Opinion
630 WDA 2021 J-A29043-22
02-15-2023
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. MARSHAWN TYLIQUE WILLIAMS Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 23, 2021, in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0001920-2020.
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.
MEMORANDUM
KUNSELMAN, J.:
Marshawn Tylique Williams appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his convictions of second-degree murder, robbery, conspiracy, and flight to avoid apprehension.
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(b), 3701(a)(1), 903, and 5126(a), respectively.
Williams' convictions arose from his activities on January 19, 2020, when Williams conspired with co-defendant, Jakwaris Robison and co-conspirators, Melissa Seaman and Michael Toles, to arrange and consummate a drug transaction with, and robbery of, Devin Way outside Way's residence in Erie. During the robbery, Way was shot and killed.
The trial court detailed the pertinent facts and trial testimony regarding the shooting incident as follows:
Earlier on January 19, 2020, Seaman, Toles, and Robison were riding as passengers in a grey, four-door Honda operated by [Williams]. While the group was driving around, Seaman messaged various third parties on her cell phone in an attempt to "see if anyone ha[d] any drugs or money that would be a possible lick." (In their vernacular, a lick is a robbery victim). After a potential target, Cohen Heath, failed to respond, Seaman continued to reach out to others on her cell phone until she successfully made contact with [Devin Way]. Way agreed to sell two (2) ounces of marijuana in exchange for $400.00.
The four co-conspirators proceeded to the Dollar Tree store located in the Liberty Plaza. [Williams], co-defendant Robison, and Toles exited the vehicle to obtain items from the store, some or all of which were not paid for. Co-defendant Robison's main purpose in going to the store was to obtain gloves to eliminate the possibility of fingerprints being left behind "in case things went bad." Before the three-some returned to the car, Toles heard Robison and [Williams] discuss harming Seaman "if things went bad" to prevent Seaman from saying something.
Meantime, while Seaman waited inside the car, for the three of them to return, she obtained from Way his address. When the three males returned to the car, Seaman announced "she felt like [Way] was going to be an easy person to get at."
Toles described the foursome's plan to rob Way:
That I was going to be in the back seat and Robison would still be in the back seat and [Seaman] would get in the [front] passenger seat. And our plan was to get out of the car and let [Way] in the middle and was going to produce a gun and tell Way to get out.
With [Williams] behind the wheel, the four proceeded to Way's residence. Way exited his home and approached the Honda. As planned, Robison exited the back seat and instructed Way to get in the middle, next to Toles. Way refused to get in the middle, so Robison re-entered the back seat, took the middle position, and Way got in the car after him. Way closed the door and [Williams] drove off.
Way directed [Williams] to turn from Southgate Drive unto Usonia Avenue. Way produced and passed around for "inspection" the marijuana for sale. However, as testified to by Seaman, no one in the vehicle actually had money on them to make the
purchase. The sham inspection continued, with Seaman passing the marijuana to [Williams] who stated he "was good" with the marijuana.
Following a brief period of awkward silence, the drug transaction morphed into the planned robbery of Way. According to the testimony of co-conspirator Toles, Toles pulled out a gun, reached around Robison, pointed the gun at Way, and instructed Way to get out of the car. Way refused and grabbed the gun. A struggle ensued between Toles and Way for the gun. [Williams], from the driver's seat, called out for Robison to assist Toles.
In response, Robison squeezed out from between Way and Toles and exited the car though the driver's side rear door. Robison ran to the other side of the car to the rear passenger door, opened the door, raised his gun and started shooting at Way.
Toles testified Robison fired the gun four (4) to six (6) times in quick succession. According to Toles, Way was shot in the back. Seaman testified she heard approximately (4) gunshots; she heard Toles yell that, he was shot, too; and when she turned around, she saw blood on Toles' leg. Seaman testified she did not see or hear from Way again.
Toles, from his position behind [Williams], observed Way turn toward Robison, and that Robison continued to shoot. It is apparent from Toles' testimony that after Robison stopped firing, either Way fell out of the vehicle through the rear passenger door where Robison was standing, or Robison pulled Way out of the car. Regardless, Toles heard Way scream during the process. Way landed on the ground, face done in the snow. Robison jumped back into the car through the door from which Way fell.Trial Court Opinion, 12/13/21, at 2-4 (citations to record omitted).
The trial court also summarized the events that occurred after the shooting, as well as the eventual apprehension of Williams and Robison:
With [Williams] behind the wheel, the four attempted to drive away. [Williams] stopped the vehicle briefly, and switched seats with Seaman so she could drive. Seaman, in a panic, drove the Honda into a snowbank where it became temporarily stuck.
At this juncture, [Williams] and Robison exited the car and started to run away.
Toles called out for Robison to return and get Robison's gun. Robison complied and Toles handed him Toles' gun as well. [Williams] and Robison then ran off again in the snow through someone's back yard.
Seaman managed to get the car unstuck and drove back past the shooting scene. Seaman, with Toles bleeding in the back seat, drove to a nearby Taco Bell on Peach Street where the Honda was pulled over by the police.
[Williams] and co-defendant Robison left the Erie area and each was missing for quite some time.
With regard to [Williams], the evening of the shooting a warrant was issued for his arrest. Wanted billboards were posted by the U.S. Marshall's Fugitive Task Force in Cleveland, Buffalo, and surrounding areas. In July of 2020, approximately seven (7) months after Way's murder, the police located [Williams] at a friend's residence in the 400 block of East 22nd Street in the City of Erie. [Williams] attempted to remain hidden inside the residence but eventually surrendered to the police.
***
On January 24, 2021, Robison was apprehended in Pittsburgh, where he no longer was wearing the beard he had at the time of the murder.Trial Court Opinion, 12/13/21, at 3-5 (citations to record omitted).
Following a five-day jury trial, Williams was convicted of the above-enumerated offenses. On April 23, 2021, the trial court sentenced Williams to life without parole followed by an aggregate term of 13½ to 27 years of imprisonment. On May 3, 2021, Williams filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied. Williams' trial counsel filed a timely notice of appeal, as well as a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Williams' Rule 1925(b) statement raised the following two claims:
The jury convicted Robison of the same charges. His appeal is pending before this Court at No. 741 WDA 2021.
1. That the evidence produced at trial by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was insufficient to support convictions in this matter with Second Degree Murder[,] Conspiracy, Flight to Avoid Apprehension, and Robbery[.]
2. The Court allowed the introduction of evidence of text/telephonic messages between a co-Defendant and an unknown subject pertaining to unrelated matters from the night prior to this offense date whose prejudicial value far outweighed any probative value, thereby prejudicing the jury as to the intent and guilt of [Williams].
Rule 1925(b) Statement, 5/24/21, at 1. The trial court filed it Rule 1925(a) opinion on December 13, 2021.
Williams raises the following two issues:
Did the Commonwealth present sufficient evidence to sustain [Williams'] conviction for the charges of homicide/murder of the second degree or conspiracy to commit robbery/robbery?
Did the trial court err in permitting the Commonwealth to present text messages between the co-defendants, when the messages were not relevant to the offense and their prejudicial value far surpassed any probative value?
Williams' Brief at 2 (footnote and excess capitalization omitted).
Regarding Williams' second issue, it was never established at trial that he was the recipient of the text messages Robison sent the day before the shooting incident.
Williams' first issue challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting three of his convictions. Our standard of review is well settled:
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, giving it the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000). "Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Lynch, 72 A.3d 706, 708 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). Any doubt about the defendant's guilt is to be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances. See Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 782 A.2d 574, 582 (Pa. Super. 2001). Additionally, the Commonwealth may sustain its burden solely by means of circumstantial evidence. Lynch, 72 A.3d at 708.Commonwealth v. Lake, 281 A.3d 341, 345-46 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation formatting altered).
Williams' second issue challenges the admissibility of evidence. Our standard of review for such a challenge is also well settled:
Appellate courts typically examine a trial court's decision concerning the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous. Typically, all relevant evidence, i.e., evidence which tends to make the existence or non-existence of a material fact more or less probable, is admissible, subject to the prejudice/probative value weighing which attends all decisions upon admissibility. See Pa.R.E. 401; Pa.R.E. 402[.]Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 136-37 (Pa. 2007).
In his Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial judge, the Honorable Daniel J. Brabender, Jr., first noted that Williams' statement of the errors complained of on appeal was too vague and should be considered waived. According to Judge Brabender, Williams' Rule 1925(b) statement was "woefully inadequate" in that it failed "to specify which element or elements of any of the crimes" that "the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Trial Court Opinion, 12/13/21, at 7-9. Regarding the second claim in his Rule 1925 statement, Judge Brabender concluded that Williams "broadly avers evidentiary error occurred in admitting evidence" of "unspecified text messages." Id. at 15.
Nonetheless, Judge Brabender authored a thorough and well-reasoned opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a) which addressed the issues raised by Williams in his Rule 1925(b) statement and found them to be without merit. We discern no legal errors in Judge Brabender's analysis.
As such, we adopt Judge Brabender's Rule 1925(a) opinion as our own in affirming Williams' judgment of sentence. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/13/21, at 9-15 (explaining that, when properly viewed, the Commonwealth proved each crime beyond a reasonable doubt); at 16-20 (concluding that no error occurred in admitting text messages co-defendant Robison made to an unknown party; the text did not directly implicate Williams, but if any error occurred it was harmless).
The parties are directed to attach Judge Brabender's December 13, 2021, opinion to this memorandum in any future appeal.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF ERIE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
v.
MARSHAWN TYLIQUE WILLIAMS
CRIMINAL DIVISION NO. 1920-2020
OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Appellant's Notice of Appeal filed May 24, 2021 from the judgments of sentence imposed April 23, 2021. For the reasons set forth below, the judgments of sentence should be affirmed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On March 8, 2021, following a five-day trial by jury, Appellant, Marshawn Tylique Williams, was convicted of Count One - Homicide/Murder of the Second Degree, Count Two -Conspiracy to Commit Robbery/Robbery, Count Three - Flight to Avoid Apprehension, Trial or Punishment, and Count Four - Robbery. Appellant was tried with co-defendant, Jakwaris Robison, who was convicted of the same offenses. Co-defendant Robison's appeal is pending before the Superior Court of Pennsylvania at 741 WD A 2021.
18Pa.C.S.A. §§2502(b), 903/370 l(a)(1)(i), 5126(a) and3701 (a)(1)(i), respectively.
See Commonwealth v. Jakwaris Robison, Erie County Docket No. 716-2020, where on March 8, 2021, co-defendant Robison was convicted as follows: Count One - Homicide/Murder of the Second Degree, Count Three -Conspiracy to Commit Robbery/Robbery, Count Nine - Robbery, and Count Thirteen - Flight to Avoid Apprehension, Trial or Punishment, at 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§2502(b), 903/3701 (a)(1)(ii), 3701(a)(1)(ii) and 5126(a), respectively.
During trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of approximately nineteen (19) witnesses, and introduced into evidence approximately 140 exhibits, many having multiple subparts. Among the Commonwealth's witnesses were Appellant's and co-defendant Robison's additional co-conspirators, Melissa Ann Seaman and Michael J. Toles, Neither Appellant nor co-defendant Robison testified, nor did they present any witnesses. No exhibits were introduced on behalf of Appellant. Co-defendant Robison offered four (4) exhibits intro the record. See Tr. Day Two, pp. 197-198, Tr. Day Four, pp. 191-192.
The convictions arose from Appellant's activities on January 19, 2020 in conspiring with co-defendant Robison and co-conspirators Seaman and Toles to arrange and consummate a drug transaction with, and robbery of, Devin Way outside Way's residence at 318 Southgate Drive in the City of Erie, Pennsylvania. During the robbery, Way was shot and killed.
The relevant facts are summarized as follows, Earlier on January 19, 2020, Seaman, Toles, and Robison were riding as passengers in a grey, four-door Honda operated by Appellant. While the group was driving around, Seaman messaged various third parties on her cell phone in an attempt to "see if anyone ha[d] any drugs or money that would be a possible lick." Transcript of Proceedings, March 3, 2021, Day 2 (Tr. Day 2), p. 62. (In their vernacular, a lick is a robbery victim. Tr. Day 2, pp. 62-63.) After a potential target, Cohen Heath, failed to respond, Seaman continued to reach out to others on her cell phone until she successfully made contact with Way. Way agreed to sell two (2) ounces of marijuana in exchange for $400.00. Tr. Day 2, pp. 64-65.
The four co-conspirators proceeded to the Dollar Tree store located in the Liberty Plaza. Appellant, co-defendant Robison, and Toles exited the vehicle to obtain items from the store, some or all of which were not paid for. Co-defendant Robison's main purpose in going to the store was to obtain gloves to eliminate the possibility of fingerprints being left behind "in case things went bad." Transcript of Proceedings, March 4, 2021, Day 3 (Tr. Day 3), p. 93. Before the three-some returned to the car, Toles heard Robison and Appellant discuss harming Seaman "if things went bad" to prevent Seaman from saying something. Tr. Day 3, pp. 91-92.
Meantime, while Seaman waited inside the car for the three to return, she obtained from Way his address. Tr. Day 2, p. 66. When the three males returned to the car, Seaman announced "she felt like [Way] was going to be an easy person to get at." Tr. Day 3, pp. 93-94.
Toles described the foursome's plan to rob Way:
That I was going to be in the back seat and Robison would still be in the back seat and Melissa would get in the [front] passenger seat. And our plan was to get out of the car and let Devin Way in the middle and we was going to produce a gun and tell Way to get out.Tr. Day 3, p. 95.
With Appellant behind the wheel, the four proceeded to Way's residence. Way exited his home and approached the Honda. As planned, Robison exited the back seat and instructed Way to get in the middle, next to Toles. Way refused to get in the middle, so Robison re-entered the back seat, took the middle position, and Way got in the car after him. Way closed the car door and Appellant drove off.
Way directed Appellant to turn from Southgate Drive onto Usonia Avenue. Way produced and passed around for "inspection" the marijuana for sale. However, as testified to by Seaman, no one in the vehicle actually had money on them to make the purchase. The sham inspection continued, with Seaman passing the marijuana to Appellant who stated he "was good" with the marijuana. Tr. Day 2, p. 78.
Following a brief period of awkward silence, the drug transaction morphed into the planned robbery of Way. According to the testimony of co-eonspirator Toles, Toles pulled out a gun, reached around Robison, pointed the gun at Way, and instructed Way to get out of the car. Way refused and grabbed the gun. A struggle ensued between Toles and Way for the gun. Appellant, from the driver's seat, called out for Robison to assist Toles. Tr. Day 2, p. 82; Tr. Day 3, pp. 108-109.
In response, Robison squeezed out from between Way and Toles and exited the car through the driver's side rear door. Tr. Day 2, pp. 79-80; Tr. Day 5, pp. 102-106. Robison ran to the other side of the car to the rear passenger door, opened the door, raised his gun and started shooting at Way. Tr. Day 3, p. 106.
Toles testified Robison fired the gun four (4) to six (6) times in quick succession. Tr. Day 3, p. 117. According to Toles, Way was shot in the back. Tr. Day 3, pp. 106-118. Seaman testified she heard approximately four (4) gunshots; she heard Toles yell that he was shot, too; and when she turned around, she saw blood on Toles' leg. Tr. Day 2, pp. 85-87; 179. Seaman testified she did not see or hear from Way again. Tr. Day 2, pp. 86-87.
Toles, from his position behind Appellant, observed Way turn toward Robison, and that Robison continued to shoot. It is apparent from Toles' testimony that after Robison stopped Firing, either Way fell out of the vehicle through the rear passenger door where Robison was standing, or Robison pulled Way out of the car. Regardless, Toles heard Way scream during the process. Way landed on the ground, face down in the snow. Tr. Day 3, p. 118. Robison jumped back into the car through the door from which Way fell. Tr. Day 3, p. 118.
With Appellant behind the wheel, the four attempted to drive away. Appellant stopped the vehicle briefly and switched seats with Seaman so she could drive. Tr. Day 2, p. 88. Seaman, in a panic, drove the Honda into a snowbank where it became temporarily stuck. At this juncture, Appellant and Robison exited the car and started to run away. Tr. Day 2, pp. 90-92.
Toles called out for Robison to return and get Robison's gun. Robison complied and Toles handed him Toles' gun as well. Tr. Day 2, p. 93; Tr. Day 3, p. 120. Appellant and Robison then ran off again in the snow through someone's back yard. Tr. Day 2, p. 94; Tr. Day 3, pp. 121-22.
Seaman managed to get the car unstuck and drove back past the shooting scene. Seaman, with Toles bleeding in the back seat, drove to a nearby Taco Bell on Peach Street where the Honda was pulled over by the police. Tr. Day 2, pp. 97-98.
Appellant and co-defendant Robison left the Erie area and each was missing for quite some time.
With regard to Appellant, the evening of the shooting a warrant was issued for his arrest. Tr. Day 4, p. 97. Wanted billboards were posted by the U.S. Marshall's Fugitive Task Force in Cleveland, Buffalo, and surrounding areas. Tr. Day 4, p. 99. In July of 2020, approximately seven (7) months after Way's murder, the police located Appellant at a friend's residence in the 400 block of East 22nd Street in the City of Erie. Appellant attempted to remain hidden inside the residence but eventually surrendered to the police. Tr. Day 4, p. 104.
The police identified co-defendant Robison as a suspect from surveillance video from the Dollar Tree Store in the Liberty Plaza. On January 22, 2021, a warrant was issued for Robison's arrest. The police learned Robison was on state parole and contacted his parole supervisor, Michelle Contis. Contis also positively identified Robison from Dollar Tree surveillance video. See Affidavit of Probable Cause. Contis provided the police with Robison's cell phone number, which through investigation revealed he was hiding in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Tr. Day 5, pp. 11-12. On January 24, 2021, Robison was apprehended in Pittsburgh, where he no longer was wearing the beard he had at the time of the murder. Tr. Day 5, pp. 11-12. It should be noted that at trial, as the result of a ruling on a motion in limine, no reference Was made to Contis' job title, his role as Robison's parole supervisor, or to Robison's status as a parolee at the time of the murder.
On April 23, 2021, Appellant was sentenced to life without parole followed by an aggregate of thirteen and one-half (13 1/3) years to twenty-seven (27) years of incarceration as follows:
Count One; Homicide/Murder of the Second Degree - life imprisonment without parole;
Count Two: Conspiracy to Commit Robbery/Robbery - ten (10) to twenty (20) years Of incarceration, consecutive to County One;
Count Three: Flight to Avoid Apprehension, Trial or Punishment- three and one-half (3 Yz) to seven (7) years of incarceration, consecutive to Count Two; and
Count Four: Robbery - Merged with Count Two.
On May 3, 2021, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, seeking reconsideration and modification of sentence. Appellant asserted the convictions were inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial. See Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and Modify Sentence, ¶ 4.
On May 17, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a response, opposing modification of sentence on the basis of the offense gravity score, prior record score, and sentencing guidelines. The Commonwealth asserted Appellant was the "mastermind" who orchestrated the robbery of Way, and who was the common connection between all co-cbnspirators in that he drove them to the victim's house; he drove the victim away from the victim's residence; he initially drove co-defendant Robison and the other two co-conspirators from the shooting scene; and after the escape vehicle crashed into a snowbank in the vicinity of the crimes, Appellant fled on foot and hid from the police for approximately six months. See Commonwealth's Response to the Defendant's Post-Sentence Motion. On May 26, 2021, the Court denied the post-sentence motion.
On May 24, 2021, Appellant's trial counsel, Mark T. Del Duca, Esq., filed a counseled Notice of Appeal and concurrently, a Concise Statement of Matters Complained of On Appeal.
On June 7, 2021, Tina M. Fryling, Esq., entered her appearance on behalf of Appellant and filed a Motion for Transcription of all proceedings. On July 21, 2021, the undersigned requested of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania an extension of the original record due date because trial transcription was not complete. No supplemental 1925(b) Statement was filed.
In the 1925(b) Statement of May 24, 2021, trial counsel generically asserted the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. See Concise Statement of Matters Complained of On Appeal (Concise Statement) filed May 24, 2021, ¶1.
In the 1925(b) Statement, trial counsel also generally averred evidentiary error occurred in admitting "evidence of text/telephone messages between a co-Defendant and an unknown subject pertaining to unrelated matters from the night prior to this offense date whose prejudicial value far surpassed any probative value, thereby prejudicing the jury as to the intent and guilt of the Defendant, Marshawn Tylique Williams." See Concise Statement. ¶2.
The claims shall be addressed ad seriatim.
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence Claims
The sufficiency of the evidence claims are waived as vague. Assuming arguendo the claims are not waived, they are wholly without merit.
A. Sufficiency of Evidence Claims Waived As Vague In the 1925(b) Statement, Appellant broadly challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as follows:
...[T]he evidence produced at trial by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was insufficient to support convictions in the matter with Second Degree Murder[,] Conspiracy, Flight to Avoid Apprehension, and Robbery, in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. 2502 §B (sic), 18 Pa.C.SA. §903, 18 Pa. C.S.A. §5126 §§A (sic) and 18 Pa.C.S.A. §3701 §§(A)(1) (sic), respectively.
1925(b) Statement, ¶1.
Appellant's sufficiency of the evidence claims are not specific enough for the Court to adequately address. Since the 1925(b) Statement does not provide any reason why any verdict was supported by insufficient evidence, the claims are waived as vague.
Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. § 1925(b)(4)(H), the 1925(b) Statement "shall concisely identify each ruling or error that the appellant intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify ail pertinent issues for the judge" Pa.R.A.P. § 1925(b)(4)(ii)(emphasis added). A concise statement too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no concise statement at all. See Commonwealth v. Lemon, 804 A.2d 34, 37 (Pa, Super. 2002); see also Commonwealth v. Bowling, 778 A.2d 683, 686-687 (Pa. Super. 2001).
In order to preserve a sufficiency of the evidence claim in a Rule 1925(b) statement, an appellant must specify the element or elements which the appellant avers were unproven.
If Appellant wants to preserve a claim that the evidence was insufficient, then the 1925(b) statement needs to specify the element or elements upon which the evidence was insufficient. This Court can then analyze the element or elements on appeal. [Where a] 1925(b) statement [ ] does not specify the allegedly unproven elements[,] ... the sufficiency issue is waived [on appeal]. Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1257 (Pa. Super. 2008), quoting Commonwealth v. Flores, 921 A,2d 517, 522-523 (Pa. Super. 2007).Commonwealth v. Tyack, 128 A.3d 254, 260 (Pa. Super. 2015). Such specificity is particularly important in cases where an appellant has been convicted of multiple crimes, each of which contains numerous elements the Commonwealth was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Freeman, 128 A.3d 1231, 1248 (Pa. Super. 2015)(emphasis added).
In this case, Appellant was convicted of multiple crimes, each requiring proof of multiple elements. The 1925(b) Statement is woefully inadequate. It fails to specify which element or elements of any of the crimes at Counts One through Four the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant's bald assertions regarding sufficiency of the evidence are far too vague to identify the pertinent issue(s) for the Trial Court to address. Appellant failed to point to any element of any crime at Counts One through Four where the evidence was arguably insufficient to support the verdict. Thus, Appellant has waived any challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence Standard
Assuming arguendo the sufficiency claims are not waived, they are wholly without merit. The evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant at all counts.
When evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, together with all reasonable inferences from that evidence, the trier of fact could have found each element of the crime charged was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Hargrove, 745 A.3d 20, 22 (Pa. Super. 2000), appeal denied, 760 A.2d 851 (Pa. 2000)(internal citations omitted); Commonwealth, v. Brunson, 938 A.2d 1057, 1058 (Pa. Super. 2007); Commonwealth v. Chambers, 599 A.2d 630, 633 (Pa. 1991). The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proof by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 141 A.2d 910, 913 (Pa. Super. 2000). The facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence, and any questions or doubts are to be resolved by the fact-finder, unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances. Commonwealth v. Hopkins, supra at 913-14.
C. Factual Basis, Elements of the Crimes and Discussion
Viewing the evidence against this standard. Appellant's generic claims regarding the sufficiency of the evidence are meritless and must be dismissed.
1. Count One: Homicide/Murder of the Second Degree
a. Factual Basis and Elements
The factual basis for the charge of Homicide/Murder of the Second Degree is that on or about January 19, 2020 at Southgate Drive and Usonia Avenue in Erie, Pennsylvania, Appellant directly or by virtue of his complicity in the commission of robbery caused the death of Devin Way. See Information.
Murder is classified as one type of Criminal Homicide. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501(b). Criminal homicide is committed when a person "intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently causes the death of another human being," 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501(a). Homicide is murder of the second degree "when it is committed While defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of a felony." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(b). A defendant is guilty of murder in the second degree where they are the plotter and actual leader of the robbery during which a killing occurred, even if the actual killing was done by an accomplice. See Commonwealth v. Melton, 178 A.2d 728 (Pa. 1962).
b. Discussion
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, there was sufficient evidence to find the Commonwealth met its burden of proof in establishing Appellant committed Homicide/Murder of the Second Degree. The Commonwealth took the position at trial Appellant was the mastermind of the operation. Also, it is apparent from the testimony that co-defendant Robison Was the shooter who inflicted the fatal wounds. Regardless, there is no doubt the record sufficiently established Appellant was a principal or accomplice in the perpetration of the robbery of Way, and Way was killed in the course of the robbery. The evidence was sufficient to establish Appellant committed Homicide/Murder of the Second Degree.
2. Count Two: Conspiracy to Commit Robbery/Robbery
a. Factual Basis and Elements
The factual basis for the charge of Conspiracy to Commit Robbery is that On or about January 19, 2020, Appellant, with the intent of promoting or facilitating robbery, agreed with Melissa Ann Seaman and/or Jakwaris D. Robison and/or Michael J. Toles, to engage in conduct which constitutes robbery or an attempt or solicitation to commit robbery, and in furtherance thereof conspired with co-defendant Robison and co-conspirators Seaman and Toles to arrange for a drug transaction and take items from Devin Way by force with a gun and shot and killed Way at South Gate Drive and UsOrtia Avenue in Erie, Pennsylvania. See Information.
Criminal Conspiracy at 18 Pa.C.S.A. §903(a)(1) is defined as:
(a) Definition of conspiracy.- A person is guilty of conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he:
(1) agrees with such person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime.18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a)(1). A conspiracy is given the same grade and degree as the most serious crime that is an object of the conspiracy. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 905(a).
To sustain a conviction for criminal conspiracy, the Commonwealth must establish the defendant: 1) entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person or persons; 2) with a shared criminal intent; and 3) an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Circumstantial evidence may provide proof of the conspiracy. The conduct of the parties and the circumstances surrounding such conduct may create a web of evidence linking the accused to the alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally: [a]n agreement can
be inferred from a variety of circumstances including, but not limited to, the relation between the parties, knowledge of and participation in the crime, and the circumstances and conduct of the parties surrounding the criminal episode. These factors may coalesce to establish a conspiratorial agreement beyond a reasonable doubt where one factor alone might fail.
Furthermore, flight, along with other circumstantial evidence, supports the inference of a criminal conspiracy.Commonwealth v. Devine, 26 A.3d 1139, 1147 (Pa. Super. 2011)(internal citations and quotations marks omitted).
Felony first degree Robbery occurs when "in the course of committing a theft, [a person]: (i) inflicts serious bodily injury upon another; (ii) threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate serious bodily injury; [or] (iii) commits or threatens immediately to commit any felony of the first or second degree." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(i), (ii), (iii).
b. Discussion
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, there was sufficient evidence to find the Commonwealth met its burden of proof in establishing Appellant committed Conspiracy to Commit Robbery.
Direct and circumstantial evidence established the elements of this crime, including the conduct of Appellant as driver; conversations between Appellant and vehicle occupants while inside the Honda; Appellant's statement(s) about his particular purpose in entering the Dollar Tree Store to obtain rubber gloves in case the transaction turned sour; Appellant's' knowledge of and continued participation in the actions of co-defendant Robison and co-conspirators Seaman and Toles as he drove them around while Seaman trolled social media searching for potential victims; Appellant's continued involvement once a transaction with Way was arranged; Appellant's instruction from behind the driver's wheel for someone to assist Toles while Toles and Way were engaged in a struggle in the back seat; Appellant's actions in starting to drive off after Way was shot and Way was either was ejected or fell from the vehicle; and Appellant's subsequent flight from the scene and the Erie area. The evidence established a conspiratorial agreement to commit robbery beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. Count Three: Flight to Avoid Apprehension, Trial or Punishment
a. Factual Basis and Elements
The factual basis for the charge of Flight to Avoid Apprehension, Trial or Punishment is that on or about January 19, 2020 in the area of Southgate and Usonia in Erie, Pennsylvania, Appellant willfully concealed himself or moved or traveled within or outside the Commonwealth with the intent to avoid apprehension, trial or punishment, in that Appellant fled the scene of the crime and/or headed to and/or hid in Cleveland, Ohio and/or East 24th Street, Erie, Pennsylvania, until caught. See Information.
The offense Flight to Avoid Apprehension, Trial or Punishment graded as a third degree felony is defined as follows:
(a) Offense defined. - A person who willfully conceals himself or moves or travels within or outside this Commonwealth with the intent to avoid apprehension, trial or punishment commits a felony of the third degree when the crime which he has been charged with or has been convicted of is a felony ....18 Pa.C.S.A. §5126(a) It is sufficient for the defendant to intentionally elude law enforcement to avoid apprehension, trial or punishment on a charge or conviction, and where the charge or conviction is a felony, the flight to avoid apprehension charge is properly graded as a felony of the third degree. See Commonwealth v. Steffy, 36 A.3d 1109,1112. (Pa. Super. 2012).
b. Discussion
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, there was sufficient evidence to find the Commonwealth met its burden of proof in establishing Appellant engaged in Flight to Avoid Apprehension, Trial or Punishment. The evidence at trial sufficiently established Appellant intentionally eluded law enforcement to avoid apprehension after Way was shot. The evidence established Appellant initially attempted to drive off; he exited the vehicle after it became stuck and he left the scene of the crime; and he eluding law enforcement for nearly seven months during which all or part of the time he absented himself from the Erie area following the murder of Way during the planned robbery of Way. The claim is meritless.
4. Count Four: Robbery
a. Factual Basis and Elements
The factual basis for the charge of Robbery is that on or about January 19, 2020 in the area of Southgate and Usonia Avenue in Erie, Pennsylvania, Appellant, directly or by virtue of his complicity, and while in the course of committing a theft, inflicted serious injury upon Devin Way, in that Appellant conspired with co-defendant Robison and co-conspirators Seaman and Toles to arrange a drug transaction and take items from Way by force with a firearm and shot Way, killing him. See Information.
Robbery as a first degree felony occurs when "in the course of committing a theft, [a person]: (i) inflicts serious bodily injury upon another; (ii) threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate serious bodily injury; [or] (iii) commits or threatens immediately to commit any felony of the first or second degree." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(i)(i), (ii), (iii).
b. Discussion
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, there was sufficient evidence to find the Commonwealth sufficiently established Appellant committed Robbery.
The record sufficiently established Appellant engaged in a plan to lure Way into the Honda for the ostensible purpose of purchasing from Way two (2) ounces of marijuana for $400.00, and once Way was inside the car, to rob him. In the course of committing the theft, Toles pointed a gun at Way and a struggle ensued. As this occurred, Appellant called out for assistance for Toles. Robison responded by exiting the vehicle and shooting Way, ultimately killing him. Appellant initially attempted to drive off. After the vehicle became stuck and the guns were retrieved from the vehicle, Appellant and co-defendant ran off. At a minimum, Appellant's actions and words intentionally placed Way in fear of immediate serious bodily injury during the commission of the robbery. See § 3701(a)(1)(ii) In the course of committing theft, serious bodily injury leading to death occurred. See § 3701(a)(1)(i). In the course of committing theft, Way was shot and killed. See § 370l(a)(I)(iii). The claim must be dismissed.
II. Evidentiary Claim Regarding Text
Messages Appellant's second generic claim of error in the 1925(b) Statement concerns unspecified text messages. In the 1925(b) Statement, counsel broadly avers evidentiary error occurred in admitting "evidence of text/telephone messages between a co-Defendant and an unknown subject pertaining to unrelated matters from the night prior to this offense date whose prejudicial value far surpassed any probative value, thereby prejudicing the jury as to the intent and guilt of the Defendant, Marshawn Tylique Williams." See Concise Statement, ¶2.
The claim is waived as vague. Assuming arguendo the claim is not deemed waived, it is without merit. Moreover, if any error occurred, it was harmless error in view of the totality of the evidence.
A. Evidentiary Claim Waived As Vague
The claim is waived as vague. In the Concise Statement, Appellant failed to specify what text message(s) and/or telephone message(s) he Was referring to, and provided no context or reference to the record where or when alleged error occurred during this lengthy trial. Appellant provided no indication when or during whose testimony the "text/telephone messages" was or were introduced. Thus the Court is left to scour the record to look for any place during the trial where a text or social media message may have been introduced. Numerous witnesses testified during this trial, leaving the Court with an onerous and time-consuming task.
Again, it is fundamental a concise statement too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no concise statement at all. Commonwealth v. Reeves, 907 A.2d 1,2 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal denied, 919 A.2d 956 (Pa. 2007). The court's review and legal analysis can be fatally impaired when the court has to guess at the issues raised. Id. If a concise statement is too vague, the court may find waiver. Id.
In this case, under the circumstances, Appellant's claim of evidentiary error with regard to unspecified "text/telephone messages" does not contain enough information for the Court to adequately address it. Therefore, the claim is waived as vague.
B. Legal Standards and Discussion
Assuming arguendo the claim is not deemed waived, it is without merit. Moreover, if any error occurred, it was harmless error in view of the overwhelming evidence of Appellant's guilt.
1. Legal Standards
The admission of evidence is a matter vested within the sound discretion of the trial court, and such a decision shall be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 749 (Pa. Super. 2014).
An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will of partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 749 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Except as otherwise provided by law, all relevant evidence is admissible. Pa.-R.-E. 402.
The threshold inquiry with admission of evidence is whether the evidence is relevant. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable, or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding the existence of a material fact.Commonwealth v. Stokes, 78 A.3d 644, 654 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Relevant evidence is that which has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence, and the fact is of consequence in determining the action. See Pa.RE. 401.
Stated another way, "Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable, or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding the existence of a material fact." Commonwealth v. Spiewak, 617 A.2d 696, 699 (Pa. 1992).
In addition, evidence is only admissible where the probative value Of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact. Stokes, 78 A.3d at 654. Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 403 provides the Court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. See Pa.RE. No. 403. "'[U]nfair prejudice' means 'a tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis or to divert the jury's attention away from its duty of weighing the. evidence impartially,'" Castellani v. Scranton Times, LP., 124 A.3d 1229, 1245 (Pa. 2015). See also, Pa.RE. 403 (comment).
Notably, evidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it may be harmful to the defendant's case. All relevant Commonwealth evidence is meant to prejudice a defendant. See Commonwealth, v. Gonzalez, 112 A.3d 1232, 1238 n.6 (Pa. Super 2015). Thus:
[e]vidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it is harmful to the defendant's case. The trial court is not required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all unpleasant facts from the jury's consideration where those facts are relevant to the issues at hand. Exclusion of evidence on the grounds that it is prejudicial is limited to evidence so prejudicial that it would inflame the jury to make a decision based on something other than the legal propositions relevant to the case.Commonwealth v. Flamer, 53 A.3d 82, 88, n. 7 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
However, where evidence is not relevant it is not necessary to determine whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact. Stokes, 78 A.3d at 654 (citing Commonwealth v. Robinson, 721 A.2d 344, 350 (Pa. 1998)). Instead, once it is determined that error occurred in admitting the evidence, the inquiry becomes "whether the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that such error was harmless," Stokes, 78 A.3d at 654 (citing Robinson, 721 A.2d at 350 (Pa. 1998)).
Harmless error occurs where:
(1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de minimis; (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of Other untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict.Stokes, 78 A.3d at 654 (citing Robinson, 721 A,2d at 350 (Pa. 1998)).
2. Discussion
Assuming arguendo the claim is not waived for vagueness, the Court is left to speculate Appellant refers to an objection made by co-defendant Robison's trial counsel on Trial Day 4 concerning text messages between co-defendant Robison and an unknown third party discussing plans of potential robberies the day before the murder. Tr. Day 4, pp. 39-42. A description follows.
During direct examination of City of Erie Police Detective Patrick Ginkel, the Commonwealth introduced text messages sent from Robison's phone to an unknown third person the day before the instant offense, Tr. Day 4, pp. 35-44. The conversation involved plans for co-defendant Robison to potentially plan a separate robbery at Presque Isle Downs & Casino. Tr. Day 4. p. 37. Robison's trial counsel objected to introduction of the text messages on the basis of relevance. The Commonwealth's position was the evidence was relevant because it tended to establish co-defendant Robison's activities in searching for robbery victims on the day before Way was robbed and shot. Tr. Day 4, pp. 40-41. The Court agreed and overruled the objections. Tr. Day 4, pp. 40, 42. Thereafter, Commonwealth witness Detective Ginkle only briefly testified to the messages, and spent the majority of the time explaining the meaning of certain street terms and jargon contained within the texts. Tr. Day 4, pp. 42-45.
The next morning, co-defendant Robison's trial counsel filed a Motion in Limine to prevent further mention of the text messages. The Court granted the Motion. Tr. Day 5, pp. 10-11. There was no further testimony of the text messages, and no reference was made to them during closing arguments.
There was no error in admitting the messages. The text messages did not concern Appellant. The text messages were between Robison and a third person. They did not directly implicate Appellant. When the messages were admitted, the trial was nearly over and only closing arguments remained. The messages were not reintroduced before the Motion in Limine was granted. At best, the initial admission of the text messages amounted to harmless error. Any prejudice to Appellant was de minimus as Appellant was not mentioned in the texts. Further, the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of Appellant's guilt was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the alleged error was so insignificant by comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict. This evidentiary claim is wholly without merit and must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the judgments of sentence should be affirmed. The Clerk of Courts is hereby directed to transmit the record to the Superior Court.
Date: 12/12/21
BY THE COURT:
Daniel J. Brahender Jr., Judge
cc: District Attorney's Office
Tina M. Fryling, Esq., 4402 Peach Street, Suite 3, Erie, Pennsylvania 16509