Opinion
No. 897 C.D. 2011
02-02-2012
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Bruce Niles/Church of Universal Brotherhood Appeal of: Bruce Niles
BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Judge HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge
This case was assigned to the opinion writer prior to January 7, 2012, when Judge Pellegrini became President Judge.
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE SIMPSON
In this appeal, Bruce Niles (Niles), trustee of the Church of Universal Brotherhood (Church), representing himself and the Church (collectively, Defendants) seek review of a summary conviction in the Court of Common Pleas of 37th Judicial District, Warren County branch (trial court). Specifically, the Defendants appeal a summary conviction for failing to connect the structures on the Church's property to the Farmington Township (Township) sewer system (Sewer System) in violation of the Township's Sewage Connection Ordinance (Ordinance). Defendants argue the trial court erred in entering a guilty verdict for a litany of reasons largely centered on their underlying contention that Township and the trial court do not have the authority to enforce the Ordinance. Upon review, we affirm.
Farmington Township Warren County, Pennsylvania Ordinance No. 090500-2, as amended by Ordinance No. 091608-1.
In 2000, Township passed an Ordinance requiring all property owners in the Township who own sewage producing structures within 150 feet of Township's Sewer System to connect such structures to the Sewer System. Thereafter, Township sent Defendants notification of the Ordinance and their need to conform. After Defendants refused to connect to the Sewer System, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, on behalf of the Township, filed a private criminal complaint against Niles and the Church for violating the Ordinance.
The Commonwealth's complaint stated Niles is president and/or agent of the Church and the Church owns property in the Township. Additionally, on the property, Defendants maintain sewage producing structures within 150 feet of the Sewer System, which are not currently connected. The complaint was docketed before a magisterial district judge, and a hearing ensued.
After a hearing, at which Niles appeared on behalf of himself and the Church, the magisterial district judge found Defendants in violation of the Ordinance and imposed a fine. The Defendants appealed to the trial court.
Five days before the summary appeal hearing, Defendants filed a motion for discovery and a motion to dismiss. In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argued: Township waited too long to bring a criminal complaint; the Church is not required to comply with the Ordinance because it is not a "person" under the plain meaning of the Ordinance; Niles cannot abide by the Ordinance because it would be a breach of his fiduciary duty to the Church and its grantor; and, Township is barred from bringing a criminal suit because it is limited to negotiating a commercial agreement with the Church to provide sewage services. Additionally, in Defendants' discovery motion, Defendants requested 25 categories of information and documentation related to the current dispute and the prior litigation between Township and Defendants.
At a hearing before the trial court, Niles did not appear nor did any representative of the Church attend. However, instead of dismissing the appeal under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 462(D), the trial court proceeded in Niles' and the Church's absence.
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 462(D) states: "[i]f the defendant fails to appear [at a summary appeal hearing], the trial judge may dismiss the appeal and enter judgment in the court of common pleas on the judgment of the issuing authority."
Before accepting any testimony, the trial court first considered Defendants' two pending motions. As to Defendants' motion to dismiss, the trial court determined the Ordinance, which applies to "any person, firm or corporation with a building ..." applies to the Church. See Ordinance No. 090500-2, §1. Moreover, the trial court determined based on the representations in Defendants' motion and Niles' supporting affidavit, the Church is a trust, and thus, a person for purposes of the Ordinance. Furthermore, as the Church's officer and trustee, Niles was properly made a defendant to the action in his capacity as the Church's representative. Therefore, the trial court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss. Additionally, the trial court denied Defendants' discovery request as untimely.
Thereafter, Township presented the merits of its prosecution. Specifically, Township presented the testimony of James R. Penley, Sr. (Penley), the vice chairman of the Township's board of supervisors. At the close of the evidence, the trial court determined the Church and Niles were in violation of the Ordinance. Therefore, the trial court ordered them to pay Township's costs of prosecution and a fine. Additionally, the trial court ordered Defendants to connect to the Sewer System. Defendants filed a notice of appeal.
In the Defendants' concise statement of matters complained of on appeal, they raised three main contentions. First, Defendants argued the trial court erred in hearing the complaint because it lacked subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Second, Defendants asserted the trial court erred in denying their motion to dismiss. Third, they claimed the trial court erred in entering a guilty verdict because: the Ordinance lacked the force of law; Penley committed perjury throughout his testimony; the trial court's presiding judge violated her oath of office; the Township did not meet its burden; and, Township and Church's relationship is of a commercial and voluntary nature, in which Township acted in bad faith.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court addressed each of Defendants' contentions. The trial court determined: Niles was properly named as a defendant as a trustee and officer of the Church; the trial court had jurisdiction; and, Niles and the Church violated the Ordinance. Furthermore, the trial court held that Defendants' remaining contentions were either not properly developed, had no support in the law, or were wholly meritless. Defendants appealed to the Superior Court, which transferred the matter to this Court for disposition.
This Court's review of an appeal from a summary conviction is limited to determining whether the trial court committed an error of law or whether the trial court's findings are not supported by competent evidence. Commonwealth v. Whiteford, 884 A.2d 364 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).
On appeal, the Defendants raise a series of arguments. Specifically, Defendants raise several claims regarding the propriety of the suit by asking whether: Township's complaint was intelligible; Niles was properly named as a defendant; Township had standing to sue; the trial court had jurisdiction over the Church's property; and, the Ordinance has the force and effect of law upon Church. Additionally, Defendants contend the trial court erred in dismissing their motion to dismiss, and in determining Township met its burden of proof. Furthermore, Defendants claim several improprieties occurred during the litigation including: the trial court failing to do its duty to eliminate controversy; Penley committing perjury; the presiding judge violating her oath of office; and, Township acting in bad faith and in conflict with the rule of law.
When a defendant appeals a summary conviction the trial court hears the matter de novo without a jury. Pa. R. Crim. P. 462(A). If a defendant fails to appear and the trial court determines the defendant is absent without cause, the trial court may dismiss the appeal, and enter a final judgment. Pa. R. Crim. P. 462(D); Commonwealth v. Slomicki, 733 A.2d 216 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001); Commonwealth v. Lowe, 698 A.2d 607 (Pa. Super. 1997). Accordingly, if a defendant fails to appear at the de novo hearing without cause and judgment is entered against him, the defendant's contentions are waived for purposes of appellate review. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal); In re Pet. for Atty. Ridgebury Twp. Auditors, 965 A.2d 314 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).
Here, Defendants did not appear before the trial court for their de novo hearing as scheduled. Although the trial court did not make a finding regarding Defendants' absences, it is evident the trial court considered Defendants' absence before entering a judgment. Therefore, the trial court was authorized to dismiss Defendants' appeal. See Slomicki. Moreover, it is noteworthy Defendants did not assert good cause existed for their absence at any time during this appeal or ask this court to open the record by remand.
Although not required, instead of summarily dismissing Defendants' appeal, the trial court held a hearing in absentia to consider the merits of the prosecution's complaint. See Commonwealth v. Kyle, 453 A.2d 668 (Pa. Super. 1982) (requiring an in absentia hearing pursuant to now replaced Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1117). Despite the trial court's consideration of Defendants' argument in their concise statement of matters complained of on appeal, Defendants did not attend the de novo hearing, and thus, failed to preserve any issues for appeal. Accordingly, as Defendants' failed to preserve any claims for review, each is dismissed as waived.
Moreover, even if Defendants' claims were preserved, we would be unable to conduct a meaningful appellate review at this time. See Commonwealth v. Spontarelli, 791 A.2d 1254 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). Not only is the record undeveloped as a result of Defendants' absence at the hearing, but Defendants' brief is also fatally insufficient. Specifically, while Defendants object to a litany of errors by the trial court, they do not rely on the record or cite any legal authority to establish a right to relief as required by Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c). To the contrary, Defendants present their contentions as vague conclusions supported by references to various "maxims of law." Thus, in addition to waiver resulting from Defendants' absence before the trial court, waiver is appropriate because the record and Defendants' briefing render review impossible. See Spontarelli.
Furthermore, upon review, the trial court did not err in determining Church and its trustee and officer, Niles, violated the Ordinance. The Ordinance states in pertinent part:
Section 1
Every owner of property in the Township whose property abuts upon any sewer system now or hereafter constructed by the Township or any other municipal authority shall connect, at the Owner's own cost, any house, building or other structure located on said property and occupied or intended for human occupancy having sewage produced thereon or emanating therefrom with such public sanitary sewer for the purpose of disposing all acceptable sanitary sewage discharged or produced from said property. Provided, however, that the public sanitary sewer shall be no further than one hundred fifty (150) feet from such house, building or other structure.
***
Section 10
In addition to any penalty hereinabove prescribed, any person, firm or corporation or its officers violating any provision of this ordinance shall, upon conviction by
action brought before a [Magisterial District Judge] in the same manner provided for the enforcement of summary offenses under the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure...Ordinance No. 090500-2 (emphasis added).
Here, according to Niles's submissions, the Church is a trust. Therefore, the Church is considered a "person" to which the Ordinance applies. See 1 Pa. C.S. §1991 (The rules of statutory construction, which are generally applicable to local ordinances defines a "person" to include "a corporation, partnership, limited liability company, business trust, other association, ... estate, trust, foundation or natural person."). Additionally, based on Township's complaint and Penley's uncontradicted testimony, the Church owns property within the Township abutting the Sewer System. Furthermore, the Church maintains buildings on its property intended for human occupancy, which create sewage waste. Also, the Church's buildings are within 150 feet of the Sewer System and are not currently connected to the Sewer System. Therefore, the trial court did not err in concluding the Church violated the Ordinance.
Defendants' objection to the trial court's in rem jurisdiction is meritless. Defendants claim the Church holds its property in allodium, thereby preventing the Township from asserting any control over its use. Although real property in Pennsylvania is allodial, as opposed to feudal, it has long been recognized the duties on a landowner proscribed by a positive statute or ordinance are enforceable by the State. Wallace v. Harmstad, 44 Pa. 492 (1862). "The truth is, that [these types of obligations], which [are] reciprocal to the right of protection, [result] out of the political relations between government and the citizen, and [bear] no relation whatever to [] land titles." Id. at 501; See De Jong v. County of Chester, 510 A.2d 902 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986) (per curiam) (challenge to the Commonwealth's authority under a statute based on allodial title is "wholly frivolous and a waste of the Court's time and resources."). --------
Likewise, according to the representations Niles made in his motions and supporting affidavit, Niles is an officer of the Church. Therefore, he may be liable under the Ordinance for the Church's violation. Thus, the trial court did not err in determining Township carried its burden to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Niles and Church were guilty of violating the Ordinance.
Accordingly, we affirm.
/s/_________
ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 2nd day of February, 2012, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of the 37th Judicial District, Warren County branch is AFFIRMED.
/s/_________
ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge