Opinion
J-S46027-19 No. 76 EDA 2019
06-23-2020
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. SANDRA ROMAN Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 30, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-SA-0000282-2017 BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J. MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Sandra Roman appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following her de novo conviction of ten improper vehicle title transactions. She chiefly asserts that the search of her title records was illegal because the investigating state trooper should have first obtained a search warrant. She claims the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress. Roman also challenges the weight of the evidence, and certain evidentiary rulings. We affirm.
Specifically, the trial court found Roman guilty of three counts of violating 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1111(b)-Transfer of Ownership of Vehicles, three counts of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1119(b)-Application of Certificate of Title by Agent, one count of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1119(c)(l)- Persons Not Authorized to Hold Certificate of Title, and three counts of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1161(b) - Certificate of Salvage Required. Roman was previously convicted of the same offenses in magisterial district court.
We derive the facts of the case from the trial court opinion and our own independent review of the record. For a more detailed explanation of the particular facts at issue in each of the ten citations, we respectfully refer the reader to the trial court opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/27/19, at 1-35.
Appellant Sandra Roman is the manager of the A to Z Auto business in Allentown, Pennsylvania. As a statutory requirement to act as an agent in vehicle title business for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT), A to Z Auto had executed an Agent Services Agreement with PennDOT. Notably, in section 26 of the Agreement PennDOT reserved the right to perform audits and inspections of documents related to the performance of title services by the agent.
The Agreement was signed on October 17, 2011 by Milagros Roman, d/b/a A to Z Auto. Milagros is the mother of Appellant Sandra Roman and her sister, fellow employee, Julisa Roman. See N.T. Summary Appeal, 9/28/18, at 7; see also Trial Court Opinion, 2/27/19, infra at 3.
Roman's convictions arose out of the discovery of ten sets of improper vehicle title documents, which Pennsylvania State Trooper Mark Rode, a vehicle fraud investigator, obtained on site at A to Z Auto's place of business. Trooper Rode took the records after first responding to an unrelated consumer complaint of delay in the transfer of title.
The initial investigation of title delay was closed without citation.
The trial court summarized the basic facts of the case as follows:
Trooper Rode testified that as a vehicle fraud investigator his duties include "inspecting notaries, car dealers, inspection garages, just making sure they adhere to the Commonwealth rules and regulations as inspection stations, as notaries and the care business . . . and make sure that the titles are performed -- are executed properly." Trooper Rode testified that on the afternoon of June 19, 2017, he went to A to Z Auto, to investigate a specific complaint (unrelated to this case), but that it is also his policy to inspect all the records of the facility. Trooper Rode indicated that part of his job is to do "random audits and inspections" of motor vehicle businesses. There [at A to Z Auto] he met with Julisa Roman, the Appellant's sister, who he asked to see the records related to vehicle tags and the titles for all vehicles that are held for sale. He further testified that Julisa Roman provided him with documents related to vehicle tags, but said that Appellant, Sandra Roman, handled the title documents. Trooper Rode indicated that Julisa Roman called Appellant and asked her to come to the scene [at A to Z Auto].Trial Court Opinion, at 1-3 (record citations omitted).
Appellant [Sandra Roman] testified that she is the manager for A to Z Auto. Trooper Rode testified that when Appellant arrived, he told her that he wanted to review the title records to make sure A to Z Auto was in compliance with PennDOT requirements. Trooper Rode testified that he had authority under the audit provision of the Agent Services Agreement with PennDOT and under 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308 - Investigation by police officers. Trooper Rode testified that Appellant initially did not comply, but thereafter provided him with the documents that are the subject of the ten citations in this case.
On inspection, Trooper Rode found numerous irregularities in the title documents. For example, several of the titles were signed by the seller, but not the buyer, which constitutes an "open" title not permitted by the applicable legal requirements that require simultaneous execution. The trial court denied Roman's motion to suppress the title records.
At trial, Roman offered to submit various affidavits from her customers, who were vehicle owners. Several of these affidavits were prepared three months after the fact, and asserted that Roman was in their "employ" for purposes of repairing or servicing their vehicles. Roman argued that these affidavits eliminated the requirement of title transfer. Roman proffered the affidavits to show the affiants' "state of mind." See Appellant's Brief, at 15; see also Pa.R.E. 803(3). None of the affiants was present at the trial. The trial court sustained the Commonwealth's objection that the affidavits were inadmissible hearsay.
Roman testified on her own behalf. Her sister Julisa and Trooper Rode also testified. Roman offered various, and sometimes changing, explanations of why her title records were defective. However, she could not provide any documentation to support her claims.
The trial court repeatedly found Trooper Rode's testimony to be credible and Appellant's testimony not credible. As a result, it convicted her of ten violations, and sentenced her to pay $2,300 in fines, plus court costs. Roman did not file a post-sentence motion. This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
It bears noting that Roman originally presented twenty-six claims in the Rule 1925(b) statement of errors. See Concise Statement of Errors, 1/31/19; see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Roman presents four overlapping questions and five sub-questions for our review. We reproduce them verbatim except for the omission of unnecessary capitalization.
I. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress the evidence, the certificates of title and salvage, as fruits of an illegal search by trooper?
A. Did Trooper require a search warrant to perform a search of the certificates of title in Appellant's possession?
B. Did any applicable exceptions exist to allow Trooper to conduct his search of the vehicle titles without a search warrant?
II. Did the trial court err in finding defendant guilty in citations T 4235350-0, T 4235487-5, T 4235544-5, and T-4235546-0 of violating 75 Pa. C.S. § 1119(b)(1) and §1119(c)1?
A. Did the trial court err in sustaining the Commonwealth's objection to Appellant entering into evidence an affidavit from the owner of the vehicle that is the subject of Citation T 4235350-0, which demonstrated that Appellant was in the employ of the owner and was therefore permitted to hold the Certificate of Title despite it not being in Appellant's name under 75 Pa. C.S. § 1119(c)(1)?
B. Did the trial court err in finding Appellant guilty of Citation T 4235487-5, of violating 75 Pa. C.S. § 1119(b)(1) because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence?
C. Did the trial court err in finding Appellant guilty at Citations T 4235544-5, and T-4235546-0 by sustaining the Commonwealth's objections to Appellant offering Affidavits from the vehicle owners into evidence showing that Appellant [was] in the employ of the owners and therefore permitted under §1119(b)(1) to hold the titles?
Appellant's Brief, at 8-11.
III. Did the trial court err in finding Appellant guilty of violating 75 Pa.C.S. §1161(b) in citations T 4235489-6, T 4235488-5, and T-4235545-6, when the verdict was against the weight of the evidence as it found Appellant guilty of conduct not expressed in the statute?
IV. Did the trial court err in finding Appellant guilty of 75 Pa. C.S. §1111(b) at citations T 5351-1, T 4235541-2, and T 4235432-5?
Primarily, Roman claims the improperly completed, or incomplete, certificates of title were the fruits of an illegal search, because Trooper Rode should have obtained a search warrant before obtaining and examining the records. She further asserts that the trial court erroneously denied her motion to suppress.
Our review of Roman's challenge to the denial of her motion to suppress is guided by the following legal principles.
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the prosecution prevailed in the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the factual findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn from them are in error.Commonwealth v. Van Winkle , 880 A.2d 1280, 1282-83 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations omitted).
The trial court concluded that Trooper Rode's search was authorized under two independent bases. First, the court determined that the Agent Services Agreement with PennDOT established Roman's consent to the search. Roman disputes that the Agent Services Agreement authorized the trooper to examine vehicle records without obtaining a search warrant.
Resolution of this issue therefore requires interpretation of the Agent Services Agreement. The interpretation of a contract "is a matter of law and an appellate court need not defer to the conclusions of the trial court. Moreover, when the terms of a contract are clear and unequivocal, meaning must be determined from the language itself." Beemus v. Interstate Nat. Dealer Services , Inc., 823 A.2d 979, 982 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). Furthermore,
[w]hether a trial court properly interpreted a contract is a question of law and this Court's scope of review is plenary. We need not defer to the conclusions of the trial court and are free to draw our own inferences. In interpreting a contract, the ultimate goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties as reasonably manifested by the language of their written agreement.Liddle v. Scholze , 768 A.2d 1183, 1185 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citations omitted).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court, we conclude that there is no merit to this issue. The trial court opinion properly disposes of the question presented. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/27/19, at 17-20, (concluding that multiple paragraphs of the Agent Services Agreement supported a determination that Roman consented to unannounced audit of vehicle title records). We adopt the trial court's analysis as our own and affirm on that basis.
As the court properly concluded Trooper Rode's search was justified by the Agent Services Agreement, we need not reach Roman's challenge to the trial court's alternative basis for denying suppression. However, in the interest of thoroughness, we note that the court was correct in this context as well.
The court found that 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(d)(1) authorized Trooper Rode's search. In contrast, Roman maintains that section 6308 does not apply because the purpose of the investigation and search was not administrative, but rather to obtain evidence of criminal activity, citing Commonwealth v. Hudak , 710 A.2d 1213 (Pa. Super. 1998). See Appellant's Brief, at 24-27. We disagree.
Section 6308(c)(2) provides that any police officer may inspect the records that the statute sets forth in subsection (d). Subsection (d) identifies the records subject to audit as "records of the purchase, acquisition, sale and disposition of vehicles ..." Id. We agree with the trial court's conclusion that this statute provided authority for Trooper Rode to audit the title records.
Additionally, Hudak does not dictate a differing result. Hudak is distinguishable on its facts. Unlike Hudak , this was not an investigation of suspected trafficking in stolen auto parts. See Hudak , 710 A.2d at 1213, 1217. To the contrary, Trooper Rode, a vehicle fraud inspector with nine years of specialized experience, testified that he was engaged in a permitted routine administrative inspection to insure agent compliance with Pennsylvania law on title transfers. The trial court found his testimony credible. We defer to the credibility determinations of the trial judge who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' credibility. See Commonwealth v. Wright , 867 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2005). Appellant asserts, but fails to develop or support, an argument in support of her claim of pretext. See Appellant's Brief, at 24-25.
In her next issue, Roman challenges the trial court's decision to preclude the admission of the affidavits allegedly signed by her customers. The court found that these affidavits constituted hearsay, and that no valid exception to the rule against hearsay justified their admission. Roman argues that the affidavits were admissible as statements of the customers' states of mind at the time they transferred possession of their vehicles to A to Z.
A trial court has broad discretion to determine whether evidence is admissible and a trial court's ruling on an evidentiary issue will be reversed only if the court abused its discretion. Accordingly, a ruling admitting evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless that ruling reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support to be clearly erroneous. If the evidentiary question is purely one of law, our review is plenary.Commonwealth v. Belani , 101 A.3d 1156, 1160 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted).
Hearsay is "a statement that (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement." Pa.R.E. 801(c). It is not admissible as evidence unless an exception to the hearsay rule applies. See Pa.R.E. 802; see also Pa.R.E. 802, 803, 803.1, and 804. One of the exceptions to the rule against hearsay is the state of mind exception:
A statement of the declarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant's will.
Pa.R.E. 803(3).Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick , 204 A.3d 527, 532 (Pa. Super. 2019), reargument denied Apr. 23, 2019.
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court, we conclude that there is no merit to this issue. The trial court opinion properly disposes of the question presented. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/27/19, at 28-30 (concluding that the affidavits did not qualify under Rule 803(3) because they were prepared in contemplation of litigation and therefore lacked the required spontaneity). We adopt the trial court's analysis as our own and affirm on that basis.
In her final issue on appeal, Roman asserts that several of her convictions were against the weight of the evidence presented at trial. "A challenge to the weight of the evidence must be raised with the trial judge or it will be waived." Commonwealth v. Gillard , 850 A.2d 1273, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2004). In order to preserve a weight of the evidence claim, it must be raised either prior to sentencing in front of the trial court or after sentencing in a post sentence motion. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A). "As this Court concluded in Commonwealth v. Washington , 825 A.2d 1264, 1266 (Pa. Super. 2003), Rule 607 clearly requires that such a claim be raised initially by a motion to the trial court, and the failure to do so compels this Court to find the issue waived, even if it was ultimately addressed by the trial court in its Rule 1925(a) opinion." Gillard , 850 A.2d at 1277.
Roman did not file a post-sentence motion preserving this challenge, and the record does not reveal any other instance where Roman preserved this issue for our review. As a result, all of Roman's challenges to the weight of the evidence are waived for failure to raise them in a timely manner with the trial court. See Gillard , 850 A.2d at 1277.
In any event, we note that the trial court concluded that Roman failed to demonstrate that the determination of guilt was so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice. See Trial Court Opinion, at 35. The court found Trooper Rode to be an honest and forthright witness, whose testimony was corroborated by the relevant documents. See id. In contrast, the court found that Roman's testimony was vague, implausible, and unsubstantiated. See id. We cannot conclude that the trial court's reasoning constitutes an abuse of discretion. --------
Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court's opinion.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Colins joins the memorandum.
Judge Olson files a dissenting memorandum. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 6/23/2020
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