Opinion
J-S58031-17 No. 1812 MDA 2016
10-10-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. CHAUNCY K. SHIELDS Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 4, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-21-CR-0002938-2015 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:
Appellant, Chauncy K. Shields, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury trial convictions for two (2) counts of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance ("PWID"), two (2) counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, and two (2) counts of criminal use of a communication facility. We affirm.
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) and (a)(32); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7512(a), respectively.
The trial court's opinion fully set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no reason to restate them.
Appellant raises three issues for our review:
DID THE COURT ERR WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT APPELLANT'S SENTENCE WAS NOT EXCESSIVE BECAUSE IT WAS WITHIN THE STANDARD RANGE FOR SENTENCING?(Appellant's Brief at 7).
DID THE COURT ERR WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE EVIDENCE PROVIDED BY THE COMMONWEALTH WAS SUFFICIENT FOR THE JURY TO FIND...APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM?
DID THE COURT ERR WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE JURY VERDICT WAS NOT SO CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AS TO SHOCK ONE'S SENSE OF JUSTICE?
Appellant failed to include a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement in his appellate brief, but the Commonwealth did not object. See Commonwealth v. Robertson , 874 A.2d 1200, 1211 (Pa.Super. 2005) (stating when defendant fails to include a Rule 2119(f) statement in appellate brief, and Commonwealth has not objected, this Court can overlook omission and review issue if substantial question is evident from appellate brief). But see Commonwealth v. McNear , 852 A.2d 401, 408 (Pa.Super. 2004) (concluding sentencing issue is waived when defendant does not include Rule 2119(f) statement in appellate brief, and Commonwealth properly objects to omission).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Merle L. Ebert, Jr., we conclude Appellant's issues merit no relief. The trial court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions presented. ( See Trial Court Opinion, filed January 11, 2017, at 6-15) (finding: (1) Appellant's sentences were within standard range of sentencing guidelines; court had benefit of presentence investigation ("PSI") report and commentary from counsel and Appellant when it sentenced Appellant; PSI report indicated Appellant had prior record score of 5 and lengthy and recent criminal history, including guilty plea to felonies in 2011 and 2012; Appellant committed current offenses while on state parole; court sentenced Appellant on each count to standard range sentence based on his prior record score; court would have been justified in imposing aggravated range sentence, because Appellant committed offenses less than 100 days after he was released from prison; when it sentenced Appellant, court considered PSI report, Appellant's background, need to protect public, gravity of offenses, and Appellant's rehabilitative needs; court did not have to state reasons for deviating from the absolute bottom of standard range when imposing Appellant's sentence; (2) evidence demonstrated that on April 14, 2015, and April 15, 2015, Appellant met CI and gave CI crack cocaine in exchange for money; CI testified she knew Appellant as drug dealer; CI testified she had used heroin and crack cocaine before she became informant; undercover officers observed Appellant meet with CI on April 14, 2015, and April 15, 2015; after meetings, CI provided police with baggies containing substance, which Appellant stipulated was cocaine; police found no other substance when they searched CI and her vehicle before and after transactions; CI called same telephone number immediately before each transaction to set up deals and both times she spoke with same person whom she identified as Appellant; Appellant was identified as individual who arrived to carry out drug transactions; jury could reasonably infer that CI called Appellant and arranged purchase of crack cocaine from him; evidence was sufficient for jury to convict Appellant of charges; (3) jury was able to evaluate credibility of all witnesses and to weigh evidence; testimony and evidence summarized in discussion of Appellant's sufficiency claim showed CI called Appellant on two separate occasions, arranged to meet with him to buy cocaine, and met and bought cocaine from him twice; verdict was not against weight of evidence). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion.
The law does not require the sentencing court to echo the words of the Sentencing Code, reciting every factor under Section 9721(b); instead, the record as a whole must reflect the court's consideration of the statutory factors in light of the facts of the offenses and the offender's character. Commonwealth v. Ventura , 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal denied, 604 Pa. 706, 987 A.2d 161 (2009) (reiterating sentencing court can satisfy requirement to place on record reasons for imposing particular sentence by indicating court has considered PSI and weighed all relevant statutory factors). --------
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 10/10/2017
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