Opinion
373 MDA 2023 J-S45038-23
03-19-2024
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. SCOTT LEE SUTTON Appellant
Appeal from the Order Entered February 8, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-08-CR-0000613-2022
BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. [*]
OPINION
STEVENS, P.J.E.
The Commonwealth appeals from a pretrial order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County quashing two counts of Delivery of a Controlled Substance pursuant to Defendant/Appellee's habeas corpus petition seeking dismissal of the drug delivery charges and disclosure of the identity of the confidential informant ("CI"). We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The facts are straightforward. At Appellee's October 14, 2022, preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of Bradford County Detective Michael Lamana, a law enforcement officer with seven years' experience and who at the relevant time was assigned to the Bradford County Drug Taskforce. Detective Lamana described his involvement with two controlled buys executed by a CI inside of Appellee's residence on February 16, 2022, and sometime in March of 2022, respectively. In each controlled buy, the detective verified that no drugs or money were on the CI's person, supplied the CI with pre-recorded buy money, witnessed a transport officer drive the CI to Appellee's residence, and observed the CI enter the residence. Remaining at the scene for the entire time, Detective Lamana eventually observed the CI exit Appellee's residence, walk directly to the transport vehicle, hand over suspected methamphetamine, and undergo a personal search uncovering no other contraband or money. N.T., 10/14/22, at 6.
As is typical in such situations, no law enforcement officer, including Detective Lamana, witnessed the exchange of drugs for money that occurred inside Appellee's residence. Instead, the CI, alone, witnessed the exchange, and Detective Lamana's testimony related the CI's out-of-court statement to him identifying Appellee as the person who sold methamphetamine to him in the trailer. N.T. at 6, 7-11. Appellee's two delivery charges stem from the controlled buys described. Detective Lamana was available for cross examination.
Defense counsel moved to dismiss the charges on grounds that the Commonwealth relied entirely on inadmissible hearsay to make its prima facie case identifying Appellee as the methamphetamine dealer in the two controlled buys. N.T. at 11-12, 13. The magisterial district judge denied defense counsel's motion, concluding that the Commonwealth presented prima facie evidence as to each element of the crimes charged. Accordingly, he bound over all charges to the Court of Common Pleas.
On December 2, 2022, defense counsel filed an omnibus pretrial motion for habeas relief asserting, inter alia, that the charges must be dismissed because the Commonwealth had presented insufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing to make a prima facie case of the methamphetamine dealer's identity when it relied solely on inadmissible hearsay offered by Detective Lamana's testimony. Should the trial court deny the motion for dismissal, the omnibus motion requested disclosure of the CI's identity as essential to the preparation of Appellee's defense against the charges brought against him.
A pre-trial habeas corpus motion is the proper means for testing whether the Commonwealth has sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case. Commonwealth v. Dantzler, 135 A.3d 1109, 1111-12 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations and quotations omitted).
Commonwealth v. Harris, 269 A.3d 534 (Pa. Super. 2022), reargument denied (Mar. 14, 2022), appeal granted, 285 A.3d 883 (Pa. 2022).
The Commonwealth filed a brief in opposition to Appellee's pretrial motion in which it argued that it had presented prima facie evidence as to each element of the charges, including the identity of the dealer. It further contended that it retained a legally recognized, qualified right not to disclose the identity of its CI at the preliminary hearing, particularly where the defense had not filed a motion to disclose the CI's identity prior to the preliminary hearing.
In its order and opinion of February 8, 2023, the trial court determined that the lack of admissible direct evidence as to the identity of the individual who dealt methamphetamine to the CI required quashal of the charges filed against Appellee. In reaching this determination, the trial court relied on Commonwealth v. Harris, 269 A.3d 534 (Pa. Super. 2022), reargument denied (Mar. 14, 2022), appeal granted, 285 A.3d 883 (Pa. 2022), in which a panel of this Court held the Commonwealth may not rely solely on hearsay evidence at a preliminary hearing to make its prima facie case that the defendant was the person who committed the crime charged, even if direct evidence was offered to establish that the alleged crime occurred.
By per curiam order at No. 104 EAL 202, our Supreme Court granted the Commonwealth's petition for allowance of appeal in Harris and identified the issue to be raised on appeal as, "Whether the Commonwealth, based on constitutional or non-constitutional principles, is prohibited from proceeding to trial following a preliminary hearing where it presented non-hearsay evidence establishing elements of the crimes charged and established the defendant's identity through hearsay evidence from officers who personally interviewed the shooting victim in the immediate aftermath of the crime and to whom the victim identified his shooters by name and in the photographs."
See Commonwealth v. McClelland, 233 A.3d 717 (Pa. 2020) ("McClelland II"); Commonwealth ex. Rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 581 A.2d 172 (Pa. 1999).
Rejecting Detective Lamana's testimony regarding the CI's incriminating statements, the trial court reasoned that the remainder of the Commonwealth's evidentiary proffer at the preliminary hearing was insufficient to make a prima facie case of identity:
the Commonwealth did not present any evidence that Defendant possessed or delivered a controlled substance. There was no evidence that Defendant was in the residence at the time the CI entered. The only evidence is that the residence is the address on Defendant's license and probation plan. This does not give rise to the inference that Defendant was in the residence and does not give rise to the inference that Defendant possessed the controlled substance and delivered the controlled substance.
The charges are hereby quashed.Trial Court Order/Opinion, 2/8/23, at 6.
The Commonwealth filed the present appeal raising the following two related questions:
1. Did the Suppression Court err in granting the Writ of Habeas Corpus on the grounds/reasoning of Harris/McClelland?
2. Did the Suppression Court err in finding that the Commonwealth did not present a prima facie case at the preliminary hearing?Brief of Appellant, at 3
Addressing the merits of the Commonwealth's appeal, we note our standard of review. The evidentiary sufficiency of the Commonwealth's prima facie case for a charged crime is a question of law for which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. See Harris, supra (citing Commonwealth v. Wroten, 257 A.3d 734, 742 (Pa. Super. 2021)).
Initially, we sua sponte determine that we have subject matter jurisdiction over the Commonwealth's interlocutory appeal from a pretrial order dismissing charges on a pretrial habeas petition asserting a lack of evidence. See Harris, 269 A.3d at 538-39 (concluding that binding precedential authority holds that jurisdiction attaches even though the Commonwealth could have opted to refile charges after an order granting a petition for habeas relief for want of evidence).
This Court has explained,
The preliminary hearing is not a trial and serves the principal function of protecting the accused's right against an unlawful arrest and detention. At a preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving the prima facie case, which is met when it produces evidence of each of the material elements of the crime charged and establishes probable cause to warrant the belief that the accused committed the offense. The
evidence supporting a prima facie case need not establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but must only demonstrate that, if presented at trial and accepted as true, the judge would be warranted in permitting the case to proceed to a jury.Wroten, 257 A.3d at 742 (citations omitted and formatting altered); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 542(D) (stating that "[a]t the preliminary hearing, the issuing authority shall determine from the evidence presented whether there is a prima facie case that (1) an offense has been committed and (2) the defendant has committed it").
The first question raised in the case sub judice is whether the trial court correctly ruled that under controlling authority the Commonwealth may not rely solely on hearsay evidence to make a prima facie showing at a preliminary hearing that a defendant perpetrated the crimes charged, even where it otherwise presents direct evidence that the crimes occurred. See TCO, 2/9/23, at 6. As noted, the trial court relied in substantial part upon this Court's recent opinion in Harris, where a panel of this Court addressed this very question by examining Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 542(E) and interpretive decisional law.
Pursuant to Rule 542(E) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure,
hearsay as provided by law shall be considered by the issuing authority in determining whether a prima facie case has been established. Hearsay evidence shall be sufficient to establish any element of an offense, including, but not limited to, those requiring proof of the ownership of, non-permitted use of, damage to, or value of property.Pa.R.Crim.P. 542(E).
A statement is hearsay if made out of court and offered in court for the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 255 A.3d 452, 458 (Pa. 2021); Pa.R.E. 801(c) (defining hearsay as "a statement that the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing" and "a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.").
In Harris, this Court determined that Pennsylvania Supreme Court jurisprudence on Rule 542(E) prohibited the Commonwealth from relying solely on hearsay evidence at a preliminary hearing to make its prima facie case that the defendant was the person who committed the crime charged, even if direct evidence established that the alleged crime occurred. Harris, 269 A.3d at 536. Because the Commonwealth had relied on hearsay evidence alone to identify and implicate defendant Harris, this Court concluded there was "insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case as to each element at the preliminary hearing."
See Commonwealth v. McClelland, 233 A.3d 717 (Pa. 2020) ("McClelland II") and Commonwealth ex. Rel. Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 581 A.2d 172 (Pa. 1999), discussed infra.
There is no dispute that to identify Appellee as the perpetrator of the charged offenses, the Commonwealth relied on Detective Lamana's hearsay testimony relating the CI's out-of-court statements offered for the truth of the matter they asserted, namely, that Appellee was the dealer in the two controlled buys.
The Commonwealth argues that it made a prima facie showing of Appellee's identity through the detective's testimony that the inescapable inference was that Appellee was the person dealing methamphetamine from his own trailer. At the preliminary hearing, however, Detective Lamana ultimately conceded that it was the CI's out-of-court statements identifying Appellee as the dealer that formed the basis for the filing of charges against Appellee. See N.T. at 16.
The Commonwealth argues that to read in Harris a requirement that a prosecutor unilaterally must produce a CI at a preliminary hearing and, thus, disclose his/her identity at the earliest phase of a prosecution unduly brings about the unintended consequence of overturning longstanding precedent recognizing in the Commonwealth a qualified privilege to withhold a CI's identity for both the CI's own protection and society's interest in effective law enforcement.
Our Supreme Court "has repeatedly recognized the importance of the Commonwealth's qualified privilege to maintain the confidentiality of an informant in order to preserve the public's interest in effective law enforcement." Commonwealth v. Marsh, 997 A.2d 318, 324 (Pa. 2010) (OAJC) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Under the qualified privilege, not until a defendant demonstrates to the trial court that the request for disclosure is reasonable and that said disclosure of either the CI's identity or the contents of the CI's communications to law enforcement will be material to their defense may a court grant a motion to disclose the CI's identity. See Marsh (discussed infra).
We would be bound by the holding in Harris if the present facts involving the use of a CI fell squarely within its ambit. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McGogney, unpublished memorandum, 293 A.3d 610, *4 n.3 (Pa. Super. filed February 14, 2023) (citing authority holding "precedent (stare decisis) requires [a three-judge panel of this Court] to adhere to a ruling of this Court until it is reversed either by our Supreme Court or an en banc panel of [the] Superior Court"]). Harris, however, does not vitiate jurisprudence that has promoted an accountable, prescribed system recognizing a qualified privilege of keeping informants' identities confidential and permitting use of their statements to law enforcement at preliminary hearings. This is particularly so where, as in the present case, the Commonwealth certified with the trial court that the CI will be produced at trial and where defendant/Appellee had not established at the preliminary hearing that the qualified privilege rubric required disclosure because the information sought was material to the preparation of the defense and that the request is reasonable.
Per 210 Pa. Code § 65.37 (Non-Precedential Decisions (formerly titled Unpublished Memorandum Decisions)), non-precedential decisions filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value. See also Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (Citations of Authorities).
To apply Harris to the facts in the case sub judice would eliminate the qualified privilege of protecting the identity of confidential informants at the preliminary hearing stage of the proceedings. Moreover, as a policy matter, such a result would hamper the effects of law enforcement to enforce the laws against the illegal use of controlled substances.
This Court has recognized our Supreme Court's observations in Marsh on both the important public policy considerations warranting the use of CIs and the due process safeguards inherent in the procedures that apply to a defendant's request for disclosure of a CI's identity:
Under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 573, a trial court has the discretion to require the Commonwealth to reveal the names and addresses of all eyewitnesses, including confidential informants, where a defendant makes a showing of material need and reasonableness:
(a) In all court cases, except as otherwise provided in Rule 230 (Disclosure of Testimony Before Investigating Grand Jury), if the defendant files a motion for pretrial discovery, the court may order the Commonwealth to allow the defendant's attorney to inspect and copy or photograph any of the following requested items, upon a showing that they are material to the preparation of the defense, and that the request is reasonable:
(i) the names and addresses of eyewitnesses....
Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(2)(a)(i).
The Commonwealth enjoys a qualified privilege to withhold the identity of a confidential source. Commonwealth v. Bing, [551 Pa. 659, 713 A.2d 56 (1998)]; Commonwealth v. Roebuck, 545 Pa. 471, 681 A.2d 1279, 1283 n. 6 (1996). In order to overcome this qualified privilege and obtain disclosure of a confidential informant's identity, a defendant must first establish, pursuant to Rule 573(B)(2)(a)(i), that the information sought is material to the preparation of the defense and that the request is reasonable. Roebuck, supra at 1283. Only after the defendant shows that
the identity of the confidential informant is material to the defense is the trial court required to exercise its discretion to determine whether the information should be revealed by balancing relevant factors, which are initially weighted toward the Commonwealth. Bing, supra at 58; Commonwealth v. Herron, 475 Pa. 461, 380 A.2d 1228 (1977).
In striking the proper balance, the court must consider the following principles:
A further limitation on the applicability of the privilege arises from the fundamental requirements of fairness. Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way. In these situations[,] the trial court may require disclosure and, if the Government withholds the information, dismiss the action.
[N]o fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and other relevant factors.
Commonwealth v. Carter, 427 Pa. 53, 233 A.2d 284, 287 (1967) (quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-62, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957)).[Marsh, 997 A.2d at 321-322] Commonwealth v. Williams, 256 A.3d 43 (Pa. Super. filed May 20, 2021) (non-precedential decision).
Per 210 Pa. Code § 65.37 (Non-Precedential Decisions (formerly titled Unpublished Memorandum Decisions)), non-precedential decisions filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value. See also Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (Citations of Authorities).
We find it was error for the trial court to determine that production of the CI was required at the preliminary hearing under the facts of this case. Rather, authority pertaining to the use of confidential informants requires the balancing of the competing interests present in each individual case prior to deciding the issue of disclosure.
We do not discern in Harris a sweeping, policy-changing holding that would undo this entire area of carefully crafted law. To apply Harris here would substantially impair law enforcement's use of confidential informants and repeal a longstanding precedent of a qualified privilege requiring judicial review as to the disclosure of confidential informants' identities. Indeed, Harris did not involve the use of a confidential informant nor did Harris discuss the qualified privilege as to disclosure of a confidential informant.
Here, the record shows the Commonwealth asserted that its prosecution of charges against Appellee would be dependent on the live testimony of the CI, who, it maintained, is willing to testify both to his/her observations made inside Appellee's residence during the two controlled buys and to his/her alleged statements made to Detective Lamana immediately after the controlled buys, consistent with the content of Detective Lamana's testimony at the preliminary hearing. This fact, alone, distinguishes the present matter from Harris, wherein the Commonwealth conceded that the victim of defendant Harris' crime indicated an unwillingness to testify. Harris at 548.
Moreover, the facts adduced at Appellee's preliminary hearing included Detective Lamana's admissible testimony that, at each controlled buy, he witnessed the CI enter Appellee's residence possessing only prerecorded buy money and exit the residence possessing only methamphetamine. This direct evidence established a connection between Appellee and the controlled buys that was lacking in Harris and McClelland II.
In Harris, this Court noted McClelland II's admonition against exclusive reliance on hearsay, where the Supreme Court explained, "The primary reason for the preliminary hearing is to protect an individual's right against unlawful arrest and detention. The preliminary hearing seeks to prevent a person from being imprisoned or required to enter bail for a crime which was never committed, or for a crime with which there is no evidence of his connection. . . . Harris, 269 A.3d at 546, quoting McClelland II, 233 A.3d at 736 (emphasis added in Harris).
The qualified privilege rubric also afforded Appellee due process safeguards that would enable pretrial disclosure of the CI's identity and the contents of his/her communications to law enforcement upon a demonstration that such disclosure was either essential to a fair determination of a cause or relevant and helpful to Appellee.
The qualified privilege predates the holdings of Harris and McClelland II, and neither decision addressed the use of CIs or indicated an intention of modifying the qualified privilege rubric. As qualified privilege jurisprudence has evolved over time, it carefully has considered the delicate balancing of important, competing interests unique to prosecutions advanced by use of CIs. In this regard, it has eschewed the use of a general standard or broadly applied rule in favor of engaging in a case-by-case assessment of facts within the qualified privilege rubric to determine whether disclosure and production of a CI in court is required. See Marsh.
Because nothing in the Harris decision addresses the distinct issues present in qualified privilege jurisprudence, we conclude that Harris does not control the case sub judice. Accordingly, finding no deficiency in the Commonwealth's evidentiary proffer at Appellee's preliminary hearing, we remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Bowes joins the Opinion.
Judge Lazarus files a Concurring Opinion.
Judgment Entered.
CONCURRING OPINION
LAZARUS, J.
I concur in the result, but write separately because, in my view, we need not address whether Harris 1 requires disclosure of a CI under the facts of this case. I agree with the Majority's recitation of our standard of review and the applicable standards of law and, thus, do not reiterate them here.
Briefly, at the preliminary hearing, Detective Michael Lamana, testified that he spoke with the confidential informant (CI), and learned that Scott Lee Sutton was dealing drugs out of his trailer at 47 Titus Lane. See N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 10/14/22, at 5-8. Subsequently, Detective Lamana confirmed that Sutton lived at that address because it was Sutton's verified probation address, as well as the registered address on his driver's license. See id. at 8-9. Detective Lamana further testified that he conducted two controlled drug buys. See id. at 6, 9-10 (Detective Lamana describing procedure used for CI's drug purchases). In each controlled drug buy, Detective Lamana verified that the CI had no drugs or money on their person, supplied the CI with pre-recorded funds to buy methamphetamine, witnessed the CI enter and exit the residence, recovered methamphetamine from the CI. See id. Additionally, Detective Lamana searched the CI confirming that the CI had no other contraband or money. See id.
While it is true that Detective Lamana did not personally enter the residence and witness the sale of drugs from Sutton to the CI, it is also true that Detective Lamana was able to verify 47 Titus Lane as Sutton's address through independent, non-hearsay evidence. See id. at 8-12. Moreover, Detective Lamana was able to testify as to how the drug buys were set up and conducted. See id. at 10-12.
In my view, the above testimony qualifies as sufficient verifiable non-hearsay evidence to satisfy the prima facie standard for a preliminary hearing set forth in McClelland II and Verbonitz.2 See Harris, 269 A.3d at 547-48 ("Commonwealth must present evidence that . . . establishes not only that a crime has been committed, but also that it was the defendant who committed it. . . . [H]earsay evidence can be introduced to corroborate direct evidence regarding an element of the crime or crimes charged.") (emphasis added); see also McClelland, 233 A.3d at 736 ("The preliminary hearing seeks to prevent a person from being imprisoned or required to enter bail for a crime . . . with which there is no evidence of [the defendant's] connection.") (emphasis added). Instantly, the above-testimony describes circumstantial non-hearsay evidence that directly connects Sutton to the sale of methamphetamine. Consequently, the Commonwealth did present non-hearsay evidence qualifying as sufficient verifiable non-hearsay evidence in accordance with our case law, and that evidence may be properly buttressed by the hearsay statements of the CI at the preliminary hearing. See McClelland, supra.
Accordingly, in my view, Harris is not implicated herein and we certainly do not need to decide, at this juncture, whether the CI must be disclosed. I do, however, concur in the result.
[*] Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.