Opinion
No. 792 C.D. 2013
12-12-2013
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. One (1) Maroon 1999 Acura Integra Vin #JH4DB7651XS001596 Appeal of: Richard Peters
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE COLINS
This matter is an appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County (the trial court) ordering forfeiture of a 1999 Acura Integra automobile (the Integra) under the act commonly known as the Controlled Substances Forfeiture Act (the Forfeiture Act), 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 6801-6802. The only issue before us is whether appellant Richard Peters (Appellant), who had no involvement in the drug offenses on which the forfeiture was based, was the owner of the Integra. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that he was the owner of the Integra and therefore reverse.
On May 15, 2012, City of Bethlehem Police Department officers arrested Justin Peters (Justin) for selling marijuana to a confidential informant. (Trial Court Op. at 3; Hearing Transcript (H.T.) at 4-6.) At the time of Justin's arrest, he was riding in the Integra, which was being driven by a female friend of his, and the marijuana sale occurred in the Integra. (Trial Court Op. at 3; H.T. at 6-7, 20.) Prior to this arrest, the officers had conducted surveillance of Justin since early April 2012 and had observed Justin selling marijuana on two other occasions, on April 10, 2012 and May 6, 2012. (Trial Court Op. at 2-3; H.T. at 3-6.) At the time of the May 6, 2012 marijuana sale, Justin was driving the Integra. (Trial Court Op. at 3; H.T. at 5-6, 19.) Justin subsequently pleaded guilty to violations of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (the Controlled Substance Act). (Trial Court Op. at 4, 9; H.T. at 8-9, 20-21.)
Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P.S. §§ 780-101 - 780-144.
When they arrested Justin, the officers seized the Integra. (Trial Court Op. at 4; H.T. at 9.) The Integra had been purchased by Appellant, Justin's father, in April 2012, approximately a month before Justin's arrest. (Trial Court Op. at 15; H.T. at 21, 24.) The Integra was registered to Appellant and was titled in Appellant's name. (Trial Court Op. at 4, 18; H.T. at 12, 14, 26-28.) Appellant, who was financially supporting Justin, purchased the Integra to provide Justin with a car to drive to work after Justin moved out of his parents' house. (Trial Court Op. at 14-15; H.T. at 24, 29.) The Integra was in poor condition when it was purchased, and Appellant performed mechanical work on it to make it drivable. (Trial Court Op. at 15; H.T. at 30, 36.) After the repairs were complete, the Integra was driven by Justin and kept by Justin at his apartment, and was not used by Appellant or any member of Appellant's family other than Justin. (Trial Court Op. at 15-18; H.T. at 9-11, 15-17, 29, 31.) Although Justin had a key to the Integra, Appellant also retained keys to the Integra. (Trial Court Op. at 4, 16; H.T. at 7-8, 24-25.)
On July 20, 2012, the Commonwealth filed a petition seeking forfeiture of the Integra. Appellant timely filed an Answer and New Matter to the forfeiture petition asserting that he was the owner of the Integra and seeking return of the Integra under the "innocent owner" defense provided by Sections 6801(a)(4)(ii) and 6802(j) of the Forfeiture Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 6801(a)(4)(ii), 6802(j). The trial court held a hearing on the forfeiture petition at which two witnesses, an officer involved in the arrest and seizure and Appellant, testified. At the hearing, there was no dispute that Justin had used the Integra in two marijuana sales. (Trial Court Op. at 11.) It was also undisputed that Appellant had no involvement in or knowledge of Justin's drug activities. (Trial Court Op. at 5; H.T. at 14, 25-26.)
On January 17, 2013, the trial court ordered the Integra forfeited to the Office of the District Attorney of Northampton County. The trial court held that the Commonwealth had shown that the Integra was used by Justin in committing violations of the Controlled Substance Act and had therefore satisfied its burden of proof for forfeiture under Section 6801(a)(4) of the Forfeiture Act. (Trial Court Op. at 9-11.) The court noted that there was "no evidence that Richard Peters knew or suspected that his son was using the Integra for any unlawful purpose." (Id. at 5.) The trial court, however, held that Appellant had not satisfied his burden of proving that he was the owner of the Integra and that he therefore lacked standing to assert the innocent owner defense. (Id. at 18.) The court found that Justin was the sole user of the Integra, and that Appellant "had purchased the Integra specifically for Justin and that he intended to allow Justin to keep the car indefinitely for Justin's personal use." (Id. at 15-16.) On this basis, the court ruled that Justin, not Appellant, was the true owner of the Integra. (Id. at 14-18.) On February 15, 2013, Appellant appealed the trial court's forfeiture order.
This appeal was to the Superior Court, which transferred the appeal to this Court pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 751. --------
Our review on this appeal is limited to examining whether the trial court's factual determinations are supported by competent evidence and whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Strand v. Chester Police Department, 687 A.2d 872, 875 n.12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997); In re One 1988 Toyota Corolla, 675 A.2d 1290, 1296 n.13 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996).
Section 6801(a)(4)(ii) of the Forfeiture Act prohibits forfeiture of a vehicle "by reason of any act or omission established by the owner thereof to have been committed or omitted without his knowledge or consent, which absence of knowledge or consent must be reasonable under the circumstances presented." 42 Pa. C.S. § 6801(a)(4)(ii). The burden is on the person asserting this innocent owner defense to prove that he is the owner of the vehicle, that he lawfully acquired it and that he had no knowledge of the unlawful activity and did not consent to the use of the vehicle for the unlawful activity. 42 Pa. C.S. § 6802(j); Commonwealth v. One 1988 Suzuki Samurai, 589 A.2d 770, 771-72 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991). Section 6802(j) of the Forfeiture Act provides:
Owner's burden of proof.--At the time of the hearing, if the Commonwealth produces evidence that the property in question was unlawfully used, possessed or otherwise subject to forfeiture under section 6801(a) or 6801.1(a), the burden shall be upon the claimant to show:
(1) That the claimant is the owner of the property or the holder of a chattel mortgage or contract of conditional sale thereon.
(2) That the claimant lawfully acquired the property.42 Pa. C.S. § 6802(j).
(3) That it was not unlawfully used or possessed by him. In the event that it shall appear that the property was unlawfully used or possessed by a person other than the claimant, then the claimant shall show that the unlawful use or possession was without his knowledge or consent. Such absence of knowledge or consent must be reasonable under the circumstances presented.
Whether the facts found by the trial court constitute ownership of a vehicle is a question of law subject to this Court's plenary review. One 1988 Suzuki Samurai, 589 A.2d at 772-73. Title and registration of the vehicle, while relevant to the issue of ownership, are not sufficient by themselves to prove ownership under the Forfeiture Act. Strand, 687 A.2d at 876; One 1988 Toyota Corolla, 675 A.2d at 1296. Who actually possessed and used the vehicle is also probative of ownership. Strand, 687 A.2d at 877; One 1988 Toyota Corolla, 675 A.2d at 1296-97; One 1988 Suzuki Samurai, 589 A.2d at 772-73. Possession alone, however, likewise does not constitute ownership. "[T]itle ownership, as well as actual possession, is only one element of ownership." One 1988 Toyota Corolla, 675 A.2d at 1296. Rather, the test for ownership is whether the claimant had dominion and control over the vehicle and the right to do with it as he pleased. Strand, 687 A.2d at 877; One 1988 Toyota Corolla, at 1296-97; One 1988 Suzuki Samurai, 589 A.2d at 772-73.
Here, the evidence and the trial court's findings established that although Justin was permissively using the Integra, Appellant, not Justin, had dominion and control over the vehicle. There was no suggestion that Appellant's title and registration were not genuine and legitimate. Appellant had purchased the Integra and taken possession of it, repairing it to make it drivable. Appellant testified that he did not make a gift of the Integra to his son (H.T. at 24), and there was no evidence that the Integra was bought or intended as a gift, rather than being provided as temporary financial support. There was no evidence that Justin had any involvement in the purchase, no evidence that Justin selected the Integra or any of its features, and no evidence that the Integra was specially suited to Justin's needs or unsuitable for later use by other family members. Nor could it be inferred that the Integra was a gift simply because Justin had possession of the vehicle, given the very short, approximately one-month period of that possession. Significantly, although Justin, not Appellant, was using the Integra, Appellant retained keys to the vehicle. (Trial Court Op. at 16; H.T. at 24-25). The trial court did not find that Appellant intended to relinquish his rights in the Integra or that he gave the Integra to Justin permanently to dispose of as he saw fit. Instead, it found only that Appellant "intended to allow Justin to keep the car indefinitely for Justin's personal use" and intended "to give the Integra to Justin indefinitely for his personal use." (Trial Court Op. at 15, 18) (emphasis added).
This case is thus significantly different from the cases where this Court has held that the person holding title to a vehicle was not the owner under the Forfeiture Act. In One 1988 Suzuki Samurai, the evidence showed that the title holder bought the vehicle as a gift for her daughter, where the daughter picked out the vehicle features, including color, transmission type and accessories, and the title holder had no significant contact with the vehicle after the purchase. 589 A.2d at 773 (title holder never drove the vehicle at all and "had only seen it a few times"). Unlike here, there was no indication in One 1988 Suzuki Samurai that the title holder retained keys to the vehicle after her daughter took possession of it. In Strand, One 1988 Toyota Corolla, and Shapley v. Commonwealth, 615 A.2d 827 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992), the title holder was found to be a "sham" owner or "straw party" who held title only on paper to shield the vehicle from forfeiture, not a genuine and legitimate purchaser of the vehicle who allowed a family member to use it. Strand, 687 A.2d at 874-77 & nn.9, 13 (title holder had no connection with the vehicle other than his name on bill of sale and title documents, and appeared to have multiple vehicles that he did not use and as to which he had little knowledge listed in his name); One 1988 Toyota Corolla, 675 A.2d at 1293-94, 1296 (evidence of title holder's purchase of the vehicle was incomplete, and user had total control over vehicle, described it as his and installed his own accessories in it); Shapley, 615 A.2d at 829 (vehicle was purchased and paid for by user, not title holder, user stated at purchase that title was being placed in title holder's name for "technical reasons," and title holder was incapable of driving the vehicle).
Because Appellant was the genuine purchaser of the Integra, as well as its titled and registered owner, and took dominion and control over it, and the evidence and the trial court's findings established only that he was permitting Justin to use it indefinitely and had not given it to him permanently, the trial court's holding that Appellant was not the owner of the Integra was in error. Accordingly, we reverse.
/s/_________
JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 12th day of December, 2013, the order of January 17, 2013 of the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County in the above captioned matter is REVERSED.
/s/_________
JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
DISSENTING OPINION BY JUDGE BROBSON
Because the majority reweighs the evidence on appeal and fails to defer to the trial court's credibility determinations with respect to Appellant Richard Peters' testimony, I respectfully dissent. I agree with the decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County (trial court) and conclude that the opinion authored by the Honorable Michael J. Koury, Jr., pursuant to Rule 1925(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, thoroughly discusses and properly disposes of the arguments raised on appeal to this Court. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court's order on the basis of Judge Koury's opinion issued in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. One Maroon Acura Integra, VIN JH4DB7651XS0011596 (Northampton County, Criminal Division, No. C-48-MISC.-1199-2012, filed April 30, 2013), a copy of which is attached to this dissenting opinion.
/s/_________
P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge
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