Opinion
14-P-691
11-03-2015
COMMONWEALTH v. TYRONE MILLER.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
On appeal from his convictions of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon against Tex Nartey and assault and battery against Natasha Sams, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient for a reasonable jury to find that he either intentionally or recklessly injured the victim Tex Nartey with scissors. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict on that charge. We also reject the defendant's challenges to the jury instructions and to the admission of certain evidence. We affirm.
In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we ask "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979) (quotation and citation omitted). Here, the jury could conclude, based on the evidence adduced at trial, that the defendant either intentionally or recklessly cut Nartey with scissors. The defendant was clearly the first aggressor; on October 2, 2012, he broke into the home and bedroom of Natasha Sams (the defendant's ex-wife) in the middle of the night, woke Sams and Nartey by screaming and yelling, threw Sams against a wall, and then raised his arm above his head, his elbow cocked at a ninety-degree angle, and threatened Nartey with the scissors. Nartey's contact with the defendant was defensive. He grabbed the defendant's hand in an attempt to get the scissors from him. In the ensuing struggle, Nartey asked the defendant to drop the scissors, but the defendant refused. In these circumstances, the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant intended to injure Nartey with the scissors. Alternatively, the jury could have concluded that the defendant's actions were reckless, and that his recklessness resulted in Nartey's injuries. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Eberhart, 461 Mass. 809, 818 (2012) ("Reckless battery is a wilful, wanton and reckless act which results in personal injury to another" [quotation and citation omitted]). For example, the jury may have decided that it was the defendant's efforts to free himself from Nartey's grasp, in order to proceed with his assault against Sams, that caused the injury. The fact that Nartey initiated the contact is not dispositive. See Commonwealth v. Parker, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 727, 734 (1988) (where defendant placed victim in fear and victim acted in self-defense, defendant could be found guilty of causing the resulting injury); Commonwealth v. Cruzado, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 803, 807 (2009) (upholding conviction of assault and battery by means of dangerous weapon where victim opened car door, then defendant drove away with victim hanging on to door).
The record does not support the Commonwealth's assertion at oral argument that the victim grabbed the defendant's arm, rather than his hand. Tr. II: 46-48.
Contrary to the defendant's arguments, we find nothing improper in the jury instruction on recklessness. As the Commonwealth notes, the judge read the instruction verbatim from the model instruction. That instruction accurately described recklessness. See Commonwealth v. Eberhart, supra at 818 (defining reckless battery as "a wilful, wanton and reckless act which results in personal injury to another" [quotation and citation omitted]).
Finally, the evidence of the defendant's prior bad acts, including the restraining orders, was properly admitted to give context to the relationship between the defendant and Sams, as well as to shed light on whether the defendant had a right to be in the home. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Robbins, 422 Mass. 305, 315 (1996) (factors relevant to defendant's right of entry include existence of legal orders against defendant); Commonwealth v. Butler, 445 Mass. 568, 575-576 (2005) (evidence of abuse admissible to show hostile relationship).
Judgments affirmed.
By the Court (Berry, Green & Blake, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority. --------
Clerk Entered: November 3, 2015.