Opinion
J-S12041-17 No. 672 MDA 2016
04-13-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. LING FONG RHODES, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 11, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, Criminal Division, No(s): 285-ICC-2016 BEFORE: PANELLA, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:
Ling Fong Rhodes ("Rhodes") appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after the trial court found her in indirect criminal contempt for violating a final Order entered pursuant to the Protection from Abuse Act ("PFA"), protecting her husband (hereinafter "Mr. R."). We affirm.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6114.
See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6101-6114.
The trial court thoroughly set forth the relevant factual and procedural history in its Opinion, which we adopt as though fully set forth herein. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/28/16, at 1-6.
Rhodes now presents the following issue for our review: "Whether the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was sufficient to establish that [Rhodes] violated the conditions of her PFA Order and had direct contact with M[.]B[.] or any of M[.]B[.]'s dependents?" Brief for Appellant at 4 (capitalization omitted).
M.B. is the daughter of Rhodes and Mr. R. M.B.'s minor daughter, C.R., was the person who had answered the phone call.
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying this test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder[,] unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that[,] as a matter of law[,] no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact[,] while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.Commonwealth v. Walsh , 36 A.3d 613, 618-19 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation and brackets omitted).
"A charge of indirect criminal contempt consists of a claim that a violation of an order or decree of court occurred outside the presence of the court. Where a PFA order is involved, an indirect criminal contempt charge is designed to seek punishment for a violation of the protective order." Commonwealth v. Baker , 722 A.2d 718, 720 (Pa. Super. 1999) (en banc) (citations omitted).
To establish indirect criminal contempt, the Commonwealth must prove: 1) the order was sufficiently definite, clear, and specific to the contemnor as to leave no doubt of the conduct prohibited; 2) the contemnor had notice of the order; 3) the act constituting the violation must have been volitional; and 4) the contemnor must have acted with wrongful intent.Walsh , 36 A.3d at 619.
Rhodes argues that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to meet all elements of indirect criminal contempt beyond a reasonable doubt, as it "was unable to prove where the phone calls in question were coming from, and who was making the alleged calls." Brief for Appellant at 7. Rhodes points to her trial testimony that, at the time the calls were made, she was confined at the Luzerne County Correctional Facility ("LCCF"), and purportedly "had no money on her books in order to make any calls out of the facility." Id. at 7-8. Rhodes further points out the testimony of M.B. that the caller ID showed that both phone calls were "out of area," and, according to Rhodes, "the residence that M[.]B[.] received these calls at was in Bear Creek, Pennsylvania, which is in the same county as the LCCF." Id. at 8. Finally, Rhodes argues that Trooper Robert Urban did not make an inquiry of the telephone company as to the source of the telephone calls in question. Id.
Rhodes challenges only one element of indirect criminal contempt, namely, her identity as the caller. "It is settled law that a witness may testify to a person's identity from h[er] voice alone." Commonwealth v. Jones , 954 A.2d 1194, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, "the weight to be accorded voice identification testimony is a question for the trier of fact." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
In its Opinion, the trial court concisely addressed all of the elements of indirect criminal contempt and determined that Rhodes's sufficiency challenge to the conviction lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/28/16, at 6-8. --------
C.R. unequivocally testified that she recognized her grandmother's (Rhodes's) voice on the telephone. N.T., 3/31/16, at 24-26. The trial court, as the fact-finder, expressly credited C.R.'s testimony, and found it to be more credible than the denial of Rhodes. See N.T., 3/31/16, at 48; Trial Court Opinion, 9/28/16, at 8; see also Commonwealth v. Furness , 2016 PA Super 298, *14 (Pa. Super. 2016) (stating that assessments of credibility and conflicts in evidence are for the fact-finder to resolve, and that this Court is not permitted to reexamine weight and credibility determinations or substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder). Moreover, even though no telephone records were presented to prove the source of the calls in question, the testimony of C.R. (and M.B.) was alone sufficient to prove that Rhodes was the caller. See Jones , 954 A.2d at 1197; see also Walsh , supra.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 4/13/2017
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