/2021, Exh. A.

Subject to my understandings set forth above, I join the Majority Opinion.

or arising from the same criminal episode, if such offense was known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial and occurred within the same judicial district as the former prosecution…[.]" Trial Court Opinion, 4/21/2021, at 27 (citing 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 (emphasis in Trial Court Opinion)). In articulating its analysis of the charges in the first and second complaints in this case, the trial court referred to charges in the second complaint that were "independent of" the first set of charges. Id. at 32. I read this to capture the principle envisioned by Campana I, that the charges were not part of the same criminal episode because they arose from a different "set of operative facts." Campana I, 304 A.2d at 440. Though the trial court's test does not utilize these precise words, it is the logical reading of the trial court's analysis given its reliance on Earp, Section 110, compulsory joinder precedent, and its statements at the Rule 600 hearing. Regarding Campana I, this Court subsequently filed a per curiam addendum opinion, on remand from the United States Supreme Court, characterizing the judgments in Campana I "as state law determinations pursuant to our supervisory powers." Commonwealth v. Campana, 314 A.2d 854, 856 (Pa. 1974) ("Campana II"). The Court stated that the result was in harmony with Section 110 of the Crimes Code which had become effective in 1973 to bar prosecutions for offenses based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode. Id. (citing 18 Pa.C.S. § 110).