Opinion
Criminal Docket No.: CR13-2159
04-19-2017
Re: Commonwealth v. Salathiel Lee Taylor
Patricia O'Boyle, Esquire Deputy Commonwealth's Attorney 800 East City Hall Avenue, Suite 600 Norfolk, Virginia 23510 Eric Korslund, Esquire Korslund & Korslund, P.C. 555 East Main Street, Suite 1102 Norfolk, Virginia 23510
Patricia O'Boyle, Esquire
Deputy Commonwealth's Attorney
800 East City Hall Avenue, Suite 600
Norfolk, Virginia 23510 Eric Korslund, Esquire
Korslund & Korslund, P.C.
555 East Main Street, Suite 1102
Norfolk, Virginia 23510 Dear Counsel:
Today the Court rules on the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea (the "Motion") filed by Defendant Salathiel Lee Taylor ("Taylor"), in which Taylor seeks to withdraw the guilty plea he entered on November 17, 2015. Because the Court finds that the Motion was filed in good faith, that Taylor has a reasonable defense, and that there is not significant prejudice to the Commonwealth, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.
Background
The Defendant, Salathiel Taylor, was indicted on one count of first degree murder, two counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, one count of robbery, and one count of conspiracy, all stemming from a September 22, 2012, incident during which Carlton Dean, Jr. ("Dean") was killed (the "Incident"). On November 17, 2015, Taylor entered into a plea agreement in which he pled guilty to second degree murder and one count of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and the Commonwealth agreed to nolle prosequi the remaining charges. He also agreed to cooperate with the Commonwealth and testify "fully and truthfully" against his co-defendants, who were charged as a result of the same homicide.
When the police arrested Taylor in 2013, Taylor gave a statement concerning his involvement in the Incident. Taylor told the police that he had visited a friend's house that night to play video games with some other people. (Ex. 4 at 3:15-20 (Nov. 17, 2015).) While playing games, he noticed that the three co-defendants were having "sidebars [sic] conversations" during which they would whisper to one another in an apparent attempt to prevent him from hearing them. (Id. at 3:20-22.) Taylor claimed that he did not know what the co-defendants were saying but that he "knew something was up." (Id. at 3:22-23.)
Some time later the co-defendants asked Taylor to drive them to a BP gas station to buy cigarettes and blunts. (Id. at 3:24-25.) Taylor agreed, but as he drove toward the gas station one of the co-defendants told him to slow down. (Id. at 4:1-3.) Taylor complied, although he claims that he did not know why he was being asked to slow down. (Id. at 4:4-6.) The three co-defendants exited the car and approached Dean while waving a gun. (Id. at 4:6-11.) Taylor witnessed the co-defendant with the gun hit Dean and then shoot him when he tried to flee. (Id. at 4:13-19.) The three individuals proceeded to rob Dean. (Id. at 4:20-23.) Taylor stated that it dawned on him that the robbery and killing must have been the subject of the "side-barrish [sic] conversation" he had witnessed earlier. (Id.)
The three co-defendants got back into Taylor's car and allegedly threatened to harm him if he told anyone what he had just seen. (Id. at 4:24-25, 5:1-4.) Taylor drove them to the gas station to purchase cigarettes and then dropped them off at someone else's house. (Id. at 9:6-13.)
On November 17, 2015, the Court accepted Taylor's guilty plea after the customary detailed colloquy. The Stipulation of Facts submitted by the Commonwealth—and signed by Taylor—closely tracked the statement that Taylor had given to the police. Most significantly, the Stipulation of Facts states that Taylor witnessed the side-bar conversations and "knew something was up." It also indicates that "[t]he defendant maintained that he did not know a robbery was about to occur and that the others had threatened to kill him if he told anybody about it."
After pleading guilty, Taylor began to cooperate with the Commonwealth in its case against the three co-defendants. At some point, however, Taylor began giving contradictory statements and changed his story. He apparently lied to the Commonwealth on several occasions and allegedly failed a polygraph test. According to the Commonwealth, these actions rendered his testimony unreliable and greatly weakened the Commonwealth's case. The Commonwealth ultimately was unable to pursue charges against the three co-defendants.
On November 28, 2016, about a year after Taylor's guilty plea was entered, Taylor's counsel ("Prior Counsel") moved to withdraw from the case, and the Court granted the motion. At the same time, Prior Counsel filed a motion to withdraw guilty plea on behalf of Taylor. The motion to withdraw asserted that Taylor had fabricated the story he had given to police under the false impression that he could send the shooter to prison without receiving any punishment. On December 7, 2016, Taylor secured new counsel ("Current Counsel"). On January 18, 2017, Current Counsel filed a second motion to withdraw guilty plea. The new motion asserts that Taylor is acting in good faith in seeking to withdraw his guilty plea and that he has a reasonable defense to the felony murder charge: that he lacked sufficient knowledge regarding the robbery to qualify him a principal in the second degree.
The Court held a hearing on the second Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea on March 3, 2017 (the "Hearing"). Both Taylor and Prior Counsel testified at the Hearing. Taylor asserted that Prior Counsel never discussed with him the difference between a principal in the second degree and an accessory after the fact. (Hearing Tr. ("Tr.") 12:1-9, 18:7-9.) Taylor further claimed that Prior Counsel barely discussed the case with him at all. (Id. at 28:6-19, 43:7-23.) Taylor also stated that Prior Counsel told him that if he did not plead guilty, then Prior Counsel would withdraw from the case, thereby pressuring him to plead guilty. (Id. at 21:25, 22:1-15.) Contrary to Taylor's testimony, Prior Counsel testified that he had discussed with Taylor all elements of the charges and all available defenses. (Id. at 57:23-25, 58:1, 59:18-25, 60:1, 62:19-22.) Prior Counsel also testified that he fully discussed the plea agreement with Taylor and did not force him in any way to accept the plea offer. (Id. at 63:10-25, 64:24-25, 65:1-16, 66:3-9.)
Positions of the Parties
The Commonwealth's Position
The Commonwealth asserts that the Motion is an attempt by Taylor to manipulate the Court. (Tr. 125:1-25; Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea ("Resp.") 6.) The Commonwealth argues that Taylor entered into the plea agreement intelligently and voluntarily, with full knowledge of the defenses available to him, and now suffers from buyer's remorse. (Tr. 125:1-25.) The Commonwealth contends that Taylor is aware he is the only remaining defendant in the case and that the Motion is Taylor's last-ditch effort to escape punishment. (Id.)
The Commonwealth argues that the Court should disregard the Stipulation of Facts offered when Taylor pled guilty. (Suppl. Resp. to Def.'s Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea ("Suppl. Resp.") 1.) According to the Commonwealth, the stipulation is merely a summary of the evidence the Commonwealth would have presented at trial and does not reference all evidence the Commonwealth gathered or had available to it. (Id.) It also contends that the Court should take into consideration Taylor's lack of credibility, based on his history of inconsistent statements. (Id. at 1-2.) As a result, the Commonwealth contends that any conflict between the testimony of Taylor and Prior Counsel should be resolved in Prior Counsel's favor. (Id. at 2.)
The Commonwealth also claims that it will be significantly prejudiced if Taylor is allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. Specifically, it points out that four and a half years have passed since the Incident, that there are witnesses who do not want to cooperate, that several police officers and experts have moved away, and that memories have faded. (Id. at 118:1-6; Resp. 11-12.)
Finally, the Commonwealth asserts that there is sufficient evidence of concert of action between Taylor and the co-defendants and that sufficient evidence therefore exists for Taylor to be found guilty as a principal in the second degree. (Suppl. Resp. 2-3.) Accordingly, the Commonwealth argues that Taylor has not raised a real defense. (Id.)
Taylor's Position
Taylor asserts that he has raised a reasonable defense—that he was unaware of the planned robbery and therefore lacked sufficient knowledge to be a principal in the second degree—that is supported by both the Stipulation of Facts and the statement he gave to police shortly after the Incident. (Br. in Supp. of Def.'s Mot. to Withdraw Guilty Plea ("Br. in Supp.") 2-3.) He asserts that the existence of this reasonable defense overrides all other considerations the Court should weigh when ruling on the Motion. (Id. at 3.)
Regarding his credibility, Taylor argues that his prior inconsistent statements should not be held against him. (Id. at 2.) He contends that whether or not his version of the facts has been consistent is immaterial to whether he understood the nuances of accomplice liability. (Id. at 1-2.) He points out that many trained lawyers are confused by the difference between a principal in the second degree and an accessory after the fact. (Id.) Taylor argues that his misunderstanding therefore is not far-fetched. (Id.)
Analysis
Legal Standard
Entering a plea of guilty is a solemn act that is not entered into lightly. Booker v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 323, 330, 734 S.E.2d 729, 732 (2012). "Ordinarily, the assistance of a capable attorney combined with the detailed questions propounded by the court secures a knowing and voluntary guilty plea." Id. at 331, 734 S.E.2d at 732. Sometimes, however, a defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea in the interests of justice. Id.
A court must evaluate a motion to withdraw a guilty plea "based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case." Justus v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 143, 154, 645 S.E.2d 284, 289 (2007) (relying upon Parris v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 321, 52 S.E.2d 872 (1949)).
Section 19.2-296 of the Code of Virginia governs withdrawals of guilty pleas. It provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . may be made only before sentence . . . ; but to correct manifest injustice, the court within twenty-one days after entry of a final order may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea." Va. Code § 19.2-296 (2015 Repl. Vol.). Although the statute does not explicitly provide a standard to guide courts when ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing, "the standard must be more liberal than the requirements of showing a manifest injustice." Justus, 274 Va. at 153, 645 S.E.2d at 288.
Within this statutory framework, the Virginia Supreme Court has held that "[t]he least surprise or influence causing a defendant to plead guilty when he has any defense at all should be sufficient grounds for permitting a change of plea from guilty to not guilty." Parris, 189 Va. at 325, 52 S.E.2d at 874 (quoting 14 Am. Jur. Criminal Law § 287, at 961 (1938)). "Leave should ordinarily be given to withdraw a plea of guilty if it was entered by mistake or under a misconception of the nature of the charge; through a misunderstanding as to its effect; through fear, fraud, or official misrepresentation; was made involuntarily for any reason; or even where it was entered inadvisedly, if any reasonable ground is offered for going to the jury." Id.
To determine when the withdrawal of a guilty plea is appropriate, Virginia courts have outlined a three-part analysis.
First, "[a]s a threshold matter, the [Virginia] Supreme Court has made clear, the motion to withdraw the guilty plea must be 'duly made in good faith and sustained by proofs.'" Booker, 61 Va. App. at 332, 734 S.E.2d at 733 (quoting Parris, 189 Va. at 324-25, 52 S.E.2d at 873-74). This part of the test "protects the integrity of the judicial process by precluding defendants from using a guilty plea as a subterfuge to manipulate the court." Cobbins v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 28, 34, 668 S.E.2d 816, 819 (2008).
Second, there must be proper grounds for the motion; a defendant may not simply withdraw a guilty plea because he changed his mind. Booker, 61 Va. App at 332, 734 S.E.2d at 733. "[A] guilty plea can be set aside if it was entered into 'under an honest mistake of material fact or facts, or if it was induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence and would not otherwise have been made.'" Id. (quoting Parris, 189 Va. at 324, 52 S.E.2d at 873). The defendant also must offer a reasonable defense that is not "a merely dilatory or formal defense." Parris, 189 Va. at 325, 52 S.E.2d at 874.
"Finally, trial courts should consider whether allowing the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea would cause prejudice to the prosecution." Booker, 61 Va. App. at 333, 734 S.E.2d at 734-35. Such prejudice may exist where the Commonwealth has already fulfilled its obligations in a plea agreement or the record supports a finding that the defendant has acted in bad faith in an attempt to delay or otherwise hinder the proceedings. Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 200, 211 n.4, 725 S.E.2d 163, 168 n.4 (2012).
Discussion
The Court has considered the Motion, the briefs submitted by the parties, and the evidence and oral argument presented at the Hearing. The Court now rules on the matter before it.
A. The Motion Was Filed in Good Faith.
For the threshold question of good faith, the Court must consider whether there has been an attempt to manipulate the court. Cobbins v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 28, 34, 668 S.E.2d 816, 819 (2008). Good faith is generally presumed as long as there is no evidence to the contrary. See, e.g., Booker v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 323, 332-37, 734 S.E.2d 729, 733-35 (2012) (acknowledging without discussing the good faith requirement); Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 200, 210-11, 725 S.E.2d 163, 168 (2012) ("[T]he record does not reflect a pattern of behavior on [the defendant's] part that would support a conclusion that [his] actions were merely an effort to impede the administration of justice."). Good faith may be lacking where there is evidence to support a finding that the defendant merely "took a look at what the consequences might be after he pled guilty and had buyer's remorse." Branch v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 540, 547 n.6, 729 S.E.2d 777, 781 n.6 (2012). A lack of good faith also has been found where the record shows that the defendant entered the guilty plea with an ulterior motive, such as delaying a trial to buy himself more time. Cobbins, 53 Va. App. at 35-36, 668 S.E.2d at 820 (describing how the defendant used his guilty plea to secure a trial continuance).
Here, the timeline of events supports the conclusion that the Motion was advanced in good faith. Current Counsel did not appear in the case until December 7, 2016. Forty-two days later, on January 18, 2017, he filed the Motion, alleging that Taylor had a reasonable defense and entered the plea inadvisedly. Although over a year has passed since Taylor entered his guilty plea, the Motion was filed shortly after the change of counsel. This supports the inference that Taylor was not simply sitting on his hands, keeping his defense in reserve so that he could surprise the Commonwealth at an inconvenient time. It took a new attorney coming into the case with fresh eyes to advance the grounds for withdrawal.
Although this was not Taylor's first motion to withdraw his guilty plea, his previous motion was based on different grounds.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Taylor filed the Motion in good faith and not merely in an attempt to manipulate the court.
B. Taylor Has a Reasonable Defense.
The Virginia Supreme Court has established a fairly low burden a defendant must satisfy in order to withdraw his guilty plea.
The least surprise or influence causing a defendant to plead guilty when he has any defense at all should be sufficient grounds for permitting a change of plea from guilty to not guilty. Leave should ordinarily be given to withdraw a plea of guilty if it was entered by mistake or under a misconception of the nature of the charge; through a misunderstanding as to its effect; through fear, fraud, or official misrepresentation; was made involuntarily for any reason; or even where it was entered inadvisedly, if any reasonable ground is offered for going to the jury.Parris v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 321, 325, 52 S.E.2d 872, 874 (1949) (emphasis added) (quoting 14 Am. Jur. Criminal Law § 287, at 961 (1938)); see also Branch v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 540, 546, 729 S.E.2d 777, 780 (2012) (describing this burden as "a relatively liberal standard"). Any proffered defense must be substantive and reasonable, and not merely dilatory or formal. Booker v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 323, 333, 734 S.E.2d 729, 733 (2012). "While not meant to be exhaustive, examples of a defense that goes beyond a 'merely formal' defense include self-defense, alibi, insanity, or a defense based on a proffer of specific evidence that, if accepted by the factfinder, would defeat the prosecution's case." Id. at 334, 734 S.E.2d at 734.
Where, as in this case, the defense relied upon by the defendant involves intent or mens rea, his proffer that he lacked the necessary intent is not a "merely formal" defense. Id. at 335, 734 S.E.2d at 734 (citing Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 200, 210, 725 S.E.2d 163, 167-68 (2012)). In Hubbard, Johnny Hubbard ("Hubbard") pled guilty to first degree murder of his wife. 60 Va. App. at 203, 725 S.E.2d at 164. Hubbard had given a statement to police in which he stated he had tried to have sex with his wife, but she refused. Id. He "said fine and that's when she called [him] a sick sex Addict [sic]." Id. They began to argue and fight, and Hubbard then grabbed a knife and stabbed his wife in the neck. Id. When she tried to reach for a telephone to call for help, Hubbard removed the telephone battery and refused to render any aid, which led to his wife's death. Id. at 203-204, 725 S.E.2d at 164-65.
About two months after pleading guilty, Hubbard moved to withdraw his guilty plea and, at the same time, his attorney moved to withdraw from the case. Id. at 204-205, 725 S.E.2d at 165. After securing new counsel, Hubbard argued that his desire to withdraw his guilty plea was based on undue pressure from each of his previous attorneys. Id. at 205, 725 S.E.2d at 165. He asserted that he had insisted all along that he lacked premeditation and therefore was not guilty of first degree murder but that his attorneys pushed him into entering the guilty plea. Id. He nevertheless "admitted that each of his previous attorneys visited him a couple of times each and that they had discussed both first and second-degree murder with him." Id.
The trial court denied Hubbard's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, finding that Hubbard's assertion that he was pressured or poorly advised by his prior attorneys was not credible. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Hubbard had raised a reasonable defense that warranted withdrawal of his guilty plea. Id. at 209, 725 S.E.2d at 167. Notably, although there was ample evidence in the record to support the conclusion that Hubbard acted with premeditation—as well as evidence to support the conclusion that his attorneys were not ineffective in advising him to plead guilty—the Court found that the defendant still had a reasonable defense. Id. at 210, 725 S.E.2d at 167-68. "The issue is not whether a court thinks a jury or other factfinder would necessarily accept the defense, but rather whether the proffered defense is one that the law would recognize as such if the factfinder found credible the facts supporting it." Id.; see also Justus v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 143, 154, 645 S.E.2d 284, 289 (2007) (holding that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea "should be granted even if the guilty plea was merely entered 'inadvisedly' when the evidence supporting the motion shows that there is a reasonable defense to be presented to the judge or jury trying the case"). It was enough that Hubbard testified he lacked premeditation, and "the statement that the Commonwealth presented to the circuit court in support of Hubbard's guilty plea was silent as to his intent." Hubbard, 60 Va. App. at 210, 725 S.E.2d at 168.
The Commonwealth has urged the Court to take into consideration Taylor's credibility, or lack thereof, as well as the evidence in the record that could potentially support a finding that Taylor was a principal in the second degree. Hubbard illustrates that these are not proper considerations for the withdrawal of a guilty plea, however. Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 200, 210, 725 S.E.2d 163, 167-68 (2012) (discussing the elements of a reasonable defense and noting that "a defendant is entitled to place the credibility of any prior statements or sworn testimony in the hands of a jury if he so chooses"). The question before the Court in the instant case is whether a reasonable defense exists if a factfinder believes Taylor's version of the Incident.
Similarly, in this case the Stipulation of Facts presented to the Court in support of Taylor's guilty plea admits that Taylor has always maintained that he lacked knowledge of the robbery and killing prior to the Incident. Although the stipulation indicates Taylor "knew something was up," there is no representation that he knew the nature of what was going to happen or even when the Incident would occur. Although the Commonwealth argues that the Court should disregard the Stipulation of Facts in this case, Hubbard demonstrates that a court may properly consider a statement submitted by the parties in support of a guilty plea, and, in particular, anything in that statement that addresses—or fails to address—the defendant's state of mind. Id.
If a factfinder believes Taylor's version of events—as supported by the Stipulation of Facts—he cannot be held culpable as a principal in the second degree for Dean's murder. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 370, 373, 157 S.E.2d 907, 909 (1967) (discussing the intent required for a principal in the second degree). Taylor instead might be convicted as an accessory after the fact for aiding in the principal's escape—or even found not guilty of that charge if a factfinder believes his claim of duress. Taylor's intent therefore is a crucial matter in this case: it could be the difference between a conviction and a not-guilty finding, or the difference between a Class 2 felony and a Class 1 misdemeanor. The Court finds that Taylor's assertion that he lacked the requisite intent to be a principal in the second degree is a reasonable defense and not merely formal.
The Court also finds that Taylor entered his guilty plea inadvisedly. As courts have made clear, inadvisedly does not necessarily mean that Taylor received ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Justus, 274 Va. at 154, 645 S.E.2d at 289 (holding that "the proper granting of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea . . . is not dependent upon a determination that the defendant failed to received adequate legal representation from counsel"); Cobbins v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 28, 34 n.2, 668 S.E.2d 816, 819 n.2 (2008) (opining that the required standard to withdraw a guilty plea "does not require a showing that the guilty plea was involuntary in any constitutional sense or the result of ineffective assistance of counsel"). The Court also recognizes that many factors can play into a defense attorney's advice to a defendant regarding whether to plead guilty. As Hubbard makes clear, even when an attorney gives perfectly sound advice, a guilty plea can still be inadvisable if the defendant has a reasonable defense. 60 Va. App. at 205, 210, 725 S.E.2d at 165, 168. Hubbard also demonstrates that the defendant's knowledge of that defense prior to him tendering a guilty plea does not preclude withdrawal of the plea. Id. at 205, 725 S.E.2d at 165. Hubbard admitted that his attorneys had thoroughly explained the law to him and that he had always insisted he lacked premeditation. Id. As the Hubbard court noted, "The least surprise or influence causing a defendant to plead guilty when he has any defense at all should be sufficient grounds for permitting a change of plea from guilty to not guilty." Id. at 207, 725 S.E.2d at 166 (quoting Parris, 189 Va. at 325, 52 S.E.2d at 874). Even assuming Prior Counsel fully explained to Taylor the difference between a principal in the second degree and an accessory after the fact, this would not preclude a finding that Taylor's plea was entered inadvisedly. It also is possible that Taylor did not fully grasp or appreciate the difference between the two crimes despite his attorney's explanations.
In fact, evidence was presented that Prior Counsel effectively assisted Taylor. Prior Counsel testified that he advised Taylor regarding, inter alia, the legal theories of concert of action and accomplice liability, the difference between a principal in the second degree and an accessory after the fact, and the intent required to be a principal in the second degree. (Tr. 62:19-22, 72:9-13, 91:20-23.) Prior Counsel also testified that he had information indicating that Taylor may have exited the vehicle and participated in the robbery of Dean, which affected the advice he provided Taylor. (Id. at 86:12-878:12.)
As Taylor notes, the difference can be confusing. (Br. in Supp. 2 ("Many jurors, lawyers, and even trial judges have been mistaken about [accomplice liability,] as evident by convictions reversed on appeal due to insufficient evidence to support a Defendant being a Principal in the Second Degree.").) --------
Assuming without deciding that Taylor's Prior Counsel correctly explained the law to Taylor, the Court finds that Taylor's guilty plea was entered inadvisedly based on his reasonable defense.
C. Withdrawal of Taylor's Guilty Plea Does Not Significantly Prejudice the Commonwealth.
The Virginia Court of Appeals has held that another factor to be considered by courts when ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is whether the withdrawal significantly prejudices the Commonwealth.
In the context of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing, a defendant does not have an unbridled right to do so simply because he asserts that he has a reasonable defense and a motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be appropriately denied where the record indicates that there has been some form of significant prejudice to the Commonwealth.Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 200, 211 n.4, 725 S.E.2d 163, 168 n.4 (2012). Such prejudice might exist, for example, if the defendant acts in bad faith or engages in misconduct. Id. The Virginia Supreme Court has held that a trial court should weigh the equities of the case and may deny the motion to withdraw if it finds that the prejudice to the Commonwealth outweighs any equities in favor of granting the motion. Small v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 292, 298-99, 788 S.E.2d 702, 705 (2016).
Here, the Commonwealth claims that it has been prejudiced by Taylor's delay in bringing forward the Motion. It notes that approximately four and a half years have passed since Dean was killed; as a result, the Commonwealth alleges that there are witnesses who do not want to cooperate, a medical examiner who has relocated to Canada, detectives who have moved out of the area, and memories that have faded. The Court notes that significant delay, standing alone, can be a sufficient reason to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. See id. (upholding the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea based in part upon a four and a half year delay since the incident).
Although the Court finds that the delay in this case has been substantial and that the Commonwealth undoubtedly will be prejudiced by a withdrawal of Taylor's guilty plea, the Motion was filed shortly after Current Counsel entered the case, as discussed in the good-faith section above. The Court also notes that there were ten trial continuances prior to entry of Taylor's guilty plea, which delayed the original trial date from August 22, 2013, to December 3, 2015; five of those continuances were by joint motion, four were by Taylor's motion, and one was by the Commonwealth's motion. This time period constitutes the bulk of the delay. By contrast, just over a year elapsed between entry of Taylor's guilty plea and the filing of the Motion. Although four and a half years have passed since Dean's death, the Court finds that the time between entry of the guilty plea and filing of the Motion more accurately reflects the delay by which the Commonwealth allegedly has been prejudiced.
Although the instant case involves an overall delay period—from the time of the crime to when the Motion was filed—similar to that in Small, the delay between the entry of the guilty plea and when the Motion was filed in the two cases differs. In Small, the defendant ("Small") waited almost two years and eight months after entering his guilty plea to move to withdraw his plea, in contrast to slightly more than a year here. See id. at 295, 788 S.E.2d at 703. Small also never changed counsel and was aware of his available defense prior to pleading guilty. Id. The rationale Small offered to support withdrawing his guilty plea was his decision that he would be better off presenting a defense of necessity. Id. The court also found that Small did not raise a reasonable defense. Id. at 300, 788 S.E.2d at 706. In short, the case at bar is easily distinguishable from Small.
The Court ultimately must weigh the equities of the case to determine whether the prejudice to the Commonwealth justifies denying the Motion. Id. at 298-99, 788 S.E.2d at 705. Here, the Court finds not only that Taylor has raised a reasonable defense, but that his delay in bringing the Motion is attributable in large part to the timing of him acquiring new counsel, who clarified Taylor's potential liability. The Court also finds that Current Counsel's filing of the Motion only weeks after first appearing in the case did not appreciably contribute to Taylor's delay in moving to withdraw his guilty plea.
The Court therefore finds that—in light of the circumstances—the prejudice to the Commonwealth does not outweigh the equities in favor of granting the Motion
Conclusion
Because the Court finds that Taylor's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea is made in good faith, that Taylor has raised a reasonable defense and entered his plea inadvisedly, and that the Commonwealth is not significantly prejudiced by Taylor's withdrawal of his guilty plea, the Court GRANTS Taylor's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.
The Clerk's Office is directed to prepare an Order consistent with this Opinion and forward a copy to the parties. Counsel shall file any objections with the Court within fourteen days.
Sincerely,
/s/
David W. Lannetti
Circuit Court Judge DWL/ced