Opinion
No. 12–P–485.
2013-10-3
COMMONWEALTH v. MUNIUR M., a juvenile.
By the Court, (BERRY, KAFKER & GRAHAM, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
In this appeal, we must determine whether a then juvenile, who admitted to sufficient facts on a charge of statutory rape and was adjudicated delinquent, was properly granted a new trial. A District Court judge, who was not the judge who accepted the juvenile's admission to sufficient facts, allowed the juvenile's motion to vacate his admission and for a new trial on the ground that the admission was not voluntary.
Background. In March, 1992, the juvenile, then fourteen years old, was charged with rape of a child with force under G.L.c. 265, § 22A. He was alleged to have digitally raped a thirteen year old, white female student with whom he attended middle school. On September 15, 1992, he admitted to sufficient facts to warrant an adjudication of delinquency as to the charge of statutory rape. The judge ordered a presentence evaluation pursuant to G.L. c. 123, § 15( e ). After receiving the presentence evaluation, on October 20, 1992, the judge adjudicated the juvenile delinquent by reason of committing statutory rape, committed him to the Department of Youth Services, but suspended the commitment and placed the juvenile on probation for one year with conditions that included no contact with the victim outside of school. In March, 2011, over eighteen years after his admission to sufficient facts, the juvenile filed a motion to vacate his admission and for new trial. At the time of the juvenile's admission to sufficient facts, his father was in the midst of a highly publicized lawsuit against the city of Pittsfield. In the lawsuit, the juvenile's father, who is black, alleged racial discrimination, resulting in his termination from the Pittsfield Police Department in 1991. In his motion, the juvenile alleged that his father, concerned that the lawsuit would prevent the juvenile from obtaining a fair trial in Pittsfield, forced him to admit to sufficient facts. In support of his motion, the juvenile submitted, inter alia, the presentence evaluation, several newspaper clippings related to his father's lawsuit, and two affidavits, one authored by him and the other by his father.
In his affidavit, the juvenile claims that he made an admission to sufficient facts out of fear of his father and fear that a trial on the criminal charge against him might affect his father's lawsuit against the city. The father in his affidavit claims to have forced the juvenile “against his will” to admit to sufficient facts on a charge of statutory rape.
After a nonevidentiary hearing, a judge allowed the juvenile's motion, based in large part, on her oral finding that the presentence evaluation bolstered the credibility of the affidavits submitted by the juvenile and his father. The judge focused on those parts of the evaluation that noted that the juvenile was “withdrawn” when in his father's presence, but “more animate and responsive” when alone. The judge then concluded that the presentence evaluation “confirms that there was some type of coercion.”
Discussion. A motion to vacate an admission to sufficient facts is treated as a motion for a new trial. See Commonwealth v. Colon, 439 Mass. 519, 524 (2003). “Disposition of such a motion is within the judge's discretion, but ‘a rigorous standard must be applied and a judge may only allow such a motion “if it appears that justice may not have been done.” ‘ “ Commonwealth v. Hiskin, 68 Mass.App.Ct. 633, 637 (2007), quoting from Commonwealth v. Berrios, 447 Mass. 701, 708 (2006). “[A] guilty plea [or an admission to sufficient facts] is void if it is involuntary and unintelligent for any reason.” Huot v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 91, 96 (1973).
As in this case, where the motion judge was not the judge who accepted the juvenile's admission to sufficient facts and no evidence was taken on the motion, our review is de novo. Commonwealth v. Lykus, 451 Mass. 310, 325–326 (2008).
“A plea [or an admission to sufficient facts] is voluntary if entered without coercion, duress, or improper inducements.” Berrios, supra. However, “the stress inherent in entering [an admission to sufficient facts], such as the concern of possibly receiving a harsher sentence if a [juvenile] is tried and [adjudicated delinquent], and pressure from family members and from counsel, do not necessarily render [an admission] involuntary, and these considerations did not make the [juvenile's admission to sufficient facts] involuntary.” Ibid. See Commonwealth v. Quinones, 414 Mass. 423, 436 (1993).
Here, the motion judge's oral findings
do not support her conclusion that the juvenile was coerced into making an admission to sufficient facts. While the presentence evaluation supports the juvenile's claim that his decision to make an admission to sufficient facts was infused with consideration of his father's lawsuit, there is nothing in the evaluation to support the claim that the juvenile's father forced him to make the admission. To the contrary, the evaluation states that “[t]o the credit of both parents, however, they are appropriately concerned about their son and when it is blatantly pointed out to them that there was some wrongdoing, they acknowledge that and they indicate a willingness to do what is best for him.”
The judge did not make written findings. Before granting the juvenile's motion, the motion judge outlined her reasons for doing so, but did not explicitly make “findings.” However, when the prosecutor asked for written findings, the judge responded, “You can get a copy of the recording that I just gave.” Therefore, we treat the judge's statements before her ruling as her oral findings.
Conclusion. Accordingly, we conclude that, on this record, the motion judge erred in finding that the juvenile's admission was coerced. Therefore, we reverse the order allowing the juvenile's motion to vacate his admission to sufficient facts and for a new trial.
So ordered.