Opinion
No. 11–P–2076.
2013-02-8
COMMONWEALTH v. Matthew WEST.
By the Court (RAPOZA, C.J., KATZMANN & CARHART, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
In October, 2001, the defendant pleaded guilty in the Roxbury Division of the Boston Municipal Court to a criminal complaint charging him with assault and battery, malicious destruction of property over $250, resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct. On September 24, 2007, the judge who had accepted that plea (trial judge) allowed the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Fifteen days later, on October 9, 2007, the trial judge reconsidered her order sua sponte, vacated it, and reinstated the defendant's convictions. The defendant appeals from the October 9 order, arguing that the trial judge lacked authority to reconsider and vacate her September 24 order in the circumstances of his case.
Although the defendant filed a notice of appeal in March, 2008, that notice was not then acted upon. A single justice of this court allowed the defendant's motion pursuant to Mass.R.A.P. 14(b), as amended, 378 Mass. 939 (1979), to have a late notice of appeal be deemed timely filed. This appeal ensued.
Discussion. The details of the trial judge's decision to vacate the defendant's 2001 plea, her subsequent reconsideration of that order, and her reinstatement of his convictions are documented in United States v. West, 552 F.Supp.2d 74, 83–86 (2008). Relevant to this appeal is the fact that in the interim between the trial judge's decision to vacate the defendant's 2001 plea and her subsequent reconsideration of that action, the Commonwealth petitioned for relief from the Supreme Judicial Court pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3.
Following the trial judge's sua sponte reinstatement of the defendant's convictions, the Commonwealth filed a submission with the Supreme Judicial Court suggesting that the petition pursuant to c. 211, § 3, should be dismissed as moot, and arguing that the trial judge had jurisdiction to act as she did in reinstating the convictions.
The Commonwealth's petition indicates that it sought relief through the Supreme Judicial Court's general superintendence powers, rather than by pursuing an appeal as allowed by Mass.R.Crim.P. 30(c)(8), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), because of the exigency of the defendant's pending sentencing in Federal court.
Although the defendant initially opposed the Commonwealth's G.L. c. 211, § 3, petition, he filed (contemporaneously with the Commonwealth's filing of a suggestion of mootness) a motion requesting that “the Single Justice [of the Supreme Judicial Court], having jurisdiction over the matter, issue its decision....” That motion was denied by a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, who then dismissed the matter as moot. The defendant did not appeal from that action. Nevertheless, he now argues that the docketing of the Commonwealth's G.L. c. 211, § 3, petition divested the trial judge of jurisdiction over her September 24 order vacating the 2001 guilty plea.
We disagree. As in Commonwealth v. George, 460 Mass. 1008, 1009 (2011), the trial judge's “subsequent reconsideration of [her] order rendered moot the Commonwealth's petition [pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3].” In any event, it is not for us to review the decision of a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court that the matter before her was moot in light of the trial judge's reconsideration of the September 24 order.
October 9, 2007, order affirmed.