Opinion
J-S54038-16 No. 141 WDA 2016 No. 181 WDA 2016
12-26-2018
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JEFFREY DONALD PETERSON, Appellant COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellant v. JEFFREY DONALD PETERSON
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order March 4, 2014 in the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-20-MD-0000925-1992 Appeal from the PCRA Order January 6, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-20-MD-0000925-1992 BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OTT, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:
Jeffrey Donald Peterson ("Peterson") appeals, nunc pro tunc, from the March 4, 2014 Order denying his first Petition for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"). We affirm.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
This Court previously set forth the relevant underlying history of this case as follows:
[Peterson] was charged on October 16, 1992, with two counts of criminal homicide-first-degree murder and one count of burglary in connection with the September 28, 1992 shooting of two victims. [Peterson] was found at the scene with a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head. The Commonwealth subsequently provided [N]otice it would seek the death penalty. On September 16, 1993, [Peterson] entered a plea of guilty to two counts of first-degree murder[,] in exchange for the Commonwealth entering a nolle prosse on the burglary charge[,] and withdrawing its intention to seek the death penalty. On November 3, 1993, the trial court sentenced [Peterson] to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment. [Peterson] did not file any post-sentence motion[s] or a direct appeal.Commonwealth v. Peterson , 118 A.3d 459 (Pa. Super. 2015) (unpublished memorandum at 1-3) (citations and paragraph break omitted, footnote added).
On January 17, 1997, [Peterson] filed a counseled PCRA [P]etition.[] ... On July 16, 1997[, the PCRA court] entered a Memorandum and Order which was docketed of record on July 17, 1997. The Order stated that the Court Administrator was directed to schedule an evidentiary hearing[,] and the record indicates that a copy was provided to the Court Administrator. For some unknown reason[,] that evidentiary hearing was never scheduled and that failure was not brought to the attention of the [PCRA court] by [Peterson's] counsel or anyone else until [Peterson] sent a letter to the Clerk of Courts[,] dated September 24, 2012[,] and docketed on October 2, 2012. ...
In his [first] PCRA [P]etition and at the PCRA hearing, [Peterson], citing his head injury, challenged his competency in 1993 to enter a voluntary, intelligent, and knowing guilty plea and challenged the effectiveness of his plea counsel for permitting the plea to be entered when he was incompetent. On March 4, 2014, the PCRA court issued a [M]emorandum and [O]rder denying relief on [Peterson's] PCRA [P]etition, based on its merits.
The 1995 amendments to the PCRA provided a grace period for the filing of a first petition until January 16, 1997.
This Court affirmed the PCRA court's March 4, 2014 Order, albeit on different grounds. Specifically, this Court held that Peterson's first PCRA Petition was untimely filed by one day, and that Peterson failed to invoke any of three timeliness exceptions at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). See Peterson , 118 A.3d 459 (unpublished memorandum at 7-8).
On March 31, 2015, Peterson filed a second PCRA Petition, invoking the newly-discovered fact exception to the PCRA's timeliness requirements, see 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9545(b)(1)(ii); claiming ineffective assistance of his first PCRA counsel for failing to timely file the first PCRA Petition; and requesting allowance to appeal the denial of his first PCRA Petition, nunc pro tunc. After holding a hearing on Peterson's Petition, the PCRA court entered an Order granting Peterson leave to appeal the March 4, 2014, Order, nunc pro tunc.
Thereafter, Peterson filed an appeal to this Court, nunc pro tunc, from the March 4, 2014 Order. The Commonwealth filed a cross-appeal, challenging the PCRA court's January 6, 2016 Order, which granted Peterson's second PCRA Petition, and permitted him to file a nunc pro tunc appeal of the PCRA court's March 4, 2014 Order.
On appeal, this Court reversed the PCRA court's January 6, 2016 Order, which granted Peterson's second PCRA Petition. Peterson , 158 A.3d 191, 2016 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3547, at *8 (Pa. Super. 2016) (unpublished memorandum). This Court explained that
Peterson's first PCRA counsel filed a detailed, albeit untimely, PCRA Petition and an appellate brief on behalf of Peterson[,] following the denial of PCRA relief on his first PCRA [P]etition. Therefore, contrary to the PCRA court's finding, Peterson's claim regarding first PCRA counsel's defective representation did not constitute "abandonment[,]" and fails to satisfy the "unknown facts" exception to the PCRA's timeliness requirements.Id. at *8-*9.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal, and ultimately reversed the Order of this Court. Commonwealth v. Peterson , 192 A.3d 1123 (Pa. 2018). Our Supreme Court concluded that Peterson's first PCRA counsel was ineffective per se, as counsel had filed Peterson's first PCRA Petition one day beyond the statutory time period for filing a PCRA petition. Id. at 1130. The Supreme Court concluded that Peterson had met the PCRA's timeliness exception set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Peterson , 192 A.3d at 1130-31. Consequently, the Supreme Court remanded to this Court to address the merits of Peterson's appeal of the PCRA court's March 4, 2014 Order, which had denied his first PCRA Petition. Id. at 1132.
Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) provides an exception to the PCRA's timeliness requirement where "the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not be ascertained by the exercise of due diligence[.]" 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). --------
Peterson raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the lower court err by finding that ... Peterson's [] plea was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered into where the
lower court misle[d] Peterson during the plea colloquy by advising him that, although he was pleading to a life sentence, he had a right to go before the Board of Pardons and have the life sentence modified to include a lesser, minimum sentence and an eligibility for parole?Brief for Appellant at 5.
2. Where Peterson suffered the violent destruction and removal of a substantial portion of the frontal lobes of his brain and other bullet[-]impact brain damage, did the lower court err by failing to credit the uncontroverted evidence and testimony from the only medical expert presented in the case[,] neuropsychiatrist Lawson Bernstein, M.D., that [Peterson] suffered a brain injury and damage that rendered him incompetent to make reasoned decisions, participate in his defense, and enter a knowing, voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty to two counts of first [-]degree murder?
As our Supreme Court has explained,
an appellate court reviews the PCRA court's findings to see if they are supported by the record and free from legal error. This Court's scope of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence on the record of the PCRA court's hearing, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, in this case, the Commonwealth. In addition, [t]he level of deference to the hearing judge may vary depending upon whether the decision involved matters of credibility or matters of applying the governing law to the facts as so determined.Commonwealth v. Fahy , 959 A.2d 312, 316 (Pa. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Peterson first argues that the PCRA court improperly concluded that his guilty plea was unlawfully induced. Brief for Appellant at 16. Peterson contends that at his plea colloquy, the trial court stated the following:
[I]f you receive a life sentence, your sentence is life. There is no minimum term at this point. As your attorneys have explained to you, probably, you have a right to go before the Governor's
Pardon Board during the time of this sentence, and ask them to set a minimum sentence so that your sentence is no longer life, but it's x amount of years to life. And then you have the right to ask to be paroled once your minimum sentence is served, but when you are sentenced, you have to go in with the understanding that right now your sentence is mandatory life, and there is no minimum, and that's up to the Governor's Pardons Board to handle at some time in the future.N.T. (Plea Colloquy), 9/16/93, at 32-33. According to Peterson, the trial court's statement was misleading, and instilled him a belief that his life sentence would be converted, in a later proceeding, to "x amount of years" as a minimum sentence, and a maximum sentence of life in prison. Brief for Appellant at 18. Peterson argues that the trial court's explanation led him to believe that there is a routine administrative process governing relief from a life sentence. Id. at 19. Peterson asserts that the trial court's statement was convoluted and mislead him regarding what is, in reality, "the extraordinary and extrajudicial right of the Governor ..., with the unanimous consent of the Board of Pardons, to grant a plea for executive mercy in the form of a pardon or commutation." Id. On this basis, Peterson asserts that he was misled by the trial court to accept the plea based upon the incorrect statements regarding the length of his sentence. Id. at 22.
In its Opinion, the PCRA court addressed Peterson's claim and concluded that it is not supported in the record. See PCRA Court Opinion, 3/4/14, at 19-20. We agree with the sound reasoning of the PCRA court, as set forth in its Opinion, and affirm on this basis as to Peterson's first claim. See id.
In his second claim, Peterson asserts that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary, because he was incompetent at the time of the plea. Brief for Appellant at 22. Peterson argues that the PCRA court improperly disregarded the only medical testimony and evidence in the case, which established that Peterson's brain injury rendered him "incompetent to make reasoned decisions, participate in his defense, and enter a knowing, voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty[.]" Id. Peterson directs our attention to undisputed evidence that he had suffered profound brain damage, "consisting of destruction to both frontal lobes of his brain[,]" after being shot in the face with a .357 caliber revolver. Id. at 23. Peterson further directs our attention to evidence that persons with his type of brain injury
are rendered compliant and appear to be cooperative and agreeable[,] even though they have little or no ability to actually look out for their own interest, weigh, reason, or consider alternative courses of action or risks and benefits associated with the actions they are agreeing to.Id. (citing N.T., 6/5/13, at 34-35).
Peterson states that the only medical expert to testify at the hearing was Lawson Bernstein, M.D. ("Dr. Bernstein"). Brief for Appellant at 24. According to Peterson, Dr. Bernstein presented evidence that the type of neurological and neuropsychological dysfunction suffered by Peterson "robbed him or severely diminished [Peterson's] capacity to engage in the type of decision-making that's described in the colloquy." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Peterson contends that the type of brain damage he suffered rendered him incapable of entering a knowing, voluntary and intelligent guilty plea. Id. at 26. Peterson argues that the PCRA court abused its discretion in disregarding Dr. Bernstein's uncontradicted testimony, and unduly relying upon the testimony of Peterson's former counsel. Id. at 27, 28.
"[A] plea of guilty will not be deemed invalid if the circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea disclose that the defendant had a full understanding of the nature and consequences of his plea and that he knowingly and voluntarily decided to enter the plea." Commonwealth v. Fluharty , 632 A.2d 312, 315 (Pa. Super. 1993). As this Court has explained,
"[o]ur law presumes that a defendant who enters a guilty plea was aware of what he was doing. He bears the burden of proving otherwise." Commonwealth v. Pollard , 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa. Super. 2003) (internal citation omitted). The entry of a negotiated plea is a "strong indicator" of the voluntariness of the plea. Commonwealth v. Myers , 434 Pa. Super. 221, 642 A.2d 1103, 1106 (Pa. Super. 1994). Moreover, "[t]he law does not require that [the defendant] be pleased with the outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty: All that is required is that [his] decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made." Commonwealth v. Anderson , 995 A.2d 1184, 1192 (Pa. Super. 2010).Commonwealth v. Reid , 117 A.3d 777, 783 (Pa. Super. 2015). In assessing the adequacy of a guilty plea colloquy and the voluntariness of the subsequent plea, "the court must examine the totality of circumstances surrounding the plea." Commonwealth v. Broaden , 980 A.2d 124, 129 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Instantly, the record supports the PCRA court's determination that Peterson entered a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent guilty plea, and that he failed to demonstrate a manifest injustice warranting the withdrawal of his plea. See PCRA Court Opinion, 3/14/14, at 3-17 (summarizing the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing), 26-27 (addressing Peterson's claim of an unknowing and involuntary plea). The PCRA court's findings are supported in the record, and its legal conclusions are sound. See id. We therefore affirm on the basis of the PCRA court's Opinion with regard to this claim. See id.
In his third claim, Peterson argues that his plea was unknowing and involuntary, because the trial court never inquired of Peterson whether he had considered the viability of all possible defenses, "as Peterson himself understood them." Brief for Appellant at 29. Peterson contends that,
[b]ased on the unique circumstances of this case, and indications that [he] might have some memory relevant to possible defenses, but definitely no memory of the alleged crime, the [trial] judge should have explored with [him] directly what he understood about potential defenses he might have raised and why he did not wish to pursue them....Id. at 31.
In its Opinion, the PCRA court addressed this claim and concluded that it lacks merit. See PCRA Court Opinion, 3/14/14, at 19 (stating that Peterson offered no testimony from himself or anyone else that he was not apprised of the defenses available to him), 20 (summarizing plea counsel's testimony that counsel discussed with Peterson all possible defenses, and that Peterson acknowledged during the plea colloquy that such discussions took place). Because the PCRA court's findings are supported in the record, and its legal conclusions are sound, we affirm on the basis of the PCRA court's Opinion with regard to this claim. See id.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 12/26/2018
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