Opinion
J-A12004-15 No. 1527 MDA 2014 No. 1528 MDA 2014 No. 1529 MDA 2014
08-07-2015
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellant v. DAVID MICHAEL WHITCOMB, JR., Appellee COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellant v. DANIEL H. GRAFF, Appellee COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellant v. MARK ANDREW HAYNES, Appellee
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order Entered July 7, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0008017-2013
Appeal from the Order Entered July 7, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0008014-2013
Appeal from the Order Entered July 7, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0008007-2013
BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE AND ALLEN, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:
The Commonwealth appeals from the orders entered July 7, 2014, precluding its introduction of prison policies in a prosecution against David Michael Whitcomb, Jr., Daniel H. Graff, and Mark Andrew Haynes, prison guards at York County Prison, accused of official oppression, conspiracy to commit official oppression, and harassment. After careful review, we reverse.
The Commonwealth has certified that that the order in question would terminate or substantially handicap its prosecution of Appellees. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d); Commonwealth v. Moser , 999 A.2d 602, 603 n.1 (Pa.Super. 2010). Accordingly, this interlocutory appeal is properly before this Court.
While investigating another matter, prison officials learned of allegations that Appellees were mistreating at least two inmates: David Wright and James Hicks. As a result of the allegations, the Commonwealth charged Appellees with official oppression, conspiracy to commit official oppression, and harassment.
Mr. Wright asserted that Appellees created a fight club, which involved making Mr. Wright and Mr. Hicks wrestle. In addition, he maintained that Appellees offered him food and other privileges in exchange for performing certain odd feats. Mr. Wright testified at a preliminary hearing that, in exchange for wrestling Mr. Hicks, the guards promised Mr. Wright food and coffee. Further, Appellee Graff pepper-foam sprayed Mr. Wright in the face in return for food. Mr. Wright also agreed to snort chili seasoning packets and coffee so that Appellees would give him lounge food. Aside from these acts, Mr. Wright also alleged that Appellee Graff wrestled him and began to strangle him during one incident. During this encounter, Appellee Haynes punched Mr. Wright, causing his head to strike a vent. Mr. Wright also averred that Appellee Haynes placed him in a headlock, began to strangle him, and on another occasion punched him. The headlock incident was captured on video surveillance. Mr. Wright also set forth that Appellee Whitcomb struck him in the leg.
Mr. Hicks received similar treatment. The Commonwealth presented evidence at the preliminary hearing that Mr. Hicks drank moldy stew in return for chicken fingers, drank fifteen cartons of milk until vomiting, and snorted shavings from a bar of soap so that he could receive a hoagie. Prior to trial, Appellees Graff and Haynes sought to preclude the Commonwealth from introducing evidence of York County Prison policies. Appellee Whitcomb orally joined in those requests. The specific documents were the Personnel Code of Ethics, a Use of Force policy, Appellees' electronic training files, signature logs of trainings attended by Appellees, a signed receipt by Appellee Haynes of the Policy and Procedures Manual, a Professionalism and Ethics Curriculum, Use of Force Curriculum, and the Prison Rape Elimination Act Curriculum.
Appellees Graff and Whitcomb had not been required to sign this form since it did not exist at the time they became employed. --------
The court conducted a pretrial hearing and granted Appellees' request to preclude the Commonwealth from introducing the prison policies and related evidence. The Commonwealth sought reconsideration, and the court heard reargument on August 27, 2014. Thereafter, the court reaffirmed its earlier ruling. This timely appeal ensued. The trial court directed the Commonwealth to file and serve a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. The Commonwealth complied, and the trial court authored its Rule 1925(a) decision. The matter is now before this Court. The Commonwealth's sole issue on appeal is "Whether the lower court abused its discretion in reaffirming its order excluding certain prison policies and related material as said documentation is relevant and probative to establishing the elements of official oppression?" Commonwealth's brief at 4.
We review the denial of the Commonwealth's evidence under an abuse of discretion standard, which includes considering whether the trial court committed an error of law. See Commonwealth v. Moser , 999 A.2d 602 (Pa.Super. 2010). The Commonwealth argues that the York County prison policies, training logs, and materials "are both relevant and probative in establishing the elements of official oppression." Commonwealth's brief at 11. It asserts that the trial court erroneously misconstrued its position as contending that a violation of the prison policies would be an ipso facto violation of the official oppression statute. According to the Commonwealth, "the issue presented is whether the prison policies and related materials are relevant, probative, and admissible evidence supporting the element of mistreatment, as well as the mens rea (knowingly) required to establish official oppression." Id. at 11-12.
The Commonwealth notes that mistreatment is an element of official oppression and that it must prove that the defendants knew that their conduct was illegal. It acknowledges that a layperson would understand that physically assaulting a prisoner constitutes mistreatment, but adds that this case involves additional allegations. The Commonwealth highlights that this case includes evidence that Appellees "encouraged inmates to engage in horseplay and other inappropriate behaviors in exchange for rewards or privileges." Id. at 13. It maintains that the prison policies and other material are relevant to demonstrating that Appellees knew that their conduct was unlawful mistreatment.
Appellees counter that the evidence in question is irrelevant and that because the term "mistreatment" is readily understandable, evidence of the policies is unnecessary. They posit that mistreatment under a prison policy does not equate to mistreatment under the official oppression statute. In their view, because "mistreatment" has a common understanding, the prison policies are not relevant in deciding whether they knowingly and illegally subjected inmates to such mistreatment.
Appellees also submit that the prison policies and other materials are inadmissible because their probative value is outweighed by the prejudicial effect they will engender. In this respect, Appellees argue that introduction of the evidence in question will confuse the jury since they might conclude that violations of the policies equate to criminal acts. Appellees submit that the Commonwealth's proffered jury instruction to ameliorate such potential prejudice is insufficient because the jury could still find that a knowing violation of the policies is a knowing violation of the criminal statute.
We find that the trial court erroneously concluded that the evidence was not relevant. Relevant evidence is broadly defined. Although the trial court offered a definition of relevant evidence, it failed to appreciate the expansive nature of that definition. Evidence is relevant if it makes a material fact more or less probable. Pa.R.E. 401.
The crime of official oppression is defined as follows.
A person acting or purporting to act in an official capacity or taking advantage of such actual or purported capacity commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, knowing that his conduct is illegal, he:18 Pa.C.S. § 5301.
(1) subjects another to arrest, detention, search, seizure, mistreatment, dispossession, assessment, lien or other infringement of personal or property rights; or
(2) denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power or immunity.
Prison policies demonstrating that Appellees' behavior was prohibited is certainly relevant to help prove both mens rea and that they subjected inmates to mistreatment. Evidence that Appellees were aware of these policies makes it more probable that they had knowledge that their behavior was illegal mistreatment. Moreover, evidence that would show that Appellees were not permitted to engage in the alleged inappropriate behavior, regardless of the inmates' acquiescence, is certainly relevant to establish that Appellees mistreated the inmates.
It is beyond cavil that prison officials stand in a position of authority over prison inmates. What may be considered consensual behavior between parties outside of prison walls must be evaluated in a different context when the interaction involves prison guards and prisoners. Cf. Commonwealth v. Checca , 491 A.2d 1358 (Pa.Super. 1985) (consensual sexual encounter between a district judge and a defendant appearing before him constituted mistreatment by the judge). Furthermore, while it is true that not all violations of a prison policy rise to the level of criminal misconduct, violation of the prison policies in question could constitute mistreatment of a prisoner, which is an element at issue.
The more appropriate inquiry herein is whether the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its potential to unduly prejudice Appellees. See Pa.R.E. 403. In this respect, the trial court did rule in the alternative that the prejudicial nature of the evidence outweighed its probative value. Specifically, the trial court ruled that "their probative value is outweighed by the strong possibility that the jury would confuse the issues." Trial Court Opinion, 10/30/14, at 7.
After review of the record, we find that the probative value of the evidence far outweighs any potential for prejudice based on purported confusion of the issues. Appellees argued below and on appeal that failing to abide by the prison policies is not criminal conduct. Their position, however, is imprecise. A violation of a prison policy is not ipso facto illegal. Nonetheless, actions that violate a prison policy can also be criminal acts. Therefore, violations of prison policies can be criminal and Appellees' alleged violations of the prison policies could meet the definition of mistreatment. The trial court failed to appreciate this critical difference in concluding that violating the prison policies in this matter was not probative evidence that Appellees violated the Crimes Code.
Evidence that Appellees violated prison policies that preclude the acts alleged herein is evidence of the element of mistreatment and demonstrates that Appellees had knowledge that the acts constituted unlawful mistreatment. Indeed, proof that Appellees violated prison policies prohibiting the type of conduct in question is relevant precisely because the acts can constitute mistreatment. Contrary to the trial court's finding, violation of the prison policies at issue directly bears on the legal determination of knowledge and mistreatment. Accordingly, the policies were highly relevant to prove that Appellees had knowledge that their behavior was illegal mistreatment. Finally, the trial court's and Appellees' position that jury confusion would arise is based on the erroneous position that the acts alleged to have constituted violations of the prison policies do not establish criminal mistreatment, but only mistreatment under the policies. Since the acts alleged to have violated the policies are essential to prove criminal mistreatment, there is little risk of prejudicial confusion and any such risk can be avoided by a carefully tailored jury instruction.
Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Allen joins the Memorandum.
Judge Donohue files a Dissenting Memorandum. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/7/2015