Opinion
J-S11033-16 No. 1322 EDA 2014
03-24-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. NATHANIEL J. McINTYRE, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 11, 2014 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Criminal Division, No(s): CP-51-CR-0013097-2012 BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:
Nathaniel J. McIntyre ("McIntyre") appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after he was convicted of criminal conspiracy (murder), recklessly endangering another person, and possession of an instrument of crime. We affirm.
See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903, 2705, 907.
In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, the trial court set forth the facts underlying this appeal, which arises out of McIntyre's participation in an attempted robbery that resulted in the shooting of Tevin Adams ("Mr. Adams"). See Trial Court Opinion, 3/3/15, at 1-4. We adopt the trial court's recitation herein by reference. See id.
After McIntyre was apprehended, the Commonwealth charged him with the above-mentioned offenses, as well as attempted murder, aggravated assault, simple assault, and violations of the Uniform Firearms Act (collectively referred to as "the remaining offenses"). The matter proceeded to a non-jury trial, at the close of which the trial court found McIntyre guilty of the above-mentioned offenses, and not guilty of the remaining offenses. On February 11, 2014, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 8½ to 17 years in prison, followed by five years of probation. McIntyre then filed a Motion for reconsideration of sentence, which the trial court denied. McIntyre thereafter timely filed a Notice of Appeal, and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal.
On appeal, McIntyre presents the following question for our review: "Was the evidence insufficient to sustain the verdict of [guilt concerning] conspiracy to commit attempted murder?" Brief for Appellant at 3 (capitalization omitted).
We observe that McIntyre was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, not conspiracy to commit attempted murder, as no such crime exists. See , e.g., Commonwealth v. Kelly , 78 A.3d 1136, 1145 (Pa. Super. 2013) (stating that "[t]he [trial] court plainly misspoke when it stated that [a]ppellant could be guilty of conspiracy to commit attempted murder, since the crime is actually conspiracy to commit murder."); see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906 (providing that a person may not be convicted of more than one of the inchoate crimes).
We apply the following standard of review when considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test,
we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. ... Finally, the finder of fact[,] while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.Commonwealth v. Melvin , 103 A.3d 1, 39-40 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted).
"To establish conspiracy to commit murder, the Commonwealth must show that the defendant, with the specific intent to kill, agreed with one or more persons to commit murder, or agreed to attempt to commit murder, or solicited someone to commit such crime or agreed to aid in the commission, attempt, or solicitation of such crime, and committed an overt act towards the commission of the murder." Commonwealth v. Stokes , 38 A.3d 846, 855 (Pa. Super. 2011) (emphasis added) (citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903, 2502(a)). "Given the surreptitious nature of conspiracy, the existence of a [conspiratorial] agreement is often proven circumstantially, such as by the relations, conduct or circumstances of the parties or overt acts on the part of co-conspirators." Commonwealth v. Jacobs , 39 A.3d 977, 985 (Pa. 2012) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "Even if [a] conspirator did not act as a principal in committing the underlying crime, he is still criminally liable for the actions of his co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy." Commonwealth v. Knox , 50 A.3d 749, 755 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).
McIntyre argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he had the requisite intent for a conviction of conspiracy to commit murder, since "the facts elicited at trial did not show a shared specific intent to kill between [McIntyre] and his co-conspirators." Brief for Appellant at 8; see also id. (asserting that "[i]t was [McIntyre's] co-conspirator Samuel Wallace who shot [Mr. Adams,] and it was [McIntyre's] co-conspirator Corey Thompson who had the shotgun."). McIntyre additionally contends that evidence of a specific intent to kill was lacking because Mr. Adams purportedly "was shot in a non-vital part of his anatomy, from which injuries he was no longer suffering[.]" Id. at 12.
"Th[e Pennsylvania Supreme] Court has held repeatedly that the use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of a human body is sufficient to establish the specific intent to kill. Additionally, the Commonwealth can prove the specific intent to kill from circumstantial evidence." Commonwealth v. Simpson , 754 A.2d 1264, 1269 (Pa. 2000) (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Hall , 701 A.2d 190, 196 (Pa. 1997) (stating that "[s]pecific intent to kill can be proven where the defendant knowingly applies deadly force to the person of another."). Our Supreme Court has held that "[t]he firing of a bullet in the general area in which vital organs are located can in and of itself be sufficient to prove specific intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Padgett , 348 A.2d 87, 88 (Pa. 1975).
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed McIntyre's claim and determined that the evidence was sufficient to support his conspiracy conviction, and to establish specific intent to kill. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/3/15, at 5-7. We agree with the trial court's analysis and conclusion, which is supported by the record and the law, and affirm on this basis with regard to McIntyre's sole issue on appeal. See id.; see also Padgett , 348 A.2d at 88 (holding that "we are not persuaded that it must be shown that the bullet fired from a revolver, a deadly weapon, initially entered a vital organ before the inference of specific intent to kill can arise."); Commonwealth v. Wyche , 467 A.2d 636, 637 (Pa. Super. 1983) (citing Padgett , and holding that "although the fatal [bullet] slug entered the victim through the buttock, the jury could properly infer the specific intent to kill from these circumstances."); Commonwealth v. Cross , 331 A.2d 813, 814-15 (Pa. Super. 1974) (finding specific intent to kill was established where the defendant discharged a firearm at the victim's vehicle, though the victim was not injured).
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 3/24/2016
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