Opinion
18-P-1255
06-04-2019
COMMONWEALTH v. AMANYEH MATRA.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
After a jury trial in 2009, the defendant, Amanyeh Matra, was convicted of, inter alia, possession of a firearm in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). After a subsequent bench trial, the defendant was convicted of being an armed career criminal in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10G (a), based on a 2004 juvenile adjudication of delinquency by reason of armed robbery in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 17. The police report from the armed robbery was introduced as part of an exhibit at the bench trial, and it indicated that the defendant "pulled out a silver knife with a black handle" and "threatened the victim" in order to steal the victim's jacket.
General Laws c. 265, § 17, provides, in pertinent part:
"Whoever, being armed with a dangerous weapon, assaults another and robs, steals or takes from his person money or other property . . . shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of years."
In 2014, a panel of this court affirmed the defendant's convictions and the denial of his motion for new trial. In May 2018, the defendant filed a motion to vacate his armed career criminal sentence, contending that his adjudication of delinquency by reason of armed robbery does not qualify as a predicate offense for a sentencing enhancement. The motion was denied, and the defendant appeals.
The Massachusetts armed career criminal act (ACCA), G. L. c. 269, § 10G, provides a sentencing enhancement for a defendant who "(a) . . . violates the provisions of paragraph (a) . . . of [G. L. c. 269, § 10,]" and was "previously convicted of a violent crime." As relevant here, a violent crime is "any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or possession of a deadly weapon that would be punishable by imprisonment for [over one year] if committed by an adult, that: (i) has as an element the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force or a deadly weapon against the person of another[.]" G. L. c. 140, § 121. See G. L. c. 269, § 10G (e) (defining "violent crime" as having meaning set forth in G. L. c. 140, § 121, for ACCA purposes).
The defendant's delinquency adjudication of armed robbery does not "unambiguously qualif[y]" as an ACCA predicate offense because the armed robbery statute requires only a dangerous weapon, rather than a deadly one. Commonwealth v. Colon, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 8, 15 (2011). See Commonwealth v. Rezendes, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 369, 379 n.12 (2015). Therefore, we "may consult the trial record to determine if the dangerous weapon used in the underlying juvenile offense was also a deadly weapon." Id.
This inquiry remains appropriate under Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), "insofar as the question is whether the weapon used was inherently deadly[, because] [t]he nature of the weapon itself can easily be ascertained from the record without requiring additional fact finding about the use of the weapon." Rezendes, 88 Mass. App. Ct. at 379 n.12.
The defendant's sole contention on appeal is that not every knife is an inherently deadly weapon, such that his commission of armed robbery with a knife cannot be a predicate violent crime for the ACCA enhancement. In this context, whether a weapon is deadly is "a question of law"; therefore, "we conduct an independent review." Id. at 372.
"[F]or the purposes of conviction under G. L. c. 269, § 10G, a deadly weapon is a weapon that is inherently deadly . . . ." Id. at 370. See id. (concluding that juvenile adjudication for assault and battery by means of dangerous weapon with pen did not qualify as ACCA predicate). "'[D]eadly' has both a stronger and narrower meaning than 'dangerous.' 'Deadly' connotes an inevitability of death, or at least a higher certainty of death than does 'dangerous.'" Id. at 373. "The definition of violent crime in [G. L. c. 140,] § 121[,] uses 'deadly weapon' in the general, common-law sense, Commonwealth v. Turner, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 825, 828 n.5 (2003), in which a knife is commonly thought of as a deadly weapon." Commonwealth v. Foreman, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 801, 803 (2005). See id. at 803-804 (reversing order dismissing ACCA indictment where predicate offense was adjudication of delinquency by reason of armed robbery with knife). See also Commonwealth v. Prater, 431 Mass. 86, 96 (2000); Commonwealth v. Reed, 427 Mass. 100, 104 (1998) ("a knife . . . is a deadly weapon"); Commonwealth v. Claudio, 418 Mass. 103, 108 (1994) ("As a general principle, our cases treat those felonies involving the use of a deadly weapon, such as a knife or a loaded gun, as inherently dangerous to human life").
Our interpretation is "consistent with the language of the Federal Armed Career Criminal Act (Federal ACCA), to which our courts have long turned for interpretive guidance," as the Federal ACCA allows sentence enhancements for acts of juvenile delinquency "only where such acts 'involv[e] the use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive device.'" Rezendes, 88 Mass. App. Ct. at 376-377, quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006). "The Federal ACCA does not allow enhancement for all juvenile offenses involving dangerous weapons, but only for a subset of weapons [including knives] that our common law would recognize as deadly." Id. at 377. Our State ACCA "achieves the same result by explicitly using the term 'deadly' instead of listing deadly weapons." Id.
Here, the police report from the defendant's adjudication of delinquency by reason of armed robbery indicated that the defendant was armed with "a silver knife with a black handle" during the incident. This was a deadly weapon within the meaning of § 121. See Prater, 431 Mass. at 96; Claudio, 418 Mass. at 108; Foreman, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 803. Therefore, the defendant's adjudication of delinquency by reason of armed robbery qualified as a predicate offense; the ACCA enhancement was appropriate.
The defendant's observation that some knives, such as a butter knife, are not deadly does not require a different result. The police report in the present case described the knife as having a silver blade with a black handle, and it was used as the weapon designed to intimidate the robbery victim into surrendering his property to the defendant and his accomplice. "A 'dangerous weapon per se' is an instrumentality designed and constructed to produce death or great bodily harm." Commonwealth v. Appleby, 380 Mass. 296, 303 (1980). Though a butter knife is not a deadly weapon, the motion judge could have reasonably inferred (1) that if the defendant had used a butter knife, the police report almost certainly would have said so, and (2) the absence of any description in the police report of the knife, beyond its color, means that the author viewed the knife as what people generally think of as a knife, that is, a sharp blade that can hurt people. The description of the knife that the defendant did use suffices to establish that it was a deadly weapon.
The defendant relies heavily on a footnote in Rezendes which states: "We do not comment on all of the weapons that would be considered inherently deadly except to say that the category clearly includes loaded firearms, certain knives, and explosive devices." 88 Mass. App. Ct. at 380 n.14. The defendant's reliance on this footnote is misplaced. The footnote expressly indicates that the court was not creating an exhaustive list of deadly weapons, as the Federal ACCA does. Id. However, the list the court did provide "clearly" included "certain knives," id., which, the defendant argues, means that only some knives qualify as deadly weapons. We have already addressed this argument in note 4, supra. Moreover, the defendant overlooks the fact that in Rezendes, the predicate offense was committed with a weapon -- a pen -- that was not inherently dangerous, and could only be dangerous as used.
Order entered August 22, 2018, denying postjudgment motion affirmed.
By the Court (Green, C.J., Meade & Singh, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
/s/
Clerk Entered: June 4, 2019.