Opinion
Criminal Docket Nos.: CR18-918/1438
06-26-2020
RE: Commonwealth v. Raymond Martin
Katherine D. Currin, Esq. MORRIS, CRAWFORD & CURRIN, P.C. 101 Northfield Street, Suite B Chesapeake, Virginia 23320 Cynthia D. Collard, Esq. Norfolk Office of the Commonwealth's Attorney 800 East City Hall Avenue Suite 600 Norfolk, Virginia 23510-2719
Katherine D. Currin, Esq.
MORRIS, CRAWFORD & CURRIN, P.C.
101 Northfield Street, Suite B
Chesapeake, Virginia 23320 Cynthia D. Collard, Esq.
Norfolk Office of the
Commonwealth's Attorney
800 East City Hall Avenue
Suite 600
Norfolk, Virginia 23510-2719 Dear Counsel:
This matter was last before the Court on January 10, 2020, for sentencing. On July 9, 2019, Mr. Martin plead guilty to the underlying charges. In a separate set of cases, Mr. Martin was also convicted of two counts of possession with intent to distribute and three counts of probation violation (for two separate files). The possession with intent to distribute cases and the probation violation matters were transferred by agreement of counsel and the other Judge that accepted the plea for those cases.
The Court heard the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and denied it on October 11, 2019. Defense counsel filed a Motion to Reconsider Withdrawal of Guilty Plea. At the January 10th hearing, Defense counsel advised the court that she filed her motion earlier in the week and noticed it had not been scanned into her client's file. Consequently, the Court was not aware of the Motion to Reconsider. Nevertheless, defense counsel provided the Court with a copy of the Motion, argued her Motion and the Commonwealth responded. Thereafter, both parties agreed to provide the Court with the transcript and the discovery materials sent to the defense prior to the guilty plea. The Court took the Motion under advisement.
The Court originally took this matter under advisement with the intent to issue an oral ruling from the bench at the next court date. However, after further contemplation, the Court has decided to issue a written ruling on the Motion to Reconsider Withdrawal of Guilty Plea.
Background
On May 2, 2018, direct indictments were filed against Raymond A. Martin (hereafter referred to as "Martin") for second degree murder, use of firearm in commission of felony, malicious wounding, use of firearm in commission of felony, possession of a firearm by a non-violent convicted felon within the past ten years, and maliciously discharge firearm in an occupied building. On July 5, 2018 direct indictments were filed against Mr. Martin for first degree murder and use of firearm in commission of a felony. The case was set and continued numerous times for various reasons. Mr. Martin's jury trial was then scheduled for July 9, 2019. (Id. ¶ 2.) On July 8, 2019, at the pretrial conference, the Court inquired, "any issues with any witnesses on either side?" (Id. ¶ 3.) The Commonwealth responded, "not that I'm aware of, Your Honor." (Id.) The defense replied "No, Your Honor". On July 9, 2019, Martin entered a guilty plea, pursuant to a plea agreement, to a reduced charge of second-degree murder, one count of use of a firearm in the commission of murder, and one count of malicious wounding with a cap at twenty-five (25) years. (Id. ¶ 5.) The Commonwealth moved to nolle prosequi use of a firearm in commission of malicious wounding and malicious shooting into occupied dwelling. On July 10, 2019, Mr. Martin was summoned to testify on behalf of his codefendant (brother). However, after conferring with his attorney, he decided not to testify. The Commonwealth also made a motion to nolle prosequi the possession of a firearm by a non-violent convicted felon within the past ten years charge against Mr. Martin on that date.
Thereafter, Mr. Martin's counsel indicated that she learned one of the victims, Phillip Timmons ("Timmons"), was unavailable and had ceased cooperation with the Commonwealth for a period of months, including the date of Martin's jury trial. (Id. ¶ 6.)
On August 22, 2019, Martin filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and on October 11, 2019, the Court heard argument on the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and denied the motion. The Court held that Martin pleaded guilty because "there was overwhelming evidence . . . not because Mr. Timmons was subpoenaed and Martin thought he was going to be here." (Tr., Oct. 11, 2019, 36.) Accordingly, the Court concluded that "[Martin] entered his guilty plea knowingly, freely, voluntarily, and intelligently." (Id.) The case was then scheduled for sentencing on January 10, 2020. The week of the new sentencing hearing, Martin filed a Motion to Reconsider Defendant's Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea, specifically seeking a determination as to whether Martin was surprised by Timmons unavailability, whether the guilty plea was entered into inadvisably, and whether Martin had a viable defense at the time of the guilty plea. (Tr., Jan. 10, 2020, 16-17.)
Party Positions
Martin's Position
Martin contends that the guilty plea was made in good faith upon the Commonwealth's representation that there were no witness issues. (Id. ¶ 5.) He asserts that Timmons unavailability and the fact that he had ceased cooperation with the Commonwealth was not disclosed to him. (Id. ¶ 7.) Accordingly, Martin argues that he possessed a fundamental misunderstanding of the evidence against him that lead him to enter a guilty plea where he otherwise would have gone to trial. (Tr., Oct. 11, 2019, 13.) On the same day that Martin plead guilty, his codefendant (brother) chose to proceed with his jury trial and was ultimately acquitted by the jury.
Martin argues that there was a reasonable defense to be presented at trial. (Mot. Withdraw Guilty Plea ¶ 8.) Martin also submitted an affidavit affirming his testimony that on the date of the underlying offense he was confronted by Christopher Allen and Phillip Timmons in a hostile manner. "Both men were armed with firearms and verbalizing that they were going to shoot [him]. [Martin] disarmed Mr. Timmons and returned fire in defense." (Aff.) At the October 11, 2019 hearing on the initial Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea, Martin asserted that his self-defense argument would be supported by all of the listed witnesses except Timmons. (Tr., Oct. 11, 2019, 16.) Martin also asserts that the facts and circumstances surrounding the availability of the witness and the Commonwealth's representation at the pretrial conference provide adequate grounds to withdraw the guilty plea. (Id. at 10-11.) Even though there were other witnesses prepared to testify, Martin argues that their testimony would not have refuted his self-defense claim (Id. at 25.)
Martin seeks reconsideration of the Court's initial denial, and he asks that the record be clear regarding the Court's consideration of whether "he was caught by surprise or whether or not the advice given to him by [counsel] that [Timmons] was anticipated to be there fit into the standard of a plea being entered into inadvisably" or "the specific standard of whether or not [Martin] had a viable defense." (Tr., Jan. 10, 2020, 16-17.)
Commonwealth's Position
The Commonwealth contends that they informed Martin that "all subpoenaed witness were available for trial and advised both the Court and counsel that there were no issues with regard to those subpoenaed witnesses." (Com. Resp. Def. Mot. Withdraw Guilty Plea. ¶ 2)(emphasis added). Furthermore, the Commonwealth asserts that Martin was made aware that there were additional witnesses and DNA evidence placing him at the scene. (Id. ¶ 3.) The upstairs neighbor would testify that she saw Martin and his brother in the parking lot from her window, heard the argument, saw the glint of a weapon, heard gunshots, and identified the defendant from a photo lineup. (Id. ¶ 3 a.) Another eyewitness identified Martin at the scene, saw the discussion escalate, and heard the gunfire. (Id. ¶ 3b.) A cooperating inmate would testify that he and Martin discussed the event and Martin confessed that the argument was over a drug sale. (Id. ¶ 3c.) Another cooperating inmate would testify that Martin sold him the AK-47, the murder weapon. (Id. ¶ 3d.) The Commonwealth also asserts that there was a phone call in which Martin stated he was the sole participant, indicated the weapon had a "couple of bodies on it", and that his codefendant was not present during the altercation. (Tr., Oct. 11, 2019, 25.)
The Commonwealth contends that it was well established that they were prepared to proceed to trial and prove the elements of the crime without Timmons. (Com. Resp. Def. Mot. Withdraw Guilty Plea. ¶ 6.) The Commonwealth investigated Timmons's last known address and discovered that it had been abandoned after a hurricane. The Commonwealth asserts that Martin never inquired into nor investigated Timmons availability, despite being granted funding for a private investigator. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 8.) Moreover, the funds granted for the private investigator were specifically granted to investigate "material witnesses that needed to be interviewed and that some of them may prove hostile to the defense." (Tr. Jan. 10, 2020, 24.) Martin never attempted to contact or subpoena Timmons prior to trial. Instead, Martin assumed that he was a necessary and available witness that the Commonwealth subpoenaed for trial. (Com. Resp. Def. Mot. Withdraw Guilty Plea ¶ 7.)
The Commonwealth asserts that they did not make a false statement or misrepresentation of fact. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 12.) The Commonwealth argues that the Court should not permit Martin to withdraw his plea as it was made knowingly, intelligently, and with a full understanding of its implications. (Id.)
In response to the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commonwealth maintains that there was overwhelming evidence against Martin, apart from Timmons testimony. (Tr., Jan. 10, 2020, 25.) The Commonwealth also argues that Timmons was not the turning point in this case. (Id.) Arguably, Martin's argument would be more valid if Timmons was the sole witness, but there were numerous witnesses that would have testified against Martin. (Id.) In light of the overwhelming evidence against Martin, the Commonwealth argues that his guilty plea was "weighed carefully" and asks the Court to deny the Motion to Reconsider Withdrawal of Guilty Plea.
Analysis
Legal Standard
"Among the constitutional rights waived by a guilty plea are the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one's accusers. . . . [T]he trial court must determine whether a defendant's decision to waive them by pleading guilty 'represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.'" Jones v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 503, 510-11, 513 S.E.2d 431, 435 (1999)(quoting North Carolina. v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970)).
A Circuit Court should only accept a guilty plea after it has determined that the plea is made voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea." Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:8(b).
The Code of Virginia provides that a guilty plea may only be withdrawn, "before sentence is imposed or imposition of a sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice, the court within twenty-one days after entry of a final order may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea." Va. Code § 19.2-296.
"Whether or not an accused should be allowed to withdraw a plea of guilty for the purpose of submitting a not guilty plea is a matter that rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and is to be determined by the facts and circumstances of each case." Jones, 29 Va. App. at 512, 513 S.E.2d at 435. In Parris v. Commonwealth, the seminole case regarding withdrawal of guilty pleas, the Virginia Supreme Court stated generally, "the withdrawal of a plea of guilty should not be denied in any case where it is in the least evident that the ends of justice will be subserved by permitting not guilty to be pleaded in its place." Parris v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 321, 325, 52 S.E.2d 872, 874 (1949). The Court further elaborated that,
[t]he least surprise or influence causing a defendant to plead guilty when he has any defense at all should be sufficient grounds for permitting a change of plea from guilty to not guilty. Leave should ordinarily be given to withdraw a plea of guilty if it was entered by mistake or under a misconception of the nature of the charge; through a misunderstanding as to its effect; through fear, fraud, or official misrepresentation; was made involuntarily for any reason; or even where it was entered inadvisedly, if any reasonable ground is offered for going to the jury.Id. "The Parris standard thus requires the defendant (i) to establish a good faith basis for making the guilty plea and later seeking to withdraw it, and (ii) to proffer evidence of a reasonable basis for contesting guilt" Cobbins v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 28, 34, 668 S.E.2d 816, 819 (2008) (citing Justus, 274 Va. at 155-56, 645 S.E.2d at 289-90).
Where such factors are present, the judge may permit a plea to be withdrawn "whenever by so doing he does not violate any positive rule of law or of established practice. But such a discretion will rarely, if ever, be exercised in aid of an attempt to rely upon a merely dilatory or formal defense." Id. at 325, 52 S.E.2d at 874 (1949). Accordingly, this determination requires "an examination of the circumstances confronting the accused immediately prior to and at the time he pleaded to the charge." Jones, 29 Va. App. at 512, 513 S.E.2d at 435.
The Court has recognized prejudice to the Commonwealth as a prohibiting factor, specifically where a plea agreement is in place and the Commonwealth has performed their half of the agreement. See Thomason v. Commonwealth, 69 Va, App. 89, 95, 815 S.E.2d 816, 818 (2018)(holding that "the pre-sentencing withdrawal of any guilty plea pursuant to Code § 19.2-296 must also consider contract principles and the agreement [Defendant] and the Commonwealth entered into."); Small v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 292, 298-99, 788 S.E.2d 702, 705 (2016)(finding that unreasonable delay is also prejudicial to the Commonwealth). Thus, a defendant must also establish that the Commonwealth will not be substantially prejudiced by withdrawal of a guilty plea. Booker v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 323, 332-33, 734 S.E.2d 729, at 733-34 (2012) (citing, inter alia, Parris and Justus).
Discussion
On July 9, 2019, the Court determined, prior to accepting the plea, that Martin entered the plea knowingly, freely, voluntarily, and intelligently. Additionally, after hearing the oral Stipulation of Facts presented to the Court by the Commonwealth, Martin told the Court "Yes", affirming his understanding that if the case had gone to trial, that would have been the evidence.
On the Motion to Reconsider, Martin seeks to clarify the Court's denial and to clarify the record regarding the Court's consideration of whether "he was caught by surprise or whether or not the advice given to him by [counsel] that [Timmons] was anticipated to be there fit into the standard of a plea being entered into inadvisably" or "the specific standard of whether or not [Martin] had a viable defense." (Tr., Jan. 10, 2020, 16-17.)
A. Martin has not demonstrated a good-faith basis for withdrawal
As a threshold matter, the motion to withdraw the guilty plea must be "duly made in good faith and sustained by proofs." Parris, 189 Va. at 324-35, 52 S.E.2d at 873-74. To that end a guilty plea can be set aside if it was entered into "under an honest mistake of material fact or facts, or if it was induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence and would not otherwise have been made." Id. at 324, 52 S.E.2d at 873. Accordingly, the Court looks to the facts and circumstances surrounding the initial plea and motion to withdraw. Good faith is most clearly lacking where there is evidence to support a finding that the defendant merely "took a look at what the consequences might be after he pled guilty and had buyer's remorse." Branch v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 540, 547 n.6, 729 S.E.2d 777, 781 n.6 (2012).
In this case, Martin does not contend that his plea was the result of any fraud, coercion, or undue influence. Instead, in what amounts to a possible mistake of fact, Martin contends that the initial plea was made in good faith based upon the Commonwealth's representation that there were no issues with witnesses. Further, Martin argues the Commonwealth's failure to disclose the fact that Timmons was unavailable was an unfair surprise that created a fundamental misunderstanding of the evidence against him and states had he known otherwise he would not have entered into the guilty plea. Martin argues that he entered into the guilty plea inadvisably because he and his counsel did not have an accurate understanding of the evidence against him. However, the court notes that on September 25, 2018 Martin's counsel filed a Motion seeking funds to hire a defense Investigator. In that Motion among other things, defense indicated the funds were for "...witnesses potentially material to the defendant's defense that must be identified, located, and interviewed." The defense was granted funds on October 11, 2018, a year prior to the hearing on the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. At one point, the defense also sought a continuance citing receipt of "over 400 pages of discovery in addition to several hours with audio and video footage." The continuance was granted. In requesting the continuance, defense represented it had not yet had adequate time to research "witnesses to subpoena."
Notably, at the October 11, 2019 hearing, Martin conceded that this is not a Brady violation and the Commonwealth did not possess a duty to disclose the fact that Timmons was no longer available. Apart from any underlying duty owed by the Commonwealth, the remaining facts and circumstances surrounding the guilty plea and the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea indicate that Martin lacks the requisite good faith to withdraw the plea. It more accurately appears that Martin is expressing buyer's remorse in light of the exoneration of his codefendant who did not plead guilty. Moreover, the evidence showed when Martin was subpoenaed to testify at his codefendant's trial, that he had not expressed remorse or a desire to withdraw his guilty plea until after Martin had a conversation with his mother the night before concerning what was transpiring at his codefendant's trial. Martin maintains that he formed the intent to withdraw the guilty plea before the jury returned the not-guilty verdict for the codefendant. Accordingly, his counsel asserts that she made this clear to the Commonwealth during the codefendant's trial. Despite the unclear timing in which Martin formed the intent to withdraw the Guilty Plea, Martin fails to provide a credible response for why he never verified his assumption that a witness would be present. Moreover, it is uncontested that Martin was fully aware of the other witnesses and the substance of their testimony against him.
While Martin may have assumed that Timmons would be present, it does not appear that he was caught by surprise, nor did the revelation of Timmons unavailability render his plea inadvisable. As previously stated, the Commonwealth provided over 400 pages of discovery to Mr. Martin that the Court has now reviewed upon agreement of the parties regarding overwhelming evidence that would have been presented at his trial. In light of the discovery information, the misunderstanding surrounding the Commonwealth's statement and Timmons availability could have been avoided. The surprise, if any, surrounding Timmons unavailability at the time of the guilty plea was the product of Martin's failure to exercise due diligence, not of any mishandling on the part of the Commonwealth. The discovery materials submitted by the Commonwealth indicate that had Martin exercised his due diligence he would have discovered the missing subpoena returns and Timmons unavailability. The Court does not find that the Commonwealth's response that there were "no issues" with witnesses meant that Timmons would be there—one way or the other. It simply meant, as far as the Commonwealth was concerned, that they did not have any issues concerning the witnesses the planned to call at trial.
The Commonwealth cites Dean v. Commonwealth, in support of the notion that a defendant is not deprived of any rights associated with the presence of a witness where they fail to exercise their due diligence and subpoena the witness. 30 Va. App. 49, 515 S.E.2d 331 (1999). In Dean, the defendant argued that he was denied a fair trial because the Commonwealth subpoenaed and released a witness without the consent of the defendant. The defendant, however, relied on the Commonwealth and had not subpoenaed the witness for trial. Id. at 56-57. The Court ultimately held that the unavailability of the witness was not due to any action by the Commonwealth. Id. Further, "a defendant cannot claim that he was denied the right to a compulsory process for obtaining witnesses on his behalf where he does not seek to subpoena the witnesses." Id. at 65. In this case, Timmons was subpoenaed but the Commonwealth was unable to find him. Unlike Dean, there were no issues regarding the release of witnesses without the consent of the other party. However, in both cases the defendants relied on the Commonwealth and failed to subpoena the witnesses for themselves. While Dean is factually dissimilar, the underlying logic as it relates to a defendant's responsibility to subpoena witness would apply to this case.
At the October 11, 2019 hearing, Martin's counsel argued that she reviewed the subpoena's issued by the Commonwealth and saw that a subpoena was issued to Timmons. However, she later concedes that there was no return for Timmons' subpoena. (Tr. 5.) Moreover, Martin had the ability to subpoena Timmons himself. In fact, as previously stated, the Court previously granted Martin funds for the pretrial investigation of material witnesses. However, it appears that Martin did not use those funds to ensure Timmons' availability. However, even if it was a misunderstanding surrounding Timmons' availability, it did not render Martin's decision to plead guilty inadvisable. Both parties acknowledge that the Commonwealth was prepared to present a number of witnesses to testify to the facts in this case, effectively making up for Timmons' absence. The Commonwealth made this known to Martin, and he was able to confer with counsel about these witnesses prior to entering his guilty plea.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Martin's claim that he was surprised by Timmons' absence and entered into the plea inadvisably is contrary to the established evidence surrounding the guilty plea and motion to withdraw. Thus, the Court finds that Martin failed to demonstrate a good faith basis for withdrawal.
B. Martin does not assert a Reasonable Defense
In support of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, a defendant must make "a prima facie showing of a reasonable defense." Spencer v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 183, 187, 806 S.E.2d 410, 412 (2017). "The reasonable defense requirement, as interpreted by this Court, "is one based upon a proposition of law, . . . or one supported by credible testimony, supported by affidavit." Thomason, 69 Va. App. at 96. Moreover, Parris depicts the reasonable defense element as a fairly low burden, finding that the element is sufficiently met where the defendant has "any defense at all." Parris, 189 Va. at 325, 52 S.E.2d at 874.
In Justus v. Commonwealth, the defendant was charged with breaking and entering, destruction of property, and malicious wounding. 264 Va. 143, 147, 645 S.E.2d 284, 285. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that "with regard to the malicious wounding charge, the affidavit . . . provided an evidentiary basis for a claim by Justus of self-defense." Id. at 155. As such, the defendant's affidavit demonstrated that she had a reasonable defense sufficient to satisfy the requirements for a Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea. Id.
Here, Martin has provided an affidavit supporting the fact that he would have relied on a self-defense claim had he not pled guilty. The affidavit specifically states that Martin was confronted by Christopher Allen and Phillip Timmons. "Both men were armed with firearms and verbalizing that they were going to shoot [him.] [Martin] disarmed Mr. Timmons, and returned fire in defense."
According to the discovery materials provided to the defense on February 8, 2018, a witness who was given a line-up told an investigator that he really did not want to say, but it was the guy with the blue band Bubba Chuck, [Raymond Martin] - "he was fighting with a guy in the parking lot and shot him."
Another Commonwealth witness gave a statement that it was late and that witness heard a loud argument. They further stated a "mother, or a woman" came out yelling, telling everyone to stop and told somebody to "put the gun in the car." Of note, that particular witness recognized the three men arguing as one guy who lived downstairs and the other two as brothers.
Another Commonwealth witness who gave a statement on August 3, 2017, stated he was in the area with a prostitute and she took him to the Villa Heights neighborhood. He stated there was an argument between two guys. About three minutes later, a car drove up and after that person saw the argument, they replied and started shooting. This particular witness went on to state that it was Martin who was arguing with the man before the shooting.
Additionally, according to the discovery materials provided to the defense, there was a Federal inmate that would have testified that he knows Raymond Martin as Bubba Chuck because he used to purchase drugs from him. He would have testified that "Bubba Chuck" wanted to sell him an AK47 for some cash and drugs, Once the deal was made "Bubba Chuck" told him "don't sell this gun to no body, don't let no body get this gun - this thing got a couple of bodies up there." Mr. Martin told another witness, that he was fighting and the other man was getting the best of him, which is when his brother starting shooting and he took a firearm and shot the man. The evidence found at the scene also supports the theory that Mr. Martin was present for some type of altercation because they also found his broken glasses.
It is not clear whether Mr. Martin would have been able to explain the inconsistencies concerning his self-defense claim. However, it is the Court's belief that no jury would have found Mr. Martin not guilty despite his own proffer that the Commonwealth witnesses supported his version of the events that evening. His Affidavit falls short and/or ignores the proffered testimony of some of the Commonwealth witnesses who were present at the scene and gave a different account of the events.
C. Martin's withdrawal would prejudice the Commonwealth
The question of prejudice against the Commonwealth is one of fairness rather than economics or efficiency. We have stated that prejudice sufficient to prevent withdrawal of a guilty plea "may exist where the record reflects that the Commonwealth has partially or fully fulfilled its obligations in a plea agreement by dismissing or amending charges or where the record supports a factual finding by the trial court that the purpose of the motion is merely to cause undue delay in the administration of justice or demonstrates other bad faith or misconduct by or on behalf of the defendant."Thomason 69 Va. App. at 97 (quoting Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 200 n.4, 725 S.E.2d 163, 168 n.4 (2012).
Although neither party addresses the possibility of prejudice to the Commonwealth, it is well-established under the relevant precedent. As a matter of law, the Court's consideration of potential prejudice is a modern extension of the Parris progeny. The issue of potential prejudice is particularly relevant where the defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. While cases like Parris and Justus outline the appropriate standard for a defendant to withdraw their guilty plea, neither of those cases dealt with a plea agreement like the one in this case. Thomason and Simmons, however, extend the Parris standard to cases that incorporate plea agreements.
Pursuant to the plea agreement, Martin plead guilty to second degree murder, use of a firearm in the commission of a murder, and malicious wounding for a crime that took place in 2016. In exchange, the Commonwealth agreed that the Court should sentence the defendant after consideration of a PSR and Victim Impact Statement. They also agreed to a cap for any active incarceration at twenty-five years and to nolle prosequi the use of a firearm in commission of a malicious wounding and malicious discharge firearm in an occupied dwelling charges. The Commonwealth also moved to nolle prosequi the last remaining charge of possession of a firearm by a non-violent felon within the past 10 years.
At this juncture, the Commonwealth has fulfilled all of its obligations outlined in the plea agreement by dismissing the remaining charges in the indictment. A withdrawal of Mr. Martin's guilty plea, would prejudice the Commonwealth and undermine the underlying contract principles involved in the establishment of the plea agreement with regard to a murder that occurred in 2016.
Conclusion
The Court finds that (1) Mr. Martin's Motion to Withdraw his guilty plea is not in good faith and he did not enter his guilty plea inadvisably; (2) Mr. Martin did not present a viable defense wherein a jury would find him not guilty; and (3) withdrawal of the guilty plea would substantially prejudice the Commonwealth, who has already performed their half of the plea agreement.
Therefore, for the reasons stated herein and on the record previously, the Court DENIES Martin's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea. The Court has attached hereto a copy of its Order with regard to this ruling that has been sent to the Clerk's Office for filing.
It is my understanding as a result of COVID-19 scheduling, as well as scheduling conflicts with defense counsel in other jurisdictions, this matter is now scheduled for sentencing on October 2, 2020, at 11:00 a.m.
Sincerely,
/s/
Michelle J. Atkins
Judge MJA/wmp
Enclosure