Opinion
21-P-314
04-26-2022
COMMONWEALTH v. Steven M. SEVERINO, Jr.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
Following a jury-waived trial, the defendant, Steven Severino, Jr., was convicted of animal cruelty, in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 77. The defendant argues on appeal that the Commonwealth's evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm.
Background. We recite the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979). At approximately 9:20 P.M. on September 3, 2018, police officers were dispatched to a home in Everett for a report of an animal being abused and "crying loudly." When the officers arrived, they observed a still dog lying on the ground; the dog's tongue was out, blood was leaking from her mouth, and she appeared to be dead.
On the scene, the officers identified and spoke to the 911 caller, a local resident whose teenage child was playing outside and heard the sound of a yelping animal. The officers spoke to the defendant, who was on the scene, and he informed them that the dog, Coco, belonged to his girlfriend, and that he was trying to take her for a walk to a park in order "to get the dog to like him." The defendant explained that the dog "attack[ed] him all the time" and showed the officers scratches on his hands. He stated that, during their walk, Coco got out of her harness and ran away. The defendant denied injuring Coco and claimed to have found her after she was already dead. During this conversation, the officers noticed the defendant was sweating, nervous, and pacing.
The defendant later informed the officers that, prior to taking Coco out for a walk, she defecated in his bedroom.
Following his conversation with the officers, the defendant was placed under arrest for animal cruelty and taken to the Everett police station where Detective Jason Leonard interviewed him. A recording of the interview was admitted at trial. During this interview, the defendant reiterated that Coco had slipped from her leash in the park and ran behind an apartment building. He claimed to have found Coco at the bottom of a four to five step stairwell behind that building. Detective Leonard obtained surveillance footage that depicted the defendant with Coco on the night of the incident. In several surveillance videos, which were also admitted in evidence, the defendant can be seen ostensibly dragging Coco by her leash and harness at 9:21 P.M. , and then carrying her in an alleyway ten seconds prior to 9:22 P.M. The defendant reemerges in the surveillance footage at 9:24 P.M. , carrying Coco, who already appeared to be lifeless. In the last surveillance video, the defendant can be seen placing Coco down in the street and attempting to perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on her for a brief period of time.
As noted, at the time of incident, a neighborhood teenager and her friend were playing outside. The local teenager, who herself had a dog, testified that she heard yelping coming from a house located behind and to the right of her house, and that she believed the noise was coming from a dog. She testified that the yelping lasted approximately fifteen to thirty minutes. The teenager further testified that while she heard the yelping, she also heard banging noises that sounded like something hitting a chain link fence. The teenager recorded the sounds on her phone, and those recordings were played at trial.
Dr. Kara Priest also testified. She performed an autopsy on Coco and found a large hemorrhage in the subdural space in Coco's head, multiple rib fractures, and hemorrhaging in Coco's chest, liver, and eye. Dr. Priest opined that Coco's death was due to blunt force trauma. Following the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, the defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty. The motion was denied, and after the defendant's case-in-chief, where he called his girlfriend, Coco's owner, as his sole witness, the judge found him guilty of animal cruelty. This appeal followed.
Dr. Priest testified that blunt force trauma is "any impact that can cause major damage to a vessel to create a large pooling of blood."
Discussion. In reviewing a denial of a motion for a required finding of not guilty, we apply the familiar standard and "ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ " Commonwealth v. Perez, 460 Mass. 683, 702 (2011), quoting Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677. "The inferences that support a conviction ‘need only be reasonable and possible; [they] need not be necessary or inescapable.’ " Commonwealth v. Waller, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 295, 303 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 713 (2014).
Pursuant to G. L. c. 272 § 77, "[w]hoever ... cruelly beats, mutilates or kills an animal ... shall be punished." "Cruelty is ‘[s]evere pain inflicted upon an animal ... without any justifiable cause.’ " Commonwealth v. Whitson, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 798, 803 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Zalesky, 74 Mass. App. Ct. 908, 909 (2009). "The Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant ‘intentionally and knowingly [committed] acts [that] were plainly of a nature to inflict unnecessary pain.’ " Whitson, supra, quoting Zalesky, supra. "The defendant's guilt [does] not depend upon whether he thought he was unnecessarily cruel, but upon whether he was so in fact." Commonwealth v. Linhares, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 819, 825 (2001), quoting Commonwealth v. Magoon, 172 Mass. 214, 216 (1898). Direct evidence of the defendant's guilt is not required. See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 99, 103-104 (2001). "A conviction may be properly based entirely on circumstantial evidence so long as that evidence establishes the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 103, quoting Commonwealth v. Martino, 412 Mass. 267, 272 (1992). Here, the defendant contends that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an intentional act caused the blunt force trauma to Coco or that he was the one who committed the act. The argument is meritless. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, there was sufficient evidence for the judge, as factfinder, to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally inflicted unnecessary pain on Coco. See Whitson, supra at 803.
At trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence that the defendant was the last person with Coco immediately prior to her death. Surveillance cameras recorded Coco and the defendant in the immediate vicinity of the same street where a teenager heard a dog yelping for approximately fifteen to thirty minutes, as well as a sound of something banging on a chain link face. Furthermore, Dr. Priest testified that Coco suffered from numerous injuries in various places on her body, and that the cause of her death was blunt force trauma. Further evidence revealed that Coco went to the vet a week prior to the incident where she received a "clean bill of health." Contrary to the defendant's contention, and notwithstanding the lack of direct evidence, a rational factfinder could infer from this testimony that Coco's injuries were not self-inflicted or accidental but were the product of an intentional act by the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Grandison, 433 Mass. 135, 141 (2001) ("The government need not exclude every possible hypothesis embracing innocence to prove its case").
The defendant argues that, even if there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Coco was intentionally injured, the Commonwealth must do more than rely on his presence at the scene and his opportunity to commit the crime to prove that he was the person who caused Coco's injuries. While "[m]ere opportunity to commit the crime or presence at the scene of the crime without other evidence is insufficient," Commonwealth v. Merola, 405 Mass. 529, 533 (1989), here, the Commonwealth presented more. In addition to the above-recited evidence, the Commonwealth also introduced evidence of the defendant's motive to commit the crime, namely that he and Coco did not get along, and that she frequently attacked him. Though not an essential element of the offense, "[t]he motive of a person who inflicts pain on an animal may be material to the issue of whether the acts of the defendant are criminal." Commonwealth v. Szewczyk, 89 Mass. App. Ct. 711, 715 n.6 (2016).
Furthermore, the Commonwealth introduced evidence at trial that arguably evinced the defendant's consciousness of guilt. Evidence tending to show consciousness of guilt includes "[e]vidence of flight, concealment, false statements to police, destruction or concealment of evidence, ... or similar conduct." Commonwealth v. Cassidy, 470 Mass. 201, 217 (2014). Here, for example, the Commonwealth's evidence showed that the defendant stated to Detective Leonard that Coco slipped from her leash and took off "like a bat out of hell," but the surveillance videos mostly depict the defendant dragging a slow or reluctant dog down the street. Moreover, the last surveillance video depicts the defendant in possession of Coco's leash after she was already injured, however the leash was later found some distance away, at the end of the defendant's street. Additionally, the defendant stated that, after he found Coco, he ran to get his girlfriend, but the surveillance videos do not show him running, and instead showed the defendant walking while carrying Coco after she appears to already be dead. This evidence, which tended to show that the defendant made false statements to police, coupled with the rest of the offered evidence, was sufficient to find the defendant guilty of animal cruelty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Montecalvo, 367 Mass. 46, 52 (1975).
The defendant argues that, because it is unclear from the video whether Coco was wearing the leash and harness after she was injured, the fact that the defendant was carrying the leash does not demonstrate a consciousness of guilt because it does not prove that he lied about Coco escaping the leash. We disagree. A reasonable inference to be drawn from the fact that the defendant possessed the leash after he claimed to have found Coco, and then disposed of it in a separate location, is that he did so to fabricate the story that Coco had run away from him. See Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 442 Mass. 135, 140 (2004), quoting Commonwealth v. Bush, 427 Mass. 26, 30 (1998) (inferences drawn from evidence "need only be reasonable and possible"); Commonwealth v. Toney, 385 Mass. 575, 584 n.4 (1982) (concealment of evidence may be evidence of consciousness of guilt).
Judgment affirmed.